RE-VISIONS OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY Gilles deleuze Cinema and philosop paola marrati Translated by Alisa Hartz 14 (
PARALLAX •• RE-VISIONS OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 'J P . Stephen G. Nichols, Geralu rmee, an d Wend11 'J Steiner SERIES EDITORS Gilles Deleuze Cinema and Philosophy Paola Marrati Translated by Alisa Hartz The Johns Hopkins University �ress BaltImore
us assistance of the humanities center and the School of Arts and Sciences at the Johns Hopkin Originally published as Gilles Deleuze: Cinema er To Leo and hent bilosophie, 2003 Presses Universitaires de France C 2008 The Johns Hopkins University Pr All rights reserved. Published 2008 nted in the United States of Ameri Paper 98765432 The Johns Hopkins University Press North Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 Marrati. paola Gilles Deleuze cinema and philosophy Paola Marrati translated by Alisa Hartz. P. cm. -(Parallax, re-visions of culture and society) Includes bibliographical references and index. 978-0-8018-8802-1(hardcover: alk. Paper) BN-1O:0-8o18-8802-6(hardcover: alk. Paper) I. Motion Pictures--Philosophy. 2. Deleuze, Gille 995. 1. Title. 95.M2962008 791.43 07035483 o1-dczx record for this book is available from the Special discounts are awailable for bulk purchases of this book. For more information, please contact Special Hro-516-6936 or specialsale @press jbu. edu The Johns Hopkins University Press friendly book materials, including recycled text paper that ed of at least 3o percent post-consumer waste. whenever possible. All of our book papers are acid-free, d our jackets and covers are printed on paper with
This book has been brought ro publication with the generous assistance of the Humanities Center and the Ktieger School of Arts and Sciences at the Johns Hopkins Un iversicy. Originally published as Gilles Deleuze: Cinema et philosophie, © 2003 Presses Universitaires de France © 2008 The Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2008 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 98 7654 32 1 The Johns Hopkins Universicy Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 www.press.jhu.edu Marrati, Paola. Gilles Oeleuze : cinema and philosophy / Paola Marrati ; translated by Alisa Hartz. p. cm. - (Parallax, re-visions of culture and society) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-I3: 978-0-80I8-8802-1 (hardcover: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8018-8802-6 (hardcover: alk. paper) I. Motion pictures-Philosophy. 2. Deleuze, Gilles, 1925-1995. 1. Title. PNI995·M2962008 79I.43 2007035483 OI-dc22 A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Special discounts al·e available for bulk purchases of this blJok. For mon: information, please contact Special Sales at 41O-5I6-6936 or specialsales@pressjhu.edu. The Johns Hopkins University Press uses environmentally friendly book materials, including recycled text paper that is composed of at least 30 percent post-consumer waste, whenever possible. All of our book papers are acid-free, and our jackets and covers are printed on paper with recycled content. To Leo and Hent -
Contents Preface to the English-language Edition Acknowledgments Frequently Cited Texts Introduction 3 The Montage of the Whole s The Time-Image 6 Images and Immanence: The Problem of he World Appendix. A Lost Everyday: Deleuze and Cavell on Hollywood Works cited
I Contents Preface to the English-language Edition iX Acknowledgments XVll Frequently Cited Texts XiX Introduction Images in Movement and Movement-Images 6 2 Cinema and Perception 27 3 The Montage of the Whole 44 4 Postwar Cinema 56 5 The Time-Image 66 6 Images and Immanence: The Problem of the World 78 Conclusion 94 Appendix. A Lost Everyday: Deleuze and Cavell on Hollywood 97 Notes II3 Works Cited 127 Index 133
Preface to the English-language edition Deleuze's two books on cinema, cinema. the M Cinema z: The Time-Image, even more than his other works, call fo different audiences and different readings. They obviously are of ir terest to students and scholars of film and media, as well as to phi losophers and critical theorists engaged with Deleuze's thinking But they also get attention across disciplinary boundaries. Cinema I and 2 offer challenging analyses of modes of perception. They describe a plurality of equally compelling ways of linking past, present future, ways that may exclude each other, but that, more of ten than not,overlap and coexist, giving to time, and to our experience of a thick, layered fabric. Together these books provide innovative oncepts to help us think about the power of images, affects, and beliefs, about the power of the mind and of the body -all of which weknow, in fact, so little about. It does not come as a surprise, then, that both books increasingly find readers in all the fields of the hu vanities and social sciences. No one can say whether the centur rill be Deleuzian, "as Foucault-somchow ironically-predicted but the reception of Deleuze's work in general, and on cinema in particular, is in this regard only at its beginning Cinema I and 2 are diffcult books, however, and their cross-disci- linary appeal makes it all the more important that their dense phil- osophical arguments and underpinnings should be closely analyzed and unpacked. I hope that this study contributes to such a task and that it will prove helpful to all readers of Deleuze m in this preface is not to map out the recent receptio Deleuze's work on cinema across disciplines. Such a in the making, and, to my mind, it is too early to attempt a general
I Preface to the English-language Edition Deleuze's two books on cinema, Cinema I: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, even more than his other works, call for different audiences and different readings. They obviously are of interest to students and scholars of film and media, as well as to philosophers and critical theorists engaged with Deleuze's thinking. But they also get attention across disciplinary boundaries. Cinema I and 2 offer challenging analyses of modes of perception. They describe a plurality of equally compelling ways of linking past, present, and future, ways that may exclude each other, but that, more often than not, overlap and coexist, giving to time, and to our experience of it, a thick, layered fabric. Together these books provide innovative concepts to help us think about the power of images, affects, and beliefs, about the power of the mind and of the body-all of which we know, in fact, so little about. It does not come as a surprise, then, that both books increasingly find readers in all the fields of the humanities and social sciences. No one can say whether "the century will be Deleuzian," as Foucault-somehow ironically-predicted, but the reception of Deleuze's work in general, and on cinema in particular, is in this regard only at its beginning. Cinema I and 2 are difficult books, however, and their cross-disciplinary appeal makes it all the more important that their dense philosophical arguments and underpinnings should be closely analyzed and unpacked. I hope that this study contributes to such a task and that it will prove helpful to all readers of Deleuze. My aim in this preface is not to map out the recent reception of Deleuze's work on cinema across disciplines. Such a reception is still in the making, and, to my mind, it is too early to attempt a general IX
Preface to the English-language Edition Preface to the Englisb-language Edition overview of its influence. Further, such an enterprise, no matter how favor of different forms of montage that undo the primacy of action important and useful it might be, ngs to the field of intellectual and present other links among perceptions, affections, and agency. history and is therefore a task I am not prepared to undertake. Nor Such a modern cinema is the explicit object of Cinema 3, which ex- is this preface meant to be a description of the content of the book plores the upsurge of films that no longer subordinate time to move the introduction fulfills that necessary function. My aim is rather to ment or action but rather aim at making time, as such, perceptible. advance a claim that, as such, is not explicitly made in the book for If this is the most recognizable, and recognized, move of th the compelling reason that it was not one of the guiding hypotheses books, some of its implications have not been sufficiently spelled of my study but, rather, imposed itself upon me while I was writing, ut--namely what the analyses of the action-image form has to say cncc of the analyses undertaken. about both liberal and Marxist-inspired political theories and what The claim is this Cinema I and 2 are the key texts in which the analysis of the time-image regimes have to say about the political Deleuze develops his political philosophy. This is not to deny the im- consequences of the prima [Imc ov portance of the more openly political books such as Anti-Oedipus or to argue that the action form, as Deleuze describes rrespond A Thousand Plateaus, nor is it to deny the significance of dcleuzc's liberal and historicist notions of subjectivity and agency, while the elaboration with Felix guattari. It is even less to argue that cinema rise of cs to not the real object of the books but only a pretext to write about not be understood as the simple, and easy, claim that there is no fu litics. As I hope to show, Deleuze takes absolutely seriously the ure for(political)action but, on the contrary, as an cffort to think Bergsonian injunction that philosophy needs and has to gency anew, along different lines than those prescribed by liberalism elaborate singular concepts that fit singular objects, and them alone, and historicism. Such a Delcuzian approach to agency is grounded if it wants to avoid building general systems of explanation that can on an understanding of modernity that, for not bcing mainstream, be,indeed, applied to everything but only because of their empti- deserves attention if one wants to fully grasp it ness. My hypothesis is a different one: it is that precisely becaus The insistence with which Deleuze highlights the similarity be- Deleuze aims to grasp the specificity of cinema, its novelty, as well tween Griffiths and Eisenstcin's concept and practice of montage is the novelty of its different instances, that he is led to analyze in detail significant in this regard. Certainly, Eisenstein has a very different forms of action and agency and their transformations. It is such a close notion of the laws that govern the life of a human socicty than grif- alysis of agency that constitutes, to my mind, the political cor fith has, but they both understand it as an organic unity whose cle- bution of cinema r and 2 ments are held together by necessary, and coherent, ties. Eisenstcin's While the regime of m Images, as Deleuze understands criticism of Griffiths"bourgeois "form of montage is grounded pre it, is not reducible to the action-image form, it is undeniable that cisely on such a shared assumption. Griffith does not grasp the dia Cinema r dwells extensively on films that make of the action-image lactic nature of the laws that govern the life of the social organism,its heir organizing center. Affection-images and pcrception-images are growth, tensions, and crises; he wrongly assumes that the clements always present, but they rare principle of of the organism are naturally given instcad of bcing historically pro film. This is why classic cinema mostly privileges the action form duced. and he fails to see that what threatens its and the active montage-be it organic, as in Griffith, or dialectic, a it at a higher level is not of the order of individual pa in Eisenstein The rise of modern cinema in the aftermath of World or betrayals. In both cases, however, what sets in motion the life of War Il, in Deleuzc's analyses, marks the demise of the action form in the organism are actions. What gives significance to affects, ideas
Prefoce to the English-language Edition overview of its influence. Further, such an enterprise, no matter how important and useful it might be, belongs to the field of intellectual history and is therefore a task I am not prepared to undertake. Nor is this preface meant to be a description of the content of the book; the introduction fulfills that necessary function. My aim is rather to advance a claim that, as such, is not explicitly made in the book for the compelling reason that it was not one of the guiding hypotheses of my study but, rather, imposed itself upon me while I was writing, as a consequence of the analyses undertaken. The claim is this: Cinema I and 2 are the key texts in which Deleuze develops his political philosophy. This is not to deny the importance of the more openly political books such as Anti-Oedipus or A Thousand Plateaus, nor is it to deny the significance of Deleuze's collaboration with Felix Guattari. It is even less to argue that cinema is not the real object of the books but only a pretext to write about politics. As I h ope to show, Deleuze takes absolutely seriously the Bergsonian injunction that philosophy needs precision and has to elaborate singular concepts that fit singular objects, and them alone, if it wants to avoid building general systems of explanation that can be, indeed, applied to everything but only because of their emptiness. My hypothesis is a different one: it is that precisely because Deleuze aims to grasp the specificity of cinema, its novelty, as well as the novelty of its different instances, that he is led to analyze in detail forms of action and agency and their transformations. It is such a close analysis of agency that constitutes, to my mind, the political contribution of Cinema I and 2. While the regime of movement-images, as Deleuze understands it, is not reducible to the action-image form, it is undeniable that Cinema I dwells extensively on films that make of the action-image their organizing center. Affection-images and perception-images are always present, but they rarely constitute the organizing principle of a film. This is why classic cinema mostly privileges the action form and the active montage-be it organic, as in Griffith, or dialectic, as in Eisenstein. The rise of modern cinema in the aftermath of World War II, in Deleuze's analyses, marks the demise of the action form in x Prefoce to the English-language Edition favor of different forms of montage that undo the primacy of action and present other links among perceptions, affections, and agency. Such a modern cinema is the explicit object of Cinema 2, which explores the upsurge of films that no longer subordinate time to movement or action but rather aim at making time, as such, perceptible. If this is the most recognizable, and recognized, move of the books, some of its implications have not been sufficiently spelled out-namely what the analyses of the action-image form has to say about both liberal and Marxist-inspired political theories and what the analysis of the time-image regimes have to say about the political consequences of the primacy of "time" over "movement." I would like to argue that the action form, as Deleuze describes it, corresponds to liberal and historicist notions of subjectivity and agency, while the rise of time-images, in the sense Deleuze gives to the term, should not be understood as the simple, and easy, claim that there is no future for (political) action but, on the contrary, as an effort to think agency anew, along different lines than those prescribed by liberalism and historicism. Such a Deleuzian approach to agency is grounded on an understanding of modernity that, for not being mainstream, deserves attention if one wants to fully grasp it. The insistence with which Deleuze highlights the similarity between Griffith's and Eisenstein's concept and practice of montage is significant in this regard. Certainly, Eisenstein has a very different notion of the laws that govern the life of a human society than Griffith has, but they both understand it as an organic unity whose elements are held together by necessary, and coherent, ties. Eisenstein's criticism of Griffith's "bourgeois" form of montage is grounded precisely on such a shared assumption. Griffith does not grasp the dialectic nature of the laws that govern the life of the social organism, its growth, tensions, and crises; he wrongly assumes that the elements of the organism are naturally given instead of being historically produced, and he fails to see that what threatens its unity or recomposes it at a higher level is not of the order of individual passions, desires, or betrayals. In both cases, however, what sets in motion the life of the organism are actions. What gives significance to affects, ideas, Xl