Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and philosophy Images in Movement and Movenent-Amages bile sections and then, after the fact, adding an abstract movement going autograph inside us. becoming in general-is, for Bergson, an artifice but an artifice may therefore sum up what we have been saying in the conclusie hat is anything but arbitrary. In that the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematograph the process of bcing made and unmade, the living perceive only cal kind(CE, 306/305: translation modified halts and right to do this: they must live, and to live they must act, and ac matogra cchanism of thought" did not have tion demands a restrained perception that can sclect from the real to wait for the birth of cinema to get to work; at most, it found in that which has interest. Our language and intellect are no exception: cinema a suitable name. In short, to summarize with Deleuze,it is realising it”(C the necessity of acting to live. 5 2/to; translation modified ). And if we think about the way cinema The privilege of the stable over the unstable, and of the immo- proceeds, this art of images in movement is no more able to grasp bile over movement, thus emerges from an oricntation toward action movements as they are happening than our perception or our intel that, in itself, is necessary and legitimate-at least within its own lect. Cinema, then, would only present false movement. But what is limits, which are in fact overstepped from the outset. The habit of true movement? What are its characteristics? Bergson's thesis is fa- taking instantancous and immobile snapshots of the becoming of re- nous: movement cannot be reduced to the space covered. Identify ality, and of retaining only what interests us in them in order to act, ing movement with the trajectory it has drawn leads to unresolvable quickly slips toward a "natural metaphysics"lodged in language but aradoxes, which condemn us to grasping nothing about move- also already lodged in the senses and the intellect. This habit leads us ment. The arguments Zeno of Elea used to prove the inexistence to conceive of movement and change merely as accidents that hap- of movement already presupposed this identification of movement pen to things that are by nature stable. Aristotle's logic of predica with space covered, which, according to Bergson, continues to oper- tive judgment, which attributes a predicate (accident)to a subject te in the whole history of philosophy, even as it is the very root of abstance), is the defnitive expression of of this habit the impossibility of thinking movement. Why? Because movement according to Bergson. But then an illusion takes hold. Not only do is indivisible, whereas space covered is divisible. Or, more precisely, forget that the stable is a section of becoming, but we fall into the be divided only by "changing its nature, by becom- trap of believing that it is possible to"think the unstable by means of g another movement, whereas space covered is infinitely divisible, the stable, the moving by means of the immobile"(CE, 273/273),and decomposable and recomposable at will, bccause it is homogenous to recompose movement with immobilities This becomes clear in the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. If Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise, since his first step takes Such is the contrivance of the cinematograph. And such is als him to, the point where the tortoise had previously been and so on, that of our knowledge. Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order t this is because of th presupposition that Achilles recompose their becoming We take snapshots, as it were, of the and the tortoise's step-are arbitrarily divisible like the segments of passing reality, and, as these are characteristics of the reality, w a line. But, of course, this is not so: cach step is in reality indi only to string them on an abstract becoming .. Perception, ible, and this is why Achilles has no problem whatsoever catching up tellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we would with the tortoise in a few bounds. 7 Movements are indivisible as well think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly de as heterogeneous, whereas spaces covered are homogenous. Achill
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy bile sections and then, after the fact, adding an abstract movement "becoming in general"-is, for Bergson, an artifice but an artifice that is anything but arbitrary. In a reality always in becoming, always in the process of being made and unmade, the living perceive only halts and states, "snapshots" cut out from change. And the living are right to do this: they must live, and to live they must act, and action demands a restrained perception that can select from the real that which has interest. Out language and intellect are no exception: from this perspective, as Bergson insists, they, too, are oriented by the necessity of acting to live.s The privilege of the stable over the unstable, and of the immobile over movement, thus emerges from an orientation toward action that, in itself, is necessary and legitimate-at least within its own limits, which are in fact overstepped from the outset. The habit of taking instantaneous and immobile snapshots of the becoming of reality, and of retaining only what interests us in them in order to act, quickly slips toward a "natural metaphysics" lodged in language but also already lodged in the senses and the intellect. This habit leads us to conceive of movement and change merely as accidents that happen to things that are by nature stable. 6 Aristotle's logic of predicative judgment, which attributes a predicate (accident) to a subject (substance), is the definitive expression of the power of this habit, according to Bergson. But then an illusion takes hold. Not only do we forget that the stable is a section of becoming, but we fall into the trap of believing that it is possible to "think the unstable by means of the stable, the moving by means of the immobile" (CE, 2731273), and to recompose movement with immobilities: ro Such is the contrivance of the cinematograph. And such is also that of our knowledge. Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristics of the reality, we have only to string them on an abstract becoming .... Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do Images in Movement and Movement-Images anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us. We may therefore sum up what we have been saying in the conclusion that the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind. (CE, 306/305; translation modified) Thus the "cinematographic mechanism of thought" did not have to wait for the birth of cinema to get to work; at most, it found in cinema a suitable name. In short, to summarize with Deleuze, it is "as though we had always made cinema without realising it" (CI, 2/ro; translation modified). And if we think about the way cinema proceeds, this art of images in movement is no more able to grasp movements as they are happening than our perception or our intellect. Cinema, then, would only present false movement. But what is true movement? What are its characteristics? Bergson's thesis is famous: movement cannot be reduced to the space covered. Identifying movement with the trajectory it has drawn leads to unresolvable paradoxes, which condemn us to grasping nothing about movement. The arguments Zeno of Elea used to prove the inexistence of movement already presupposed this identification of movement with space covered, which, according to Bergson, continues to operate in the whole history of philosophy, even as it is the very root of the impossibility of thinking movement. Why? Because movement is indivisible, whereas space covered is divisible. Or, more precisely, movement can be divided only by "changing its nature," by becoming another movement, whereas space covered is infinitely divisible, decomposable and recomposable at will, because it is homogenous. This becomes dear in the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. If Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise, since his first step takes him to the point where the tortoise had previously been and so on, this is because of the erroneous presupposition that Achilles' stepand the tortoise's step-are arbitrarily divisible like the segments of a line. But, of course, this is not so: each step is in reality indivisible, and this is why Achilles has no problem whatsoever catching up with the tortoise in a few bounds. ? Movements are indivisible as well as heterogeneous, whereas spaces covered are homogenous. Achilles' II
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and philosophy step and the tortoises step may very well trace the same trajectory in nent is clearly not the answer Deleuze is secking. But accor space, but their movements follow different articulations. Deleuze, Bergson proposes not one but three theses on movement. Because of movement's indivisible and heterogeneous nature, The irreducibility of movement to space covered should not stop us any attempt to reconstitute it with positions in space and instants rom considering the other two theses and, above all, the way they n time is doomed to failure. Once a movement has been carried out,one can, of course, consider its trajectory, section it into posi onnected, which is what will allow Deleuze to give a cinemato graphic reading of Bergson and to bring out an"objective alliance ns in space, and correlate these positions with instants. But what between Bergson and cinema. Because the whole project of Cinema is obtained through such a procedure is a succession of immobile depends on this alliance, its content needs to be defined positions, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a homogenous Deleuze understands Bergson's distinction between the Ancients and abstract time-a spatialized time. The underlying presuppose- and the moderns as a second thesis on movement. lf both modern n is that what is true of the line that has been traced is also true nce and Greek metaphysics and science share the illusion that of the movement, but even if we bring two instants or two positions movement can be recomposed with instants or positions, they carry infinitely close, movement will elude us: it always"slips through the out this recomposition according to divergent principles and thus interval"(CE, 308/307). This is because we find ourselves, from the miss movement"in two very different ways. Whereas Greek philos- outset, in the absurd position of believing that a series of immobilities hy is a philosophy of ideas, which retains only privileged moments can produce movement. Here Bergson is denouncing an illegitimate of movement-forms, modern science is built on the renunciation of spatialization of movement that implies the spatialization of time it- any idea of form and considers movement in relation to any-instar self. Movement is reduced to space when it is made to coincide with whatever. Art is no stranger to this difference in attitude; to the con- a juxtaposition of points, and time is reduced to a scries of instants trary. Bergson's example is a galloping horse; the Parthenon sculptors that merely reproduces the spatial juxtaposition. But real, indivis- fix this gallop into a characteristic form that is meant to recapture the ble, and heterogeneous movement happens in a qualitative time, in sence of the movement, whereas instantancous photography iso- duration. Deleuze summarizes this opposition with two formulas lates the gallop in any-instant-whatevers and decomposes it into any on the one hand we have"immobile sections abstract time"and number of different positions. This is the distinction that we have the other hand, "real movement concrete duration"(Cl, I/Io already encountered between the ideal synthesis of movement and its We are now in a better position to understand why Bergson grants ing within the province of modern ngs in the latter category,fall- nsible analysis. Cinema clearly belo uch significance to cinema as the paradigm of the"mechanism of thought. Photograms are instantancous snapshots, "immobile sec why, asks Deleuze, does Bergson project cinema backward, using tions, "of positions or hat have been arbitrarily cut out from to express the commonalities of the ancient and modern manners of the real movement, which is unreeled over the length of an abstract staking movement, rather than situating it, as would nd always identical time: the time "in"the projection apparatus. legitimate, at their point of divergence, and understanding cinema as Rather than placing oneself within a singular It and grasp- the exemplary evidence of the modern illusion? The reason for this, ing its nature, one artificially decomposes and recomposes it according to Bergson, Yet with respect to Deleuze's initial problem, that of finding the with the same result. The difference that separates them, as radical a pecificity of the i Be it may be in some respects, is a difference"of degree rather than of mous thesis does not seem to get us very far. Cinema as false move- kind"(CE 332/332). To understand Bergson's position, we must take
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy step and the tortoise's step may very well trace the same trajectory in space, but their movements follow different articulations. Because of movement's indivisible and heterogeneous nature, any attempt to reconstitute it with positions in space and instants in time is doomed to failure. Once a movement has been carried out, one can, of course, consider its trajectory, section it into positions in space, and correlate these positions with instants. But what is obtained through such a procedure is a succession of immobile positions, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a homogenous and abstract time-a spatialized time. The underlying presupposition is that what is true of the line that has been traced is also true of the movement, but even if we bring two instants or two positions infinitely close, movement will elude us: it always "slips through the interval" (CE, 308/307). This is because we find ourselves, from the outset, in the absurd position of believing that a series of immobilities can produce movement. Here Bergson is denouncing an illegitimate spatialization of movement that implies the spatialization of time itself Movement is reduced to space when it is made to coincide with a juxtaposition of points, and time is reduced to a series of instants that merely reproduces the spatial juxtaposition. But real, indivisible, and heterogeneous movement happens in a qualitative time, in duration. Deleuze summarizes this opposition with two formulas: on the one hand, we have "immobile sections + abstract time" and, on the other hand, "real movement + concrete duration" (CI, 1/10). We are now in a better position to understand why Bergson grants such significance to cinema as the paradigm of the "mechanism of thought." Photograms are instantaneous snapshots, "immobile sections," of positions or states that have been arbitrarily cut out from the real movement, which is unreeled over the length of an abstract and always identical time: the time "in" the projection apparatus. Rather than placing oneself within a singular movement and grasping its nature, one artificially decomposes and recomposes it. Yet with respect to Deleuze's initial problem, that of finding the specificity of the movement of cinematographic images, Bergson's famous thesis does not seem to get us very far. Cinema as false move- 12 Images in Movement and Movement-Images ment is clearly not the answer Deleuze is seeking. But according to Deleuze, Bergson proposes not one but three theses on movement. The irreducibility of movement to space covered should not stop us from considering the other two theses and, above all, the way they are connected, which is what will allow Deleuze to give a cinematographic reading of Bergson and to bring out an "objective alliance" between Bergson and cinema. Because the whole project of Cinema I depends on this alliance, its content needs to be defined. Deleuze understands Bergson's distinction between tbe Ancients and the Moderns as a second thesis on movement. If both modern science and Greek metaphysics and science share the illusion that movement can be recomposed with instants or positions, they carry out this recomposition according to divergent principles and thus "miss movement" in two very different ways. Whereas Greek philosophy is a philosophy of ideas, which retains only privileged moments of movement-forms, modern science is built on the renunciation of any idea of form and considers movement in relation to any-instantwhatever. Art is no stranger to this difference in attitude; to the contrary. Bergson's example is a galloping horse; the Parthenon sculptors fix this gallop into a characteristic form that is meant to recapture the essence of the movement, whereas instantaneous photography isolates the gallop in any-instant-whatevers and decomposes it into any number of different positions. This is the distinction that we have already encountered between the ideal synthesis of movement and its sensible analysis. Cinema clearly belongs in the latter category, falling within the province of modern science and metaphysics. Then why, asks Deleuze, does Bergson project cinema backward, using it to express the commonalities of the ancient and modern manners of mistaking movement, rather than situating it, as would seem more legitimate, at their point of divergence, and understanding cinema as the exemplary evidence of the modern illusion? The reason for this, according to Bergson, is that ancient and modern sciences end up with the same result. The difference that separates them, as radical as it may be in some respects, is a difference "of degree rather than of kind" (CE, 332/332). To understand Bergson's position, we must take 13
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and philosophy the nature of time into account more explicitly than we have done up invention itsclf. It is this conception that leads Bergson to make the to this point. If the philosophy of ideas retains only forms of me hing at all"(CE, ment while modern scicnce is interested in the any-instant-whatev 341/341). Now, the time that coincides with the production of the this is because the first is essentially static, and time intervenes only new is precisely the kind of time that modern science ignores. For as a degradation of eternity. Modern science, to the contrary, intro- modern physics, as for Aristotle, time is the"number of movemen duces time as an independent variable. Kepler and Galileo establish of a mobile Ton a trajectory that represents what is a new scientific paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, in which time becomes aptly called the"course of time. "1 Time thus draws a line in which n essential clement.8 Bergson notes that Kepler's question-how to purcly temporal succession is copied from spatial juxtaposition. But calculate the respective positions of planets at any moment whatever, juxtaposition in space is de jure instantancous, this spatial- once their position at a given moment is known-bccomes the ideal ization of time is the origin of the illusion that everything in the uni- problem of all scicnce. Henceforward it will be a matter, at least in verse is already given, that the future is, at least in principle, already principle, of determining the relative positions of the clements of contained in the present and the past, and that the whole of time cach material system as a function of time as an independent vari- could be unfolded instantaneously. Laplace's demon, who, knowing able. There would scem to be a radical difference between a static the position and speed of all particles in the universe at a given mo- science, in which time intervenes merely as degradation or as neg- ment, could thercfore know every future and past event, is the per- ligible interval between the passage of one eternal form to another, fect expression of the consequences of understanding unfold- and a science in which time is the very clement of all becoming and ing in space. De jure if not de facto, such time produces nothing; it of all possible change, especially for Bergson, who sees the problem is merely the abstract and ultimately inessential frame in which one of becoming as the decisive problem of philosophy. Why, then, does event succeeds another without this succession affecting the nature Bergson nonetheless sce the difference betwcen modern scicnce and of events in any way. II ancient science as merely a difference of degree rather than kind? It is in this reduction of time to a spatial model that ancient meta- is not just one concept of time,a physics and modern physics coincide, according to Bergson. And it ads on how we understand its nature. As Deleuze rightly empha- is for this reason that both are under the auspices of the"cinemato- sizes, Bergson's central question concerns the production of the new, graphic mechanism of thought, the true significance of which and philosophy must be converted from seeking out the eternal to are now in a position to understand. Not only docs cinema extract analyzing what makes it possible for the new to appear(Cl, 3/1) 'immobile sections"from movement to which it then adds the ab- Time is this"condition of possibility", nothing new is created with- stract time of the movement of the camera, but, worse yet, in so do- out taking time. We may know a painter, his manner, model, and it perpetuates the illusion that temporal succession is only the the colors he uses; nonetheless, Bergson remarks, we cannot foresee unfolding of spatial juxtaposition, which is negligible de jure. It lead what will appear on the canvas, "that unforeseeable nothing which is us to believe that time is nothing but the artificial setting into mo- rk of art. And it is this nothing that takes time tion of a whole that is already given at once "as on the film of the cin- (CE 341/340). There is a time necessary to creation in art but in atograph"(CE, 339/339).Cinema, like thought, misses movement other domains as well: in history, socicty, and life itself.? But the time when it claims to reconstitute it with immobile shots that it unreels in question is time as duration, incessant qualitative change, ver the length of an abstract becoming rather than grasping the het is not an external frame in which events occur but is identical erogeneity of movements as they are happening. At the same time
Gilles De/euze: Cinema and Philosophy the nature of time into account more explicitly than we have done up to this point. If the philosophy of ideas retains only forms of movement while modern science is interested in the any-instant-whatever, this is because the first is essentially static, and time intervenes only as a degradation of eternity. Modern science, to the contrary, introduces time as an independent variable. Kepler and Galileo establish a new scientific paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, in which time becomes an essential element.s Bergson notes that Kepler's question-how to calculate the respective positions of planets at any moment whatever, once their position at a given moment is known-becomes the ideal problem of all science. Henceforward it will be a matter, at least in principle, of determining the relative positions of the elements of each material system as a function of time as an independent variable. There would seem to be a radical difference between a static science, in which time intervenes merely as degradation or as negligible interval between the passage of one eternal form to another, and a science in which time is the very element of all becoming and of all possible change, especially for Bergson, who sees the problem of becoming as the decisive problem of philosophy. Why, then, does Bergson nonetheless see the difference between modern science and ancient science as merely a difference of degree rather than kind? Because there is not just one concept of time, and everything depends on how we understand its nature. As Deleuze rightly emphasizes, Bergson's central question concerns the production of the new, and philosophy must be converted from seeking out the eternal to analyzing what makes it possible for the new to appear (CI, 3/ll). Time is this "condition of possibility"; nothing new is created without taking time. We may know a painter, his manner, model, and the colors he uses; nonetheless, Bergson remarks, we cannot foresee what will appear on the canvas, "that unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art. And it is this nothing that takes time" (CE, 341/340). There is a time necessary to creation in art but in other domains as well: in history, society, and life itself.9 But the time in question is time as duration, incessant qualitative change; time is not an external frame in which events occur but is identical with 14 Images in Movement and Movement-Images invention itself. It is this conception that leads Bergson to make the startling assertion that "time is invention or it is nothing at all" (CE, 341/341). Now, the time that coincides with the production of the new is precisely the kind of time that modern science ignores. For modern physics, as for Aristotle, time is the "number of movement," the movement of a m.obile T on a trajectory that represents what is aptly called the "course of time." IO Time thus draws a line in which purely temporal succession is copied from spatial juxtaposition. But because juxtaposition in space is de jure instantaneous, this spatialization of time is the origin of the illusion that everything in the universe is already given, that the future is, at least in principle, already contained in the present and the past, and that the whole of time could be unfolded instantaneously. Laplace's demon, who, knowing the position and speed of all particles in the universe at a given moment, could therefore know every future and past event, is the perfect expression of the consequences of understanding time as unfolding in space. De jure if not de facto, such time produces nothing; it is merely the abstract and ultimately inessential frame in which one event succeeds another without this succession affecting the nature of events in any way. II It is in this reduction of time to a spatial model that ancient metaphysics and modern physics coincide, according to Bergson. And it is for this reason that both are under the auspices of the "cinematographic mechanism of thought," the true significance of which we are now in a position to understand. Not only does cinema extract "immobile sections" from movement, to which it then adds the abstract time of the movement of the camera, but, worse yet, in so doing it perpetuates the illusion that temporal succession is only the unfolding of spatial juxtaposition, which is negligible de jure. It leads us to believe that time is nothing but the artificial setting into motion of a whole that is already given at once "as on the film of the cinematograph" (CE, 339/339). Cinema, like thought, misses movement when it claims to reconstitute it with immobile shots that it unreels over the length of an abstract becoming rather than grasping the heterogeneity of movements as they are happening. At the same time, 15
illes Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy Images in Movement and Movement-images cinema,like thought, also misses time by retaining only that aspect this hypothesis and give coherence to his cinematographic reading of that is copied from space: length-time, time as number of movem Bergson, Deleuze needs Bergson's third thesis on movement. thought, ignores a-fundamental-d of time. We have already seen why Bergson maintains that movement invention-time. Yet invention-time is necessary. In Bergsons terms, which is indivisible and heterogeneous, is irreducible to space if on is inevitable, if the future is condemned to succeed the cred,which, to the contrary, is divisible and homogenous. This is present rather than bcing given at once, this is because time is iden- the first thesis. The second thesis, as we have just seen, concerns the cal to the unpredictable and the new, because "the duration of the different methods the ancients and moderns used to reconstitute universe must be one with the latitude of creation which can find movement with instants or positions. As for the third thesis, we have place in it"(CE, 340/339). What prevents time from being reduced already encountered it without explicitly naming it. The third thesi to space is nothing other than its power of creation. Modern physics asserts that not given. Of course, as Bergson formulates it, is no more able than ancient metaphysics to think this dimension his thesis bears directly on time and only indirectly on movement of time. But even as he dismisses these two different but convergent But Deleuze links the three theses together according to a logic in forms of the spatialization of time, Bergson scems to feel some regret. which movement and time are indissociable. Deleuze himself The Ancients were interested in immobile essences; for them time is formulated in Bergsons text. merely the degradation of the e. But modern science no longer It is, strictly speaking, Deleuzc's cinematographic reading of Berg- recognizes privileged instants, and "change is no longer a diminu- son: it allows one to grasp a coherence in Bergson's position that of- ion of essence, duration is not a dilution of eternity"(CE, 344/343) ten goes unnoticed and is the force behind the whole analysis of cin- Rather, modern scicnce is situated from the outset within the flux cma that Deleuze develops. We must therefore follow it attentively of time, which becomes reality itself. This kind of science should be If movement cannot be reduced to space covered, and thus able to envision time as creation, and if it does not think it itself. it be reconstituted with "immobile sections abstract time, this is be- nonetheless calls for a"new philosophy cause movement as translation in space is inseparable from a change Bergson thus seems to hesitate between two paths: gathering the in duration For Bergson, as we know, duration is qualitative change, Ancients and the Moderns under the same illusion, or pure becoming. And duration. know, which Bergson the difference that separates them and on the need to produce a new tially saw as psychological and identical to consciousness, will take philosophy for a that can no longer accept a metaphysics of an ontological dimension in the texts after Time and Free Will: An ternal ideas. Morcover, the very fact that Bergson uses nascent cin- Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Bergson cma to name "the oldest illusion is, according to Deleuze, both sign duration as the opening of time as change, the opening of the uni- and consequence of this hesitation. A descendant of instantancous verse or being. Bergson of ten calls this dimension the Whole. But, photography and of the immanent analysis of movement, cinema is Deleuze insists, we should not mistake the Whole for a closed set: it lodged at the center of modern science. Why give such a new name is itself the Open, the dimension of a time-bcing thatchanges and, in to Zeno's paradoxes? Perhaps modern physics needs a new art, just a ndures and produces the movements are q it needs a new philosophy. And perhaps cinema is one of these tive and heterogeneous, it is because they participate in the Whole of art forms And perhaps, even as he gives the name"cinema to the the universe. They express a change in the Whole. Each translatio illusion that must be overcome, what Bergson is saying about move- in space is an affection of duration: "An animal moves, but this is for ment is in profound harmony with cinema. But in order to support a purpose: to feed, migrate, ctc. (CI, 8/18; see MM Ill/iz1). Space
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy cinema, like thought, also misses time by retaining only that aspect that is copied from space: length-time, time as number of movement. Cinema, like thought, ignores a-fundamental-dimension of time: invention-time. Yet invention-time is necessary. In Bergson's terms, if succession is inevitable, if the future is condemned to succeed the present rather than being given at once, this is because time is identical to the unpredictable and the new, because "the duration of the universe must ... be one with the latitude of creation which can find place in it" (CE 340/339). What prevents time from being reduced to space is nothing other than its power of creation. Modern physics is no more able than ancient metaphysics to think this dimension of time. But even as he dismisses these two different but convergent forms of the spatialization of time, Bergson seems to feel some regret. The Ancients were interested in immobile essences; for them time is merely the degradation of the essence. But modern science no longer recognizes privileged instants, and "change is no longer a diminution of essence, duration is not a dilution of eternity" (CE, 344/343). Rather, modern science is situated from the outset within the flux of time, which becomes reality itself. This kind of science should be able to envision time as creation, and if it does not think it itself, it nonetheless calls for a "new philosophy." Bergson thus seems to hesitate between two paths: gathering the Ancients and the Moderns under the same illusion, or insisting on the difference that separates them and on the need to produce a new philosophy for a science that can no longer accept a metaphysics of eternal i deas. Moreover, the very fact that Bergson uses nascent cinema to name "the oldest illusion" is, according to Deleuze, both sign and consequence of this hesitation. A descendant of instantaneous photography and of the immanent analysis of movement, cinema is lodged at the center of modern science. Why give such a new name to Zeno's paradoxes? Perhaps modern physics needs a new art, just as it needs a new philosophy. And perhaps cinema is one of these new art forms. And perhaps, even as he gives the name "cinema" to the illusion that must be overcome, what Bergson is saying about movement is in p rofound harmony with cinema. But in order to support Images in Movement and Movement-Images this hypothesis and give coherence to his cinematographic reading of Bergson, Deleuze needs Bergson's third thesis on movement. We have already seen why Bergson maintains that movement, which is indivisible and heterogeneous, is irreducible to space covered, which, to the contrary, is divisible and homogenous. This is the first thesis. The second thesis, as we have just seen, concerns the different methods the Ancients and Moderns used to reconstitute movement with instants or positions. As for the third thesis, we have already encountered it without explicitly naming it. The third thesis asserts that the whole is not given. Of course, as Bergson formulates it, this thesis bears directly on time and only indirectly on movement. But Deleuze links the three theses together according to a logic in which movement and time are indissociable. Deleuze himself produces this linkage; it is never explicitly formulated in B ergson's text. It is, strictly speaking, Deleuze's cinemarographic reading of Bergson: it allows one to grasp a coherence in Bergson's position that often goes unnoticed and is the force behind the whole analysis of cinema that Deleuze develops. We must therefore follow it attentively. If movement cannot be reduced to space covered, and thus cannot be reconstituted with "immobile sections + abstract time," this is because movement as translation in space is inseparable from a change in duration. For Bergson, as we know, duration is qualitative change, or pure becoming. And duration, as we know, which Bergson initially saw as psychological and identical to consciousness, will take on an ontological dimension in the texts after Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Bergson comes to view duration as the opening of time as change, the opening of the universe or being. Bergson often calls this dimension the Whole. But, Deleuze insists, we should not mistake the Whole for a closed set; it is itself the Open, the dimension of a time-being that changes and, in changing, endures and produces the new. I2 If movements are qualitative and heterogeneous, it is because they participate in the Whole of the universe. They express a change in the Whole. Each translation in space is an affection of duration: ''An animal moves, but this is for a purpose: to feed, migrate, etc." (CI, Sir8; see MM III/I2I). Space 17
Gilles deleuze cinema and phil Images in Movement and Movenent-images and duration, movement as translation and movement as qualitative questions progressively, but we will soon see an initial relation to cin- change, are thus not only irreducible but interrelated. The Whole precisely what allows Deleuze to establish this relation and In effect, the concept of the mobile section allows Deleuze to cs- to Bergson's theses Rather than tablish a connection between movement and image. Deleuze is still opposing the two formulas"immobile sections+ abstract time"and referring to Bergson, but this time to the Bergson of the first chap- real movement+ concrete duration, the first expressing an illusion ter of Matter and Memor: In this chapter, which we will have occa- and the second a real relation. hey? acrial systems that are spread now related to two different sion to revisit, Bergson discovered a type of images that differ from systems. The first formula applies d sets, systems that consist those static images that are instantancous and immobile snapshots of of a certain number of distinct parts, mate images that do not resemble the photograms of cinemat in space, like those systems that modern physics was able to isolate. ographic films but that are movement from the outset and in them- In such systems one can, in fact, consider immobile sce selves. Drawing a parallel with Einstein's physics, Bergson in cffect alculate successive states as a function of abstract time. The second proposes a conception of the material universe as a universe of figures formula refers, on the contrary, to an open Whole that endures and of light and movement, "blocs of space-time, as Deleuze often puts continues to change In this universe there would be an absolute coincidence between But one cannot stop with this distinction. Sets are only artificially matter, light, and movement, and Bergsons name for this coinci- losed; they participate in the open. Movement is what produces the cnce is"image": the material universe is a universe of moving im passage between two levels Rather than distinguishing"false"from ages 13 Or, more prcciscly, of movement-images. Deleuze introduces truc" movement, Deleuze suggests that it be considered from two this term, which does not figure in Bergson, in order to underline aspects. On the one hand, movement is an cffect of translation: it establishes itself berween the objects of closed sets and modifies their an essential aspect of Bergsonian images: their mobility is absolute, so to speak, and does not depend on a mobile body as its substrate. On the other hand, but inseparably, it expresse And the term also, of course establishes the connection with cinema duration or the Whole. In this way movement relates"the objects of according to Deleuze, it is precisely such movement-images a closed system to open duration and duration to the objects of the that cinema and cinema alone produces. We will soon see why. system which it forces to open up"(Ci, 11/22). Movement of trans- For Deleuze, the concept of the mobile section corresponds ex lation and change in duration are identical. The objects of a closed actly to the movement-images of Matter and Memory and by bring- system can be considered as immobile sections, and the movement ing it to bear on Creative Evolution's thesis on movement, he is able established between them can be considered as a mobile to draw out a coherent linkage between images, time, and move duration. In other words, movement is a mobile section of tim ment. Alongside Instantancous images, immobile Why is this term or concept important? What are its implications ment, there are also movement-images that are mobile sections of for philosophical conceptions of time and movement? And, abor duration. Thus, image is not only on the first side of movement,the all, since this is Deleuzc's purpose, how does it relate to cinema? Our side turned toward the translation in space of objects that belong to point of departure was the need to think the specificity of cinem closed sets. Image is also on the second side of movement, the side the singular concepts that cinema demands. And once again we are d change in duration. For our perception, which is used confronted with speculations on the nature of movement and time to grasping movements as displacements in space, it is not casy to link to films. We can only answer this set of conceive of images that, in spatial translation itself, directly present
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy and duration, movement as translation and movement as qualitative change, are thus not only irreducible but interrelated. The Whole as open is precisely what allows DehlZe to establish this relation and to give a more "rigorous" status to Bergson's theses. Rather than simply opposing the two formulas "immobile sections + abstract time" and "real movement + concrete duration," the first expressing an illusion and the second a real relation, they are now related to two different systems. The first formula applies to closed sets, systems that consist of a certain number of distinct parts, material systems that are spread in space, like those systems that modern physics was able to isolate. In such systems one can, in fact, consider immobile sections and calculate successive states as a function of abstract time. The second formula refers, on the contrary, to an open Whole that endures and continues to change. But one cannot stop with this distinction. Sets are only artificially closed; they participate in the open. Movement is what produces the passage between two levels. Rather than distinguishing "false" from "true" movement, Deleuze suggests that it be considered from two aspects. On the one hand, movement is an effect of translation: it establishes itself between the objects of closed sets and modifies their respective positions. On the other hand, but inseparably, it expresses duration or the Whole. In this way movement relates "the objects of a closed system to open duration and duration to the objects of the system which it forces to open up" (Cr, n/n). Movement of translation and change in duration are identical. The objects of a closed system can be considered as immobile sections, and the movement established between them can be considered as a mobile section of duration. In other words, movement is a mobile section of time. Why is this term or concept important? What are its implications for philosophical conceptions of time and movement? And, above all, since this is Deleuze's purpose, how does it relate to cinema? Our point of departure was the need to think the specificity of cinema, the singular concepts that cinema demands. And once again we are confronted with speculations on the nature of movement and time that have no apparent link to films. We can only answer this set of 18 Images in Movement and Movement-Images questions progressively, but we will soon see an initial relation to cinema come into focus. In effect, the concept of the mobile section allows Deleuze to establish a connection between movement and image. Deleuze is still referring to Bergson, but this time to the Bergson of the first chapter of Matter and Memory. In this chapter, which we will have occasion to revisit, Bergson discovered a type of images that differ from those static images that are instantaneous and immobile snapshots of movement: images that do not resemble the photograms of cinematographic films but that are movement from the outset and in themselves. Drawing a parallel with Einstein's physics, Bergson in effect proposes a conception of the material universe as a universe of figures of light and movement, "blocs of space-time," as Deleuze often puts it. In this universe there would be an absolute coincidence between matter, light, and movement, and Bergson's name for this coincidence is "image": the material universe is a universe of moving images.13 Or, more precisely, of movement-images. Deleuze introduces this term, which does not figure in Bergson, in order to underline an essential aspect of Bergsonian images: their mobility is absolute, so to speak, and does not depend on a mobile body as its substrate. And the term also, of course, establishes the connection with cinema since, according to Deleuze, it is precisely such movement-images that cinema and cinema alone produces. We will soon see why. For Deleuze, the concept of the mobile section corresponds exactly to the movement-images of Matter and Memory, and by bringing it to bear on Creative Evolution's thesis on movement, he is able to draw out a coherent linkage between images, time, and movement. Alongside instantaneous images, immobile sections of movement, there are also movement-images that are mobile sections of duration. Thus, image is not only on the first side of movement, the side turned toward the translation in space of objects that belong to closed sets. Image is also on the second side of movement, the side turned toward change in duration. For our perception, which is used to grasping movements as displacements in space, it is not easy to conceive of images that, in spatial translation itself, directly present