quainted. This is possible because, as Ernest Mandel remarks, "the concept conception of being that would take into account both its subjective and of alienation.. is part of the mature Marx's instrumentarium Lukacs was objective dimensions. in fact the first to show this, to notice and explain not merely the influence For Hegel the resolution of the antinomies is a theoretical task. How- of Hegel on Marx's early political ral marxian"world er, he believes that this task can only be carried out under specific histori- but on the concepts and method of Capital He reevaluated Marx conditions which happened to be those of his own time and place. famous"coquetting" with Hegel, and concluded that in that work, "a whole Philosophy of praxis begins with a critique of the conservative implications series of categories of central importance and in constant use stem directhy of this resolution of the antinomies and a radicalization of its historical from Hegel's Logic.” aspect. Both Marx and Lukacs argued that because Hegel could not conceive Lukacs reconstructed a philosophy of praxis from the methodologic of really radical changes in modern culture, he treated temporary historical traces of Marx's philosophical position visible in his economic wri conditions such as monarchy and wage labor as though they were eternal result of this effort is not identical with the position of either the Manu- necessities. They claimed that the antinomies would be transcended by social scripts or the Grundrisse; nevertheless, it is impressive to what extent Lukacs support in these unpublished ones. Most important, Lukacs'philosophy of ang Had Marx confined himself to arguing this position in relation to the somewhat speculative extrapolations from Marx's published work can find praxis has remarkable structural similarities to that of Marx, notably insofar phy of value based on the demand for revolutionary social change. This new as lukacs develops an original critique of philosophy paralleling Marx's o philosophy would have been compatible with a traditional ontology and This convergence has a biographical background. Like Marx, Lukacs was might have been formulated as a"left" variant of Hegel' s philosophy. Marx's deeply schooled in Hegelian dialectics and so when he sought to develop a startling innovation was to include all the antinomies in his theory of revolu- Marxist philosophy, he returned to the Hegelian doctrine from which Marx tion, those relating to epistemology and ontology as well as the moral and set out. It is this link, mediated by the supposedly"scientific"work Capital political ones. He thus arrived at the astounding proposition that social hich bespeaks an affinity of Marxism for philosophy of praxis. Yet this change could not only accomplish such goals as reconciling individual and biographical coincidence does not quite explain the similarity of the trans- society, moral responsibility and self-interest, but that it could also unite formation undergone by Hegel's dialectic at their hands subject and object, thought and being, man and nature. This proposition has a number of paradoxical corollaries from which The antinomies must not shrink in interpreting the early Marx. As we will see, Lukacs to The defining trait of philosophy of praxis is the claim that the"antino. shares a similar approach. When philosophy of praxis contends that human mies"of philosophy can only be resolved in history. The concept of"antin- action is philosophically relevant not just in ethics or politics but in all omy"employed here is derived from Hegel, for whom it signifies the ever domains, it is asserting a wholly original ontological position. For this idening gap between subject and object in modern culture. Ever since philosophy, human action touches being as such, and not simply those Descartes distinguished the two substances, philosophy and life had become special domains we usually conceive as affected by our activities. In some- more and more sharply sundered. Rich and complex theories of the subjec what different terms, essentially this same requirement can be formulated tive dimension of being explain the meaning of freedom, value, political the transcendence of the antinomy of value and fact, "ought" and"is. For, ideals, while equally powerful and encompassing theories of the objective if human action affects being, then values do not confront a normless and dimension of being explain the laws of necessity in nature and history. From humanly indifferent reality, but rather represent its highest potentialities his earliest to his last works, Hegel saw his task as cataloguing the resulting This position is coherent only where being is interpreted through a spe- ontradictions in modern culture and transcending them in a dialectical cial sphere in which human being is actually able to transform the objects or 3 Chapter
3 Chapter 1 4 quainted. This is possible because, as Ernest Mandel remarks, “the concept of alienation . . . is part of the mature Marx's instrumentarium.”4 Lukács was in fact the first to show this, to notice and explain not merely the influence of Hegel on Marx's early political essays, or on the general Marxian "worldview," but on the concepts and method of Capital. He reevaluated Marx's famous "coquetting" with Hegel, and concluded that in that work, “a whole series of categories of central importance and in constant use stem directly from Hegel's Logic.”5 Lukács reconstructed a philosophy of praxis from the methodological traces of Marx's philosophical position visible in his economic writings. The result of this effort is not identical with the position of either the Manuscripts or the Grundrisse; nevertheless, it is impressive to what extent Lukács’ somewhat speculative extrapolations from Marx's published work can find support in these unpublished ones. Most important, Lukács’ philosophy of praxis has remarkable structural similarities to that of Marx, notably insofar as Lukács develops an original critique of philosophy paralleling Marx's own. This convergence has a biographical background. Like Marx, Lukács was deeply schooled in Hegelian dialectics and so when he sought to develop a Marxist philosophy, he returned to the Hegelian doctrine from which Marx set out. It is this link, mediated by the supposedly “scientific” work Capital, which bespeaks an affinity of Marxism for philosophy of praxis. Yet this biographical coincidence does not quite explain the similarity of the transformation undergone by Hegel's dialectic at their hands. The Antinomies The defining trait of philosophy of praxis is the claim that the “antinomies” of philosophy can only be resolved in history. The concept of “antinomy” employed here is derived from Hegel, for whom it signifies the ever widening gap between subject and object in modern culture. Ever since Descartes distinguished the two substances, philosophy and life had become more and more sharply sundered. Rich and complex theories of the subjective dimension of being explain the meaning of freedom, value, political ideals, while equally powerful and encompassing theories of the objective dimension of being explain the laws of necessity in nature and history. From his earliest to his last works, Hegel saw his task as cataloguing the resulting contradictions in modern culture and transcending them in a dialectical conception of being that would take into account both its subjective and objective dimensions. For Hegel the resolution of the antinomies is a theoretical task. However, he believes that this task can only be carried out under specific historical conditions which happened to be those of his own time and place. Philosophy of praxis begins with a critique of the conservative implications of this resolution of the antinomies and a radicalization of its historical aspect. Both Marx and Lukács argued that because Hegel could not conceive of really radical changes in modern culture, he treated temporary historical conditions such as monarchy and wage labor as though they were eternal necessities. They claimed that the antinomies would be transcended by social revolution and not by philosophical speculation. Had Marx confined himself to arguing this position in relation to the antinomies of moral and political life, he would have created a new philosophy of value based on the demand for revolutionary social change. This new philosophy would have been compatible with a traditional ontology and might have been formulated as a “left” variant of Hegel's philosophy. Marx's startling innovation was to include all the antinomies in his theory of revolution, those relating to epistemology and ontology as well as the moral and political ones. He thus arrived at the astounding proposition that social change could not only accomplish such goals as reconciling individual and society, moral responsibility and self-interest, but that it could also unite subject and object, thought and being, man and nature. This proposition has a number of paradoxical corollaries from which we must not shrink in interpreting the early Marx. As we will see, Lukács too shares a similar approach. When philosophy of praxis contends that human action is philosophically relevant not just in ethics or politics but in all domains, it is asserting a wholly original ontological position. For this philosophy, human action touches being as such, and not simply those special domains we usually conceive as affected by our activities. In somewhat different terms, essentially this same requirement can be formulated as the transcendence of the antinomy of value and fact, “ought” and “is.” For, if human action affects being, then values do not confront a normless and humanly indifferent reality, but rather represent its highest potentialities. This position is coherent only where being is interpreted through a special sphere in which human being is actually able to transform the objects on
which it acts. Then the apparently humanly indifferent spheres, such as dereification of social life. As I have argued above, the philosophical ambi- nature,can be ontologically subordinated to a sphere within which human ion of Marx and Lukacs goes beyond social theory, for they claim that all action can affect the substratum of reality, for example, history. Action can nated starting out from the disalienation of socie only constitute reality where reality cannot be conceived independent of that This wider claim indicates a second dimension of the theory concerned with sphere. Hence Marx writes that "nature too, taken abstractly, for itself, and the ontological generalization of the social analysis. This most daring dimen- idly separated from man, is nothing for man. 6 sion of the philosophy of praxis will be treated through what I call The attempt to understand being in general through human being is a"metacritical" approach to the history of philosophy. Later chapters will then kind of inverted philosophical anthropology. Marx and Lukacs share this consider the problematic role of nature and attempt to formulate an original pproach with philosophers such as Feuerbach and Heidegger, with this difference: the latter focus on the individual, and so construct specul response to the difficulties it poses for an"absolute historicism. This will draw on the resources of philosophy of in what I take to philosophies with moralistic overtones. For Marx and Lukacs, on the con be its final formulation in the late work of Herbert Marcuse. Before turning trary, history is the "paradigmatic order"for the interpretation of bei to a discussion of the concept of metacritique and its relevance to the idea of a"realization"or"end of philosophy, I would like to consider briefly some For this philosophy, "reality"is history, and history itself is to be under- of the objections to viewing Marx's philosophy of praxis as a contribution to tood as in essence an object of human practice. Because the philosophy of ontology praxis conceives being as history and history as the product of human action it can mutatis mutandis conceive of human action as relevant to the consti. Ontology or Histol tution of being. Action takes on a universal significance, going beyond the With the possible exception of Marcuse, the Frankfurt School contests social world to affect being as such. As Lukacs puts it, We have... made the interpretation of Marx,'s Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis. Alfred own history and if we are able to regard the whole of reality wirkich- Schmidt's careful study of Marx's concept of nature attempts to situate the keid as history(i.e as our history, for there is no other), we shall have raised Manuscripts at an equal distance from a materialist ontology and an absolut ourselves in fact to the position from which reality can be understood as our historicism such as that described above. Jurgen Habermas also rejects the interpretation of Marx's Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis. He argues The ontologically significant relation between human being and being that the early Marx distinguishes between nature as such, and nature as it in general is now social action because history is constituted in such action. enters the historical sphere through labor, and which therefore has a social History is ontology and the becoming of the human species is the privileged character. Marx's social theory would have implications only for society in domain within which the antinomies of phile can finally be resolved. the larger framework of a naturalistic ontology. Within this same tradition, n Marx's Manuscripts Marcuse concludes that The however, it is customary to attack Lukacs' philosophy of praxis as idealistic history of man is at the same time the process of the whole of nature; his Thus the similarities I identify between the early Marx and Lukacs history is the production and reproduction' of the whole of nature, further- denied. ance of what exists objectively through once again transcending its current form thou it is interesting to note that another influential school of Marxist ought, that founded by Louis Althusser, makes no such distinction. Throughout this book, I will be concerned with the implications of this Rejecting equally the early Marx and Lukacs, the Althusserians see in both a remarkable proposition. These implications can be considered under two romantic refusal of scientific objectivity and the independence of nature. main headings. First, there is the dimension of philosophy of praxis con- There is thus a certain unwitting convergence of Frankfurt School and erned with the resolution of social antinomies through the disalienation or Althusserian interpretations in that both emphasize the autonomy of nature 5 Chapter
5 Chapter 1 6 which it acts. Then the apparently humanly indifferent spheres, such as nature, can be ontologically subordinated to a sphere within which human action can affect the substratum of reality, for example, history. Action can only constitute reality where reality cannot be conceived independent of that sphere. Hence Marx writes that “nature too, taken abstractly, for itself, and rigidly separated from man, is nothing for man.”6 The attempt to understand being in general through human being is a kind of inverted philosophical anthropology. Marx and Lukács share this approach with philosophers such as Feuerbach and Heidegger, with this difference: the latter focus on the individual, and so construct speculative philosophies with moralistic overtones. For Marx and Lukács, on the contrary, history is the “paradigmatic order” for the interpretation of being generally.7 For this philosophy, “reality” is history, and history itself is to be understood as in essence an object of human practice. Because the philosophy of praxis conceives being as history and history as the product of human action, it can mutatis mutandis conceive of human action as relevant to the constitution of being. Action takes on a universal significance, going beyond the social world to affect being as such. As Lukács puts it, “We have . . . made our own history and if we are able to regard the whole of reality [Wirklichkeit] as history (i.e. as our history, for there is no other), we shall have raised ourselves in fact to the position from which reality can be understood as our ‘action.’”8 The ontologically significant relation between human being and being in general is now social action because history is constituted in such action. History is ontology and the becoming of the human species is the privileged domain within which the antinomies of philosophy can finally be resolved. In an early essay on Marx's Manuscripts Marcuse concludes that “The history of man is at the same time the process of ‘the whole of nature’; his history is the ‘production and reproduction’ of the whole of nature, furtherance of what exists objectively through once again transcending its current form.”9 Throughout this book, I will be concerned with the implications of this remarkable proposition. These implications can be considered under two main headings. First, there is the dimension of philosophy of praxis concerned with the resolution of social antinomies through the disalienation or dereification of social life. As I have argued above, the philosophical ambition of Marx and Lukács goes beyond social theory, for they claim that all objectivity can be disalienated starting out from the disalienation of society. This wider claim indicates a second dimension of the theory concerned with the ontological generalization of the social analysis. This most daring dimension of the philosophy of praxis will be treated through what I call a “metacritical” approach to the history of philosophy. Later chapters will then consider the problematic role of nature and attempt to formulate an original response to the difficulties it poses for an “absolute historicism.” This argument will draw on the resources of philosophy of praxis in what I take to be its final formulation in the late work of Herbert Marcuse. Before turning to a discussion of the concept of metacritique and its relevance to the idea of a “realization” or “end’ of philosophy, I would like to consider briefly some of the objections to viewing Marx's philosophy of praxis as a contribution to ontology. Ontology or History With the possible exception of Marcuse, the Frankfurt School contests the interpretation of Marx's Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis. Alfred Schmidt's careful study of Marx's concept of nature attempts to situate the Manuscripts at an equal distance from a materialist ontology and an absolute historicism such as that described above. Jürgen Habermas also rejects the interpretation of Marx's Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis. He argues that the early Marx distinguishes between nature as such, and nature as it enters the historical sphere through labor, and which therefore has a social character. Marx’s social theory would have implications only for society in the larger framework of a naturalistic ontology. Within this same tradition, however, it is customary to attack Lukács’ philosophy of praxis as idealistic. Thus the similarities I identify between the early Marx and Lukács are denied. It is interesting to note that another influential school of Marxist thought, that founded by Louis Althusser, makes no such distinction. Rejecting equally the early Marx and Lukács, the Althusserians see in both a romantic refusal of scientific objectivity and the independence of nature. There is thus a certain unwitting convergence of Frankfurt School and Althusserian interpretations in that both emphasize the autonomy of nature
by contrast with philosophy of praxis and condemn as idealistic any doctrine The idea that history, properly understood, has ontological significance is that attempts to understand nature through history. I cannot consider these the main philosophical claim of philosophy of praxis. Marx did not choose onvergent critiques in detail. Here I would like simply to sketch the Frank between an ontological and a historical interpretation of the social furt School's attempt to"save"the early Marx from historicism. he chose both. Hence his most striking utterances, such as the one just In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas does admit that Marx's uoted, or the following: "Sociery is the accomplished union of man and xt is ambiguous. He claims that the ambiguities have given rise to a"phe- nature, the veritable resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of oenological of Marxism"which overlooks Marx's naturalism and and the realized humanism of nature "14 for which, therefore, the category of labor then acquires unawares the leaning or we orld-constituting life activity in general. "10 Although Habermas The Normative dime includes Marcuse in this phenomenological strain, this would only be true of The interpretation of the Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis is also the very early and late work. Throughout most of his career Marcuse's challenged from an ethical point of view. Marx's claim that the"human position was close to Schmidt's and Habermas' in denying the ontological ssence"is"alienated" is frequently said to imply an ethical ideal. Marx is f social categories. In Reason and Revolution, for example, Marcuse supposed to have rested his case for revolution on the injustice of capitalist too notes the ambiguities of Marx's text; he writes of it: All this has an alienation. Humanity s true essence as"species being imperatively requires obvious resemblance to Hegels idea of reason. Marx even goes so far as to the overthrow of capitalism and the creation of conditions in which social describe the self-realization of man in terms of the unity of thought and institutions are based on cooperation and creativity rather than competition ing. But, in fact, "Marx... detached dialectic from this ontological This formulation recapitulates the antinomy of value and fact, i.e. capitalist hich cannot be hypostatized as a metaphysical state of affairs "condition se. In his work, the negativity of reality becomes a historical fact versus socialist value Not everyone agrees. Some see in the Manuscripts an attempt to tran- Such an interpretation may explain Marx's later Marxism but it do scend the opposition of value and fact presupposed by this interpretation for the Manuscripts. It is particularly significant that in the The debate over the Manuscripts is of course related to the larger debate over dH灯mMm如 mative in some sense, bur l argue tha it is not bay chosen: naturalism or humanism, history or ontology. But Marx himself an ethical conception. What is at stake here is the dialectical character of Marx's theory, hence Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism, and as a also his relation to Hegel. Were Marx to accept the dichotomy of value and ully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution fact, ethics and social reality, he would regress behind Hegel to a utopi the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and moralistic position like that of Bruno Bauer and Moses Hess. In his essay on man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence Hess, Lukacs showed that these Left Hegelians attempted to recover revolu- between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and tionary possibilities by positing ethical values as the basis for knowledge of cessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of the future. They thus rejected Hegel's concrete analysis of and reconciliation history and knows itself to be this solution. I with the present. The early Marx would not have defined his own advance over Hegel as In his mature works Hegel found the"ought"realized in the"is"of his society. On Hegels terms, if Marx had posited the"human essence"as an ontological one. He believed he had shown that all ontology is historical in ethical ideal, philosophy would already have transcended it theoretically essence and that the dichotomy berween being and history is therefore false through the demonstration of the relative rationality of what is. Alienation 7 Chapter
7 Chapter 1 8 by contrast with philosophy of praxis and condemn as idealistic any doctrine that attempts to understand nature through history. I cannot consider these convergent critiques in detail. Here I would like simply to sketch the Frankfurt School's attempt to “save” the early Marx from historicism. In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas does admit that Marx's text is ambiguous. He claims that the ambiguities have given rise to a “phenomenological strain of Marxism” which overlooks Marx's naturalism and for which, therefore, “the category of labor then acquires unawares the meaning of world-constituting life activity in general.”10 Although Habermas includes Marcuse in this phenomenological strain, this would only be true of the very early and late work. Throughout most of his career Marcuse’s position was close to Schmidt's and Habermas’ in denying the ontological status of social categories. In Reason and Revolution, for example, Marcuse too notes the ambiguities of Marx's text; he writes of it: “All this has an obvious resemblance to Hegel's idea of reason. Marx even goes so far as to describe the self-realization of man in terms of the unity of thought and being.”11 But, in fact, “Marx . . . detached dialectic from this ontological base. In his work, the negativity of reality becomes a historical condition which cannot be hypostatized as a metaphysical state of affairs.”12 Such an interpretation may explain Marx's later Marxism but it does not account for the Manuscripts. It is particularly significant that in the formulations of Habermas and Marcuse, the antinomies Marx attempted to transcend reappear as alternatives between which he is supposed to have chosen: naturalism or humanism, history or ontology. But Marx himself writes: Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism, and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.13 The early Marx would not have defined his own advance over Hegel as the demonstration that alienation is a historical category rather than an ontological one. He believed he had shown that all ontology is historical in essence and that the dichotomy between being and history is therefore false. The idea that history, properly understood, has ontological significance is the main philosophical claim of philosophy of praxis. Marx did not choose between an ontological and a historical interpretation of the social categories; he chose both. Hence his most striking utterances, such as the one just quoted, or the following: “Society is the accomplished union of man and nature, the veritable resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature.”14 The Normative Dimension The interpretation of the Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis is also challenged from an ethical point of view. Marx's claim that the “human essence” is “alienated” is frequently said to imply an ethical ideal. Marx is supposed to have rested his case for revolution on the injustice of capitalist alienation. Humanity’s true essence as “species being” imperatively requires the overthrow of capitalism and the creation of conditions in which social institutions are based on cooperation and creativity rather than competition. This formulation recapitulates the antinomy of value and fact, i.e. capitalist fact versus socialist value. Not everyone agrees. Some see in the Manuscripts an attempt to transcend the opposition of value and fact presupposed by this interpretation. The debate over the Manuscripts is of course related to the larger debate over Marxism and ethics.15 Considered as a philosophy of praxis, Marx's theory is unquestionably normative in some sense, but I argue that it is not based on an ethical conception. What is at stake here is the dialectical character of Marx's theory, hence also his relation to Hegel. Were Marx to accept the dichotomy of value and fact, ethics and social reality, he would regress behind Hegel to a utopianmoralistic position like that of Bruno Bauer and Moses Hess. In his essay on Hess, Lukács showed that these Left Hegelians attempted to recover revolutionary possibilities by positing ethical values as the basis for knowledge of the future. They thus rejected Hegel's concrete analysis of and reconciliation with the present. In his mature works Hegel found the “ought” realized in the “is” of his society. On Hegel’s terms, if Marx had posited the “human essence” as an ethical ideal, philosophy would already have transcended it theoretically through the demonstration of the relative rationality of what is. Alienation
might, like the police courts Hegel deduces from the Idea, remain as an tion that Marx relativizes ethical ideals as moments in the real process of unpleasant fact of practical life. But then so are fleas and measles. The becoming of what is, and so goes beyond utopian moralism. indifference of philosophical reason to such matters, Marx does not set out from a philosophically elaborated concept of the happiness, is not arbitrary but expresses the essence of the social world. The state, that might be immediately contrasted with the institutions he wishes demand for the abstract ideal is a moment of negation of reality necessarily to criticize. In fact, he dismisses this method contemptuously in a letter to frustrated by an objectivity which transcends i, that is to say, by reason Ruge: Until now the philosophers had the solution to all riddles in their itself. Hegelianism is not overcome by the renewed positing of the ideal, but desks, and the stupid outside world simply had to open its mouth so that the rather anticipates it and refutes it in advance ousted pigeons of absolute science might fly into it. "17Instead, the philoso- Hegel's critique of Kant and of abstract ethical idealism influenced phical deduction of what ought to be must proceed from actual struggles Marx to seek a basis for revolu theory in the tendencies of soci testifying to the living contradiction of ideal and real. The appropriate role reality, in a dialectic of ideal and real in history. Lukacs argues that the early for the new philosopher consists in"explaining to the world its own acts, Hegel prepared the Marxian approach. showing that actual struggles contain a transcending content that can be In contrast to Fichte with his revolutionary Utopia, Hegel developed linked to the cept of a rational social life. The critic," Marx writes, ry early on in his work the tendency to"understand what is, a ten therefore can start with any form of theoretical and practical consciousness dency which originally pointed energetically in the direction of the fu- and develop the true actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality ture. His concern to comprehend the present as at once become and as its ought-to-be and goal. "18 becoming is.. the germ of a true historical dialectics(the dialectics of In these earliest"Marxist "writings, Marx can be seen struggling to re- history translated into thought). For it is precisely in the present that all lease new grounds for revolution from Hegelian political philosophy. A forms of objectivity can be revealed quite concretely as processes, since generation later Engels summarized Marx's conclusion with admirable it is the present which shows most clearly the unity of result and start- simplicity. Where Hegel had claimed that "All that is real is rational; and all ing point of the ss. Given that, the rejection of all"Oughts"and that is rational is real. "for marx futuristic utopian thinking, the concentration of philosophy on knowl- The Hegelian proposition turns into its opposite through Hegelian dia- dge of the present(grasped dialectically) emerges precisely as the only lectics itself all that is real in the sphere of human history becomes irra- ssible epistemological method of knowing what is really knowable tional in the process of time, is therefore irrational by its very destina- about the future, the tendencies within the present which impel tion, is tainted beforehand with irrationality;, and everything which really and concretely towards the rational in the minds of men is destined to become real. however much This sounds more like marx than he mature it may contradict existing apparent reality. In accordance with all the Marx than the author of the Manuscripts. That work may be seen as transi- les of the Hegelian method of thought, the proposition of the ration- tional between an ethical and a socio-economic approach to knowledge of ality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other propo the future. In the Manuscripts, Marx attempts to reconstruct the ideal tion: All that exists deserves to perish. I9 concepts of political philosophy as potentialities awaiting realization. The In sum, the only way beyond Hegel is through him. Marx makes this contradictions between philosophy and reality are reformulated as immanent passage in the Manuscripts, where he is finally able to "develop the true contradictions in reality itself. The new method is neither speculative nor actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and pirical, but synthesizes these contrary approaches in a metacritique. This goal. There Marx identifies reason(true actuality)with the socially medi- merari itique relativizes what is and what ought to be as contradictory ated process of satisfying human needs and on that basis developing human tendencies actually inhabiting the real-in-process. It is through this concep- individuality. Then the "existing actuality, alienated capitalist society, is 9 Chapter 10
9 Chapter 1 10 might, like the police courts Hegel deduces from the Idea, remain as an unpleasant fact of practical life. But then so are fleas and measles. The indifference of philosophical reason to such matters, essentially to human happiness, is not arbitrary but expresses the essence of the social world. The demand for the abstract ideal is a moment of negation of reality necessarily frustrated by an objectivity which transcends it, that is to say, by reason itself. Hegelianism is not overcome by the renewed positing of the ideal, but rather anticipates it and refutes it in advance. Hegel's critique of Kant and of abstract ethical idealism influenced Marx to seek a basis for revolutionary theory in the tendencies of social reality, in a dialectic of ideal and real in history. Lukács argues that the early Hegel prepared the Marxian approach. In contrast to Fichte with his revolutionary Utopia, Hegel developed very early on in his work the tendency to “understand what is,” a tendency which originally pointed energetically in the direction of the future. His concern to comprehend the present as at once become and becoming is . . . the germ of a true historical dialectics (the dialectics of history translated into thought). For it is precisely in the present that all forms of objectivity can be revealed quite concretely as processes, since it is the present which shows most clearly the unity of result and starting point of the process. Given that, the rejection of all “Oughts” and futuristic utopian thinking, the concentration of philosophy on knowledge of the present (grasped dialectically) emerges precisely as the only possible epistemological method of knowing what is really knowable about the future, the tendencies within the present which impel it really and concretely towards the future.16 This sounds more like Marx than Hegel, indeed, more like the mature Marx than the author of the Manuscripts. That work may be seen as transitional between an ethical and a socio-economic approach to knowledge of the future. In the Manuscripts, Marx attempts to reconstruct the ideal concepts of political philosophy as potentialities awaiting realization. The contradictions between philosophy and reality are reformulated as immanent contradictions in reality itself. The new method is neither speculative nor empirical, but synthesizes these contrary approaches in a metacritique. This metacritique relativizes what is and what ought to be as contradictory tendencies actually inhabiting the real-in-process. It is through this conception that Marx relativizes ethical ideals as moments in the real process of becoming of what is, and so goes beyond utopian moralism. Marx does not set out from a philosophically elaborated concept of the state, that might be immediately contrasted with the institutions he wishes to criticize. In fact, he dismisses this method contemptuously in a letter to Ruge: “Until now the philosophers had the solution to all riddles in their desks, and the stupid outside world simply had to open its mouth so that the roasted pigeons of absolute science might fly into it.”17 Instead, the philosophical deduction of what ought to be must proceed from actual struggles testifying to the living contradiction of ideal and real. The appropriate role for the new philosopher consists in “explaining to the world its own acts,” showing that actual struggles contain a transcending content that can be linked to the concept of a rational social life. “The critic,” Marx writes, “therefore can start with any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and develop the true actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and goal.”18 In these earliest “Marxist” writings, Marx can be seen struggling to release new grounds for revolution from Hegelian political philosophy. A generation later Engels summarized Marx's conclusion with admirable simplicity. Where Hegel had claimed that “All that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real,” for Marx: The Hegelian proposition turns into its opposite through Hegelian dialectics itself: all that is real in the sphere of human history becomes irrational in the process of time, is therefore irrational by its very destination, is tainted beforehand with irrationality; and everything which is rational in the minds of men is destined to become real, however much it may contradict existing apparent reality. In accordance with all the rules of the Hegelian method of thought, the proposition of the rationality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other proposition: All that exists deserves to perish.19 In sum, the only way beyond Hegel is through him. Marx makes this passage in the Manuscripts, where he is finally able to “develop the true actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and goal.” There Marx identifies reason (true actuality) with the socially mediated process of satisfying human needs and on that basis developing human individuality. Then the “existing actuality,” alienated capitalist society, is
shown to be reason's"unreasonable form "which must be further mediated method of lukacs and Marx insofar as it crosses the usual boundaries be. and overcome through revolution. The critique of political economy, which tween philosophical and social explanation. There is, however, a consider- egins already in the Manuscripts, derives socialist potentialities from the able difference between the metacritical approach of philosophy of prax ontradictions of the given capitalist forms. The ought-to-be and goal and Habermas's metacritique. His knowle constitutive emerges from the dialectic of existence and essence as a demand of reason, a anthropological in their generality. The(relative) truth of knowledge is methodological precondition of rationality, and not as an ethical ideal. conserved in contact with these interests by reason of their very generality As a philosopher of praxis, Marx attempts to reconstruct the concept of Reductionism is thus avoided at the cost of a loss in sociological reason so that capitalist alienation appears as reasons essential problem, ness. Marx and Lukacs offer no such theory of general anthropological problem to be resolved through historical action. Marx takes what for Hegel interests. Instead, their metacritique moves in the opposite direction, toward d earlier philosophy is a mere social contingency, human suffering, and a domain of concreteness which they claim founds theoretical abstractions dignifies it with ontological status, not in order to attribute it to the human We might better compare this approach with Whiteheads condition, but rather the better to comprehend the presuppositions of its I hold that philosophy is the critic of abstractions. Its function is the historical transcendence. These presuppositions are preserved ideally in double one, first of harmonizing them by assigning to them their rela- philosophy, in the concept of reason, and therefore Marx insists, against the tive status as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by direct reformers of the "practic cal party, "that"You cannot abolish phi- comparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe and the phy without realizing it. 20 The concept of an"Aufhebung "of philosophy also has a methodol 加么 omoting the formation of more complete schemes of thought.< reby rx and Lukacs, of course the aim of such criticism of abstractions is cal side, with which we will be focally concerned in this book. Once again, it not to found a speculative metaphysics, but rather to achieve what might be is by reference to the Frankfurt School that I will attempt to clarify the called a sociological desublimation of the concepts of philosophy project of the early Marx and Lukacs To some extent this difference in orientation, as compared with Ha- bermas, may be due to the fact that the latter is p concerned to refute Metacritique a supposedly value-free positivism, while Marx and Lukacs reflect on social The term"metacritique" became widely known through Habermas's theory in a cultural climate deeply imbued with Kantianism. In Kantian use of it to refer to the study of the various forms of theory in the light of philosophy the formal properties of rationality are abstracted as completely their intrinsic dependence on specific Habermas distinguishes these interests from those of everyday practie itself. The Kantian system demonstrates that these formal affairs by their enormous generality, however, despite this they belong to the ties,as they relate to epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, are apriori ocial world. They are quasi-transcendental conditions of possible objectivity ditions for any and all knowledge and action in the correspondi for the spheres of knowledge they determine. The odd description, quas of real life. transcendental, "refers to their character as neither ordinary social facts In their Kantian cultural climate, both Marx and Lukacs follow in the world constituting posits of the pure ego. Habermas needs some such footsteps of Hegel in attempting to resolve the antinomies of form and oncept since he wants to avoid both positivism and historicism in order ontent that arise from this formalistic paradigm of rationality. To Hegel affirm both the cognitive value of natural science and its rootedness in a they owe dialectics as the method through which the opposites can be generic interest in technical control that determines the type of representa reconciled in a higher unity, a totality. The application of the concept of totality to the study of the historically given forms of rationality provides the The term"metacritique" in this sense bears a certain resemblance to the basis for a non-reductive social theory of knowledge. Philosophy is not I1 Chapter I
11 Chapter 1 12 shown to be reason's “unreasonable form,” which must be further mediated and overcome through revolution. The critique of political economy, which begins already in the Manuscripts, derives socialist potentialities from the contradictions of the given capitalist forms. The “ought-to-be and goal” emerges from the dialectic of existence and essence as a demand of reason, a methodological precondition of rationality, and not as an ethical ideal. As a philosopher of praxis, Marx attempts to reconstruct the concept of reason so that capitalist alienation appears as reason's essential problem, a problem to be resolved through historical action. Marx takes what for Hegel and earlier philosophy is a mere social contingency, human suffering, and dignifies it with ontological status, not in order to attribute it to the human condition, but rather the better to comprehend the presuppositions of its historical transcendence. These presuppositions are preserved ideally in philosophy, in the concept of reason, and therefore Marx insists, against the reformers of the “practical political party,” that “You cannot abolish philosophy without realizing it.”20 The concept of an “Aufhebung” of philosophy also has a methodological side, with which we will be focally concerned in this book. Once again, it is by reference to the Frankfurt School that I will attempt to clarify the project of the early Marx and Lukács. Metacritique The term “metacritique” became widely known through Habermas’s use of it to refer to the study of the various forms of theory in the light of their intrinsic dependence on specific “knowledge-constitutive interests.”21 Habermas distinguishes these interests from those of everyday practical affairs by their enormous generality, however, despite this they belong to the social world. They are quasi-transcendental conditions of possible objectivity for the spheres of knowledge they determine. The odd description, “quasitranscendental,” refers to their character as neither ordinary social facts nor world constituting posits of the pure ego. Habermas needs some such concept since he wants to avoid both positivism and historicism in order to affirm both the cognitive value of natural science and its rootedness in a generic interest in technical control that determines the type of representations it studies. The term “metacritique” in this sense bears a certain resemblance to the method of Lukács and Marx insofar as it crosses the usual boundaries between philosophical and social explanation. There is, however, a considerable difference between the metacritical approach of philosophy of praxis and Habermas's metacritique. His knowledge-constitutive interests are anthropological in their generality. The (relative) truth of knowledge is conserved in contact with these interests by reason of their very generality. Reductionism is thus avoided at the cost of a loss in sociological concreteness. Marx and Lukács offer no such theory of general anthropological interests. Instead, their metacritique moves in the opposite direction, toward a domain of concreteness which they claim founds theoretical abstractions. We might better compare this approach with Whitehead’s: I hold that philosophy is the critic of abstractions. Its function is the double one, first of harmonizing them by assigning to them their relative status as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by direct comparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe and thereby promoting the formation of more complete schemes of thought.22 In Marx and Lukács, of course, the aim of such criticism of abstractions is not to found a speculative metaphysics, but rather to achieve what might be called a sociological desublimation of the concepts of philosophy. To some extent this difference in orientation, as compared with Habermas, may be due to the fact that the latter is primarily concerned to refute a supposedly value-free positivism, while Marx and Lukács reflect on social theory in a cultural climate deeply imbued with Kantianism. In Kantian philosophy the formal properties of rationality are abstracted as completely as possible from the particular contents on which the faculty of reason exercises itself. The Kantian system demonstrates that these formal properties, as they relate to epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, are apriori preconditions for any and all knowledge and action in the corresponding domains of real life. In their Kantian cultural climate, both Marx and Lukács follow in the footsteps of Hegel in attempting to resolve the antinomies of form and content that arise from this formalistic paradigm of rationality. To Hegel they owe dialectics as the method through which the opposites can be reconciled in a higher unity, a totality. The application of the concept of totality to the study of the historically given forms of rationality provides the basis for a non-reductive social theory of knowledge. Philosophy is not