off? Answer:It was right to call it off.What has been called off is the national assembly which the Kuomintang was preparing to convene;according to the Kuomintang's stipulations it would not have had the slightest power,and the procedure for its election was entirely in conflict with the popular will.Together with the people of all sections of society,we disapproved of that kind of national assembly.The provisional national assembly we are proposing is radically different from the one that has been called off.The convening of this provisional national assembly will undoubtedly impart a new spirit to the whole country and provide the essential prerequisite for reconstructing the government apparatus and the army and for mobilizing the entire people.On this hinges the favourable turn in the War of Resistance. Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project. HTML revised 2004 by Marxists.org Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHALAND TAIYUAN November 12,1937 [This was the outline for a report made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in Yenan,in November 1937 at a meeting of Party activists.It met with immediate opposition from the Right opportunists in the Party,and not until the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938 was the Right deviation basically overcome.] I.THE PRESENT SITUATION IS ONE OF TRANSITION FROM A WAR OF PARTIAL RESISTANCE TOA WAR OF TOTAL RESISTANCE 1.We support any kind of war of resistance,even though partial,against the invasion of Japanese imperialism.For partial resistance is a step forward from non-resistance,and to a certain extent it is revolutionary in character and is a war in defence of the motherland
off? Answer:It was right to call it off. What has been called off is the national assembly which the Kuomintang was preparing to convene; according to the Kuomintang's stipulations it would not have had the slightest power, and the procedure for its election was entirely in conflict with the popular will. Together with the people of all sections of society, we disapproved of that kind of national assembly. The provisional national assembly we are proposing is radically different from the one that has been called off. The convening of this provisional national assembly will undoubtedly impart a new spirit to the whole country and provide the essential prerequisite for reconstructing the government apparatus and the army and for mobilizing the entire people. On this hinges the favourable turn in the War of Resistance. Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project. HTML revised 2004 by Marxists.org Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHAI AND TAIYUAN November 12, 1937 [This was the outline for a report made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in Yenan, in November 1937 at a meeting of Party activists. It met with immediate opposition from the Right opportunists in the Party, and not until the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938 was the Right deviation basically overcome.] I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IS ONE OF TRANSITION FROM A WAR OF PARTIAL RESISTANCE TO A WAR OF TOTAL RESISTANCE 1. We support any kind of war of resistance, even though partial, against the invasion of Japanese imperialism. For partial resistance is a step forward from non-resistance, and to a certain extent it is revolutionary in character and is a war in defence of the motherland
2.However,a war of partial resistance by the government alone without the mass participation of the people will certainly fail,as we have already pointed out (at the meeting of Party activists in Yenan in April of this year,at the Party's National Conference in May,and in the resolution [1l of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August).For it is not a national revolutionary war in the full sense,not a people's war. 3.We stand for a national revolutionary war in the full sense,a war in which the entire people are mobilized,in other words,total resistance.For only such resistance constitutes a people's war and can achieve the goal of defending the motherland. 4.Although the war of partial resistance advocated by the Kuomintang also constitutes a national war and is revolutionary in character to a certain extent,its revolutionary character is far from complete.Partial resistance is bound to lead to defeat in the war;it can never successfully defend the motherland. 5.Herein lies the difference in principle between the stand of the Communist Party and the present stand of the Kuomintang with regard to resistance.If Communists forget this difference in principle,they will be unable to guide the War of Resistance correctly,they will be powerless to overcome the Kuomintang's one-sidedness,and they will debase themselves to the point of abandoning their principles and reduce their Party to the level of the Kuomintang.That would be a crime against the sacred cause of the national revolutionary war and the defence of the motherland. 6.In a national revolutionary war in the full sense,in a war of total resistance,it is essential to put into effect the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by the Communist Party,and it is essential to have a government and an army that will enforce this programme in its entirety. 7.The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows: (1)In northern China,regular warfare in which the Kuomintang played the chief role has ended, and guerrilla warfare in which the Communist Party is playing the chief role has become primary. In Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces,the Japanese aggressors have broken through the Kuomintang's battle lines and are advancing on Nanking and the Yangtse valley.It is already dear that the Kuomintang's partial resistance cannot last long. (2)In their own imperialist interests,the governments of Britain,the United States and France have indicated that they will help China,but so far there has been only verbal sympathy and no practical aid whatsoever. (3)The German and Italian fascists are doing everything to assist Japanese imperialism. (4)The Kuomintang is still unwilling to make any fundamental change in its one-party dictatorship and autocratic rule over the people,through which it is carrying on partial resistance. This is one side of the picture.The other side is seen in the following:
2. However, a war of partial resistance by the government alone without the mass participation of the people will certainly fail, as we have already pointed out (at the meeting of Party activists in Yenan in April of this year, at the Party's National Conference in May, and in the resolution [1] of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August). For it is not a national revolutionary war in the full sense, not a people's war. 3. We stand for a national revolutionary war in the full sense, a war in which the entire people are mobilized, in other words, total resistance. For only such resistance constitutes a people's war and can achieve the goal of defending the motherland. 4. Although the war of partial resistance advocated by the Kuomintang also constitutes a national war and is revolutionary in character to a certain extent, its revolutionary character is far from complete. Partial resistance is bound to lead to defeat in the war; it can never successfully defend the motherland. 5. Herein lies the difference in principle between the stand of the Communist Party and the present stand of the Kuomintang with regard to resistance. If Communists forget this difference in principle, they will be unable to guide the War of Resistance correctly, they will be powerless to overcome the Kuomintang's one-sidedness, and they will debase themselves to the point of abandoning their principles and reduce their Party to the level of the Kuomintang. That would be a crime against the sacred cause of the national revolutionary war and the defence of the motherland. 6. In a national revolutionary war in the full sense, in a war of total resistance, it is essential to put into effect the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by the Communist Party, and it is essential to have a government and an army that will enforce this programme in its entirety. 7. The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows: (1) In northern China, regular warfare in which the Kuomintang played the chief role has ended, and guerrilla warfare in which the Communist Party is playing the chief role has become primary. In Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces, the Japanese aggressors have broken through the Kuomintang's battle lines and are advancing on Nanking and the Yangtse valley. It is already dear that the Kuomintang's partial resistance cannot last long. (2) In their own imperialist interests, the governments of Britain, the United States and France have indicated that they will help China, but so far there has been only verbal sympathy and no practical aid whatsoever. (3) The German and Italian fascists are doing everything to assist Japanese imperialism. (4) The Kuomintang is still unwilling to make any fundamental change in its one-party dictatorship and autocratic rule over the people, through which it is carrying on partial resistance. This is one side of the picture. The other side is seen in the following:
(1)The political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army is spreading fast and far,and they are being acclaimed throughout the country as"the saviours of the nation".The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to keep up the guerrilla warfare in northern China,so as to defend the whole country,tie down the Japanese aggressors and hinder them from attacking the Central Plains and the Northwest. (2)The mass movement has developed a step further. (3)The national bourgeoisie is leaning towards the left. (4)Forces favouring reforms are growing within the Kuomintang. (5)The movement to oppose Japan and aid China is spreading among the people of the world. (6)The Soviet Union is preparing to give practical assistance to China. This is the other side of the picture 8.Therefore,the present situation is one of transition from partial to total resistance.While partial resistance cannot last long,total resistance has not yet begun.The transition from one to the other, the gap in time,is fraught with danger. 9.In this period,China's partial resistance may develop in one of three directions: The first is the ending of partial resistance and its replacement by total resistance.This is what the majority of the nation demands,but the Kuomintang is still undecided. The second is the ending of armed resistance and its replacement by capitulation.This is what the Japanese aggressors,the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements demand,but the majority of the Chinese people oppose it. The third is the coexistence of armed resistance and capitulation in China.This could come about as a result of the intrigues of the Japanese aggressors,the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements to split China's anti-Japanese front when they kind it impossible to attain the second direction.They are now engineering something of this kind.Indeed this danger is very grave. 10.Judging from the present situation,the domestic and international factors which prevent capitulationism from winning out have the upper hand.These factors include:Japan's persistence in its policy of subjugating China,which leaves China no alternative but to fight;the existence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army;the wishes of the Chinese people;the wishes of the majority of the Kuomintang members;the anxiety of Britain,the United States and France lest capitulation by the Kuomintang damage their interests;the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy of helping China;the high hopes which the Chinese people place(not without foundation)in the SovietUnion.The proper and co-ordinated use of these factors would not only frustrate capitulationism and splitting but also overcome the obstructions to any advance beyond partial resistance
(1) The political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army is spreading fast and far, and they are being acclaimed throughout the country as "the saviours of the nation". The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to keep up the guerrilla warfare in northern China, so as to defend the whole country, tie down the Japanese aggressors and hinder them from attacking the Central Plains and the Northwest. (2) The mass movement has developed a step further. (3) The national bourgeoisie is leaning towards the left. (4) Forces favouring reforms are growing within the Kuomintang. (5) The movement to oppose Japan and aid China is spreading among the people of the world. (6) The Soviet Union is preparing to give practical assistance to China. This is the other side of the picture. 8. Therefore, the present situation is one of transition from partial to total resistance. While partial resistance cannot last long, total resistance has not yet begun. The transition from one to the other, the gap in time, is fraught with danger. 9. In this period, China's partial resistance may develop in one of three directions: The first is the ending of partial resistance and its replacement by total resistance. This is what the majority of the nation demands, but the Kuomintang is still undecided. The second is the ending of armed resistance and its replacement by capitulation. This is what the Japanese aggressors, the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements demand, but the majority of the Chinese people oppose it. The third is the coexistence of armed resistance and capitulation in China. This could come about as a result of the intrigues of the Japanese aggressors, the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements to split China's anti-Japanese front when they kind it impossible to attain the second direction. They are now engineering something of this kind. Indeed this danger is very grave. 10. Judging from the present situation, the domestic and international factors which prevent capitulationism from winning out have the upper hand. These factors include: Japan's persistence in its policy of subjugating China, which leaves China no alternative but to fight; the existence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army; the wishes of the Chinese people; the wishes of the majority of the Kuomintang members; the anxiety of Britain, the United States and France lest capitulation by the Kuomintang damage their interests; the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy of helping China; the high hopes which the Chinese people place (not without foundation) in the SovietUnion. The proper and co-ordinated use of these factors would not only frustrate capitulationism and splitting but also overcome the obstructions to any advance beyond partial resistance
11.Therefore,the prospect of going over from partial to total resistance does exist.To strive for this prospect is the urgent common task of all Chinese Communists,all progressive members of the Kuomintang,and all the Chinese people. 12.China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now confronting a grave crisis.This crisis may be prolonged,or it may be overcome fairly quickly.Internally,the decisive factors are Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and a change in Kuomintang policy on the basis of this co- operation,and the strength of the worker and peasant masses.Externally,the decisive factor is assistance from the Soviet Union. 13.Political and organizational reform of the Kuomintang is both necessary and possible.2 The main reasons are Japanese pressure,the Chinese Communist Party's united front policy,the wishes of the Chinese people,and the growth of new forces inside the Kuomintang.Our task is to work for this reform of the Kuomintang as a basis for reforming the government and the army.This reform undoubtedly requires the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang,and we are only in a position to offer suggestions. 14.The government should be reformed.We have proposed the convening of a provisional national assembly,which is likewise both necessary and possible.Undoubtedly this reform also requires the consent of the Kuomintang. 15.The task of reforming the army consists in building up new armies and reforming the old armies.If a new army of '50,000 to 300,000 men imbued with a new political spirit can be built up within six to twelve months,the situation on the anti-Japanese battlefield will begin to mend.Such an army would influence all the old armies and rally them around itself.This would provide the military basis for the turn to the strategic counter-offensive in the War of Resistance.This reform likewise requires the Kuomintang's consent.The Eighth Route Army ought to have an exemplary role to play in the course of this reform.And the Eighth Route Army itself should be expanded. IL CAPITULATIONISM MUST BE COMBATED BOTH INSIDE THE PARTY AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY INSIDE THE PARTY OPPOSE CLASS CAPITULATIONISM 16.In 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism led to the failure of the revolution.No member of our Party should ever forget this historical lesson written in blood. 17.With regard to the Party's line of an anti-Japanese national united front,the main danger inside the Party before the Lukouchiao Incident was "Left"opportunism,that is,closed-doorism,the reason being chiefly that the Kuomintang had not yet begun to resist Japan. 18.Since the Lukouchiao Incident the main danger inside the Party is no longer "Left"closed- doorism but Right opportunism,that is,capitulationism,the reason being chiefly that the Kuomintang has begun to resist Japan
11. Therefore, the prospect of going over from partial to total resistance does exist. To strive for this prospect is the urgent common task of all Chinese Communists, all progressive members of the Kuomintang, and all the Chinese people. 12. China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now confronting a grave crisis. This crisis may be prolonged, or it may be overcome fairly quickly. Internally, the decisive factors are Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and a change in Kuomintang policy on the basis of this cooperation, and the strength of the worker and peasant masses. Externally, the decisive factor is assistance from the Soviet Union. 13. Political and organizational reform of the Kuomintang is both necessary and possible.[2] The main reasons are Japanese pressure, the Chinese Communist Party's united front policy, the wishes of the Chinese people, and the growth of new forces inside the Kuomintang. Our task is to work for this reform of the Kuomintang as a basis for reforming the government and the army. This reform undoubtedly requires the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and we are only in a position to offer suggestions. 14. The government should be reformed. We have proposed the convening of a provisional national assembly, which is likewise both necessary and possible. Undoubtedly this reform also requires the consent of the Kuomintang. 15. The task of reforming the army consists in building up new armies and reforming the old armies. If a new army of '50,000 to 300,000 men imbued with a new political spirit can be built up within six to twelve months, the situation on the anti-Japanese battlefield will begin to mend. Such an army would influence all the old armies and rally them around itself. This would provide the military basis for the turn to the strategic counter-offensive in the War of Resistance. This reform likewise requires the Kuomintang's consent. The Eighth Route Army ought to have an exemplary role to play in the course of this reform. And the Eighth Route Army itself should be expanded. II. CAPITULATIONISM MUST BE COMBATED BOTH INSIDE THE PARTY AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY INSIDE THE PARTY, OPPOSE CLASS CAPITULATIONISM 16. In 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu's capitulationism led to the failure of the revolution. No member of our Party should ever forget this historical lesson written in blood. 17. With regard to the Party's line of an anti-Japanese national united front, the main danger inside the Party before the Lukouchiao Incident was "Left" opportunism, that is, closed-doorism, the reason being chiefly that the Kuomintang had not yet begun to resist Japan. 18. Since the Lukouchiao Incident the main danger inside the Party is no longer "Left" closeddoorism but Right opportunism, that is, capitulationism, the reason being chiefly that the Kuomintang has begun to resist Japan
19.Already in April at the Yenan meeting of Party activists,then again in May at the National Conference of the Party,and especially in August at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (the Lochuan meeting),we posed the following question:Will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie in the united front,or the bourgeoisie the proletariat?Will the Kuomintang draw over the Communist Party,or the Communist Party the Kuomintang?In relation to the current specific political task this question means:Is the Kuomintang to be raised to the level of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation,to the level of the total resistance advocated by the Communist Party?Or is the Communist Party to sink to the level of the Kuomintang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie,to the level of partial resistance? 20.Why must we pose the question so sharply?The answer is: On the one hand,we have the Chinese bourgeoisie's proneness to compromise;the Kuomintang's superiority in material strength;the declaration and the decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang,which slander and insult the Communist Party and cry out for "an end to the class struggle";the Kuomintang's yearning for "the capitulation of the Communist Party"and its widespread propaganda to this end;Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to place the Communist Party under his control;the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas;the plan concocted during the Kuomintang's Lushan Training Course [3]in July "to reduce the Communist Party's strength by two-fifths in the course of the War of Resistance";the attempts of the Kuomintang to seduce Communist cadres with offers of fame and fortune and wine and women;the political capitulation of certain petty-bourgeois radicals(represented by Chang Nai-chil41);etc. On the other hand,we have the uneven theoretical level among Communists;the fact that many of our Party members lack the experience of co-operation between the two parties gained during the Northern Expedition;the fact that a large number of Party members are of petty-bourgeois origin; the reluctance of some Party members to continue a life of bitter struggle;the tendency towards unprincipled accommodation with the Kuomintang in the united front;the emergence of a tendency towards a new type of warlordism in the Eighth Route Army;the emergence of the problem of Communist participation in the Kuomintang government;the emergence of a tendency towards excessive accommodation in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas;etc. We must sharply pose the question of who is to lead and must resolutely combat capitulationism in view of the grave situation described above. 21.For several months now,and especially since the outbreak of the War of Resistance,the Central Committee and Party organizations at all levels have waged a clear-cut and firm struggle against capitulationist tendencies,actual or potential,have taken various necessary precautions against them and have achieved good results. The Central Committee has issued a draft resolution [5]on the problem of Communist participation in the government. A struggle has been started against the tendency towards new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army
19. Already in April at the Yenan meeting of Party activists, then again in May at the National Conference of the Party, and especially in August at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (the Lochuan meeting), we posed the following question: Will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie in the united front, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Will the Kuomintang draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party the Kuomintang? In relation to the current specific political task this question means: Is the Kuomintang to be raised to the level of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, to the level of the total resistance advocated by the Communist Party? Or is the Communist Party to sink to the level of the Kuomintang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie, to the level of partial resistance? 20. Why must we pose the question so sharply? The answer is: On the one hand, we have the Chinese bourgeoisie's proneness to compromise; the Kuomintang's superiority in material strength; the declaration and the decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which slander and insult the Communist Party and cry out for "an end to the class struggle"; the Kuomintang's yearning for "the capitulation of the Communist Party" and its widespread propaganda to this end; Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to place the Communist Party under his control; the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; the plan concocted during the Kuomintang's Lushan Training Course [3] in July "to reduce the Communist Party's strength by two-fifths in the course of the War of Resistance"; the attempts of the Kuomintang to seduce Communist cadres with offers of fame and fortune and wine and women; the political capitulation of certain petty-bourgeois radicals (represented by Chang Nai-chi[4]); etc. On the other hand, we have the uneven theoretical level among Communists; the fact that many of our Party members lack the experience of co-operation between the two parties gained during the Northern Expedition; the fact that a large number of Party members are of petty-bourgeois origin; the reluctance of some Party members to continue a life of bitter struggle; the tendency towards unprincipled accommodation with the Kuomintang in the united front; the emergence of a tendency towards a new type of warlordism in the Eighth Route Army; the emergence of the problem of Communist participation in the Kuomintang government; the emergence of a tendency towards excessive accommodation in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; etc. We must sharply pose the question of who is to lead and must resolutely combat capitulationism in view of the grave situation described above. 21. For several months now, and especially since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Committee and Party organizations at all levels have waged a clear-cut and firm struggle against capitulationist tendencies, actual or potential, have taken various necessary precautions against them and have achieved good results. The Central Committee has issued a draft resolution [5] on the problem of Communist participation in the government. A struggle has been started against the tendency towards new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army