in attempting to base his philosophy on a real social force, there is the danger Thus it is the very principle of class which limits political revolution. that he will reduce historical action to a mere instrument of philosophy, Marx concludes, and this distinguishes his early method from that of the which later would then be the real"subject"of the revolutionary process. later works, that his philosophy cannot be realized by a social class in the Marx first approaches this problem in a speculative form in the"Intro- usual sense but only by "a class in civil society which is not a class of civil duction"to the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of society, a class which is the dissolution of all classes. >What he is seeking, in Right. There he arrives at an undialectical construction of the relation of other words, is a class that is not a class, a"universal class in something like theory to practice, philosophy to the proletariat, that does not so much Hegel's sense of the term, with no particular interest at all,hence the abstract character of ethical demands as attribute this ver opposed to that of society as a whole. Having arrived at a rather Hegelian abstractness to the demands of an entire social class. Lucien goldmann formulation of the problem in his earlier essay, it is not surprising that he hat this failure is not of merely biographical interest, but that the here reaches a variant of the Hegelian solution. undialectical conclusions of this text anticipate the later undialectical theory. Marx argues that the proletariat alone of all classes can go beyond a practice relation in the socialist movement: "In fact, it suffices to replace the merely political revolution to a general social revolution for it has no place word philosophy in the 'Introduction with the word Party (and at bottom within the existing system. It is, Marx claims, and here he was right for his in the two cases we are concerned with an ideology-elaborating group) in time if not for ours, the product of the"disintegration"of other social strata, order to obtain a position very close to that expressed by Lenin in his work with no sectional interests of its own to defend. For this reason its project What is to be done”n can be truly universal in character, and can bring down the system of class farx's failure in this essay is due in part to his method, which differs which Marx now identifies as the source of egoistic individualism and the radically from that of his later sociological and economic work He does not basis of civil society start from an analysis of society but from philosophy. He takes his new larx concludes that only the proletariat can"revolutionize the ele- philosophical concept of freedom and tests it against the various classes of ments themselves, " that is, transform what it is to be an individual in society, society to find one that can serve as its representative in practice. As he puts for it has no interest in conserving a particular status opposed to the whole, Revolutions need a passive element, a material basis... "2Or again, hence no interest in perpetuating the split between civil society and the state " Theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses. 24 The proletariat thus appears as the appropriate instrument of Marx's phi- Marx's essay looks like a class analysis and indee features of it losophy and the demand for revolution is now addressed to this class. Marx ipate his later theory of class. He tries to prove that previous, merely writes, "Philosophy is the head of this emancipation and the proletariat is its political revolutions have failed to achieve human emancipation because the heart. Philosophy can only be realized by the abolition of the proletariat, and have liberated not man but particular classes from oppression. The French the proletariat can only be abolished by the realization of philosophy oisie, for example, was oppressed by the nobility in terms of its In spite of the elegant symmetry of this solution, it falls far short of re particular interests. The wrongs done to the bourgeoisie appeared to all other solving the problems Marx has posed for himself. Here theory and practice classes to exemplify the general injustice of the sociery and so they supported arise independently, and if social revolution satisfies essential demands of its revolution. But the liberation of the bourgeoisie from these wrongs wa theory, it is by no means clear that the proletariat intends this result in not human emancipation but only bourgeois emancipation. It did not free revolting. Lukacs remarks: humanity but only the bourgeoisie to pursue its interests, which in turn The issue turns on the question of theory and practice. And this not me into conflict with the interests of society as a whole erely in the sense given it by Marx when he says in his first critique of Hegel that"theory becomes a material force when it has seized the 33 Chapter
33 Chapter 2 34 in attempting to base his philosophy on a real social force, there is the danger that he will reduce historical action to a mere instrument of philosophy, which later would then be the real “subject” of the revolutionary process. Marx first approaches this problem in a speculative form in the “Introduction” to the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.” There he arrives at an undialectical construction of the relation of theory to practice, philosophy to the proletariat, that does not so much overcome the abstract character of ethical demands as attribute this very abstractness to the demands of an entire social class. Lucien Goldmann suggests that this failure is not of merely biographical interest, but that the undialectical conclusions of this text anticipate the later undialectical theorypractice relation in the socialist movement: “In fact, it suffices to replace the word philosophy in the ‘Introduction’ with the word Party (and at bottom in the two cases we are concerned with an ideology-elaborating group) in order to obtain a position very close to that expressed by Lenin in his work What is To Be Done?”22 Marx’s failure in this essay is due in part to his method, which differs radically from that of his later sociological and economic work. He does not start from an analysis of society but from philosophy. He takes his new philosophical concept of freedom and tests it against the various classes of society to find one that can serve as its representative in practice. As he puts it, “Revolutions need a passive element, a material basis . . .”23 Or again, “Theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses.”24 Marx’s essay looks like a class analysis and indeed some features of it anticipate his later theory of class. He tries to prove that previous, merely political revolutions have failed to achieve human emancipation because they have liberated not man but particular classes from oppression. The French bourgeoisie, for example, was oppressed by the nobility in terms of its particular interests. The wrongs done to the bourgeoisie appeared to all other classes to exemplify the general injustice of the society and so they supported its revolution. But the liberation of the bourgeoisie from these wrongs was not human emancipation but only bourgeois emancipation. It did not free humanity but only the bourgeoisie to pursue its interests, which in turn came into conflict with the interests of society as a whole. Thus it is the very principle of class which limits political revolution. Marx concludes, and this distinguishes his early method from that of the later works, that his philosophy cannot be realized by a social class in the usual sense but only by “a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution of all classes.”25 What he is seeking, in other words, is a class that is not a class, a “universal” class in something like Hegel’s sense of the term, with no particular interest at all, hence none opposed to that of society as a whole. Having arrived at a rather Hegelian formulation of the problem in his earlier essay, it is not surprising that he here reaches a variant of the Hegelian solution. Marx argues that the proletariat alone of all classes can go beyond a merely political revolution to a general social revolution for it has no place within the existing system. It is, Marx claims, and here he was right for his time if not for ours, the product of the “disintegration” of other social strata, with no sectional interests of its own to defend. For this reason its project can be truly universal in character, and can bring down the system of class which Marx now identifies as the source of egoistic individualism and the basis of civil society. Marx concludes that only the proletariat can “revolutionize the elements themselves,” that is, transform what it is to be an individual in society, for it has no interest in conserving a particular status opposed to the whole, hence no interest in perpetuating the split between civil society and the state. The proletariat thus appears as the appropriate instrument of Marx’s philosophy and the demand for revolution is now addressed to this class. Marx writes, “Philosophy is the head of this emancipation and the proletariat is its heart. Philosophy can only be realized by the abolition of the proletariat, and the proletariat can only be abolished by the realization of philosophy.”26 In spite of the elegant symmetry of this solution, it falls far short of resolving the problems Marx has posed for himself. Here theory and practice arise independently, and if social revolution satisfies essential demands of theory, it is by no means clear that the proletariat intends this result in revolting. Lukács remarks: The issue turns on the question of theory and practice. And this not merely in the sense given it by Marx when he says in his first critique of Hegel that “theory becomes a material force when it has seized the
masses. " Even more to the point is the need to discover those features revising the concept of reason as it is formulated both in the philosophical and determinations both of the theory and the ways of seizing the tradition and his previous writings. To accomplish this, Marx must masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle eturn to the study of need from a new angle. In the early essays, Marx f revolution. We must extract the practical found a form of rational interaction in the pursuit of happiness. But the the method and its relation to its object. If this is not done that"seizing content of the concept of need with which he worked remained unthema- the masses" could well turn out to be a will o' the wisp. It might turn tized and unanalyzed; it remained, in fact, immediate and hence irrational out that the masses were seized by quite different forces, that they were for Marx as it had for earlier political philosophy. This now becomes the in pursuit of quite different ends. In that event, there would be no nec. decisive dimension of the problem sary connection between the theory and their activity, it would be a If there was a still dogmatic element in the earlier essays, it lay in Marx's form that enables the masses to become conscious of their socially nec- failure to derive rational social interaction, the of the essary or fortuitous actions, without ensuring a genuine and necessary elements themselves, "from the needs it was to help satisfy. Instead, social bond between consciousness and action. 27 revolution still appeared as a philosophical exigency from which the needy Lukacs points out that in the same text Marx briefly lays down the basic could incidentally benefit. The antinomy on and need is not abolished condition for achieving real unity of theory and practice. Marx writes, Will in the accidental convergence of philosophy and the proletariat, but rather theoretical needs be directly practical needs? It is not enough that thought reproduced in a new guise. The antinomies of philosophy and reality, theory should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive toward thought. "28 Both and practice which appear in Marx's discussion of historical agency are Marx and Lukacs thus arrive at the conclusion that it is not only the"indif- simply displacements of the original antinomy of politic ference of form towards content" that must be overcome, but also the resolve these antinomies, Marx will now reverse the terms of the problem indifference of content towards form and attempt to found the demands of reason in the very nature of need. But Marx has so far seen the necessity of creating a form of rational interac- his amounts to demonstrating that the content of the sphere of need is tion in the pursuit of happiness and to this end he has identified an agent rational, is, in fact, the essential sphere of rationality for a metacritically capable of implementing the"demands of reason. " But still the form-content reconstructed concept of distinction persists because the pursuit of happiness itself has not been raised How does Marx go about it? I will sketch the three dialectical "me universality, only its for The proletariat ments" of Marx,'s metacritique and then elaborate each in some detail. Marx appears as a passive instrument of philosophy because its revolt uncon- begins by showing that philosophical categories are displacements of social sciously serves the"cunning of reason" by realizing this form. An ungenerous ones. For example, Marx is convinced that the problem of alienated labor is observer could still insist that Marx is tossing"the roasted pigeons of abso- the real foundation of Hegel's philosophy, but that Hegel does not pose lute science"into the mouth of the proletariat. Marx correctly. Marx argues that "Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political hat there is no solution within the framework of a formalistic concept of economy. He conceives labour as the the self-confirming n, and so he proceeds to a radical critique and revision of the concept of [ But] labour as Hegel understands and es it is abstract reason itself. mental labour. Thus, that which above all constitutes the essence of philoso- phy, the alienation of man knowing himself, or alienated scIence Revision of the Concept of Reason itself, Hegel grasps as its essence. 29 The whole artificial, speculative and In the third phase of his early work, in the Economic and Philosophical ultimately theological structure of Hegel's system results from his failure to Manuscripts of 1844, Marx sets out to unify theory and practice through thematize real labor as the ontological core of history 35 Chapter
35 Chapter 2 36 masses.” Even more to the point is the need to discover those features and determinations both of the theory and the ways of seizing the masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle of revolution. We must extract the practical essence of the theory from the method and its relation to its object. If this is not done that “seizing the masses” could well turn out to be a will o’ the wisp. It might turn out that the masses were seized by quite different forces, that they were in pursuit of quite different ends. In that event, there would be no necessary connection between the theory and their activity, it would be a form that enables the masses to become conscious of their socially necessary or fortuitous actions, without ensuring a genuine and necessary bond between consciousness and action.27 Lukács points out that in the same text Marx briefly lays down the basic condition for achieving real unity of theory and practice. Marx writes, “Will theoretical needs be directly practical needs? It is not enough that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive toward thought.”28 Both Marx and Lukács thus arrive at the conclusion that it is not only the “indifference of form towards content” that must be overcome, but also the indifference of content towards form. Marx has so far seen the necessity of creating a form of rational interaction in the pursuit of happiness and to this end he has identified an agent capable of implementing the “demands of reason.” But still the form-content distinction persists because the pursuit of happiness itself has not been raised to rational universality, only its form, i.e. cooperation. The proletariat appears as a passive instrument of philosophy because its revolt unconsciously serves the “cunning of reason” by realizing this form. An ungenerous observer could still insist that Marx is tossing “the roasted pigeons of absolute science” into the mouth of the proletariat. Marx now seems to realize that there is no solution within the framework of a formalistic concept of reason, and so he proceeds to a radical critique and revision of the concept of reason itself. Revision of the Concept of Reason In the third phase of his early work, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx sets out to unify theory and practice through revising the concept of reason as it is formulated both in the philosophical tradition and his own previous writings. To accomplish this, Marx must return to the study of need from a new angle. In the early essays, Marx found a form of rational interaction in the pursuit of happiness. But the content of the concept of need with which he worked remained unthematized and unanalyzed; it remained, in fact, immediate and hence irrational for Marx as it had for earlier political philosophy. This now becomes the decisive dimension of the problem. If there was a still dogmatic element in the earlier essays, it lay in Marx’s failure to derive rational social interaction, the “revolutionizing of the elements themselves,” from the needs it was to help satisfy. Instead, social revolution still appeared as a philosophical exigency from which the needy could incidentally benefit. The antinomy of reason and need is not abolished in the accidental convergence of philosophy and the proletariat, but rather reproduced in a new guise. The antinomies of philosophy and reality, theory and practice which appear in Marx’s discussion of historical agency are simply displacements of the original antinomy of political philosophy. To resolve these antinomies, Marx will now reverse the terms of the problem and attempt to found the demands of reason in the very nature of need. But this amounts to demonstrating that the content of the sphere of need is rational, is, in fact, the essential sphere of rationality for a metacritically reconstructed concept of reason. How does Marx go about it? I will sketch the three dialectical “moments” of Marx’s metacritique and then elaborate each in some detail. Marx begins by showing that philosophical categories are displacements of social ones. For example, Marx is convinced that the problem of alienated labor is the real foundation of Hegel’s philosophy, but that Hegel does not pose it correctly. Marx argues that “Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy. He conceives labour as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man. . . . [But] labour as Hegel understands and recognizes it is abstract mental labour. Thus, that which above all constitutes the essence of philosophy, the alienation of man knowing himself, or alienated science thinking itself, Hegel grasps as its essence.” 29 The whole artificial, speculative and ultimately theological structure of Hegel’s system results from his failure to thematize real labor as the ontological core of history
Having relativized the philosophical categories with respect to social the need to change the world has vanished. The tulate itself ones, Marx proceeds to the second"moment"of the metacritique. This on having produced the reality and thereby justified it. consists in casting the social categories in the form of the philosophical ones This is what Lukacs means by philosophy re in the Reductionism is avoided by treating the now socially interpreted categori of immediacy. In The Holy Family, Marx and Engels describe it birical facts but as moments in a philosophical dialectic. Thus mystery of speculative construction. They write, Speculation Marx's labor is not that of the economists but plays a properly philosophical hand apparently freely creates its object a priori out of itself and, on the role. Finally, in a third phase, the metacritique demonstrates the power of other hand, precisely because it wishes to get rid by sophistry of the rational social action to resolve the contradictions of the philosophically recast social and natural dependence on the object, falls into the most irrational and tegories. In this phase Marx is able to show that the alienation of labor is a unnatural bondage to the object, whose most accidental and most individual fundamental problem within philosophy, and not just a contingent social attributes it is obliged to construe as absolutely necessary and general problem. This is impossible for Hegel who encounters the alienation of labor Hegel's error results from describing real alienation as the phenomena in history as no more than a passing appearance of the alienation of reason. For Hegel the alienation of the In sum, Marx redefines the terms of Hegel's philosophy, while retaining individual in the ancien regime did not consist in reduction to an"abased, in part the relations Hegel establishes between these terms. Marx can then enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being, "but in the fact that the state did et the entire system in motion in history because of the social redefinition to which he has submitted it. It is clear that marxs new definitions do not rational obedience of is subjects. Once the stac has d s d not command the correspond with Hegels and that he shifts back and forth in the Manuscript can command rational obedience even from an "abased. enslaved. aban- between his own concepts and s. But this is not just an ambiguous use loned, contemptible being. There is thus a merely contingent relation of terms. Marx's substantive thesis is that Hegel's concepts are a miscon- between philosophy and Marx's"real"alienation, which consists in human struction of a reality he has described more accurately, that he is solving the misery and dependence. The philosopher becomes the "enemy"of the ry problems Hegel addressed human community in demonstrating to it that it should accept its fate The first phase of Marx's metacritique is developed in the conclusion of without protest. He withdraws the moral credit of the oppressed by rational- the Manuscripts in the "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic " There Marx argues ing the established order. thought. To found reason, that is, to demonstrate the unity of subject and ideat Marx argues that Hegel falls into"uncritical positivism and uncritical by narrowing the subject to a mere function bject, "It is necessary, therefore, to surmount the object of consciousness. thought Objectivity as such is regarded as an alienated human relationship which alent to self- consciousness. All does not corr alienation of human life is, therefore, nothing but alienation of self- return of the alienated, the demonstration of its unity with the ce consciousness. The alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded as subject, consists for Hegel only in surpassing the cognitive immediacy of the the expression, reflected in knowledge and thought, of the real alien- object. Thus the appropriation of alienated reality is its comprehension. But, ation of human life. Instead, actual alienation, that which appears real, Marx argues, in its social application this method leaves the world exactly as is in its innermost hidden nature(which philosophy first discloses)only it was before, tacking a certificate of rationality onto every form of oppres- the phenomenal being of the alienation of real human life, self- n. Since alienation is, at least for Hegel, really overcome in philosophy, Hence for Hegel, "It is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself
37 Chapter 2 38 Having relativized the philosophical categories with respect to social ones, Marx proceeds to the second “moment” of the metacritique. This consists in casting the social categories in the form of the philosophical ones. Reductionism is avoided by treating the now socially interpreted categories not as empirical facts but as moments in a philosophical dialectic. Thus Marx’s labor is not that of the economists but plays a properly philosophical role. Finally, in a third phase, the metacritique demonstrates the power of social action to resolve the contradictions of the philosophically recast social categories. In this phase Marx is able to show that the alienation of labor is a fundamental problem within philosophy, and not just a contingent social problem. This is impossible for Hegel who encounters the alienation of labor in history as no more than a passing concern. In sum, Marx redefines the terms of Hegel’s philosophy, while retaining in part the relations Hegel establishes between these terms. Marx can then set the entire system in motion in history because of the social redefinition to which he has submitted it. It is clear that Marx’s new definitions do not correspond with Hegel’s and that he shifts back and forth in the Manuscripts between his own concepts and Hegel’s. But this is not just an ambiguous use of terms. Marx’s substantive thesis is that Hegel’s concepts are a misconstruction of a reality he has described more accurately, that he is solving the very problems Hegel addressed unsuccessfully in a mystified way. The first phase of Marx’s metacritique is developed in the conclusion of the Manuscripts in the “Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic.” There Marx argues that Hegel’s term “alienation” stands for the uncomprehended object of thought. To found reason, that is, to demonstrate the unity of subject and object, “It is necessary, therefore, to surmount the object of consciousness. Objectivity as such is regarded as an alienated human relationship which does not correspond with the essence of man, self-consciousness.” 30 The return of the alienated, the demonstration of its unity with the conscious subject, consists for Hegel only in surpassing the cognitive immediacy of the object. Thus the appropriation of alienated reality is its comprehension. But, Marx argues, in its social application this method leaves the world exactly as it was before, tacking a certificate of rationality onto every form of oppression. Since alienation is, at least for Hegel, really overcome in philosophy, the need to change the world has vanished. Thought can congratulate itself on having produced the reality and thereby justified it. This is what Lukács means by philosophy remaining in the standpoint of immediacy. In The Holy Family, Marx and Engels describe it as “the mystery of speculative construction.” They write, “Speculation on the one hand apparently freely creates its object a priori out of itself and, on the other hand, precisely because it wishes to get rid by sophistry of the rational and natural dependence on the object, falls into the most irrational and unnatural bondage to the object, whose most accidental and most individual attributes it is obliged to construe as absolutely necessary and general.”31 Hegel’s error results from describing real alienation as the phenomenal appearance of the alienation of reason. For Hegel the alienation of the individual in the ancien régime did not consist in reduction to an “abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being,” but in the fact that the state did not correspond with its concept, that, in practice, it could not command the rational obedience of its subjects. Once the state has been reformed, then it can command rational obedience even from an “abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being.” There is thus a merely contingent relation between philosophy and Marx’s “real” alienation, which consists in human misery and dependence. The philosopher becomes the “enemy” of the human community in demonstrating to it that it should accept its fate without protest. He withdraws the moral credit of the oppressed by rationalizing the established order. Marx argues that Hegel falls into “uncritical positivism and uncritical idealism” because he begins by narrowing the subject to a mere function of thought. For Hegel, human life, man is equivalent to self-consciousness. All alienation of human life is, therefore, nothing but alienation of selfconsciousness. The alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded as the expression, reflected in knowledge and thought, of the real alienation of human life. Instead, actual alienation, that which appears real, is in its innermost hidden nature (which philosophy first discloses) only the phenomenal being of the alienation of real human life, selfconsciousness.32 Hence for Hegel, “It is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself
inhumanly, in opposition to himself, but that he objectifies himself by terms modeled on identity philosophy. Michel Henry notes, " the structure distinction from and in opposition to abstract thought, which constitutes of the proletariat appears as the structure of consciousness itself such as this alienation as it exists and as it has to be transcended. "33 is understood in german metaphys tion to the formula he ascribes mansel. In this second phase Marx revises the concepts of need and reason to consciousness,Marx argues that man is sensuous kistence, and overcome their antinomial formulation in political philosophy. This revision that, therefore, the subject is a natural being. Its essential mode of activity consists in transferring the formal attributes of reason to need. In Hegel, is also natural: labor, not thinking. Similarly, Marx proposes to redefine the reason is self-reflective, it mediates itself in the course of its own self- mally for the human senses. Note that Man does not return to Locke. He narrow sense that its ethical postulates apply equrrso universal.both in the concept of the object as an essential correlate of this subject, existing pre development in history; again, for Hegel reason is als all, but also in does not found knowledge on the senses in the empiricist manner, but broader sense that its unconditioned categories apply to the whole of reality redefines subject and object in their living connection. Thus Marx's"sense The unity of subject and object is the foundation of this concept of rational- object"is not a Lockean "idea"but the actual object itself, as it exists for the ity, the essential demand of reason which establishes reasons' imperium eases and especially as an object of need. Marx transfers these determinations of rationality wholesale onto"man. Writing still under the influence of Heidegger in his early review of the And since"man"in Marx's sense is a being of need, need no longer appears Manuscripts, Marcuse relates the Marxian concept of sensuousness to Kant's as the irrational content of a formalistic rationality, but is itself charged with claim that objects are necessarily given through sense perception. Sensuou the functions of rationality ness is thus a transcendental precondition of access to objectivity in general For Marx the philosophical subject is now a natural being, man. As and not just a material relationship to particular objects. Feuerbach empha- such, this subject encounters its object, nature, in a natural way, through sized the passive nature of the sensuous subject and its quality of neediness need, Bertell Ollman suggests the concept of "internal relations"to describe and dependence on its objects. These ideas culminate in Marx for whom the his encounter. The ontologically primordial sphere is not that of natural distress and neediness that appear in man s sensuousness are no more purely science, in which external relations prevail, but the sphere of need in which matters of cognition than his distress and neediness, as expressed in es essential relations unite subject and object. As a natural, embodied, sen- tranged labor, are purely economic. Distress and neediness do not describe tient, objective being [man] is a suffering, conditioned and limited human the individual modes of man's behavior at all; they are features of his whole being, like animals and plants. The object of his drives exist outside himself being. "35 As such, they are correlated with fearures of being itself. With the as objects independent of him, yet they are objects of his needs, essential tablishment of these new definitions of the philosophical subject and objects which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his bject, the first phase of Marx' s metacritique is completed. faculties. "39 of an object is the most evident and irrefutable The second phase of the metacritique then proceeds to reconstitute the proof that the object belongs to my nature and that the existence of the formal structure of philosophy of identity with the help of these redefined object for me and its property are the property appropriate to my being. "40 terms. It is easy to overlook this moment of the metacritique since Marx Were this simply a statement about human physiology it would of insists that "real, natural subjects must have"real, " natural objects. This course be completely banal. It is no news that hunger requires food. How- seems to imply that objects and subjects are things standing in extern ever, Marx is attempting to make a statement about being in general, about relations. But the concept of"thinghood" is inadequate to grasp the essence ontology, and not just about the empirical being of the human animal. He of natural being, Despite the mutual externality of real subjects and objects explicitly affirms that this is an ontological relation, and not merely a fact of his remarks seem to imply, Marx goes on to reconstruct their relations in physiology. He writes, "Man,'s feelings, passions, etc, are not merely anthro- 39 Chapter
39 Chapter 2 40 inhumanly, in opposition to himself, but that he objectifies himself by distinction from and in opposition to abstract thought, which constitutes alienation as it exists and as it has to be transcended.”33 In opposition to the formula he ascribes to Hegel, “man=selfconsciousness,” Marx argues that man is sensuous natural existence, and that, therefore, the subject is a natural being.34 Its essential mode of activity is also natural: labor, not thinking. Similarly, Marx proposes to redefine the concept of the object as an essential correlate of this subject, existing proximally for the human senses. Note that Marx does not return to Locke. He does not found knowledge on the senses in the empiricist manner, but redefines subject and object in their living connection. Thus Marx’s "sense object" is not a Lockean “idea” but the actual object itself, as it exists for the senses and especially as an object of need. Writing still under the influence of Heidegger in his early review of the Manuscripts, Marcuse relates the Marxian concept of sensuousness to Kant’s claim that objects are necessarily given through sense perception. Sensuousness is thus a transcendental precondition of access to objectivity in general and not just a material relationship to particular objects. Feuerbach emphasized the passive nature of the sensuous subject and its quality of neediness and dependence on its objects. These ideas culminate in Marx for whom the “distress and neediness that appear in man’s sensuousness are no more purely matters of cognition than his distress and neediness, as expressed in estranged labor, are purely economic. Distress and neediness do not describe the individual modes of man’s behavior at all; they are features of his whole being.”35 As such, they are correlated with features of being itself. With the establishment of these new definitions of the philosophical subject and object, the first phase of Marx’s metacritique is completed. The second phase of the metacritique then proceeds to reconstitute the formal structure of philosophy of identity with the help of these redefined terms. It is easy to overlook this moment of the metacritique since Marx insists that “real,” natural subjects must have “real,” natural objects. This seems to imply that objects and subjects are things standing in external relations. But the concept of “thinghood” is inadequate to grasp the essence of natural being.36 Despite the mutual externality of real subjects and objects his remarks seem to imply, Marx goes on to reconstruct their relations in terms modeled on identity philosophy. Michel Henry notes, “the structure of the proletariat appears as the structure of consciousness itself such as this is understood in German metaphysics.”37 In this second phase Marx revises the concepts of need and reason to overcome their antinomial formulation in political philosophy. This revision consists in transferring the formal attributes of reason to need. In Hegel, reason is self-reflective, it mediates itself in the course of its own selfdevelopment in history; again, for Hegel reason is also universal, both in the narrow sense that its ethical postulates apply equally to all, but also in the broader sense that its unconditioned categories apply to the whole of reality. The unity of subject and object is the foundation of this concept of rationality, the essential demand of reason which establishes reasons’ imperium. Marx transfers these determinations of rationality wholesale onto “man.” And since “man” in Marx’s sense is a being of need, need no longer appears as the irrational content of a formalistic rationality, but is itself charged with the functions of rationality. For Marx the philosophical subject is now a natural being, man. As such, this subject encounters its object, nature, in a natural way, through need. Bertell Ollman suggests the concept of “internal relations” to describe this encounter.38 The ontologically primordial sphere is not that of natural science, in which external relations prevail, but the sphere of need in which essential relations unite subject and object. “As a natural, embodied, sentient, objective being [man] is a suffering, conditioned and limited human being, like animals and plants. The object of his drives exist outside himself as objects independent of him, yet they are objects of his needs, essential objects which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his faculties.”39 Again: “the need of an object is the most evident and irrefutable proof that the object belongs to my nature and that the existence of the object for me and its property are the property appropriate to my being.”40 Were this simply a statement about human physiology it would of course be completely banal. It is no news that hunger requires food. However, Marx is attempting to make a statement about being in general, about ontology, and not just about the empirical being of the human animal. He explicitly affirms that this is an ontological relation, and not merely a fact of physiology. He writes, “Man’s feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthro-
pological characteristics in the narrower sense, but are true ontological "non-musical ear" knows less than the musical ear. It misses the reality of affirmations of being (nature). "4 What is more, he proposes a theory of hat it hears. Marx thus distinguishes between a merely animal relation to he historical evolution of human need which indicates that it is not o the world and the revealing of a meaning. It is in the recognition of meaning hunger which is objectified in food, but the higher needs of the soci that man and nature are united. Thus sociery is the accomplished union of human being which find their essential object in the natural world. In this man with nature, the veritable resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism sense the interdependence of man and nature takes on a larger metaphysical of man and the realized humanism of nature. "47 significance which I will call their"participatory identity. Hence Marx says Finally, the third phase of the metacritique derives philosophical and that"Nature is the inorganic body of express the idea that itical from these formulations that nature, subject and object, are indies uDly o once the philosophical terms have been reconstituted in history where they Now too the labor through which need is satisfied will also appear as an an be set in motion through social practice. Ar stake her ontological category in the forms of philosophy of identity. Labor is in fact the concept of"alienation"which, Marx argues, stands in contradiction to the actual of unifying subject and object, man and nature. Here the "hum Hegel's concept of alienation is now revised to mean a Marx passes from the abstract and immediate positing of the unity of subject specific, degraded type of objectification in which the transformed world and object in need, to a reflective, mediated unity through the production of turns around and dominates its creators instead of serving them. The indi- he object of need by the subject in labor viduals cannot recognize or develop themselves through alienated objects, Such philosophically reconceptualized labor Marx calls "objectifica but are crushed and oppressed by them. Because alienation, as"loss of the tion, the natural activity of the naturalized subject, man. When human object, is not just a social category but also a determination of being, it beings transform their environment through labor, they "objectify"their recapitulates the antinomy of subject and object. In alienation, subject and needs and faculties. This they must do, for as a natural being man must object stand in conflict, as opposed principles requiring mediation. express and authenticate himself in being as well as in thought, "43The Identity philosophy demands that the object appear in speculation as a result is a"humanized" nature within which human beings can fulfill them product of the subject, but for Marx this production process is now a real elves and unfold their potentialities in a continuous process of self- and one, occurring in history and not in the head of a philosopher. Alienation is world-creation. Human existence is confirmed and universalized in the a problem for philosophy, splitting subject from object, but not a problem transformed objects of labor and, by extension, in all of being. Marx writes, that could be solved in pure thought through a speculative con It is only when objective reality everywhere becomes for man in society the Marx notes that " the medium through which alienation occurs is itself a reality of human faculties, human reality, and the reality of his own faculties, practical one. Its transcendence will also have to be practical, requiring that all objects become for him the objectification of himself. The obj reversal in the relations between human beings and the products of thei hen confirm and realize his individuality. They are his own objects, which is labor. This then is the real" alienation which must be overcome and which to say that man himself becomes the object. 44 Hegel confounds with objectivity itself. Marx uses the word"human" here in an emphatic sense: "Man is not Philosophy now appears not as a means through which a subject-object merely a natural being: he is a human natural being..Consequently, human unity is achieved, but rather as the reflection in thought of their unification objects are not natural objects as they present themselves directly.. 4 To be through labor. If this unity is obstructed by alienation, philosophy too will human in this sense is to be social. Thus the humanization of nature reveals fail. Thus where Hegel saw actual alienation, alienation in Marx,'s sense of ocial dimensions of objects hidden to alienated man. The full reality of the term, as the phenomenal form of the alienation of self-consciousness, nature is known to an attuned observer, not to"crude erception. The 41 Chapter 2
41 Chapter 2 42 pological characteristics in the narrower sense, but are true ontological affirmations of being (nature)…”41 What is more, he proposes a theory of the historical evolution of human need which indicates that it is not only hunger which is objectified in food, but the higher needs of the social human being which find their essential object in the natural world. In this sense the interdependence of man and nature takes on a larger metaphysical significance which I will call their “participatory identity.” Hence Marx says that “Nature is the inorganic body of man,” to express the idea that man and nature, subject and object, are indissolubly joined. 42 Now too the labor through which need is satisfied will also appear as an ontological category in the forms of philosophy of identity. Labor is in fact the actual process of unifying subject and object, man and nature. Here Marx passes from the abstract and immediate positing of the unity of subject and object in need, to a reflective, mediated unity through the production of the object of need by the subject in labor. Such philosophically reconceptualized labor Marx calls “objectification,” the natural activity of the naturalized subject, man. When human beings transform their environment through labor, they “objectify” their needs and faculties. This they must do, for as a natural being man must “express and authenticate himself in being as well as in thought,” 43 The result is a “humanized” nature within which human beings can fulfill themselves and unfold their potentialities in a continuous process of self- and world-creation. Human existence is confirmed and universalized in the transformed objects of labor and, by extension, in all of being. Marx writes, “It is only when objective reality everywhere becomes for man in society the reality of human faculties, human reality, and the reality of his own faculties, that all objects become for him the objectification of himself. The objects then confirm and realize his individuality. They are his own objects, which is to say that man himself becomes the object.”44 Marx uses the word “human” here in an emphatic sense: “Man is not merely a natural being; he is a human natural being….Consequently, human objects are not natural objects as they present themselves directly…”45 To be human in this sense is to be social. Thus the humanization of nature reveals social dimensions of objects hidden to alienated man. The full reality of nature is known to an attuned observer, not to “crude” perception. The “non-musical ear” knows less than the musical ear.46 It misses the reality of what it hears. Marx thus distinguishes between a merely animal relation to the world and the revealing of a meaning. It is in the recognition of meaning that man and nature are united. “Thus society is the accomplished union of man with nature, the veritable resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature.”47 Finally, the third phase of the metacritique derives philosophical and political consequences from these formulations, consequences that appear once the philosophical terms have been reconstituted in history where they can be set in motion through social practice. At stake here is the meaning of the concept of “alienation” which, Marx argues, stands in contradiction to the “human essence.” Hegel’s concept of alienation is now revised to mean a specific, degraded type of objectification in which the transformed world turns around and dominates its creators instead of serving them. The individuals cannot recognize or develop themselves through alienated objects, but are crushed and oppressed by them. Because alienation, as “loss of the object,” is not just a social category but also a determination of being, it recapitulates the antinomy of subject and object. In alienation, subject and object stand in conflict, as opposed principles requiring mediation. Identity philosophy demands that the object appear in speculation as a product of the subject, but for Marx this production process is now a real one, occurring in history and not in the head of a philosopher. Alienation is a problem for philosophy, splitting subject from object, but not a problem that could be solved in pure thought through a speculative construction. Marx notes that “the medium through which alienation occurs is itself a practical one.”48 Its transcendence will also have to be practical, requiring a reversal in the relations between human beings and the products of their labor. This then is the “real” alienation which must be overcome and which Hegel confounds with objectivity itself. Philosophy now appears not as a means through which a subject-object unity is achieved, but rather as the reflection in thought of their unification through labor. If this unity is obstructed by alienation, philosophy too will fail. Thus where Hegel saw actual alienation, alienation in Marx’s sense of the term, as the phenomenal form of the alienation of self-consciousness