8 Journal of Economic Perspectives Moloch-State,the omnipotence of the bureaucracy,goes much farther.There are clothing regulations,a regulation of public and private construction (dimensions of houses);the colors one wears,the music one hears,the festivals-all are regulated.There are rules for birth and rules for death;the providential State watches minutely over every step of its subjects,from cradle to grave.It is a regime of paper work and harassment,endless paper work and endless harassment. The ingenuity and inventiveness of the Chinese,which have given so much to mankind-silk,tea,porcelain,paper,printing,and more-would no doubt have enriched China further and probably brought it to the threshold of modern industry,had it not been for this stifling state control.It is the State that kills technological progress in China.Not only in the sense that it nips in the bud anything that goes against or seems to go against its interests,but also by the customs implanted inexorably by the raison d'Etat.The atmosphere of routine,of traditionalism,and of immobility,which makes any innovation suspect,any initiative that is not commanded and sanctioned in advance,is unfavorable to the spirit of free inquiry. In short,to go back to Elvin (1973),the reason the Chinese did not develop based on their scientific knowledge is that no one was trying.Why try?Especially since the Chinese were not without their own quiet resources to thwart bureaucratic interferences and frustrations-reliance on personal and familial collaboration,for example,in place of arbitrary or institutional practice in business.In such matters, personal trust could yield more dependable performance than legal rules. In all this,the contrast with Europe was marked.Where fragmentation and national rivalries compelled European rulers to pay heed to their subjects,to recognize their rights and cultivate the sources of wealth,the rulers of China had a free hand.Again Elvin (1973,pp.224-225)captures some of this: ..it was the great size of the Chinese Empire which made the adoption of the policies of the Ming emperors possible.In a Chinese subcontinent made up of smaller independent states,like those of the Five Dynasties [907-960 C.E.]or the Ten Kingdoms,no government could have afforded to close itself off.International economic interdependence (as that between regions would have become)would have removed this option;and the need for diplomatic and military alliances,and revenue from foreign trade,would have made isolationism undesirable.With smaller states,there might also have been,as there was in north-western Europe in early modern times,a closer conscious identification of the governed with their countries and rulers.Prior to mod- ern communications,the immensity of the empire precluded nationalism Whatever the mix of factors,the result seems to have been a curious pattern of isolated initiatives and sisyphean discontinuities-up,up,up and then down again-almost as though the society were constrained by a homeostatic braking mechanism or held down by a silk ceiling.The result,if not the aim,was a kind of
Moloch-State, the omnipotence of the bureaucracy, goes much farther. There are clothing regulations, a regulation of public and private construction (dimensions of houses); the colors one wears, the music one hears, the festivals—all are regulated. There are rules for birth and rules for death; the providential State watches minutely over every step of its subjects, from cradle to grave. It is a regime of paper work and harassment, endless paper work and endless harassment. The ingenuity and inventiveness of the Chinese, which have given so much to mankind—silk, tea, porcelain, paper, printing, and more—would no doubt have enriched China further and probably brought it to the threshold of modern industry, had it not been for this stifling state control. It is the State that kills technological progress in China. Not only in the sense that it nips in the bud anything that goes against or seems to go against its interests, but also by the customs implanted inexorably by the raison d’Etat. The atmosphere of routine, of traditionalism, and of immobility, which makes any innovation suspect, any initiative that is not commanded and sanctioned in advance, is unfavorable to the spirit of free inquiry. In short, to go back to Elvin (1973), the reason the Chinese did not develop based on their scientific knowledge is that no one was trying. Why try? Especially since the Chinese were not without their own quiet resources to thwart bureaucratic interferences and frustrations—reliance on personal and familial collaboration, for example, in place of arbitrary or institutional practice in business. In such matters, personal trust could yield more dependable performance than legal rules. In all this, the contrast with Europe was marked. Where fragmentation and national rivalries compelled European rulers to pay heed to their subjects, to recognize their rights and cultivate the sources of wealth, the rulers of China had a free hand. Again Elvin (1973, pp. 224 –225) captures some of this: . . . it was the great size of the Chinese Empire which made the adoption of the policies of the Ming emperors possible. In a Chinese subcontinent made up of smaller independent states, like those of the Five Dynasties [907-960 C.E.] or the Ten Kingdoms, no government could have afforded to close itself off. International economic interdependence (as that between regions would have become) would have removed this option; and the need for diplomatic and military alliances, and revenue from foreign trade, would have made isolationism undesirable. With smaller states, there might also have been, as there was in north-western Europe in early modern times, a closer conscious identification of the governed with their countries and rulers. Prior to modern communications, the immensity of the empire precluded nationalism. Whatever the mix of factors, the result seems to have been a curious pattern of isolated initiatives and sisyphean discontinuities— up, up, up and then down again—almost as though the society were constrained by a homeostatic braking mechanism or held down by a silk ceiling. The result, if not the aim, was a kind of 8 Journal of Economic Perspectives
David S.Landes 9 change-in-immobility;or maybe immobility-in-change.Innovation was allowed to go (was able to go)so far and no farther.4 The Europeans knew much less of these interferences.Instead,they entered during these centuries into an exciting world of innovation and emulation that challenged and tempted vested interests and kept the forces of conservatism scrambling.Changes were cumulative,news of novelty spread fast and a new sense of progress and achievement replaced an older,effete reverence for authority.This intoxicating sense of freedom touched (infected)all domains.These were years of heresies in the church,of popular initiatives that,we can see now,anticipated the rupture of the Reformation;of new forms of expression and collective action that challenged the older organization of society and posed a threat to other polities;of new ways of doing and making things that made newness a virtue and a source of delight. Important in all this was the role of the Christian church in Europe as custodian of knowledge and school for technicians.One might have expected otherwise:that organized spirituality,with its emphasis on prayer and contempla- tion,would have had little interest in technology;and that with its view of labor as penalty for original sin,it would have had no concern to save labor.And yet everything seems to have worked in the opposite direction:The desire to free clerics from time-consuming earthly tasks led to the introduction and diffusion of power machinery and,beginning with the Cistercians in the twelfth century,to the hiring of lay brothers (conversi)to do the dirty work,which led in turn to an awareness of and attention to time and productivity.All of this gave rise on monastic estates to remarkable assemblages of powered machinery-complex se- quences designed to make the most of the water power available and distribute it through a series of industrial operations.A description of the abbey of Clairvaux in the mid-twelfth century (cited in White,1978,p.245-246)exults in this versatility: "coquendis,cribrandis,vertendis,terendis,rigandis,lavandis,molendis,molliendis,suum sine contradictione praestans obsequium."The author,clearly proud of these achieve- ments,further tells his readers that he will take the liberty of joking(the medieval clerical equivalent of,"if you'll pardon the expression"):the fulling hammers,he says,seem to have dispensed the fullers of the penalty for their sins;and he thanks God that such devices can mitigate the oppressive labor of men and spare the backs of their horses. Why this peculiarly European joy in discovery?This pleasure in the new and better?This cultivation of invention-or what some have called "the invention of invention"?Different scholars have suggested a variety of reasons,typically related to religious values.One possible reason grows from the Judaeo-Christian respect for manual labor,summed up in a number of biblical injunctions.One example will suffice:when God warns Noah of the coming flood and tells him he will be saved, it is not God who saves him."Build thee an ark of gopher wood,"says the Lord,and For example,Max Weber (1922 [1951].as cited in Hall,1985,p.41)argued that the administrative bureaucracy was undermanned,so that government came to know and respond to changes only after they had gotten under way.Hence a pattern of "intermittent and jerky"homeostatic interventions
change-in-immobility; or maybe immobility-in-change. Innovation was allowed to go (was able to go) so far and no farther.4 The Europeans knew much less of these interferences. Instead, they entered during these centuries into an exciting world of innovation and emulation that challenged and tempted vested interests and kept the forces of conservatism scrambling. Changes were cumulative, news of novelty spread fast and a new sense of progress and achievement replaced an older, effete reverence for authority. This intoxicating sense of freedom touched (infected) all domains. These were years of heresies in the church, of popular initiatives that, we can see now, anticipated the rupture of the Reformation; of new forms of expression and collective action that challenged the older organization of society and posed a threat to other polities; of new ways of doing and making things that made newness a virtue and a source of delight. Important in all this was the role of the Christian church in Europe as custodian of knowledge and school for technicians. One might have expected otherwise: that organized spirituality, with its emphasis on prayer and contemplation, would have had little interest in technology; and that with its view of labor as penalty for original sin, it would have had no concern to save labor. And yet everything seems to have worked in the opposite direction: The desire to free clerics from time-consuming earthly tasks led to the introduction and diffusion of power machinery and, beginning with the Cistercians in the twelfth century, to the hiring of lay brothers (conversi) to do the dirty work, which led in turn to an awareness of and attention to time and productivity. All of this gave rise on monastic estates to remarkable assemblages of powered machinery— complex sequences designed to make the most of the water power available and distribute it through a series of industrial operations. A description of the abbey of Clairvaux in the mid-twelfth century (cited in White, 1978, p. 245–246) exults in this versatility: “coquendis, cribrandis, vertendis, terendis, rigandis, lavandis, molendis, molliendis, suum sine contradictione praestans obsequium.” The author, clearly proud of these achievements, further tells his readers that he will take the liberty of joking (the medieval clerical equivalent of, “if you’ll pardon the expression”): the fulling hammers, he says, seem to have dispensed the fullers of the penalty for their sins; and he thanks God that such devices can mitigate the oppressive labor of men and spare the backs of their horses. Why this peculiarly European joy in discovery? This pleasure in the new and better? This cultivation of invention— or what some have called “the invention of invention”? Different scholars have suggested a variety of reasons, typically related to religious values. One possible reason grows from the Judaeo-Christian respect for manual labor, summed up in a number of biblical injunctions. One example will suffice: when God warns Noah of the coming flood and tells him he will be saved, it is not God who saves him. “Build thee an ark of gopher wood,” says the Lord, and 4 For example, Max Weber (1922 [1951], as cited in Hall, 1985, p. 41) argued that the administrative bureaucracy was undermanned, so that government came to know and respond to changes only after they had gotten under way. Hence a pattern of “intermittent and jerky” homeostatic interventions. David S. Landes 9