Realizing Philosophy: Marx, Luacs and the frankfurt school Andrew Feenberg IDraft, for discussion, must not be published or linked on the webl
Realizing Philosophy: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School Andrew Feenberg [Draft, for discussion, must not be published or linked on the web]
Table of Content Fe Preface,…n l. The Philosophy of Praxis……… 2. The Demands of reason 3. Metacritique of the Idea of Nature……47 4. Reification and Rationality 5. The Realization of Philosophy 6. The Controversy over Subject-Object Identity 7. From Lukacs to the frankfurt School 8. The Last Philosophy of Praxis. 9. Philosophy of Praxis: Summary and Significand Appendix: The Unity of Theory and Practice. 241 Notes……263
Table of Contents Foreword ..............................................................................iii Preface ................................................................................... v 1. The Philosophy of Praxis................................................... 1 2. The Demands of Reason .................................................. 23 3. Metacritique of the Idea of Nature.................................. 47 4. Reification and Rationality.............................................. 67 5. The Realization of Philosophy......................................... 99 6. The Controversy over Subject-Object Identity ............ 133 7. From Lukács to the Frankfurt School .......................... 167 8. The Last Philosophy of Praxis....................................... 195 9. Philosophy of Praxis: Summary and Significance ........ 215 Appendix: The Unity of Theory and Practice................... 241 Notes .................................................................................. 263
Foreword to show that a similar logic is at work in Manx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Like Lukacs, Marx carries out a socially based"metacri- Two powerful ideologies contend in the world today, a technocratic ide. tique of philosophy which I explain in the first two chapters of this new logy based on science and economics, and various religious fundamentalisms What separates them philosophically is their attitude toward reason. Scientific This new version differs considerably from the original. I have retained and technical advance justify confidence in reason which, furthermo the principal theoretical concepts, but I have added two entirely new chapters supports progress in democracy and human rights in the advanced societies on the Frankfurt School (chapters 7 and 8)which provide a far better accou Naturalism and liberalism complement each other. Fundamentalisms reject of the relation of Critical Theory to the philosophy of praxis than the rather the rationalist pretension to explain all of reality. These ideologies react against sketchy one of the earlier edition. Chapter 4 presents a much revised evalua- the more unpleasant side effects of a brutal and unjust modernization process. tion of Lukacs' theory of reification. The earlier version of the book emph These dire effects have begun to overtake large sectors of the advanced socie- ized the Weberian and Hegelian influences on Lukacs. My research on elves, stimulating even there movements hostile to science around Heidegger for my book on Heidegger and Marcuse made me aware also of th religion, race and nationalism. Mystery returns with dire political conse- o-Kantian roots of the critique of reified objectivism in both Heidegger and Lukacs. This was an influence I had previously under-estimated. It is impor- In this increasingly troubled context, it is necessary to rethink the claims the interpretation toward the ontological sigr of the dominant rationalistic ideology. The Marxist philosophy of praxis is meaning in the constitution of worlds. Concepts such as Heidegger's Dasein among the most important resources for such a project. It promises a more and Lukacs"identical subject-object"are not substantial things but rather democratic version of rationalism compatible with science and technology but signify meaning- generating processes. also critical of the flaws of modernity. Whether it can deliver on that promise I have also been able to update my understanding of Lukacs concept of is very much in doubt, but its argument and its vision are worthy of considera- nature from study of his recently published Defence of History and Class tion even so. Perhaps a critical appreciation of this tradition can yield elements Consciousness. This text is the background to new chapters that address of an alternative philosophy respectful of both reason and humanity. This is Lukacs' critique of science and technology much more thoroughly(Chapters se in this book. 6-9). These chapters also draw on my research in philosophy of technology This book is a thoroughly revised and rewritten version of Lukacs, Marr solve problems left in suspense in the earlier version of the book. and the Sources of Crirical Theory. The original was published over 30 yea Finally, I have condensed and placed in an appendix two chapters on his- of a doctoral dissertation on Lukacs prep torical materialism and class consciousness that interrupted the flow of the for Herbert Marcuse at the University of California, San Diego. Like the nt in the earlier version of the book. present work, that earlier one was based on insights gained while writing that Lukacs, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory was my first book. Over thesis but not fully developed in its pages. I attempt to explain the underlying the years I have looked back on it with logic of Lukacs' famous reification essay in Hisrory and Class Consciousne always believed there were good things in it, and this belief is occasionally in terms of three"demands of reason"that emerge from classical German confirmed by people who recall finding it helpful in navigating the flow of philosophy. According to Lukacs these demands are fulfilled not by specula- Lukacs complicated argument. On the other hand, there are many proble tion but by revolution. This is his interpretation of the famous"realization of with this first attempt. I have often thought about how I would write such a philosophy" for which Marx calls in his early writings, and most notably in book"today, my plans changing from year to year, decade to decade.The the eleventh"Thesis on Feuerbach. Chapter 5 of this new book presents the reading of Lukacs' defense of History and Class Consciousness against ortho- I now understand it. Soon after completing the thesis I was able
Foreword Two powerful ideologies contend in the world today, a technocratic ideology based on science and economics, and various religious fundamentalisms. What separates them philosophically is their attitude toward reason. Scientific and technical advance justify confidence in reason which, furthermore, supports progress in democracy and human rights in the advanced societies. Naturalism and liberalism complement each other. Fundamentalisms reject the rationalist pretension to explain all of reality. These ideologies react against the more unpleasant side effects of a brutal and unjust modernization process. These dire effects have begun to overtake large sectors of the advanced societies themselves, stimulating even there movements hostile to science around religion, race and nationalism. Mystery returns with dire political consequences. In this increasingly troubled context, it is necessary to rethink the claims of the dominant rationalistic ideology. The Marxist philosophy of praxis is among the most important resources for such a project. It promises a more democratic version of rationalism compatible with science and technology but also critical of the flaws of modernity. Whether it can deliver on that promise is very much in doubt, but its argument and its vision are worthy of consideration even so. Perhaps a critical appreciation of this tradition can yield elements of an alternative philosophy respectful of both reason and humanity. This is my purpose in this book. This book is a thoroughly revised and rewritten version of Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory. The original was published over 30 years ago in 1981. The book grew out of a doctoral dissertation on Lukács prepared for Herbert Marcuse at the University of California, San Diego. Like the present work, that earlier one was based on insights gained while writing that thesis but not fully developed in its pages. I attempt to explain the underlying logic of Lukács’ famous reification essay in History and Class Consciousness in terms of three “demands of reason” that emerge from classical German philosophy. According to Lukács these demands are fulfilled not by speculation but by revolution. This is his interpretation of the famous “realization of philosophy” for which Marx calls in his early writings, and most notably in the eleventh “Thesis on Feuerbach.” Chapter 5 of this new book presents the argument as I now understand it. Soon after completing the thesis I was able to show that a similar logic is at work in Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Like Lukács, Marx carries out a socially based “metacritique” of philosophy which I explain in the first two chapters of this new book. This new version differs considerably from the original. I have retained the principal theoretical concepts, but I have added two entirely new chapters on the Frankfurt School (chapters 7 and 8) which provide a far better account of the relation of Critical Theory to the philosophy of praxis than the rather sketchy one of the earlier edition. Chapter 4 presents a much revised evaluation of Lukács’ theory of reification. The earlier version of the book emphasized the Weberian and Hegelian influences on Lukács. My research on Heidegger for my book on Heidegger and Marcuse made me aware also of the neo-Kantian roots of the critique of reified objectivism in both Heidegger and Lukács. This was an influence I had previously under-estimated. It is important because it orients the interpretation toward the ontological significance of meaning in the constitution of worlds. Concepts such as Heidegger’s Dasein and Lukács’ “identical subject-object” are not substantial things but rather signify meaning-generating processes. I have also been able to update my understanding of Lukács’ concept of nature from study of his recently published Defence of History and Class Consciousness. This text is the background to new chapters that address Lukács’ critique of science and technology much more thoroughly (Chapters 6-9). These chapters also draw on my research in philosophy of technology to solve problems left in suspense in the earlier version of the book. Finally, I have condensed and placed in an appendix two chapters on historical materialism and class consciousness that interrupted the flow of the main argument in the earlier version of the book. Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory was my first book. Over the years I have looked back on it with a mixture of pride and dismay. I have always believed there were good things in it, and this belief is occasionally confirmed by people who recall finding it helpful in navigating the flow of Lukács’ complicated argument. On the other hand, there are many problems with this first attempt. I have often thought about how I would write such a book “today,” my plans changing from year to year, decade to decade. The reading of Lukács’ defense of History and Class Consciousness against ortho-
dox Marxist critics finally encouraged me to set to work by confirming many to name substantial entities with quasi-magical powers. This interpretation of my own interpretations. overlooks the Hegelian influence that is decisive for philosophy of praxis book was important to me for another reason: the From a dialectical standpoint, the Marxist concepts refer to processes of oncept of reification is the key to all my later work on the critical theory of historical mediation, not to things or ideals. Hence Marx writes, "Commu- technology. The usual technocratic understanding of technology is reified in nism is for us not a state of affairs still to be established, not an ideal to which precisely Lukacs sense of the term. Technologies are supposed to be products reality [will] have to adjust. We call communism the real movement which of scientific knowledge, morally neutral tools beneficial to humanity when abolishes the present state of affairs. The conditions of this movement result properly used. But in reality technologies are more than scientific tools; they from premises now in existence. "Marx contrasts the common sense notion of are also social products that shape the behavior of their users. They mor communism as an ideal with an alternative notion of communism as an nearly resemble on than mathematics or science. And like legislar ongoing pre hey are either good or bad, never neutral. When societies become conscious he basic Marxist concepts do not transcend the world in which they of the nature of the technical"laws"under which they live, they can judge and function but rather, they are moments in its developmental dynamic. At the hange them. In recent years we have seen new technology emerge from this time,they have an ontological significance in the philosophy of pra process as movements engaging the environment and the Internet refute old that I endeavor to explain. They are, in Heidegger's phrase, " ontic technocratic arguments for the neutrality of technology. Critical theory of ontological, at once objects in the world and foundations of worlds. The technology offers a framework for understanding the possibilities opened by ontological project consists in the attempt to account for nature as well as his change. The theory identifies harbingers of a technological age fully aware history on the basis of the dialectic of historical praxis. This ambitious project of its powers, responsibilities, and risks is dropped in the mature Marx, but he never abandons his early dialectical The philosophers discussed in this book stood on the verge of such in- account of the social world. sights but did not quite manage to develop a theory of technical politics, no The same dialectical approach clarifies the nature of critical standards in doubt because technology had not yet become an object of effective move he Frankfurt School. For example, Adorno's concept of the "non-identical ments hange. This lacuna is of great significance. As the reader will does not refer to a higher value, but to the mediated structure of reality which discover, they are continually brought up against the problem of the status of is occluded by instrumental reason and accessible only indirectly through science, technology and nature in their attempts to develop an all encompas philosophical reflection and art. And Marcuse's"second dimension ing philosophy of praxis. No adequate resolution is possible without under ing of historical potentialities, is not a Platonic ideal but the determinate randing the ways in which technology both mediates the human relation to negation of the existing world, immanent in its developmental process. nature and is itself politically and socially mediated. Progress in insight into An unde of the dialectical character of the basic concepts of the technology can be traced in the history of philosophy of praxis culminating, I essential for avoiding crude interpretive errors such as argue, in Marcuse 's late work. The critical theory of technology I have devel- characterize much of the critical literature. I have tried to re-establish the oped starts where he left off and attempts to complete the project these original complexity of this tradition. It is as dialectical thought that it contin- philosophers initiated. ues to be of interest. As such it opens new perspective t If I were to summarize as briefly as possible the essential innovation of gles in contemporary capitalist societies. With the decline of traditional forms new version of my book, it would be the emphasis on a diale ctical inter. of working class revolutionary struggle, these new forms of struggle are in- pretation of philosophy of praxis. The basic concepts of Marxism are ambigu creasingly focused on the irrationality of capitalism, the absurdity of it sibjec objecaascepts as the proletariat and communism, like Lukacs"identical ous. Such cond pretension to organize and control all of social life through the market, and are commonly dismissed as metaphysical fantasies. They seem the catastrophic environmental consequences of its frenetic pursuit of profit
dox Marxist critics finally encouraged me to set to work by confirming many of my own interpretations. Revising this early book was important to me for another reason: the concept of reification is the key to all my later work on the critical theory of technology. The usual technocratic understanding of technology is reified in precisely Lukács’ sense of the term. Technologies are supposed to be products of scientific knowledge, morally neutral tools beneficial to humanity when properly used. But in reality technologies are more than scientific tools; they are also social products that shape the behavior of their users. They more nearly resemble legislation than mathematics or science. And like legislation, they are either good or bad, never neutral. When societies become conscious of the nature of the technical “laws” under which they live, they can judge and change them. In recent years we have seen new technology emerge from this process as movements engaging the environment and the Internet refute old technocratic arguments for the neutrality of technology. Critical theory of technology offers a framework for understanding the possibilities opened by this change. The theory identifies harbingers of a technological age fully aware of its powers, responsibilities, and risks. The philosophers discussed in this book stood on the verge of such insights but did not quite manage to develop a theory of technical politics, no doubt because technology had not yet become an object of effective movements for change. This lacuna is of great significance. As the reader will discover, they are continually brought up against the problem of the status of science, technology and nature in their attempts to develop an all encompassing philosophy of praxis. No adequate resolution is possible without understanding the ways in which technology both mediates the human relation to nature and is itself politically and socially mediated. Progress in insight into technology can be traced in the history of philosophy of praxis culminating, I argue, in Marcuse’s late work. The critical theory of technology I have developed starts where he left off and attempts to complete the project these philosophers initiated. If I were to summarize as briefly as possible the essential innovation of this new version of my book, it would be the emphasis on a dialectical interpretation of philosophy of praxis. The basic concepts of Marxism are ambiguous. Such concepts as the proletariat and communism, like Lukács’ “identical subject-object” are commonly dismissed as metaphysical fantasies. They seem to name substantial entities with quasi-magical powers. This interpretation overlooks the Hegelian influence that is decisive for philosophy of praxis. From a dialectical standpoint, the Marxist concepts refer to processes of historical mediation, not to things or ideals. Hence Marx writes, “Communism is for us not a state of affairs still to be established, not an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of affairs. The conditions of this movement result from premises now in existence.”1 Marx contrasts the common sense notion of communism as an ideal with an alternative notion of communism as an ongoing process. The basic Marxist concepts do not transcend the world in which they function but rather, they are moments in its developmental dynamic. At the same time, they have an ontological significance in the philosophy of praxis that I endeavor to explain. They are, in Heidegger’s phrase, “onticontological,” at once objects in the world and foundations of worlds. The ontological project consists in the attempt to account for nature as well as history on the basis of the dialectic of historical praxis. This ambitious project is dropped in the mature Marx, but he never abandons his early dialectical account of the social world. The same dialectical approach clarifies the nature of critical standards in the Frankfurt School. For example, Adorno’s concept of the “non-identical” does not refer to a higher value, but to the mediated structure of reality which is occluded by instrumental reason and accessible only indirectly through philosophical reflection and art. And Marcuse’s “second dimension,” consisting of historical potentialities, is not a Platonic ideal but the determinate negation of the existing world, immanent in its developmental process. An understanding of the dialectical character of the basic concepts of the philosophy of praxis is essential for avoiding crude interpretive errors such as characterize much of the critical literature. I have tried to re-establish the original complexity of this tradition. It is as dialectical thought that it continues to be of interest. As such it opens new perspectives on the existing struggles in contemporary capitalist societies. With the decline of traditional forms of working class revolutionary struggle, these new forms of struggle are increasingly focused on the irrationality of capitalism, the absurdity of its pretension to organize and control all of social life through the market, and the catastrophic environmental consequences of its frenetic pursuit of profit
The philosophy of praxis placed questions of rationality and irrationality at the center of its political vision. In this respect it still has something to teach February 2012
The philosophy of praxis placed questions of rationality and irrationality at the center of its political vision. In this respect it still has something to teach us. Vancouver, February 2012