《国外马克思主义 Western Marxism》阅读文献与材料：Professor Andrew Feenberg's book（new）

2 utilitarian arguments for revolution, a vaguely utilitarian concern for human The demands of reason happiness constitutes the moral aura of most Marxist discourse. Marxists add to Lockes critique of political relations a parallel critique of property rela Deontological Grounds for Revolution tions, both of which, in their view, should be instrumental to"the good of The ambition of philosophy of praxis is to link the fulfillment of what mankind. Locke's main point is conserved: society, as a common creation Marx called the"demands of reason"to revolutionary political goals. The f human beings, should serve their interests and not the contrary establishment of this link implies that revolution can be rationally justified Socialism undoubtedly originated in some such sense of revolution as a and that the practice of a rational life includes revolutionary political action. legitimate collective means to happiness. But this is not enough for Marx to These are in fact fundamental conclusions of the early Marx and Lukacs. In justify revolution. Kant shows that a rational being has higher interests than his early works Marx develops a metacritique of political philosophy and those discovered through a utilitarian calculus, including duties of obedience derives a rationale for revolution from it. In History and Class Conscious- to the state regardless of"material"consequences. By conceptualizing this ness, Lukacs constructs a metacritique of classical German philosophy from higher"sphere of duty in terms of a dialectical theory of individuation and which he too derives a rationale for revolution. This chapter is primarily mutual recognition, Hegel succeeds in basing similar conclusions on a far concerned with Marx's early justification of revolution, while a later one will more sophisticated social theory. Thus in Kant and Hegel philosophy takes a ke up lukacs related argument conservative turn, denying the pertinence of the utilitarian grounds for By way of introduction, it will be helpful to consider the traditional revolution put forth in theories such as Locke's. lea of the right of revolution. Of course throughout most of its history Marx revives revolutionary theory not by a"regression" to utilitarian- litical philosophy has been more concerned with rational grounds for ism,but rather by developing a new deontological ground for revolution obedience to government than with the right of revolution In modern times based on the intrinsic nature of rationality. Deontological grounds for obedience has been justified by reference to functions performed by the state revolution flow from the demand for rational political action, independent that benefit the individuals. However, the expectation of a fair return for of the use to be made of the freedom won by that action, whether it be the obedience may be disappointed. Then, when the state fails to fulfill its pursuit of happiness, morality, or any other end. Rousseau is the chief earlier function, grounds for obedience become grounds for revolution. Similarly, representative of this position. For him freedom, as the actual exercise of most justifications of revolution imply a theory of obligation to a legitimate self-determining rationality, is an end in itself. state. This dialectic of obedience and revolt is not a sign of inconsistency i The difference between teleological and deontological grounds for revo- litical philosophy, but on the contrary results from its consistent com- n is especially clear in Locke and Rousseau's discussions of s mitment to rationality in a world of contingencies. These observations are are against it, of course, but for very different reasons. Locke argues that confirmed by the early theories of Marx and Lukacs. In both cases conserva is illegitimate because"this freedom from tive political doctrines, subjected to a metacritique, are transformed into so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot their revolutionary opposites precisely in the name of reason. part with it but by which forfeits his preservation and life together. Rous- We can gauge their originality by comparison with earlier political the- seau,on the contrary, makes no appeal to the right to life but claims that ory. The classic ground for revolution, formulated for example by Locke, is moral self-responsibility is incompatible with slavery. He argues that"when teleological or utilitarian in character. Locke believes that"the end of gov- man renounces his liberty he renounces his essential manhood, ernment is the good of mankind. Although Marxists only rarely offer his duty as a human atible with man's

23 Chapter 2 24 Chapter 2 The Demands of Reason Deontological Grounds for Revolution The ambition of philosophy of praxis is to link the fulfillment of what Marx called the “demands of reason” to revolutionary political goals. The establishment of this link implies that revolution can be rationally justified and that the practice of a rational life includes revolutionary political action. These are in fact fundamental conclusions of the early Marx and Lukács. In his early works Marx develops a metacritique of political philosophy and derives a rationale for revolution from it. In History and Class Conscious￾ness, Lukács constructs a metacritique of classical German philosophy from which he too derives a rationale for revolution. This chapter is primarily concerned with Marx’s early justification of revolution, while a later one will take up Lukács’ related argument. By way of introduction, it will be helpful to consider the traditional idea of the right of revolution. Of course throughout most of its history political philosophy has been more concerned with rational grounds for obedience to government than with the right of revolution. In modern times obedience has been justified by reference to functions performed by the state that benefit the individuals. However, the expectation of a fair return for obedience may be disappointed. Then, when the state fails to fulfill its function, grounds for obedience become grounds for revolution. Similarly, most justifications of revolution imply a theory of obligation to a legitimate state. This dialectic of obedience and revolt is not a sign of inconsistency in political philosophy, but on the contrary results from its consistent com￾mitment to rationality in a world of contingencies. These observations are confirmed by the early theories of Marx and Lukács. In both cases conserva￾tive political doctrines, subjected to a metacritique, are transformed into their revolutionary opposites precisely in the name of reason. We can gauge their originality by comparison with earlier political the￾ory. The classic ground for revolution, formulated for example by Locke, is teleological or utilitarian in character. Locke believes that “the end of gov￾ernment is the good of mankind.” 1 Although Marxists only rarely offer utilitarian arguments for revolution, a vaguely utilitarian concern for human happiness constitutes the moral aura of most Marxist discourse. Marxists add to Locke’s critique of political relations a parallel critique of property rela￾tions, both of which, in their view, should be instrumental to “the good of mankind.” Locke’s main point is conserved: society, as a common creation of human beings, should serve their interests and not the contrary. Socialism undoubtedly originated in some such sense of revolution as a legitimate collective means to happiness. But this is not enough for Marx to justify revolution. Kant shows that a rational being has higher interests than those discovered through a utilitarian calculus, including duties of obedience to the state regardless of “material” consequences. By conceptualizing this “higher” sphere of duty in terms of a dialectical theory of individuation and mutual recognition, Hegel succeeds in basing similar conclusions on a far more sophisticated social theory. Thus in Kant and Hegel philosophy takes a conservative turn, denying the pertinence of the utilitarian grounds for revolution put forth in theories such as Locke’s. Marx revives revolutionary theory not by a “regression” to utilitarian￾ism, but rather by developing a new deontological ground for revolution based on the intrinsic nature of rationality. Deontological grounds for revolution flow from the demand for rational political action, independent of the use to be made of the freedom won by that action, whether it be the pursuit of happiness, morality, or any other end. Rousseau is the chief earlier representative of this position. For him freedom, as the actual exercise of self-determining rationality, is an end in itself. The difference between teleological and deontological grounds for revo￾lution is especially clear in Locke and Rousseau’s discussions of slavery. Both are against it, of course, but for very different reasons. Locke argues that slavery is illegitimate because “this freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it but by which forfeits his preservation and life together.”2 Rous￾seau, on the contrary, makes no appeal to the right to life, but claims that moral self-responsibility is incompatible with slavery. He argues that “when a man renounces his liberty he renounces his essential manhood, his rights, and even his duty as a human being. . . .It is incompatible with man’s

nature,and to deprive him of his free will is to deprive his actions of all fact realized, that it continues to produce "demands"transcendent to the oral sanction.”3 given state of affairs, that revolution is therefore still a rational ac Deontological grounds for revolution are usually explained as Rousseau But after Kant and Hegel, it is impossible to renew revolutionary theory does here, by reference to an absolute value placed on human dignity, the by returning to the speculative methods of a Rousseau. Kant's argumen right of each individual to determine himself freely and to secure respectful against revolution is based precisely on the implicit grounds for obedience treatment from others. Where political conditions prevent this they ought to government contained in Rousseau's revolutionary theory. This theory itself be overthrown. Here we pass from the mere righr of revolution, which flows must therefore be submitted to a radical critique in order to discover how fr with human hap obligation to revolution political philosophy had been reconciled-prematurely-with an unjust name of dignity and freedom. This is very much the sort of problem that society, and to find in it elements that can be reformulated to again ground a reoccupies the young Marx. He writes in one early essay: To be radical is revolutionary struggle this society. The core of this effort consists in to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself.. The overcoming the antinomy of reason and need Marx identifies as constitutive criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being being of the entire tradition of political philosophy. Marx subjects these for man. It ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all to a radical revision in the course of which he develops his metacritical those conditions in which man is an abased. enslaved, abandoned. con- approach. mptible being... For the young Marx, a revolution"a la hauteur des Marx's me principes"'is a revolution for freedom and dignity. 5 struction of the ritique of political philosophy is based on a specific con- lation between reason and need that derives largely from a Basic to this theory of revolution is the idea that the rational subject is Kantian interpretation of Rousseau. This limits the bearing of Marxs ot fulfilled merely in thought, nor even in private morality, but also re analysis, which simply assumes that the essence of the whole tradition is quires a sphere of public activity. But where rationality must be deployed, revealed in what is presumably its highest stage. Nevertheless, the analysis is there freedom too is necessary, for Freedom is the 'formal element' of at least an interesting hypothesis about political philosophy in general form be. "6 Thus for Marx. as for furthermore, Marx's approach is sociologically justified because it is the Rousseau. revolution is a condition for the full exercise of doctrine of Rousseau-Kant that underlies the democratic ideology of the comparable with Cartesian doubt or the Enlightenment struggle again French Revolution as understood by later German liberalism. superstition as an attack on contingent obstacles to rationality and as a Marx assumes with Rousseau and Kant that freedom is not whim but methodological preliminary to the flowering of humankinds highest faculty. obedience to self-given law. "g With them he also assumes that the rules of farx's concern with the problems of revolutionary rationality is formu conduct cannot be derived from happiness as an end, but flow from the lated explicitly in some of his earliest writings. He tries to show that revolu oncept of autonomy: the rational individual owes it to himself to maintain tion can satisfy "the demands of reason, "that through it reason, or philoso. his independence from both his own needs and the power of other men. phy, can be "realized" in social reality. 7 This terminology is of cou Happiness is not, however, a matter of indifference for Rousseau, nor even Hegelian. It was Hegel who first proposed to show that reason was realized, for Kant. In Rousseau, for example, freedom is essentially the right and the hat the contradiction between the rational concept of the state and its power to do what is in one s own interests as a member of the community historical reality had finally been overcome. This philosophical tour de force Freedom is a value in itself, but it is also bound up with the pursuit was intended to lay the revolution to rest, to deprive it of the halo of ration- collective self-interest in the higher sphere of politics ality with which the Enlightenment had surrounded it. Starting from such It has been argued that in Kant too right conduct establishes general premises. Marx's task is laid out for him: to demonstrate that reason is nor in forms of soci ial interaction that maximize the freedom of each individual to Chapter

25 Chapter 2 26 nature, and to deprive him of his free will is to deprive his actions of all moral sanction.”3 Deontological grounds for revolution are usually explained as Rousseau does here, by reference to an absolute value placed on human dignity, the right of each individual to determine himself freely and to secure respectful treatment from others. Where political conditions prevent this they ought to be overthrown. Here we pass from the mere right of revolution, which flows from a concern with human happiness, to an obligation to revolution in the name of dignity and freedom. This is very much the sort of problem that preoccupies the young Marx. He writes in one early essay: “To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself. . . .The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being for man. It ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, con￾temptible being. . .”4 For the young Marx, a revolution “à la hauteur des principes” is a revolution for freedom and dignity.5 Basic to this theory of revolution is the idea that the rational subject is not fulfilled merely in thought, nor even in private morality, but also re￾quires a sphere of public activity. But where rationality must be deployed, there freedom too is necessary, for “Freedom is the ‘formal element’ of rationality, the only form in which reason can be.”6 Thus for Marx, as for Rousseau, revolution is a condition for the full exercise of reason. It is comparable with Cartesian doubt or the Enlightenment struggle against superstition as an attack on contingent obstacles to rationality and as a methodological preliminary to the flowering of humankind’s highest faculty. Marx’s concern with the problems of revolutionary rationality is formu￾lated explicitly in some of his earliest writings. He tries to show that revolu￾tion can satisfy “the demands of reason,” that through it reason, or philoso￾phy, can be “realized” in social reality. 7 This terminology is of course Hegelian. It was Hegel who first proposed to show that reason was realized, that the contradiction between the rational concept of the state and its historical reality had finally been overcome. This philosophical tour de force was intended to lay the revolution to rest, to deprive it of the halo of ration￾ality with which the Enlightenment had surrounded it. Starting from such premises, Marx’s task is laid out for him: to demonstrate that reason is not in fact realized, that it continues to produce “demands” transcendent to the given state of affairs, that revolution is therefore still a rational act. But after Kant and Hegel, it is impossible to renew revolutionary theory by returning to the speculative methods of a Rousseau. Kant’s argument against revolution is based precisely on the implicit grounds for obedience to government contained in Rousseau’s revolutionary theory. This theory itself must therefore be submitted to a radical critique in order to discover how political philosophy had been reconciled—prematurely—with an unjust society, and to find in it elements that can be reformulated to again ground a revolutionary struggle against this society. The core of this effort consists in overcoming the antinomy of reason and need Marx identifies as constitutive of the entire tradition of political philosophy. Marx subjects these concepts to a radical revision in the course of which he develops his metacritical approach. Marx’s metacritique of political philosophy is based on a specific con￾struction of the relation between reason and need that derives largely from a Kantian interpretation of Rousseau. This limits the bearing of Marx’s analysis, which simply assumes that the essence of the whole tradition is revealed in what is presumably its highest stage. Nevertheless, the analysis is at least an interesting hypothesis about political philosophy in general; furthermore, Marx’s approach is sociologically justified because it is the doctrine of Rousseau-Kant that underlies the democratic ideology of the French Revolution as understood by later German liberalism. Marx assumes with Rousseau and Kant that freedom is not whim but “obedience to self-given law.”8 With them he also assumes that the rules of conduct cannot be derived from happiness as an end, but flow from the concept of autonomy: the rational individual owes it to himself to maintain his independence from both his own needs and the power of other men. Happiness is not, however, a matter of indifference for Rousseau, nor even for Kant. In Rousseau, for example, freedom is essentially the right and the power to do what is in one’s own interests as a member of the community. Freedom is a value in itself, but it is also bound up with the pursuit of collective self-interest in the higher sphere of politics. It has been argued that in Kant too right conduct establishes general forms of social interaction that maximize the freedom of each individual to

follow his merely "natural"end, which is happiness. Kant does not so much The antinomy of Reason and Need reject the pursuit of happiness as reduce it to an "anthropological"or em Marx's essay"On the Jewish Question" is an attempt to explain the ical consideration, thereby clearly delineating the boundaries between contradiction between the ideal democratic state and the facts of capitalist deontological and utilitarian grounds for political action. The basis of this social life as it appears in Rousseau and the French Revolution, filtered hilosophical distinction is the praxeological one between ethics and eco- through Kant and Hegel. This contradiction results from the split between nomics. In the ethical form of action, the behavior of all subjects is intrinsi- moral-political rationality (the basis of the state) and utilitarian- cally compatible, while economic behavior is conflictual and competitive anthropological goals(the basis of the economy). Marx argues that this split Ethical action achieves harmony through conformity to a universal rule. It is reflected in the distinction between"man" and"citizen"in French revolu- n thus be called"rational. The pursuit of material welfare is mere"con- tionary theory, which corresponds with the distinction between civil society, tent "of experience, determined by nature and therefore contingent. It is the sphere of private ac nd the state, the sphere of cooperative activity ompatible in principle with ethical behavior but subordinate to it by right. The state accumulates all the functions of rationality: consciousness, re- Marx argues that this construction of the relation of reason and need flexivity, morality, universality, and"species-life, "this last being a term splits the ideal of freedom from the actual motives freedom serves. This split derived from Feuerbach which signifies the consciously social and coopera- undercuts the protest against poverty in a formally "rational " society, reduc tive nature of man. The merely empirical functions of natural human ing such protest to a marginal concern of merely empirical interest. Life existence are then consigned to the sphere of civil society where the individ- becomes, in fact, a means to rationality in a topsy IsIon likely to ual lives his"real" life, as opposed to his ideal life as a rational citizen in the satisfy only those for whom the means of life are assured. What is required state. In civil society the egoism of private individuals creates a competitive reformulation of political theory to establish the intrinsic rationality and hell. Human action does not achieve rational universality there, but is rather universality of the pursuit of happiness and the satisfaction of the needs on mere nature. Marx writes: which happiness depends. The perfect political state is, by its nature, the species life of man as op- Marx worked out this program in three stages, to which corresp posed to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life three important early works. In the first part of the essay "On the Jewish continue to exist in civil society outside the political sphere, as qualities Question" he attacks the problem of need, in order to show that the con- of civil society. Where the political state has attained to its full devel flictual form of action associated with it is not natural and necessary, but opment, man leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but in real- historical and therefore subject to revolutionary change. This essay culmi- ty, in life, a double existence-celestial and terrestrial. He lives in the oncept of need. The second stage of the aa patible with the nates in a new formulation of the concept of freedom con political community, where he acts simply as a private individual,treats other men as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means and in the“ Introduction” to the“ Contribution to the c becomes the pla Philosophy of Right. "There Marx"deduces"the political and social condi tions for a realization of his new concept of freedom. This text identifies the the In presenting the problem in this manner, Marx is not simply criticizing goism of bourgeois society. There is that, but more important is the fact proletariat as the agent of a revolution that will abolish philosophy in realiz- th life" is decisively linked to reason in the concept of the ing it. The last stage is reached in the Economic and Philosophical Manu- Rationality in the political domain is exemplified by the cooperative aspect of 1844. There Marx follows the thread back to its beginning in of human nature, which takes refuge in the state once it has been driven of reason, which he now sets out to revise from competitive civil society. As Marx put it in a letter to Ruge: Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form . . As far as actual life 27 Chapter 2

27 Chapter 2 28 follow his merely “natural” end, which is happiness. Kant does not so much reject the pursuit of happiness as reduce it to an “anthropological” or em￾pirical consideration, thereby clearly delineating the boundaries between deontological and utilitarian grounds for political action.9 The basis of this philosophical distinction is the praxeological one between ethics and eco￾nomics. In the ethical form of action, the behavior of all subjects is intrinsi￾cally compatible, while economic behavior is conflictual and competitive. Ethical action achieves harmony through conformity to a universal rule. It can thus be called “rational.” The pursuit of material welfare is mere “con￾tent” of experience, determined by nature and therefore contingent. It is compatible in principle with ethical behavior but subordinate to it by right. Marx argues that this construction of the relation of reason and need splits the ideal of freedom from the actual motives freedom serves. This split undercuts the protest against poverty in a formally “rational” society, reduc￾ing such protest to a marginal concern of merely empirical interest. Life becomes, in fact, a means to rationality in a topsy turvy vision likely to satisfy only those for whom the means of life are assured. What is required is a reformulation of political theory to establish the intrinsic rationality and universality of the pursuit of happiness and the satisfaction of the needs on which happiness depends. Marx worked out this program in three stages, to which correspond three important early works. In the first part of the essay “On the Jewish Question” he attacks the problem of need, in order to show that the con￾flictual form of action associated with it is not natural and necessary, but historical and therefore subject to revolutionary change. This essay culmi￾nates in a new formulation of the concept of freedom compatible with the revision of the concept of need. The second stage of the analysis is developed in the “Introduction” to the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.” There Marx “deduces” the political and social condi￾tions for a realization of his new concept of freedom. This text identifies the proletariat as the agent of a revolution that will abolish philosophy in realiz￾ing it. The last stage is reached in the Economic and Philosophical Manu￾scripts of 1844. There Marx follows the thread back to its beginning in the concept of reason, which he now sets out to revise. The Antinomy of Reason and Need Marx’s essay “On the Jewish Question” is an attempt to explain the contradiction between the ideal democratic state and the facts of capitalist social life as it appears in Rousseau and the French Revolution, filtered through Kant and Hegel.. This contradiction results from the split between moral-political rationality (the basis of the state) and utilitarian￾anthropological goals (the basis of the economy). Marx argues that this split is reflected in the distinction between “man” and “citizen” in French revolu￾tionary theory, which corresponds with the distinction between civil society, the sphere of private activity, and the state, the sphere of cooperative activity. The state accumulates all the functions of rationality: consciousness, re￾flexivity, morality, universality, and “species-life,” this last being a term derived from Feuerbach which signifies the consciously social and coopera￾tive nature of man. The merely empirical functions of natural human existence are then consigned to the sphere of civil society where the individ￾ual lives his “real” life, as opposed to his ideal life as a rational citizen in the state. In civil society the egoism of private individuals creates a competitive hell. Human action does not achieve rational universality there, but is rather mere nature. Marx writes: The perfect political state is, by its nature, the species life of man as op￾posed to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the political sphere, as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained to its full devel￾opment, man leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but in real￾ity, in life, a double existence—celestial and terrestrial. He lives in the political community, where he acts simply as a private individual, treats other men as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means and becomes the plaything of alien powers.10 In presenting the problem in this manner, Marx is not simply criticizing the egoism of bourgeois society. There is that, but more important is the fact that “species life” is decisively linked to reason in the concept of the state. Rationality in the political domain is exemplified by the cooperative aspect of human nature, which takes refuge in the state once it has been driven from competitive civil society. As Marx put it in a letter to Ruge: “Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. . . . As far as actual life

is concerned, the political state especially contains in all its modern forms reflects a split in human nature, inevitable in capitalist society, between its he demands of reason, even where the political state is not yet of empirical content and its rational essence. The empirical man of civil sociery ocialistic demands "1 The task now is to criticize the "irrational is the really existing human being, an egoistic individual standing in perpet- ntradictory form in which reason exists in the modern state and to explain ual contradiction with its own rational duty as citizen. But only through the why it has been confined to this limited domain while actual life persists as a citizen can the man exist, that is, can the individual freely pursue private natural residue in civil society interests under the protection of the state. Meanwhile, the ideal citiz Marx seeks a solution through a critique of the limits of the concept of rational political animal, manifests the essence of what it is to be human. Ye political revolution, which is still equivalent for him with the French Revo- the citizen is there only to protect and defend the rights of egoistic lution. Political revolution aims to maximize individual freedom in private Existence and essence require each other and also stand in contradiction. life while accepting uncritically its basis as received from the ancien regime Marx says, "Man as he really is, is seen only in the form of egoistic man, and your Private property, which it aims to purify of feudal restrictions."This man in his true nature only in the form of abstract citizen. revolution, "Marx says, "regards civil sociery, the sphere of human needs Political revolution founders on this antinomy. It confines itself to lib- labour, private interests and civil law, as the basis of its own existence, as a erating a pregiven"nature"characterized by irrational private competition. self-subsistent pre-condition, and thus as its natural basis. 2 In contrast to this nature reason has a bare "artificial"existence as an"alle. Civil society appears essentially as a sphere of"nature" because it lacks gorical, moral person"in the citizen. Most abstractly formulated, the the most important determinations of rationality, reflexivity, necessiry, and dilemma is an example of the fundamental antinomy of form and content: universality. On the one hand, the political revolution does not conceive of rational form here presides over empirical content not by mediating it an civil society as a historical result, as the outcome of a process of mediation, raising ir to rationa/ universality, bur by leaving it be in its given irrationa/ hence as a self-reflected and self-developed sphere of reason. Instead, it is condition. seen as the product of the unmediated natural inclinations of the egoistic At this very abstract level, Marx's critique of formal democracy is struc- individuals. These egoistic individuals are simply received by the revolution turally similar to Lukacs' critique of Kantian ethics. In Lukacs terms, the he passive, given result of the dissolution of society [of the ancien antinomy of reason and need is an example of the more general antinomy of 'gimel, an object of direct apprehension and consequently a natural ob- alue and fact, of"ought"and"is", that arises from the formalistic concept of reason. This concept of reason is based on the acceptance of "immediacy, On the other hand, as a"natural"man, the merely given product that is to say, on the failure to discover in the given facts those potentialities tinct and need, the egoistic individual of bourgeois society is plunged into and tendencies embodying rationality and driving toward a rational end. bellum omnium contra omnes. The activity of this egoistic individu Instead, the given is defined as indifferent to reason and value, as the merely consists in competitive struggle. Its form is merely particular and falls under empirical, factical residue of the process of formal abstraction in which the no universal law. Marx claims that the contradiction between reason and concept of reason is constructed. As Lukacs puts it, "Precisely in the pure, need, the one mediated, necessary and universal, the other empirically given, classical expression it received in the philosophy of Kant it remains true that ontingent and particular, cannot be resolved on the ground of capitali the ought' presupposes an existing reality to which the category of ought emains inapplicable in principle. "16 This is the dilemma of bourgeois larx goes on to show that the bourgeois split in the individual between democracy as Marx explains it: political rationality presupposes as its mate n and citizen is a rial substratum an irrational social existence which does not conform to opposite requires the other for its existence. The polarity of cItzen 29 Chapter 2

29 Chapter 2 30 is concerned, the political state especially contains in all its modern forms the demands of reason, even where the political state is not yet conscious of socialistic demands.” 11 The task now is to criticize the “irrational” and contradictory form in which reason exists in the modern state and to explain why it has been confined to this limited domain while actual life persists as a natural residue in civil society. Marx seeks a solution through a critique of the limits of the concept of political revolution, which is still equivalent for him with the French Revo￾lution. Political revolution aims to maximize individual freedom in private life while accepting uncritically its basis as received from the ancien regime, namely private property, which it aims to purify of feudal restrictions. “This revolution,” Marx says, “regards civil society, the sphere of human needs, labour, private interests and civil law, as the basis of its own existence, as a self-subsistent pre-condition, and thus as its natural basis.”12 Civil society appears essentially as a sphere of “nature” because it lacks the most important determinations of rationality, reflexivity, necessity, and universality. On the one hand, the political revolution does not conceive of civil society as a historical result, as the outcome of a process of mediation, hence as a self-reflected and self-developed sphere of reason. Instead, it is seen as the product of the unmediated natural inclinations of the egoistic individuals. These egoistic individuals are simply received by the revolution as “the passive, given result of the dissolution of society [of the ancien régime], an object of direct apprehension and consequently a natural ob￾ject.”13 On the other hand, as a “natural” man, the merely given product of in￾stinct and need, the egoistic individual of bourgeois society is plunged into a bellum omnium contra omnes. The activity of this egoistic individual consists in competitive struggle. Its form is merely particular and falls under no universal law. Marx claims that the contradiction between reason and need, the one mediated, necessary and universal, the other empirically given, contingent and particular, cannot be resolved on the ground of capitalist society. Marx goes on to show that the bourgeois split in the individual between need and reason, man and citizen is a dialectical one in which each polar opposite requires the other for its existence. The polarity of man and citizen reflects a split in human nature, inevitable in capitalist society, between its empirical content and its rational essence. The empirical man of civil society is the really existing human being, an egoistic individual standing in perpet￾ual contradiction with its own rational duty as citizen. But only through the citizen can the man exist, that is, can the individual freely pursue private interests under the protection of the state. Meanwhile, the ideal citizen, as a rational political animal, manifests the essence of what it is to be human. Yet the citizen is there only to protect and defend the rights of egoistic man. Existence and essence require each other and also stand in contradiction. Marx says, “Man as he really is, is seen only in the form of egoistic man, and man in his true nature only in the form of abstract citizen.”14 Political revolution founders on this antinomy. It confines itself to lib￾erating a pregiven “nature” characterized by irrational private competition. In contrast to this nature, reason has a bare “artificial” existence as an “alle￾gorical, moral person” in the citizen. 15 Most abstractly formulated, the dilemma is an example of the fundamental antinomy of form and content: rational form here presides over empirical content not by mediating it and raising it to rational universality, but by leaving it be in its given irrational condition. At this very abstract level, Marx’s critique of formal democracy is struc￾turally similar to Lukács’ critique of Kantian ethics. In Lukács’ terms, the antinomy of reason and need is an example of the more general antinomy of value and fact, of “ought” and “is”, that arises from the formalistic concept of reason. This concept of reason is based on the acceptance of “immediacy,” that is to say, on the failure to discover in the given facts those potentialities and tendencies embodying rationality and driving toward a rational end. Instead, the given is defined as indifferent to reason and value, as the merely empirical, factical residue of the process of formal abstraction in which the concept of reason is constructed. As Lukács puts it, “Precisely in the pure, classical expression it received in the philosophy of Kant it remains true that the ‘ought’ presupposes an existing reality to which the category of ‘ought’ remains inapplicable in principle.” 16 This is the dilemma of bourgeois democracy as Marx explains it: political rationality presupposes as its mate￾rial substratum an irrational social existence which does not conform to rational principles

Marx and Lukacs arrive at similar solutions to the problem they have emancipation will only be complete when the real individual identified. For Marx, it is necessary to transform civil society into a sphere of an has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen: when as an individ- rational interaction. But paradoxically this is not a political goal. Marx was al man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he aware of the Hegelian critique of Jacobin voluntarism and quite self- has become a species-being; and when he has recognized and organized consciously worked toward a non-voluntaristic formulation of revolutionary his own powers(forces propres) as social powers so that he no longer theory. Marx believed political revolution to be through and through tied to separates this social power from himself as political power. 20 class society because in it moral principles contrary to the interests of the This condition for the fulfillment of the " demands of reason"is contained individuals must be imposed by the state on a separate civil society of privat already in abstract form in the modern state. It is the new basis for deontological owners. A revolution to abolish class society and private property would only grounds for revolution and for the realization of philosophy eproduce these evils were it to attempt to impose morality in opposition to In sum, Marx has shown that political philosophy accepts the irrational the perceived interests of the individuals. Rather, a social revolution against form of the pursuit of happiness(civil society) as a natural fact, and so the very principle of class would necessarily have to be rooted in thei applies the demands of reason only to the state. These demands concern the this condition would it overcome and civil society, reason and need. opposites such as individual and society, private interest and common god Marx writes, "The political revolution dissolves civil sociery into its el- and all the similar displacements of the ly of content and form in the ements [egoistic individuals] without revolutionizing these elements them- political domain. Marx demonstrates that community cannot be realized in elves or subjecting them to criticism. "IN What is required is precisely the the state so long as it rules a civil society based on a conflictual form of revolutionizing"of private and individual existence so that it too conforms action. To fulfill the demands of reason it will be necessary to also realize with the demands of reason. The content of free activiry must no longer them in civil society. To accomplish this, in turn, it is necessary to overcome stand in contradiction with freedom itself. In the more abstract terms of what Lukacs calls the "immediacy"of the sphere of need, its philosophically ukas, this solution"consists in annulling [aufzuheben] that indifference of naturalized form. This Marx succeeds in doing with the concept of a social form toward content,. which is the basis of reified rationality. 19 revolution that changes not just the state, but that also " revolu At this point Marx derives what might be called a new"concept tioniz[es] . the elements themselves. Community can be realized at all griff of free society from the Aufhebung of the contradiction between the levels of society, including the material level of the sphere of need, only concept and the object of traditional democratic political theory. He does when the pursuit of happiness in class society has been transformed ot yet know concretely in what rational social activity would consist, but he knows the condition for such activity, namely, the transcendence of the The Agent of Revolution opposition between private egoism and rational common action. Collective action in the common interest, action based on the reciprocal recognition of <%. Mars's next step consists in finding a possible agent for the radical sformation of man and citizen. This proves to be a more delicate matter the humanity and needs of all, must transcend the narrow boundaries of n first appears. On the one hand, Marx must base his new concept of politics and extend to economic life as well. Economic activity must have a freedom on some actual social force to escape the merely abstract ethical rational form and human needs partake of rational universality through their relation of philosophy to reality he has already satirized in a letter to Ruge reciprocal recognition. Until now the philosophers had the solution to all riddles in their desks Marx concludes: and the stupid outside world simply had to open its mouth so that the of absolute science might fly into it. On the other hand, 31 Chapter

31 Chapter 2 32 Marx and Lukács arrive at similar solutions to the problem they have identified. For Marx, it is necessary to transform civil society into a sphere of rational interaction. But paradoxically this is not a political goal. Marx was aware of the Hegelian critique of Jacobin voluntarism and quite self￾consciously worked toward a non-voluntaristic formulation of revolutionary theory. Marx believed political revolution to be through and through tied to class society because in it moral principles contrary to the interests of the individuals must be imposed by the state on a separate civil society of private owners. A revolution to abolish class society and private property would only reproduce these evils were it to attempt to impose morality in opposition to the perceived interests of the individuals. Rather, a social revolution against the very principle of class would necessarily have to be rooted in their interests; only on this condition would it overcome the antinomy of state and civil society, reason and need.17 Marx writes, “The political revolution dissolves civil society into its el￾ements [egoistic individuals] without revolutionizing these elements them￾selves or subjecting them to criticism.”18 What is required is precisely the “revolutionizing” of private and individual existence so that it too conforms with the demands of reason. The content of free activity must no longer stand in contradiction with freedom itself. In the more abstract terms of Lukács, this solution “consists in annulling [aufzuheben] that indifference of form toward content . . . which is the basis of reified rationality.”19 At this point Marx derives what might be called a new “concept” or Be￾griff of free society from the Aufhebung of the contradiction between the concept and the object of traditional democratic political theory. He does not yet know concretely in what rational social activity would consist, but he knows the condition for such activity, namely, the transcendence of the opposition between private egoism and rational common action. Collective action in the common interest, action based on the reciprocal recognition of the humanity and needs of all, must transcend the narrow boundaries of politics and extend to economic life as well. Economic activity must have a rational form and human needs partake of rational universality through their reciprocal recognition. Marx concludes: Human emancipation will only be complete when the real individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individ￾ual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-being; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as political power.20 This condition for the fulfillment of the “demands of reason” is contained already in abstract form in the modern state. It is the new basis for deontological grounds for revolution and for the realization of philosophy. In sum, Marx has shown that political philosophy accepts the irrational form of the pursuit of happiness (civil society) as a natural fact, and so applies the demands of reason only to the state. These demands concern the establishment of a true community through the reconciliation of antinomial opposites such as individual and society, private interest and common good, and all the similar displacements of the antinomy of content and form in the political domain. Marx demonstrates that community cannot be realized in the state so long as it rules a civil society based on a conflictual form of action. To fulfill the demands of reason it will be necessary to also realize them in civil society. To accomplish this, in turn, it is necessary to overcome what Lukács calls the “immediacy” of the sphere of need, its philosophically naturalized form. This Marx succeeds in doing with the concept of a social revolution that changes not just the state, but that also “revolu￾tioniz[es]…the elements themselves.” Community can be realized at all levels of society, including the material level of the sphere of need, only when the pursuit of happiness in class society has been transformed. The Agent of Revolution Marx’s next step consists in finding a possible agent for the radical transformation of man and citizen. This proves to be a more delicate matter than first appears. On the one hand, Marx must base his new concept of freedom on some actual social force to escape the merely abstract ethical relation of philosophy to reality he has already satirized in a letter to Ruge: "Until now the philosophers had the solution to all riddles in their desks, and the stupid outside world simply had to open its mouth so that the roasted pigeons of absolute science might fly into it."21 On the other hand