Introduction This work aims to give an analytic presentation of the two books that Gilles deleuze devoted to cinema, Cinema I: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, on three axes:(1)the innovative con- tribution of Deleuze's analyses to the field of cinema theory, (2)the philosophical issues of broader significance, and ()the place of Cin ema I and 2 in Deleuze's oeuvre as a whole. These three aspects are eparable and must be studied conjointly in order for us to under stand the multiple stakes of Deleuzc's philosophy of cinema Deletae and Theories of Cinema very important contribution to the field of nema theory. Deleuze's work goes against the grain of two trends that dominated cinematographical studies in France, and spread other countries, from the postwar period to the 198os: the realist and phenomenological approach of Andre Bazin, on the one hand, and the linguistic and psychoanalytical approach of Christian Metz, the other. Delcuzc's distance from the two is not, however, symmetri- cal; even as he rejects Bazins realism, Deleuze is profoundly marked by the theme of a cinema of time, which he adopts and develops in
I Introduction This work aims to give an analytic presentation of the two books that Gilles Deleuze devoted to cinema, Cinema I: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, on three axes: (1) the innovative contribution of Deleuze's analyses to the field of cinema theory, (2) the philosophical issues of broader significance, and (3) the place of Cinema I and 2 in Deleuze's oeuvre as a whole. These three aspects are inseparable and must be studied conjointly in order for us to understand the multiple stakes of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema. Deleuze and Theories of Cinema Cinema I and 2 make a very important contribution to the field of cinema theory. Deleuze's work goes against the grain of two trends that dominated cinematographical studies in France, and spread to other countries, from the postwar period to the 1980s: the realist and phenomenological approach of Andre Bazin, on the one hand, and the linguistic and psychoanalytical approach of Christian Metz, on the other. Deleuze's distance from the two is not, however, symmetrical; even as he rejects Bazin's realism, Deleuze is profoundly marked by the theme of a cinema of time, which he adopts and develops in
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and philosophy traductiOn an original manner. Phenomenologically oriented approaches can losophy to think. A central issue is ot account for what belongs to cinema itself insofar as they retain from confirming Heidegger's famous theses on modernity as the ubjective or"natural"perception as the model of reference, whereas of representation, cinema radically calls them into question. Because he specificity of cinematographic perception lies precisely in the fact PPcarancc, that it cannot be referred back to any subjective center. Cinemas "art, " falls within the frame of the double movement in which man specificity is also underestimated by linguistic approaches, which as- becomes a subject at the same time that the world itself becomes im- similate images to utterances. Deleuzc's project is thus to extract age. Yet cinema does not summon an image-world before the gaze of of cinema, to describe what belongs exclusivel a spcctator-subject. Rather, cinemas particularity is to produce im and to analyze how and in what singular modes cinema thinks in ages that are irreducible to the model of subjective perception. It is images themselves. To describe the specificity of cinema, Deleuze of- relation to this general context that one must understand Deleuze fers a classification of different types of filmic images that, without nalyses of the status of cinematographic perception, his rejection of claiming to be exhaustive, nonetheless takes into account the whole realist and phenomenological approaches that, directly or indirectly, history of cinema such as it unfolded before the advent of digital presuppose a thcory of representation, as well as the fundamental mages. This classification turns on two oncepts: the move- importance he grants to the first chapter of Bergson's Matter and lent-image and the time-image. The elaboration of the concepts of Memory. The universe described by Bergson is ruled by a strict equiv movement-image and time-image(and their different types)allows alence between images, matter, light, and movement. These move- Deleuze to produce a properly cinematographic semiology of great ment-images-Deleuze's term-form a radically centered universe richness and to reorganize the major debates that run through the in which perception does not wait for the human gaze to emerge history of cinema around a general problematic. The concept of the Because of the equivalence between movement and light, images in movement-image gives him a new perspective from which to themselves are perception, perception of matter that needs no con- sider debates on the relation between montage and shot and between sciousness in order to become visible. Conscious perception surges as cinema and narration. The concept of the time-image allows him special image, a "living image" that, rather than reacting to all the to account for the mutation that occurred in postwar cinema and movements of other images, is able to make a selection among them. for the break that separated"classic"cinema from"modern"cinema This selection is dictated by the interests and needs of life: percep- The articulation between movement-image and time-image marks tion becomes conscious on the condition that it perceive less, retain- not only an internal articulation in the history of cinema but also an ing only the useful aspects of things. These are the two major points articulation between cinema, the other arts, and a certain state of the where Bergson distances himself from a long philosophical tradition world. From Deleuzc's classification of images emerges a history of light is not"in"consciousness but in things themselves, and, from cinema as history of the aesthetic, political, and philosophical issues the perception is linked to action rather than dis- of the twentieth century interested contemplation. These are also the two aspects that allow Deleuze to join Bergsons philosophy with On the one hand because of montage and the mobile camera, cinema can show an centered universe of mot mages in which subjective percep ons do, of course, emerge but in which they have no privilege what soever but are merely singular movements among the movements of
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy an original manner. Phenomenologically oriented approaches cannot account for what belongs to cinema itself insofar as they retain subjective or "natural" perception as the model of reference, whereas the specificity of cinematographic perception lies precisely in the fact that it cannot be referred back to any subjective center. Cinema's specificity is also underestimated by linguistic approaches, which assimilate images to utterances. Deleuze's project is thus to extract an "essence" of cinema, to describe what belongs exclusively to cinema, and to analyze how and in what singular modes cinema thinks in images themselves. To describe the specificity of cinema, Deleuze offers a classification of different types of filmic images that, without claiming to be exhaustive, nonetheless takes into account the whole history of cinema such as it unfolded before the advent of digital images. This classification turns on two key concepts: the movement-image and the time-image. The elaboration of the concepts of movement-image and time-image (and their different types) allows Deleuze to produce a properly cinematographic semiology of great richness and to reorganize the major debates that run through the history of cinema around a general ptoblematic. The concept of the movement-image gives him a new perspective from which to consider debates on the relation between montage and shot and between cinema and narration. The concept of the time-image allows him to account for the mutation that occurred in postwar cinema and for the break that separated "classic" cinema from "modern" cinema. The articulation between movement-image and time-image marks not only an internal articulation in the history of cinema but also an articulation between cinema, the other arts, and a certain state of the world. From Deleuze's classification of images emerges a history of cinema as history of the aesthetic, political, and philosophical issues of the twentieth century. Philosophical Stakes The concepts of movement-image and time-image are strictly philosophical concepts; we must therefore analyze what cinema gives phi- 2 lntroduction losophy to think. A central issue is the status of representation. Far from confirming Heidegger's famous theses on modernity as the age of representation, cinema radically calls them into question. Because of a false appearance, we are led to believe that cinema, a technical "art," falls within the frame of the double movement in which man becomes a subject at the same time that the world itself becomes image. Yet cinema does not summon an image-world before the gaze of a spectator-subject. Rather, cinema's particularity is to produce images that are irreducible to the model of subjective perception. It is in relation to this general context that one must understand Deleuze's analyses of the status of cinematographic perception, his rejection of realist and phenomenological approaches that, directly or indirectly, presuppose a theory of representation, as well as the fundamental importance he grants to the first chapter of Bergson's Matter and Memory. The universe described by Bergson is ruled by a strict equivalence between images, matter, light, and movement. These movement-images-Deleuze's term-form a radically acentered universe in which perception does not wait for the human gaze to emerge. Because of the equivalence between movement and light, images in themselves are perception, perception of matter that needs no consciousness in order to become visible. Conscious perception surges as a special image, a "living image" that, rather than reacting to all the movements of other images, is able to make a selection among them. This selection is dictated by the interests and needs of life: perception becomes conscious on the condition that it perceive less, retaining only the useful aspects of things. These are the two major points where Bergson distances himself from a long philosophical tradition: light is not "in" consciousness but in things themselves, and, from the outset, conscious perception is linked to action rather than disinterested contemplation. These are also the two aspects that allow Deleuze to join Bergson's philosophy with cinema. On the one hand, because of montage and the mobile camera, cinema can show an acentered universe of movement-images in which subjective perceptions do, of course, emerge but in which they have no privilege whatsoever but are merely singular movements among the movements of 3
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosoply introduction the world. Morcover, if most great films of classic cinema(Ameri multiplicity of immanent images of thought are substituted for the can films, but also Sovict and European)are structured around the ular and dogmatic one, and, for the first time, the Bergson of the link between perception and action(what Deleuze calls the"action first chapter of Matter and Memory takes his place alongside Spinoza form), cinema has always been able to undo this link. It was able to in the line of philosophers of immanence. This is not the only ma- produce images that go beneath subjective perception and tend to re- or shift following the books on cinema. The project of describing join the perception of matter itself, just as it created images in which he singular essence of cinema raises another explicit question that erception is no longer directly connected to action but creates ne will be central to What Is Philosophy that of the singularity of phi- links with images that come from time and thought. According to Deleuze, this is where the distinction is played out between classic of, Pny itself, of what brings art, philosophy, and science--forms thought and creation-together and yet maintains their disting incma and modern, postwar cinema, first with Italian neorealism Finally, the analysis of the crisis of the action form and then with the french New Wave. This cinema, where what is at ed Deleuze to frame more broadly the problem of the broken link stake is no longer"seclingl in order to act"but"sec[ing] in order to between humans and the world. The revolutionary dreams of carly as Bergson's Creative Evolution puts it, is still Bergsonian in American and European cinema did not fulfill their promises. But of dimensions of a nonchronological time that Bergson, in its great moments, cinema never stopped filming the faith in new had also purs modes of existence still to be discovered. Through cinema, a face of modernity emerges: the face not of the death of God but of the loss nema i and 2 in deleuze oeuvre of the world. What we lack is an immanent beliefin this world: not a belief in its existence, which no one doubts, but in the possibility of If cinema is Bergsonian, as Deleuze writes, it also led Deleuze to read creating new forms of life in it. What Is Philosophy? devotes extensive Bergson in a different way. Bergson was always important to Delcuzc's analyses to the modern problem of an immanent conversion of faith oeuvre, but Bergson was nonetheless somehow absent in rclation to The a central issue in Dcleuze's philosophy: immanence, or more pre- cisely, the definition of the planc of immanence. Now, the analysis of Matter and Memorys universe of movement-images, an essential piece of the project of a philosophy of cinema, is undertaken using these very concepts This has many consequences, and onc of the tasks of What Is Philosophy? is to make them explicit. Deleuze does not rescind his critique of what he called, as carly as Nietzsche and Philosophy the "dogmatic image of thought, "that is to say, a sct of implicit presuppositions that mislead us as to the nature of thought But the encounter with cinema led deleuze to reconsider the onto logical status of images. Images are capable of all sorts of movement and are affected by all dimensions of time. Therefore they part into account what had becn cstablished in Cinema I and 2. There, a
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy the world. Moreover, if most great films of classic cinema (American films, but also Soviet and European) are structured around the link between perception and action (what Deleuze calls the "action form"), cinema has always been able to undo this link. It was able to produce images that go beneath subjective perception and tend to rejoin the perception of matter itself, just as it created images in which perception is no longer directly connected to action but creates new links with images that come from time and thought. According to Deleuze, this is where the distinction is played out between classic cinema and modern, postwar cinema, first with Italian neorealism and then with the French New Wave. This cinema, where what is at stake is no longer "see[ing] in order to act" but "see[ing] in order to see," as Bergson's Creative Evolution puts it, is still Bergsonian in its exploration of dimensions of a nonchronological time that Bergson, for his part, had also pursued. Cinema I and 2 in Deleuze's Oeuvre If cinema is Bergsonian, as Deleuze writes, it also led Deleuze to read Bergson in a different way. Bergson was always important to Deleuze's oeuvre, but Bergson was nonetheless somehow absent in relation to a central issue in Deleuze's philosophy: immanence, or more precisely, the definition of the plane of immanence. Now, the analysis of Matter and Memory's universe of movement-images, an essential piece of the proj ect of a philosophy of cinema, is undertaken using these very concepts. This has many consequences, and one of the tasks of What Is Philosophy? is ro make them explicit. Deleuze does not rescind his critique of what he called, as early as Nietzsche and Philosophy, the "dogmatic image of thought," that is to say, a set of implicit presuppositions that mislead us as to the nature of thought. But the encounter with cinema led Deleuze to reconsider the ontological status of images. Images are capable of all sorts of movement and are affected by all dimensions of time. Therefore they participate fully in the plane of immanence. What Is Philosophy? takes fully into account what had been established in Cinema I and 2. There, a 4 Introduction multiplicity of immanent images of thought are substituted for the singular and dogmatic one, and, for the first time, the B ergson of the first chapter of Matter and Memory takes his place alongside Spinoza in the line of philosophers of immanence. This is not the only major shift following the books on cinema. The project of describing the singular essence of cinema raises another explicit question that will be central to What Is Philosophy?, that of the singlllarity of philosophy itself, of what brings art, philosophy, and science-forms of thought and creation-together and yet maintains their distinctions, Finally, the analysis of the crisis of the action form in cinema led Deleuze to frame more broadly the problem of the broken link between humans and the world. The revolutionary dreams of early American and European cinema did not fulfill their promises. But in its great moments, cinema never stopped filming the faith in new modes of existence still to be discovered. Through cinema, a face of modernity emerges: the face not of the death of God but of the loss of the world. What we lack is an immanent belief in this world: not a belief in its existence, which no one doubts, but in the possibility of creating new forms of life in it. What Is Philosophy? devotes extensive analyses to the modern problem of an immanent conversion of faith. The strictly philosophical legacy of Cinema I and 2 is thus extremely significant
brought about by cinema i first and foremost movement in im- Images in Movement and ages. Where other visual arts-from mask making to painting, from sculpture to photography--produce static images, which, even when Movement-/mages they are images of movement, must be frozen in a certain pose, cin a sets images themselves in movement. We must therefore look t movement for cinemas difference, or for its own nature But what kind of movement is concerned? If, as Deleuze believes. e need to think the essence of cinema, that which belongs to cinema Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory and to cinema alone, the first precaution we must take is to avoid ing concepts that are too broad or too abstract. For that matter, this precaution concerns not only cinema but philosophy as the c of thought. Very carly in his work, Deleuze adopted Bergsons de mand for "precision in philosophy": Philosophy must fit tightly to its object. 2 Most philosophical systems produce concepts so abstract (movement, time, being, the one, the multiple, etc. ) that they can be There is no doubt that cinema was one of the twentieth century's applied to anything and everything: to reality, to the possible, and great inventions. It was art, but it also accompanied whole genera- even to the impossible. The explanatory power of such concepts is tions as they went about their daily lives. It was modern art, if only nly superficial: they can account for everything insofar as they are because it managed, like no other art of the twentieth century, to be concerned with nothing in particular. But there should be no space part of all our lives. This is precisely what Deleuze acknowledges in between a philosophical concept and its object: precision requires the last lines of the preface to the French edition of Cinema 1, where concepts that are"tailor-made. Precise concepts delimit singular ob- he justifies the absence of reproductions in the book by calling on jects and these objects alone. There should be no gap between expe- the great films, of which each of us retains to a greater or lesser ex- ence and its explanation, even when the aim is to understand the tent a memory, emotion, or perception(xiv/8). Stanley Cavell, too, of experience and to return to its sources. If one thereby invokes this collective memory in his books on cinema. The situation goes beyond expcricnce-and we will see that this is necessary-it is altered so but the fact remains that cinema not in order to reach the "conditions of every possible experience, has been able to inscribe its history within our collective memory, as'in Kant, but to reach the conditions of real expcrience. 3 Cinema and we have yet to assess the significance of such a fact. written under the ut what is new about cinema? What makes cinema an essen- is to produce the singular concepts that belong to cinema. This cn- tial feature of the twentieth century? Or in other words, where do cavor leads Deleuze to deepen this theme, always present in films, the great films and the lesser, draw that power of emotion and ork, and to reformulate it in a new direction. But before analyzing perception that has left so many traces in our memory? Cinema I Deleuze's books on cinema shifted his philosophical and 2 provide Deleuzc's answers to these questions and to many ary, their stakes must be unfolded. crs. Before addressing their broader significance, we must analyze the It is thercfore not enough to say that cinema introduces first distinctive characteristic of cinema: movement. For the novelty ment in images, the kind of movement proper to natographic
I Images in Movement and Movement-Images Draw out of the movement the mobility which is its essence. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory There is no doubt that cinema was one of the twentieth century's great inventions. Ie was art, but it also accompanied whole generations as they went about their daily lives. It was modern art, if only because it managed, like no other art of the twentieth century, to be part of all our lives. This is precisely what Deleuze acknowledges in the last lines of the preface to the French edition of Cinem4 1, where he j ustifies the absence of reproductions in the book by calling on "the great films, of which each of us retains to a greater or lesser extent a memory, emotion, or perception" (xiv/8). Stanley Cavell, too, invokes this collective memory in his books on cinema. The situation may have altered some time ago, but the fact remains that cinema has been able to inscribe its history within our collective memory, and we have yet to assess the significance of such a fact. I But what is new about cinema? What makes cinema an essential feature of the twentieth century? Or in other words, where do films, the great films and the lesser, draw that power of emotion and p erception that has left so many traces in our memory? Cinema 1 and 2 provide Deleuze's answers to these questions and to many others. Before addressing their broader significance, we must analyze the first distinctive characteristic of cinema: movement. For the novelty 6 Images in Movement and Movement-Images brought about by cinema is first and foremost movement in images. Where other visual arts-from mask making to painting, ftom sculpture to photography-produce static images, which, even when they are images of movement, must be frozen in a certain pose, cinema sets images themselves in movement. We must therefore look to movement for cinemas difference, or for its own nature. But what kind of movement is concerned? If, as Deleuze believes, we need to think the essence of cinema, that which belongs to cinema and to cinema alone, the first precaution we must take is to avoid using concepts that are too broad or too abstract. For that matter, this precaution concerns not only cinema but philosophy as the exercise of thought. Very early in his work, Deleuze adopted Bergson's demand for "precision in philosophy": philosophy must fit tightly to its object.2 Most philosophical systems produce concepts so abstract (movement, time, being, the one, the multiple, etc.) that they can be applied to anything and everything: to reality, to the possible, and even to the impossible. The explanatory power of such concepts is only superficial: they can account for everything insofar as they are concerned with nothing in particular. But there should be no space between a philosophical concept and its object: precision requires concepts that are "tailor-made." Precise concepts delimit singular objects and these objects alone. There should be no gap between experience and its explanation, even when the aim is to understand the conditions of experience and to return to its sources. If one thereby goes beyond experience-and we will see that this is necessary-it is not in order to reach the "conditions of every possible experience," as in Kant, but to reach the conditions of real experience.3 Cinema 1 and 2 are written under the auspices of this requirement: their aim is to produce the singular concepts that belong to cinema. This endeavor leads Deleuze to deepen this theme, always present in his work, and to reformulate it in a new direction. But before analyzing the way Deleuze's books on cinema shifted his philosophical itinerary, their stakes must be unfolded. It is therefore not enough to say that cinema introduces movement in images; the kind of movement proper to cinematographic 7
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and philosoph Images in Movement and Movement-images images must be specified. The first chapter Theses on entific conception of movement that had been accepted for centuries movement: First commentary on Bergson, and because its artistic interest was equally dubious insofar as art distinctions and extracts different aspects seemed to be consecrated to a nobler kind of movement, that of the to Deleuze, it is important to determine precisely the technological synthesis of forms. Such was the ambiguity of cinemas beginning conditions of cinema: defining it as a projection system that refers to an "industrial art, it was"neither an art nor a science"(CI, 6/16) a photographic framework is not sufficient. Cinema depends not on This analytic character of cinematographic movement attracted the photo in general but on the snapshot, the equidistance of snap- Henri Bergsons attention as early as igo in Creative Evolution. In shots, and their transfer to a framework that constitutes the"film. order to reproduce any movement whatever on screen-the move- g-exposure photos and older image-projection systems such as ment, for example, of a regiment marching by-cinema proceeds hadow puppets are not part of the same technological lineage as cin first of all through decomposition. First, a series of snapshots is ema because cinema is a system that reproduces not"movement taken, with the march appearing in an immobile position in each is, as a function of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an im- ries of immobile images of successive positions is then animated,but pression of continuity"( Ch s/14). Cinema decomposes and recom it is animated through an entirely exterior movement. As it unrolls poses movement in relation to equidistant any-instant-whatevers: it through the camera, the strip of film bestows the illusion of move produces a sensible and immanent analysis of movement, meaning ment on images that are in themselves static. In this sense, accord that movement is described in a continuity rather than being an in ing to Bergson, cinema's operation is doubly artificial: rather than evitable but ultimately inessential transition between two figures, catching movements as they are happening, it must do with immo- two shots, or two poses Certain forms of dance and mime are punc- bile shots from which, with the help of the camera, it then extracts tuated by climaxes, by poses or forms that are finally attained: they an impersonal and abstract movement, "movement in general"(CE, do of course bring movement into play, but the movement in ques- 304/304). But what is notable about the "artificiality"of this pro- n is only the passage between one pose and another and hold cedure is that it characterizes not only cinema but also philosophy, interest in itself 4 These systems imply not an analysis but a synthesis language, and even our intelligence and our ways of perceiving(or of movement and, indeed, an ideal (or transcendent)synthesis inso- perceptive habits). For this reason, as Bergson maintains, the cin far as movement is merely the between forms that alone ematographic mechanism coincides with the mechanism of thought have value and are supposed to precede movement. itself, and the new technology of nascent cinema merely corroborates Viewed from this perspective, cinema is the last descendant of the "oldest illusion"of conceptual thought(CE, 272/272) produced by the modern scientifc revolution. only a handy if analogy Kepler's astronomy, Galilco's physics, or Cartesian geometry were in and our oldest habits; they have a true common nature. Cinema ex- fact based on an analytical conception of movement; they considered poses from the outside, so to speak, the most distinctive operation movement at any moment whatever and rejected the idea of privi- of human perception and intellect: they have a"cinematographical leged instants. It is for this very reason, Deleuze remarks, that cinema tendency" that is nothing less than our"natural metaphysic"(CE, 326/325-26). The operation of decomposing every singular becom- Cinema seemed to hold little interest because it was based on a sci- ng into a series of stable elements that are like snapshe
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy images must be specified. The first chapter of Cinema I, "Theses on movement: First commentary on Bergson," introdu,ces a series of distinctions and extracts different aspects of movement. According to Deleuze, it is important to determine precisely the technological conditions of cinema: defining it as a projection system that refers to a photographic framework is not sufficient. Cinema depends not on the photo in general but on the snapshot, the equidistance of snapshots, and their transfer to a framework that constitutes the "film." Long-exposure photos and older image-projection systems such as shadow puppets are not part of the same technological lineage as cinema because cinema is a system that reproduces not "movement in general" but movement "as a function of any-instant-whatever, that is, as a function of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an impression of continuity" (CI, 5h4). Cinema decomposes and recomposes movement in relation to equidistant any-instant-whatevers: it produces a sensible and immanent analysis of movement, meaning that movement is described in a continuity rather than being an inevitable but ultimately inessential transition between two figures, two shots, or two poses. Certain forms of dance and mime are punctuated by climaxes, by poses or forms that are finally attained: they do of course bring movement into play, but the movement in question is only the passage between one pose and another and holds no interest in itself. 4 These systems imply not an analysis but a synthesis of movement and, indeed, an ideal (or transcendent) synthesis insofar as movement is merely the transition between forms that alone have value and are supposed to precede movement. Viewed from this perspective, cinema is the last descendant of the transformation produced by the modern scientific revolution. Kepler's astronomy, Galileo's physics, or Cartesian geometry were in fact based on an analytical conception of movement; they considered movement at any moment whatever and rejected the idea of privileged instants. It is for this very reason, Deleuze remarks, that cinema in its early days was greeted with more skepticism than enthusiasm. Cinema seemed to hold little interest because it was based on a sci- 8 Images in Movement and Movement-Images entific conception of movement that had been accepted for centuries and because its artistic interest was equally dubious insofar as art seemed to be consecrated to a nobler kind of movement, that of the synthesis of forms. Such was the ambiguity of cinema's beginnings: an "industrial art," it was "neither an art nor a science" (CI, 6/16). This analytic character of cinematographic movement attracted Henti Bergson's attention as early as 1907 in Creative Evolution. In order to reproduce any movement whatever on screen-the movement, for example, of a regiment marching by-cinema proceeds first of all through decomposition. First, a series of snapshots is taken, with the march appearing in an immobile position in each. Next, these snapshots are juxtaposed and projected on a screen. A series of immobile images of successive positions is then animated, but it is animated through an entirely exterior movement. As it untolls through the camera, the strip of film bestows the illusion of movement on images that are in themselves static. In this sense, according to Bergson, cinema's operation is doubly artificial: rather than catching movements as they are happening, it must do with immobile shots from which, with the help of the camera, it then extracts an impersonal and abstract movement, "movement in general" (CE, 304/304). But what is notable about the "artificiality" of this procedure is that it characterizes not only cinema but also philosophy, language, and even our intelligence and our ways of perceiving (or perceptive habits). For this reason, as Bergson maintains, the cinematographic mechanism coincides with the mechanism of thought itself, and the new technology of nascent cinema merely corroborates the "oldest illusion" of conceptual thought (CE, 2721272). There is not only a handy if surprising analogy between cinema and our oldest habits; they have a true common nature. Cinema exposes from the outside, so to speak, the most distinctive operation of human perception and intellect: they have a "cinematographical tendency" that is nothing less than our "natural metaphysic" ( CE, 326/325-26). The operation of decomposing every singular becoming into a series of stable elements that are like snapshots or immo- 9