694 International Organization lower in pay and prestige during economic recession.This is because they evaluate the probability of future employment opportunities differently in periods of eco- nomic recession than in periods of economic prosperity.An individual will accept employment when the offer exceeds the value of the probability of employment at the previous(higher)wage and exceeds the reservation wage.In economic recession, the probability of employment at the higher wage diminishes,thereby making less- remunerative employment more acceptable than in periods of economic prosperity. If these jobs are filled with immigrant labor,as undoubtedly some are,the competi- tion between the native and immigrant labor force will rise during economic down- turns.25 In sum,competition for market-based resources-jobs-intensifies during periods of economic recession,leading to the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment;in periods of economic prosperity,competition diminishes,leading to the decline of anti-immigrant sentiment. Competition for state-based resources.Another vociferous debate centers around whether immigrants contribute more in taxes than they receive in services from the state.26 Again,I attempt to avoid this debate by pointing out that competition varies as a function of economic prosperity,regardless of the underlying net balance of contributions.Economic recession reduces state revenues while increasing demands on those revenues.The scarcity of resources available to the state for redistribution increases the competition between the immigrant population and the native popula- tion over access to these assets regardless of whether immigrant contributionsexceed expenditures on immigrants.Moreover,the broader the immigrant access to re- sources,the broader the base of competition and hence the more intense the competi- tion.At yet a more general level,economic recession reduces the reservation wage and aggravates the competition between the native and the immigrant workforce over employment by enlarging the segment of employment opportunities over which they compete. The competition over state-based resources also increases as a function of the rate at which the immigrant population increases.The state provides public as well as private goods to its residents.27 Public goods in the rigorous sense are characterized by two traits:nonexcludability,which means that once the good is provided to a particular class of individuals,other members of that class cannot be excluded from consuming that good;and jointness of supply,which means that the provision of the good to one person does not diminish the supply available to others.To the extent that public goods are nonexcludable but lack jointness of supply,these goods become subject to crowding,thereby increasing the competition between the indigenous and 25.The immigrant also faces a reservation wage but one that is generally lower than the native work- er's.The gap between the immigrant and native reservation wages depends in part on the degree to which benefits offered to the native population are extended to the immigrant population. 26.This debate is summarized in Martin and Midgley 1994;see also Simon 1989 and the citations listed therein.As George J.Borjas points out for the United States,the dependency ratio is based on the composition of the immigrant intake,among other factors,and that composition changes over time;see Borjas 1990. 27.See Zolberg 1992;and Freeman 1986
lower in pay and prestige during economic recession. This is because they evaluate the probability of future employment opportunities differently in periods of economic recession than in periods of economic prosperity. An individual will accept employment when the offer exceeds the value of the probability of employment at the previous(higher) wage and exceedsthe reservation wage. In economic recession, the probability of employment at the higher wage diminishes, thereby making lessremunerative employment more acceptable than in periods of economic prosperity. If these jobs are lled with immigrant labor, as undoubtedly some are, the competition between the native and immigrant labor force will rise during economic downturns.25 In sum, competition for market-based resources—jobs—intensi es during periods of economic recession, leading to the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment; in periods of economic prosperity, competition diminishes, leading to the decline of anti-immigrantsentiment. Competition for state-based resources. Another vociferous debate centers around whether immigrants contribute more in taxes than they receive in services from the state.26 Again, I attempt to avoid this debate by pointing out that competition varies as a function of economic prosperity, regardless of the underlying net balance of contributions. Economic recession reduces state revenues while increasing demands on those revenues. The scarcity of resources available to the state for redistribution increases the competition between the immigrant population and the native population over accessto these assetsregardless of whether immigrant contributionsexceed expenditures on immigrants. Moreover, the broader the immigrant access to resources, the broader the base of competition and hence the more intense the competition. At yet a more general level, economic recession reduces the reservation wage and aggravates the competition between the native and the immigrant workforce over employment by enlarging the segment of employment opportunitiesover which they compete. The competition over state-based resources also increases as a function of the rate at which the immigrant population increases. The state provides public as well as private goods to its residents.27 Public goods in the rigorous sense are characterized by two traits: nonexcludability, which means that once the good is provided to a particular class of individuals, other members of that class cannot be excluded from consuming that good; and jointness of supply, which means that the provision of the good to one person does not diminish the supply available to others. To the extent that public goods are nonexcludablebut lack jointness ofsupply, these goods become subject to crowding, thereby increasing the competition between the indigenous and 25. The immigrant also faces a reservation wage but one that is generally lower than the native worker’s. The gap between the immigrant and native reservation wages depends in part on the degree to which bene ts offered to the native population are extended to the immigrant population. 26. This debate is summarized in Martin and Midgley 1994; see also Simon 1989 and the citations listed therein. As George J. Borjas points out for the United States, the dependency ratio is based on the composition of the immigrant intake, among other factors, and that composition changes over time; see Borjas 1990. 27. See Zolberg 1992; and Freeman 1986. 694 International Organization
Political Geography of Immigration Control 695 immigrant communities for these goods.If the rate of increase in the immigrant community is large,immigrants stretch the capacity of the system to deliver these goods:classrooms become crowded,traffic increases,public transportation becomes overburdened,sewage treatment facilities are overloaded.In the medium to long term,additional public goods may be made available,as revenues from the increased population flow to the state and are allocated to the provision of these goods.In the short term,however,competition for these goods is exacerbated by a rapid increase in the number of immigrants. Competition for"community"resources.As foreigners enter a community,they bring with them an alternative conception of society,thereby presenting competition over the definition of the local community.28 Rather than being associated with eco- nomic recession,this competition is triggered by the sheer number of immigrants in the community.The competition is offset by the process of assimilating the foreign population into the native population,thereby undermining competition from the alternative.The ability of immigrants to assimilate and the length of time required to do so appear to vary across groups;this introduces immigrant characteristics into the equation of native-immigrant competition.29 Local Patterns of Support and Opposition and the Local PoliticalAgenda At the local level,party positions reflect the underlying preferences of the population for immigration control.As structural conditions that affect support for and opposi- tion to immigration change,the position of the local parties will change as well. Models of collective action suggest that large groups are more difficult to organize than small groups and are therefore less powerful politically30 If this is true,then employers should always be more politically powerful than"public opinion,and immigration control policy should be similarly skewed toward employers'interests. The geographic concentration of immigrants,however,tends to concentrate the costs of immigration and facilitates the organization of political opposition to immigration at particular conjunctures.3 To draw on James Q.Wilson's policy typology,I argue that under certain conditions the politics of immigration policy shift from"client"to "interest group"politics.32 The former policy type is characterized by the political 28.Waever 1993. 29.This can be,but is not necessarily,associated with race.In Britain,for example,most observers would argue that European migrants are more easily assimilated than the"coloured"migrants from the "New Commonwealth"countries.Yet Switzerland has failed to integrate its European (Italian)immigrant population,and,in France,black Africans were initially better received than Spaniards,although North African Arabs are the least well integrated.See Castles and Kosack 1973,chap.10.for a discussion of race and discrimination against the immigrant community.Additional examples come from Germany and Japan.Both countries have ethnically homogenous immigrants who.having re-immigrated after genera- tions of absence,face considerable discrimination despite a common ethnicity. 30.Olson1965. 31.The argument is similar to Gary P.Freeman's but not identical:see Freeman 1995. 32.W1son1980
immigrant communities for these goods. If the rate of increase in the immigrant community is large, immigrants stretch the capacity of the system to deliver these goods: classrooms become crowded, traffic increases, public transportation becomes overburdened, sewage treatment facilities are overloaded. In the medium to long term, additional public goods may be made available, as revenuesfrom the increased population ow to the state and are allocated to the provision of these goods. In the short term, however, competition for these goods is exacerbated by a rapid increase in the number of immigrants. Competition for ‘‘community’’ resources. As foreigners enter a community, they bring with them an alternative conception of society, thereby presenting competition over the de nition of the local community.28 Rather than being associated with economic recession, this competition is triggered by the sheer number of immigrants in the community. The competition is offset by the process of assimilating the foreign population into the native population, thereby undermining competition from the alternative.The ability of immigrants to assimilate and the length of time required to do so appear to vary across groups; thisintroducesimmigrant characteristicsinto the equation of native–immigrant competition.29 Local Patterns of Support and Opposition and the Local Political Agenda At the local level, party positionsre ect the underlying preferences of the population for immigration control. As structural conditionsthat affect support for and opposition to immigration change, the position of the local parties will change as well. Models of collective action suggest that large groups are more difficult to organize than small groups and are therefore less powerful politically.30 If this is true, then employers should always be more politically powerful than ‘‘public opinion,’’ and immigration control policy should be similarly skewed toward employers’interests. The geographic concentration of immigrants, however, tendsto concentrate the costs of immigration and facilitatesthe organization of political opposition to immigration at particular conjunctures.31 To draw on James Q. Wilson’s policy typology, I argue that under certain conditionsthe politics of immigration policy shift from ‘‘client’’ to ‘‘interest group’’ politics.32 The former policy type is characterized by the political 28. Waever 1993. 29. This can be, but is not necessarily, associated with race. In Britain, for example, most observers would argue that European migrants are more easily assimilated than the ‘‘coloured’’ migrants from the ‘‘New Commonwealth’’ countries. Yet Switzerland has failed to integrate its European (Italian) immigrant population, and, in France, black Africans were initially better received than Spaniards, although North African Arabs are the least well integrated. See Castles and Kosack 1973, chap. 10, for a discussion of race and discrimination against the immigrant community. Additional examples come from Germany and Japan. Both countries have ethnically homogenousimmigrants who, having re-immigrated after generations of absence, face considerable discrimination despite a common ethnicity. 30. Olson 1965. 31. The argument is similar to Gary P. Freeman’s but not identical; see Freeman 1995. 32. Wilson 1980. Political Geography of Immigration Control 695
696 International Organization participation of groups receiving concentrated benefits and the absence of organized opposition from those bearing the diffuse costs of immigration,whereas the latter is characterized by political activity from pro-immigrant groups receiving concentrated benefits and anti-immigrant groups bearing concentrated costs. Empirically,societal opposition to immigration sometimes resembles the interest group organization of employers;examples include FAIR(Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform)in the United States and the Birmingham Immigration Con- trol Association in Britain.It is sometimes represented by political parties,such as the Vlaamsblok in Belgium or the National Front in France,or it may be more amorphous,such as the initiative movements in California and Switzerland.As the costs of immigration increase,however,the political salience of the opposition to immigrants increases.33 This picture is consonant with public opinion surveys in advanced industrial countries that indicate most respondents oppose additionalimmi- gration but also believe that immigration is not a significant political problem most of the time.Thus opposition to immigration periodically becomes organized rather than remaining constantly latent.Political organization can be attributed in part to the concentration of costs arising from immigration associated with the concentration of the immigrant community-a facet that is largely overlooked by those who analyze the politics of immigration control policy. Thus both support for and opposition to immigration are politically organized and politically significant.However,support and opposition do not necessarily rise and fall in tandem.That is,when opposition to immigration is at a peak,support can be either strong or weak.Support for and opposition to immigration are connected through unemployment:when unemployment is high,other things being equal,local support will be weak and opposition will be strong.However,opposition may rise during a period of economic prosperity in the presence of a large,unassimilated population;and support may be strong in periods of economic recession,if firms face inflexible labor markets and/or capital immobility. Driven by electoral competition,local politicians will shift their policy positions in response to changing community preferences,toward either greater openness or greater closure.This depiction of immigration control suggests two hypotheses.First, policy positions of mainstream parties will tend to converge toward the local median voter.Second,as preferences of the population on immigration control shift,the positions of the parties will tend to shift in tandem.I do not suggest that positions of candidates will always be identical and shift to exactly the same degree;rather,can- didates learn that their positions differ from constituency preferences through elec- toral defeat.They respond by changing their positions or are replaced by candidates who will.Furthermore,the positions of the parties reflect not the extreme position of some supporters but a balance between the support for and opposition to immigra- tion.However,because immigration control is determined in the national rather than 33.Christopher Husbands makes a similar distinction between"racism"and "political racism,"the subset of racism that affects political outcomes;see Husbands 1988
participation of groups receiving concentrated bene ts and the absence of organized opposition from those bearing the diffuse costs of immigration, whereas the latter is characterized by political activity from pro-immigrant groupsreceiving concentrated bene ts and anti-immigrant groups bearing concentrated costs. Empirically, societal opposition to immigration sometimes resembles the interest group organization of employers; examples include FAIR (Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform) in the United States and the Birmingham Immigration Control Association in Britain. It is sometimes represented by political parties, such as the Vlaamsblok in Belgium or the National Front in France, or it may be more amorphous, such as the initiative movements in California and Switzerland. As the costs of immigration increase, however, the political salience of the opposition to immigrants increases.33 This picture is consonant with public opinion surveys in advanced industrial countriesthat indicatemost respondents oppose additionalimmigration but also believe that immigration is not a signi cant political problem most of the time. Thus oppositionto immigration periodically becomes organized rather than remaining constantly latent. Political organization can be attributed in part to the concentration of costs arising from immigration associated with the concentration of the immigrant community—a facet that is largely overlooked by those who analyze the politics of immigration control policy. Thus both support for and opposition to immigration are politically organized and politically signi cant. However, support and opposition do not necessarily rise and fall in tandem. That is, when opposition to immigration is at a peak, support can be either strong or weak. Support for and opposition to immigration are connected through unemployment:when unemployment is high, other things being equal, local support will be weak and opposition will be strong. However, opposition may rise during a period of economic prosperity in the presence of a large, unassimilated population;and support may be strong in periods of economic recession, if rms face in exible labor markets and/or capital immobility. Driven by electoral competition, local politicians will shift their policy positions in response to changing community preferences, toward either greater openness or greater closure. This depiction of immigration controlsuggeststwo hypotheses.First, policy positionsof mainstream parties will tend to converge toward the local median voter. Second, as preferences of the population on immigration control shift, the positions of the parties will tend to shift in tandem. I do not suggest that positions of candidates will always be identical and shift to exactly the same degree; rather, candidates learn that their positions differ from constituency preferences through electoral defeat. They respond by changing their positions or are replaced by candidates who will. Furthermore, the positions of the partiesre ect not the extreme position of some supporters but a balance between the support for and opposition to immigration. However, because immigration control is determined in the national rather than 33. Christopher Husbands makes a similar distinction between ‘‘racism’’ and ‘‘political racism,’’ the subset of racism that affects political outcomes; see Husbands 1988. 696 International Organization