regarded as a mere rationalization of covert interests, nor as a passive reflec the philosophical tradition, a "philosophy of identity. The identity referred tion of production relations. Rather, it is the form in which the actual to is that of thought and being, reason and reality. This identity is theologi- contradictions of social life are raised to consciousness under the horizon of cal and to it Feuerbach opposes what he calls "the true and absolute view- the given society. The juxtaposition of the philosophical concepts with a point": "the viewpoint of the distinction between I and thou, subject and specific social background both explains the impasses and antinomies of object. "2 Yet although Feuerbach rejects the philosophy of identity, he heory, and shows a path to resolution through social action. reconstructs its formal principles on another plane Susan Buck-Morss argues that Adorno's cultural criticism was deeply He detaches the formal structure of philosophy from its concept of the influenced by this method, as he discovered it in Lukacs. She summarizes subject and object. The"philosophy of the future, as he calls it, will con- Lukacs' approach lucidly as follows serve these formal traits but attach them to a new subject-object concept. Instead of reducing bor hought to the economic conditions of This is a metacritique of fundamental philosophical concepts. These con- its production, Lukacs argued that the nature of those conditions could cepts are relativized by reconstructing them in the concrete existential be found within the intellectual phenomena themselves. Once these domains from which they were first abstracted in their initial construction thinkers accepted given social reality as the reality, they had to come upon a barrier of irrationality which could not be overcome(and which He first redefines the concepts of subject and object, arguing that they had led Kant to posit the thing-in-itself, because that barrier could not are both sensuous, natural things in the world which cannot be bro be removed from theory without being removed from society. Con- together merely conceptually. The identity achieved in and through thought rely, if theorists could see through the reified appearances, they is spurious and ideological, but there is another kind of subject-object would recognize that the antinomies of philosophy were due not to the identity which can be achieved through sense perception and love. Feuer- inadequacies of reason, but to those of the reality in which reason tried bach writes, The identity of subject and object, which in self-consciousness to find itself. 2 [in other words, in Hegel] is only an abstract idea, is truth and reality only in ch the same analysis could be made of marx's ear nan's sensuous perception of man. Thus the formal principle, subject- object identity, is taken from Hegel and conserved while its content in Buck-Morss contrasts sociological reductionism and metacritique. But Hegel's thought is rejected what does it mean to find"the nature of [economic] conditions.. within the he upshot is an enlargement of the concept of the subject to include intellectual phenomena? This is a crucial point that requires clarification in more than thinking, to include the whole human being, so to speak. This Marx by reference to the influence of Feuerbach. Feuerbach's central idea is that philosophy is secularized theology. He says, What lies in through its continued submission to the formal principles of idealistic the other world for religion, lies in this world for philosophy. 4 When philosophy. Feuerbach expressed his conclusion in ringing phrases which philosophy identifies the subject with reason, with thinki certainly influenced Marx. theological idea of"spirit"down to earth. Similarly, the concept of the he unity of thought and being has meaning and truth only when man object as an object-of-thought, constituted by thought or obeying rational is comprehended as the ground and subject of this unity. Only a real ws,is a homely transcendental equivalent of Biblical Genesis. being recognizes real objects; only where thought is not the subject of This appears to be a crass reduction of the essence of philosophy. What tself but a predicate of a real being is the idea not separated from be- akes Feuerbach interesting is his attempt to go beyond this basic thesis From this result the following categorical imperatives: Desire not to be Feuerbach calls Hegel's thought, which he sees as the culmination of a philosopher as distinct from a man; be nothing else than 13 Chapter I
13 Chapter 1 14 regarded as a mere rationalization of covert interests, nor as a passive reflection of production relations. Rather, it is the form in which the actual contradictions of social life are raised to consciousness under the horizon of the given society. The juxtaposition of the philosophical concepts with a specific social background both explains the impasses and antinomies of theory, and shows a path to resolution through social action. Susan Buck-Morss argues that Adorno's cultural criticism was deeply influenced by this method, as he discovered it in Lukács. She summarizes Lukács’ approach lucidly as follows: Instead of reducing bourgeois thought to the economic conditions of its production, Lukács argued that the nature of those conditions could be found within the intellectual phenomena themselves.... Once these thinkers accepted given social reality as the reality, they had to come upon a barrier of irrationality which could not be overcome (and which had led Kant to posit the thing-in-itself, because that barrier could not be removed from theory without being removed from society. Conversely, if theorists could see through the reified appearances, they would recognize that the antinomies of philosophy were due not to the inadequacies of reason, but to those of the reality in which reason tried to find itself.23 Much the same analysis could be made of Marx's early critique of political philosophy. Buck-Morss contrasts sociological reductionism and metacritique. But what does it mean to find “the nature of [economic] conditions…within the intellectual phenomena?” This is a crucial point that requires clarification in the case of Marx by reference to the influence of Feuerbach. Feuerbach’s central idea is that philosophy is secularized theology. He says, “What lies in the other world for religion, lies in this world for philosophy.” 24 When philosophy identifies the subject with reason, with thinking, it brings the theological idea of “spirit” down to earth. Similarly, the concept of the object as an object-of-thought, constituted by thought or obeying rational laws, is a homely transcendental equivalent of Biblical Genesis. This appears to be a crass reduction of the essence of philosophy. What makes Feuerbach interesting is his attempt to go beyond this basic thesis toward a reconstruction of philosophy. Feuerbach calls Hegel’s thought, which he sees as the culmination of the philosophical tradition, a “philosophy of identity.” The identity referred to is that of thought and being, reason and reality. This identity is theological and to it Feuerbach opposes what he calls “the true and absolute viewpoint”: “the viewpoint of the distinction between I and thou, subject and object.” 25 Yet although Feuerbach rejects the philosophy of identity, he reconstructs its formal principles on another plane. He detaches the formal structure of philosophy from its concept of the subject and object. The “philosophy of the future,” as he calls it, will conserve these formal traits but attach them to a new subject-object concept. This is a metacritique of fundamental philosophical concepts. These concepts are relativized by reconstructing them in the concrete existential domains from which they were first abstracted in their initial construction as philosophical. He first redefines the concepts of subject and object, arguing that they are both sensuous, natural things in the world which cannot be brought together merely conceptually. The identity achieved in and through thought is spurious and ideological, but there is another kind of subject-object identity which can be achieved through sense perception and love. Feuerbach writes, “The identity of subject and object, which in self-consciousness [in other words, in Hegel] is only an abstract idea, is truth and reality only in man’s sensuous perception of man.”26 Thus the formal principle, subjectobject identity, is taken from Hegel and conserved while its content in Hegel’s thought is rejected. The upshot is an enlargement of the concept of the subject to include more than thinking, to include the whole human being, so to speak. This enlarged subject retains what might be called an “ontological pathos” through its continued submission to the formal principles of idealistic philosophy. Feuerbach expressed his conclusion in ringing phrases which certainly influenced Marx. The unity of thought and being has meaning and truth only when man is comprehended as the ground and subject of this unity. Only a real being recognizes real objects; only where thought is not the subject of itself but a predicate of a real being is the idea not separated from being. . . . From this result the following categorical imperatives: Desire not to be a philosopher as distinct from a man; be nothing else than a thinking
man. Do not think as a thinker, that is, with a faculty torn from the to- As Marx works out his program in the Manuscripts, it becomes clear tality of the real human being and isolated for itself; think as a living that he is attempting not just a "reform of philosophy'-Feuerbach's and real being, as one exposed to the vivifying and refreshing waves of hrase-but a rigorous Aufhebung, or transcendence, of Hegelian idealism the world, s oceans. Think in existence, in the world as a member of i, and with it of philosophy generally. To accomplish this Marx develops a not in the vacuum of abstraction as a solitary monad, as an absolute metacritique of Hegel, designed to show that the concept of reason as monarch, as an indifferent, super-worldly God; then you can be sure absolute knowledge is a still theological attempt to overcome social alien- that your ideas are unities of being and thought. 2 tion in thought. The"ordre des raisons must be reversed: when alienation That is precisely Marx's starting point in the 1844 Manuscripts. There is overcome in real life, then and only then will it be possible to overcom he attempts to obey Feuerbach's injunction by a heroic effort to overcome the alienation of reason. Thus the Manuscripts do not achieve their end in a he gap between thought and life. As Marx puts it, "One basis for life and mere philosophical reformulation of the concept of reason. Revolution expresses himself in the first person in a manner which indicates his personal thought and life, thinker and society, by founding ming the opposition of on practically in life take in the matter and community. The retention of the formal structure of Hegel's thought My universal consciousness is only the theoretical form of that whose infused with this new content yields a philosophy of praxis. living form is the real community, the social entity, although at the pr sent day this universal consciousness is an abstraction from real life and The Realization of Philosophy is opposed to it as an enemy. That is why the activity of my universal What makes the approach taken by Marx and Lukacs unique and dis- consciousness as such is my theoretical existence as a social being. 29 anguishes it not only from Kant but also from Hegel, is their belief that the However, Marx is a better dialectician and more rigorous thinker than primary antinomy to be overcome is that of traditional philosophy and social Feuerbach. He is not content to retain simply the general form of the reality. Here the term"metacritique"applies in a double sense. Not only do hilosophy of identity while giving an anthropological twist to the concep Marx and Lukacs attempt to relate philosophical abstractions to the social of subject and object. He takes more than this from Hegel in order to lifeworld but they claim to identify the intrinsic limitation of the traditional accomplish more ambitious goals than Feuerbach's. Marx follows Hegel in philosophical method of abstraction. Because traditional philosophy assu requiring that subject-object unity be grasped as the actual constitution of that the alienated foundations of the social order are rooted in the very the object by the subject. And like Hegel he tries to avoid a Fichtean reduc- nature of reality, it concludes that the antinomies can only be resolved tion of the object to the subject through a dialectical conception of their peculatively in thought, and formulates them in view of such a resolution. relationship. He also agrees with the hegel of the Phenomenology of Mind The criterion of philosophical adequacy that guides concept formation in the hat this relationship is established in the historical process. He accepts, in tradition thus reflects an implicit sense of the limits of social change which other words, what Lukacs describes as "Hegel's programme: to Marx and Lukacs challenge. They argue that the resolution of the antino- absolute, the goal of his philosophy, as a resulr remains valid for Marxism mies requires a radical social transformation unimagined by their predeces- with its very different objects of knowledge, and is even of greater concern to sors. it,as the dialectical process is seen to be identical with the course of his- Nevertheless, neither Marx nor Lukacs tory. 0 The formal principles Marx retains are thus richer and more complex Rather, they proceed from the assumption tha bsimple disi philosophe han those that survive Feuerbach's critical appropriation of traditional concept of reason, as elaborated in philosophy, and its concrete social ubstratum reflects contradictions in social reality. Despite its limits tradi- tional philosophy was able to identify social potentialities, even if only in a 15 Chapter I
15 Chapter 1 16 man. Do not think as a thinker, that is, with a faculty torn from the totality of the real human being and isolated for itself; think as a living and real being, as one exposed to the vivifying and refreshing waves of the world’s oceans. Think in existence, in the world as a member of it, not in the vacuum of abstraction as a solitary monad, as an absolute monarch, as an indifferent, super-worldly God; then you can be sure that your ideas are unities of being and thought.27 That is precisely Marx’s starting point in the 1844 Manuscripts. There he attempts to obey Feuerbach’s injunction by a heroic effort to overcome the gap between thought and life. As Marx puts it, “One basis for life and another for science is a priori a falsehood.”28 Elsewhere in the text, Marx expresses himself in the first person in a manner which indicates his personal stake in the matter. My universal consciousness is only the theoretical form of that whose living form is the real community, the social entity, although at the present day this universal consciousness is an abstraction from real life and is opposed to it as an enemy. That is why the activity of my universal consciousness as such is my theoretical existence as a social being.29 However, Marx is a better dialectician and more rigorous thinker than Feuerbach. He is not content to retain simply the general form of the philosophy of identity while giving an anthropological twist to the concepts of subject and object. He takes more than this from Hegel in order to accomplish more ambitious goals than Feuerbach’s. Marx follows Hegel in requiring that subject-object unity be grasped as the actual constitution of the object by the subject. And like Hegel he tries to avoid a Fichtean reduction of the object to the subject through a dialectical conception of their relationship. He also agrees with the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Mind that this relationship is established in the historical process. He accepts, in other words, what Lukács describes as “Hegel’s programme: to see the absolute, the goal of his philosophy, as a result remains valid for Marxism with its very different objects of knowledge, and is even of greater concern to it, as the dialectical process is seen to be identical with the course of history.”30 The formal principles Marx retains are thus richer and more complex than those that survive Feuerbach’s critical appropriation of traditional philosophy. As Marx works out his program in the Manuscripts, it becomes clear that he is attempting not just a “reform of philosophy”—Feuerbach’s phrase—but a rigorous Aufhebung, or transcendence, of Hegelian idealism, and with it of philosophy generally. To accomplish this Marx develops a metacritique of Hegel, designed to show that the concept of reason as absolute knowledge is a still theological attempt to overcome social alienation in thought. The “ordre des raisons” must be reversed: when alienation is overcome in real life, then and only then will it be possible to overcome the alienation of reason. Thus the Manuscripts do not achieve their end in a mere philosophical reformulation of the concept of reason. Revolution becomes the basis for a new constellation, overcoming the opposition of thought and life, thinker and society, by founding reason practically in life and community. The retention of the formal structure of Hegel’s thought infused with this new content yields a philosophy of praxis. The Realization of Philosophy31 What makes the approach taken by Marx and Lukács unique and distinguishes it not only from Kant but also from Hegel, is their belief that the primary antinomy to be overcome is that of traditional philosophy and social reality. Here the term “metacritique” applies in a double sense. Not only do Marx and Lukács attempt to relate philosophical abstractions to the social lifeworld, but they claim to identify the intrinsic limitation of the traditional philosophical method of abstraction. Because traditional philosophy assumes that the alienated foundations of the social order are rooted in the very nature of reality, it concludes that the antinomies can only be resolved speculatively, in thought, and formulates them in view of such a resolution. The criterion of philosophical adequacy that guides concept formation in the tradition thus reflects an implicit sense of the limits of social change which Marx and Lukács challenge. They argue that the resolution of the antinomies requires a radical social transformation unimagined by their predecessors. Nevertheless, neither Marx nor Lukács simply dismiss philosophy. Rather, they proceed from the assumption that the tension between the concept of reason, as elaborated in philosophy, and its concrete social substratum reflects contradictions in social reality. Despite its limits traditional philosophy was able to identify social potentialities, even if only in a
peculative form. The problem now consists in reconstructing the insights of 3. Marx and Lukacs seem to say that only the revolution can"solve philosophy in a new context, oriented toward practical social change. Mar- philosophical problems, and yet they propose solutions to these problems in cuse summarizes this conclusion as follows: "The philosophical construction philosophical works written before the revolution. Does this not imply that of reason is replaced by the creation of a rational society. The philosophical the revolution is after all irrelevant to the solution of philosophical prob- ideals of a better world and of true Being are incorporated into the practical lems? im of struggling mankind, where they take on a human form. "3 These questions arise largely from ambiguities in Western Marxism In sum, the metacritical approach of philosophy of praxis consists in special terminology. When this terminology is understood it becomes clear dialectically relativizing philosophical form and social content, and corre that Marx and Lukacs are not making quite such radical claims as at first spondingly, theory and practice. Marx and Lukacs do not philosophize appears. The chief difficulty stems from ambiguities in the terms"philoso- phy"and"theory. " I will therefore begin with this issue. of philosophy as such, and eo ipso of its forms of evidence and its problemat In its usual meaning"philosophy"refers to the activity of reflecting on ics. Rather, they consider the tradition as essentially completed, and then the basic assumptions and concepts of a discipline, proceed to study it from"outside, "as a moment in a larger social process in this sense Marx and Lukacs are obviously still doing philosophy, and they which action can intervene. It is in this light, and not in some merely would not deny it. But for them, "philosophy"refers to a specific historical pragmatic sense of urgency, that we are to understand Marxs eleventh thesis tradition that develops common themes from the Greeks to Hegel. They n Feuerbach: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various way regard this tradition as"completed, and they would deny that they ar the point is, to change it. 3 merely continuing it in their own work. The unity of the tradition consists Within the tradition of Western Marxism, these rather opaque formula- in certain paradigmatic concepts and methods which run through it from tions of the theory-practice relation have a quite definite meaning. One of the beginning to the end, in spite of variations and innovations. It is this the aims of this book is to clarify that meaning. Since I am writing within paradigm which has been exhausted, not the activity of reflection per. hat tradition myself, I will follow Marx and Lukacs in using terms like The early Marx and Lukacs, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida have all philosophy, ""theory, ""practice, and phrases like"the unity of theory and proposed general theories of the unity of the philosophical tradition, and on practice, " the realization of philosophy. Before proceeding on this basis, I that basis have announced its end. Reflection continues, and indeed it has no would like step briefly outside that framework to anticipate some objec- original concepts to substitute for the old ones. But the philosopher's rela- tions. I will put these objections in the form of questions that implicitly tion to these concepts is no longer immediate, naive; the"death"of philoso- challenge the very idea of a unity of theory and practice or a realization of phy means no more than that thinkers become conscious of the histor limits of the cultural system on the basis of which these concepts arise 1. Marx and Lukacs claim that they are"realizing" philosophy, puttin For Marxists, this conso is specifically social. They trace the ori theory into practice. How does this differ from "applying"theory to the gin of philosophy's eternal truths, its constants and paradigms, back to a olution of a practical problem? social world that is in the process of disappearing. There is a particularly 2. Marx and Lukacs claim that the philosophical tradition is finished clear statement of this position in the Communist Manifesto. which would seem to mean that they themselves are not philosophe The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class ntributing to that tradition. Yet surely the Manuscripts of 1844 and tagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different ep- History and Class Consciousness are philosophical works. Are they then ochs. But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to philosophers after all, and if so how can they elaborate a philosophy on the past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. basis of the proposition that philosophy is dead?5 No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all 17 Chapter I
17 Chapter 1 18 speculative form. The problem now consists in reconstructing the insights of philosophy in a new context, oriented toward practical social change. Marcuse summarizes this conclusion as follows: "The philosophical construction of reason is replaced by the creation of a rational society. The philosophical ideals of a better world and of true Being are incorporated into the practical aim of struggling mankind, where they take on a human form.”32 In sum, the metacritical approach of philosophy of praxis consists in dialectically relativizing philosophical form and social content, and correspondingly, theory and practice. Marx and Lukács do not philosophize within the historically given tradition, presupposing the continuing validity of philosophy as such, and eo ipso of its forms of evidence and its problematics. Rather, they consider the tradition as essentially completed, and then proceed to study it from "outside," as a moment in a larger social process in which action can intervene. It is in this light, and not in some merely pragmatic sense of urgency, that we are to understand Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it.”33 Within the tradition of Western Marxism, these rather opaque formulations of the theory-practice relation have a quite definite meaning. One of the aims of this book is to clarify that meaning. Since I am writing within that tradition myself, I will follow Marx and Lukács in using terms like “philosophy,” “theory,” “practice,” and phrases like “the unity of theory and practice,” “the realization of philosophy.” Before proceeding on this basis, I would like to step briefly outside that framework to anticipate some objections. I will put these objections in the form of questions that implicitly challenge the very idea of a unity of theory and practice or a realization of philosophy. Here are some examples: 1. Marx and Lukács claim that they are “realizing” philosophy, putting theory into practice. How does this differ from “applying” theory to the solution of a practical problem? 2. Marx and Lukács claim that the philosophical tradition is finished, which would seem to mean that they themselves are not philosophers contributing to that tradition. Yet surely the Manuscripts of 1844 and History and Class Consciousness are philosophical works. Are they then philosophers after all, and if so how can they elaborate a philosophy on the basis of the proposition that philosophy is dead?34 3. Marx and Lukács seem to say that only the revolution can “solve” philosophical problems, and yet they propose solutions to these problems in philosophical works written before the revolution. Does this not imply that the revolution is after all irrelevant to the solution of philosophical problems? These questions arise largely from ambiguities in Western Marxism's special terminology. When this terminology is understood it becomes clear that Marx and Lukács are not making quite such radical claims as at first appears. The chief difficulty stems from ambiguities in the terms “philosophy” and “theory.” I will therefore begin with this issue. In its usual meaning “philosophy” refers to the activity of reflecting on the basic assumptions and concepts of a discipline, practice or culture. In this sense Marx and Lukács are obviously still doing philosophy, and they would not deny it. But for them, “philosophy” refers to a specific historical tradition that develops common themes from the Greeks to Hegel. They regard this tradition as “completed,” and they would deny that they are merely continuing it in their own work. The unity of the tradition consists in certain paradigmatic concepts and methods which run through it from the beginning to the end, in spite of variations and innovations. It is this paradigm which has been exhausted, not the activity of reflection per se. The early Marx and Lukács, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida have all proposed general theories of the unity of the philosophical tradition, and on that basis have announced its end. Reflection continues, and indeed it has no original concepts to substitute for the old ones. But the philosopher's relation to these concepts is no longer immediate, naive; the “death” of philosophy means no more than that thinkers become conscious of the historical limits of the cultural system on the basis of which these concepts arise. For Marxists, this consciousness is specifically social. They trace the origin of philosophy's eternal truths, its constants and paradigms, back to a social world that is in the process of disappearing. There is a particularly clear statement of this position in the Communist Manifesto. The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs. But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all
the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain forms, or problems. Marx and Lukacs thus do not return to the empirical so much as completely vanish except with the tot show the inseparable connection between the most abstract concepts of appearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the hilosophy and a concrete social context that can be changed. most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that Let me return now to the example of the antinomy of public and pri- its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ide- vate interest to illustrate how practice can contribute to resolving a theoreti- cal problem. Plato sets up the problem as philosophy has treated it ever If we accept the limitation of"philosophy "to a specific tradition bound since. The lower classes of the Republic pursue private interests and this p with the history of class society, then we need a wider term with which to disqualifies them from rule. Plato's guardians are qualified to rule by the refer to the general process of reflection on basic assumptions of which this complete elimination of their private lives; they cannot even know their own hilosophy "would be an instance. This more general term is"theory. children. For the greeks the abolition of the family is the abolition of the Now we need to distinguish between two types of theory, a type which is private sphere, hence also private interest. The antinomy is evident here identified with traditional philosophy and a new type in which Marxism It does not disappear in as different a philosopher as Rousseau. He dis- engages. This is precisely the distinction between"traditional"and"critical tinguishes the general will from the will of all as public vs. private interest. eory that Horkheimer introduced in a famous essay. 6 Like the Frankfurt He does not conceive of a special class as the bearer of the general will, but School, Marx and Lukacs argue that traditional theory has been superseded instead projects the antinomy into the individual. The split this produces in by a new critical theory. They do not suggest that philosophy should be the individual requires"virtue"in the citizen to resist mere greed. Even bandoned for practical activity or simply"applied" in the usual sense of the Mandeville, who claims that "private vices are public benefits, readily term. The point, then, is not that reflection should cease, but that a new admits that the intention of the individuals in pursuing private interests has kind of reflection is needed nothing to do with the public benefits achieved by a paradoxical reversal. This new kind of reflection differs from the old in two ways. On the The antinomy survives down to the present. The "original position, one hand, it treats many as famous from Rawls'A Theory of ustice, accomplishes the same division of granted as problematic. On the other hand, it treats these assumptions as public from private interests Plato demands. Habermas, with his rigid relative to the social situation from which they arise. For example, instead of distinction between communicative and strategic uses of language, perpetu accepting the eternal necessity of the antinomy of public and private interest, ates the antinomy in a particularly sophisticated manner. critical theory shows that this antinomy belongs to a specific social world For a Marxist the limitation of this type of thinking is clear. The un Critical theory still works with the concepts of public and private interest questioned assumption that lies behind the antinomy is the permanency of elaborated in philosophy, but it problematizes the social background against ivately owned means of productio ng antagonism hich these two forms of interest appear as antinomian opposites. he members of society. Public interests then arise alongside private ones The critique of abstract or"pure"theory is to be understood in this insofar as the community has needs which are not identical with the me context. Once again it is not that Marx and Lukacs reject conceptual gener- summation of these antagonistic private interests. But what if historical ality for empirical specificity, but rather that the process of abstraction in conditions arose in which private ownership of means of production could which philosophy detaches its concepts from their social basis gives rise to a be replaced by the rational administration of both the economy and the state bias they reject. Philosophy treats its concepts as though they rested on in the interests of the whole community? Of course some forms of personal ternal facts conceived in this private" interest would remain, but these would not stand in an antagonise- oncepts is occluded and it becomes tic relation to the public interest of the community. Instead of dedication to possible resolving philosophical ablic interest requiring a virtuous dictatorship or general renunciation of 19 Chapter I
19 Chapter 1 20 the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.35 If we accept the limitation of “philosophy” to a specific tradition bound up with the history of class society, then we need a wider term with which to refer to the general process of reflection on basic assumptions of which this “philosophy” would be an instance. This more general term is “theory.” Now we need to distinguish between two types of theory, a type which is identified with traditional philosophy and a new type in which Marxism engages. This is precisely the distinction between “traditional” and “critical” theory that Horkheimer introduced in a famous essay. 36 Like the Frankfurt School, Marx and Lukács argue that traditional theory has been superseded by a new critical theory. They do not suggest that philosophy should be abandoned for practical activity or simply “applied” in the usual sense of the term. The point, then, is not that reflection should cease, but that a new kind of reflection is needed. This new kind of reflection differs from the old in two ways. On the one hand, it treats many assumptions the philosophical tradition took for granted as problematic. On the other hand, it treats these assumptions as relative to the social situation from which they arise. For example, instead of accepting the eternal necessity of the antinomy of public and private interest, critical theory shows that this antinomy belongs to a specific social world. Critical theory still works with the concepts of public and private interest elaborated in philosophy, but it problematizes the social background against which these two forms of interest appear as antinomial opposites. The critique of abstract or “pure” theory is to be understood in this context. Once again it is not that Marx and Lukács reject conceptual generality for empirical specificity, but rather that the process of abstraction in which philosophy detaches its concepts from their social basis gives rise to a bias they reject. Philosophy treats its concepts as though they rested on eternal facts of nature or the human condition. But once conceived in this way, the social background of these concepts is occluded and it becomes impossible to imagine a role for human action in resolving philosophical problems. Marx and Lukács thus do not return to the empirical so much as show the inseparable connection between the most abstract concepts of philosophy and a concrete social context that can be changed. Let me return now to the example of the antinomy of public and private interest to illustrate how practice can contribute to resolving a theoretical problem. Plato sets up the problem as philosophy has treated it ever since. The lower classes of the Republic pursue private interests and this disqualifies them from rule. Plato's guardians are qualified to rule by the complete elimination of their private lives; they cannot even know their own children. For the Greeks the abolition of the family is the abolition of the private sphere, hence also private interest. The antinomy is evident here. It does not disappear in as different a philosopher as Rousseau. He distinguishes the general will from the will of all as public vs. private interest. He does not conceive of a special class as the bearer of the general will, but instead projects the antinomy into the individual. The split this produces in the individual requires “virtue” in the citizen to resist mere greed. Even Mandeville, who claims that “private vices are public benefits,” readily admits that the intention of the individuals in pursuing private interests has nothing to do with the public benefits achieved by a paradoxical reversal. The antinomy survives down to the present. The “original position,” famous from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, accomplishes the same division of public from private interests Plato demands. Habermas, with his rigid distinction between communicative and strategic uses of language, perpetuates the antinomy in a particularly sophisticated manner. For a Marxist the limitation of this type of thinking is clear. The unquestioned assumption that lies behind the antinomy is the permanency of privately owned means of production and the resulting antagonism between the members of society. Public interests then arise alongside private ones insofar as the community has needs which are not identical with the mere summation of these antagonistic private interests. But what if historical conditions arose in which private ownership of means of production could be replaced by the rational administration of both the economy and the state in the interests of the whole community? Of course some forms of personal “private” interest would remain, but these would not stand in an antagonistic relation to the public interest of the community. Instead of dedication to public interest requiring a virtuous dictatorship or general renunciation of
private interests, the two would be in harmony: the free development of each upporting the free development of all. The traditional philosophical con- struction of the issue would no longer apply. Or at least so claims Marxist The point I want to make is not that such a Marxist reform of society would work-that is another problem-but rather that once one envis as a real possibility, social action appears to play a central role in resolving a philosophical problem that has traditionally been treated as purely theoreti- cal in character. It is this new role for social action that is intended by the concept of a"realization"of philosophy. Philosophy is realized in the sense that its old ideal of somehow reconciling public and private interest is finally achieved. This realization involves a radical social change, and not a purely conceptual mediation such as Platos utopia, Rousseau's"virtue, or Mande- ville s equivalent of the"invisible hand. Note that this new type of theoretical reflection need not await the revolution. Reflection can always go beyond the given achievements of its era ward ideal outcomes. This is true of marx as much as it is of Plato. But what appears as a real possibility to anticipatory thinking differs drastically with time and place. Although Plato could imagine women becoming uardians in his ideal republic, he saw no way to abolish slavery. Aristotle once made the fantastic suggestion that slavery could be abolished if tools could activate themselves without human agency. Marx writes in a time when this idle fantasy of the ancients appears as an imminent possibility. On the basis of this changed historical situation, he imagines a wholly different practical context for philosophy than the one prevailing in all previous class societies. Thus Marxists can propose theoretical solutions to problems the revolution is supposed to solve practically. However, they do generally insist that only by struggling against capitalism has the working class been able to oblematize the dominant assumptions of a millennial class culture so that solutions to old problems can be anticipated, 37 Later chapters will explain this connection between theory and practice in more detail. 21 Chapter I
21 Chapter 1 22 private interests, the two would be in harmony: the free development of each supporting the free development of all. The traditional philosophical construction of the issue would no longer apply. Or at least so claims Marxist theory. The point I want to make is not that such a Marxist reform of society would work—that is another problem—but rather that once one envisages it as a real possibility, social action appears to play a central role in resolving a philosophical problem that has traditionally been treated as purely theoretical in character. It is this new role for social action that is intended by the concept of a “realization” of philosophy. Philosophy is realized in the sense that its old ideal of somehow reconciling public and private interest is finally achieved. This realization involves a radical social change, and not a purely conceptual mediation such as Plato's utopia, Rousseau's “virtue,” or Mandeville's equivalent of the “invisible hand.” Note that this new type of theoretical reflection need not await the revolution. Reflection can always go beyond the given achievements of its era toward ideal outcomes. This is true of Marx as much as it is of Plato. But what appears as a real possibility to anticipatory thinking differs drastically with time and place. Although Plato could imagine women becoming guardians in his ideal republic, he saw no way to abolish slavery. Aristotle once made the fantastic suggestion that slavery could be abolished if tools could activate themselves without human agency. Marx writes in a time when this idle fantasy of the ancients appears as an imminent possibility. On the basis of this changed historical situation, he imagines a wholly different practical context for philosophy than the one prevailing in all previous class societies. Thus Marxists can propose theoretical solutions to problems the revolution is supposed to solve practically. However, they do generally insist that only by struggling against capitalism has the working class been able to problematize the dominant assumptions of a millennial class culture so that new solutions to old problems can be anticipated. 37 Later chapters will explain this connection between theory and practice in more detail