Political Geography of Immigration Control 689 ity"to attitudes in the"traditional settler nations,"such as Australia,Canada,and the United States,"where nation building through immigration led to ideas of member- ship based on civic participation and a generally shared commitment to democratic values."8 From this perspective,"settler"states are those where nationalidentity and citizenship are based on civic values of participation;immigrants are viewed as po- tential citizens,and the state is relatively open to immigration.In contrast,"nonim- migrant"nations are those where citizenship and national identity are based on ethnicity; where these cultural values hold,immigrants are viewed as aliens or foreigners,and low levels of immigration are anticipated.Because national identity is fixed,in order to account for the variation over time the analyses introduce additional exogenous variables. From the "identity"perspective,elites,institutional structures,or extremist groups, for example,can damp down or kindle pressures to control alien entry.10 Economic interests of domestic political actors are a second major explanatory scheme.One group of analysts favors employer interests in explaining levels of openness.According to Marxian analyses,employer interests are dominant because of their privileged access to the capitalist state;for public choice analysts,it is because employers face fewer collective action problems than do employees or the public at large:12 for labor market analysts,employer interests are a reasonable proxy for other societal interests because migrant labor is concentrated in the secondary labor market and therefore complements and enhances the returns to the native labor force deployed in the primary labor market.3 Alternatively,domestic political actors are believed to have competing economic interests,forcing them to vie in the politi- cal arena for different policy outcomes.That is,"different social classes within the national territory will have conflicting interests which can result in opposing posi- tions on immigration."14 In other words,employers are one important class of politi- cal actors in favor of immigration,but now unions(or other interest groups)enter the political equation as actors who"might be opposed on the ground that this will harm workers'wages and working conditions."From the "economic"perspective,varia- tion is explained either in terms of employer demand for labor and hence for mi- grants or in terms of power balances among societal actors,some who support immi- gration,others who oppose it. Finally,many analysts point to the tension between economic benefits that accrue from immigration and the cultural costs that openness entails.One method of model- ing the relationship between economic and cultural variables and political outcomes focuses on the competition for scarce resources.5 National-ethnic identity is defined 8.Meissner 1992,70. 9.Altematively,"this view assumes that ethnic and racial strife is inevitable and invariant"and cannot account for variation over time;see Olzak 1992. 10.See,for example,Roeder 1994. 11.See Castells 1975;Castles and Kosack 1973;and Petras 1981. 12.Freeman 1995. 13.Piore1979. 14.Leitner1995,262. 15.For alternative ways of modeling the relationship between the economic and cultural variables,see Hollifield 1992;Freeman 1995;Zolberg 1983;and Leitner 1995
ity’’to attitudesin the ‘‘traditionalsettler nations,’’such asAustralia, Canada, and the United States, ‘‘where nation building through immigration led to ideas of membership based on civic participation and a generally shared commitment to democratic values.’’ 8 From this perspective,‘‘settler’’states are those where national identity and citizenship are based on civic values of participation; immigrants are viewed as potential citizens, and the state is relatively open to immigration. In contrast, ‘‘nonimmigrant’’ nations are those where citizenship and national identity are based on ethnicity; where these cultural values hold, immigrants are viewed as aliens or foreigners, and low levels of immigration are anticipated.Because nationalidentityis xed,in order to account for the variation over time the analyses introduce additional exogenous variables.9 From the ‘‘identity’’ perspective, elites, institutionalstructures, or extremist groups, for example, can damp down or kindle pressures to control alien entry.10 Economic interests of domestic political actors are a second major explanatory scheme. One group of analysts favors employer interests in explaining levels of openness. According to Marxian analyses, employer interests are dominant because of their privileged access to the capitalist state;11 for public choice analysts, it is because employers face fewer collective action problems than do employees or the public at large;12 for labor market analysts, employer interests are a reasonable proxy for other societal interests because migrant labor is concentrated in the secondary labor market and therefore complements and enhancesthe returns to the native labor force deployed in the primary labor market.13 Alternatively, domestic political actors are believed to have competing economic interests, forcing them to vie in the political arena for different policy outcomes. That is, ‘‘different social classes within the national territory will have con icting interests which can result in opposing positions on immigration.’’ 14 In other words, employers are one important class of political actorsin favor of immigration, but now unions(or other interest groups) enter the political equation as actors who ‘‘might be opposed on the ground that this will harm workers’ wages and working conditions.’’ From the ‘‘economic’’ perspective, variation is explained either in terms of employer demand for labor and hence for migrants or in terms of power balances among societal actors,some who support immigration, others who oppose it. Finally, many analysts point to the tension between economic bene ts that accrue from immigration and the cultural coststhat openness entails. One method of modeling the relationship between economic and cultural variables and political outcomes focuses on the competition for scarce resources.15 National–ethnic identity is de ned 8. Meissner 1992, 70. 9. Alternatively, ‘‘this view assumes that ethnic and racial strife is inevitable and invariant’’ and cannot account for variation over time; see Olzak 1992. 10. See, for example, Roeder 1994. 11. See Castells 1975; Castles and Kosack 1973; and Petras 1981. 12. Freeman 1995. 13. Piore 1979. 14. Leitner 1995, 262. 15. For alternative ways of modeling the relationship between the economic and cultural variables, see Holli eld 1992; Freeman 1995; Zolberg 1983; and Leitner 1995. Political Geography of Immigration Control 689
690 International Organization as a contested social boundary that becomes politically significant only when compe- tition for scarce resources arises between the native and the immigrant populations. Susan Olzak,for example,argues that"competition potentially occurs when two or more groups come to exploit the same realized niches."6"Niche overlap"triggers ethnic competition and,with it,anti-immigrant sentiment.From the"competition" perspective,anti-immigrant sentiment and hence political opposition to immigration are not constant but change in light of changing circumstances:the size of the immi- grant community,its rate of growth,and other socioeconomic factors. Each of these alternative hypotheses has been criticized on both logical and empiri- cal grounds.7 However,rather than discard the hypotheses,I suggest that because immigrants are geographically concentrated,the analysis must be disaggregated to the level of the salient local political units.Then,each of these perspectives may provide some insight into the dynamics of immigration policy.Those who emphasize national identity suggest that the analysis must also be sensitive to factors that mediate between public opinion and policy outputs,that is,the political institutions of the nation.Those who emphasize economic variables suggest that important political actors are not limited to those concerned with national identity. Societies have political actors who actively promote immigration as well as those who oppose it.Those who focus on the interaction of cultural and economic variables suggest that the intensity and hence the political significance of national- ethnic identity may vary,and that explanations should incorporate variables that affect the intensity of public opinion.In this sense,the three types of analyses are incomplete but complement each other.The explanation I offer builds on these in- sights while emphasizing a fourth element,the geographic concentration of the immi- grant community. The Political Geography of Immigration Control The Geographic Concentration of Migrants Among demographers and sociologists,the geographic specificity of migratory pat- terns is well known,on both the sending and receiving end."Migrants arriving in a particular country do not spread out randomly throughout all possible destina- tions."18 Examples abound.In the United States,six states of fifty-California,Texas, Florida,New York,New Jersey,and Illinois-host 73 percent of the immigrant popu- lation;33 percent of the foreign-born population reside in California alone.In 1990, 8 percent of the U.S.population were foreign born,but they comprised 22 percent of California's population and 16 percent of New York's.This pattern holds in Australia as well.There,in 1991,22 percent of the population were foreign born;this popula- tion is concentrated in the cities and suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne.Of the 147 16.01zak1992. 17.In conformity with academic fashion,all of the authors cited provide a critique of the altemative theoretical frameworks while making the case for their own. 18.White1993b,52
as a contested social boundary that becomes politicallysigni cant only when competition for scarce resources arises between the native and the immigrant populations. Susan Olzak, for example, argues that ‘‘competition potentially occurs when two or more groups come to exploit the same realized niches.’’ 16 ‘‘Niche overlap’’ triggers ethnic competition and, with it, anti-immigrant sentiment. From the ‘‘competition’’ perspective, anti-immigrant sentiment and hence political opposition to immigration are not constant but change in light of changing circumstances: the size of the immigrant community, its rate of growth, and other socioeconomic factors. Each of these alternativehypotheseshas been criticized on both logical and empirical grounds.17 However, rather than discard the hypotheses, I suggest that because immigrants are geographically concentrated, the analysis must be disaggregated to the level of the salient local political units. Then, each of these perspectives may provide some insight into the dynamics of immigration policy. Those who emphasize national identity suggest that the analysis must also be sensitive to factors that mediate between public opinion and policy outputs, that is, the political institutions of the nation. Those who emphasize economic variables suggest that important political actors are not limited to those concerned with national identity. Societies have political actors who actively promote immigration as well as those who oppose it. Those who focus on the interaction of cultural and economic variables suggest that the intensity and hence the political signi cance of national– ethnic identity may vary, and that explanations should incorporate variables that affect the intensity of public opinion. In this sense, the three types of analyses are incomplete but complement each other. The explanation I offer builds on these insights while emphasizing a fourth element, the geographic concentrationof the immigrant community. The Political Geography of Immigration Control The Geographic Concentration of Migrants Among demographers and sociologists, the geographic speci city of migratory patterns is well known, on both the sending and receiving end. ‘‘Migrants arriving in a particular country do not spread out randomly throughout all possible destinations.’’ 18 Examples abound.In the United States,six states of fty—California,Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois—host 73 percent of the immigrant population; 33 percent of the foreign-born population reside in California alone. In 1990, 8 percent of the U.S. populationwere foreign born, but they comprised 22 percent of California’s population and 16 percent of New York’s. This pattern holdsin Australia as well. There, in 1991, 22 percent of the population were foreign born; this population is concentrated in the cities and suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne. Of the 147 16. Olzak 1992. 17. In conformity with academic fashion, all of the authors cited provide a critique of the alternative theoretical frameworks while making the case for their own. 18. White 1993b, 52. 690 International Organization
Political Geography of Immigration Control 691 parliamentary constituencies with approximately equal population,the smallest per- centage of foreign born was 4.8 percent,and the largest was ten times that level,49 percent.Thirty of the 147 constituencieshad foreign-born populationsof at least 30 percent;all but seven of these are located in the Melbourne and Sydney metropolitan areas.A similar concentration of immigrants is found in European states.In Britain, for example,58 percent of the Afro-Caribbeans live in Greater London as do 80 percent of the black African immigrants.In France,40 percent of the foreign-born population can be found in the Parisian basin,with the remainder of the immigrants concentratedin the industrial regions surrounding Lyon,Marseilles,and Strasbourg.1 This spatial concentration of migrants is attributed to several factors.Paul White enumerates the economic,social,political,and geographic forces that affect migrant destinations in the host countries,the most important of which are the initial eco- nomic pull of labor markets and the subsequent reinforcement of migrant concentra- tion through migrant networks or"chain migration."20 This brief overview indicates that the spatial concentration of immigrants in host countries is well documented empirically and well understood theoretically.The po- litical significance of this concentration,however,has been widely overlooked.One factor that may diminish the significance of the immigrant community's geographic concentration-and may account for why this aspect of immigration has been ig- nored in political analyses of immigration policy-is internal migration.21 Internal migration tends to distribute the economic costs and benefits more evenly among the indigenous population.Furthermore,the social impact of immigration is reduced by the self-selected out-migration of individuals with the least tolerance for immigrants. There are two reasons,however,to believe that internal migration does not mitigate entirely the consequences of immigrants'geographic concentration.First,internal migration is never so complete that it entirely separates the indigenous and immi- grant communities.Therefore,for better or worse,interaction between the two popu- lations is always higher in some areas than in others.Second,what appears to be a recent trend in internal out-migration may,in fact,intensify relations between the two communities by increasing the ratio of immigrants to the remaining indigenous population. The argument is straightforward.Because immigrant communities are spatially concentrated,the impact of the immigrant community is not evenly spread across the indigenous population.For better or worse,interaction between the host and immi- grant populations is higher where they are concentrated.Internal migration may di- minish the impact of spatial concentration but does not erase it.So we need to exam- ine the spatial distribution of both the benefits and costs of immigration in order to understand the politics of immigration control.It is this interaction that I attempt to model in the next section,followed by an analysis of how local preferences in sup- 19.See Martin and Midgley 1994 for the United States;Kopras 1993 for Australia;Cross 1993,124, for Britain;and King 1993 for France. 20.See White 1993a:King 1993;and Massey 1987,1989. 21.See Borjas 1994;and Frey 1994 for the United States;for Britain,see Cross 1993:and for Europe more broadly.see White 1993b
parliamentary constituencieswith approximately equal population, the smallest percentage of foreign born was 4.8 percent, and the largest was ten times that level, 49 percent. Thirty of the 147 constituencies had foreign-born populations of at least 30 percent; all but seven of these are located in the Melbourne and Sydney metropolitan areas. A similar concentration of immigrants is found in European states. In Britain, for example, 58 percent of the Afro-Caribbeans live in Greater London as do 80 percent of the black African immigrants. In France, 40 percent of the foreign-born population can be found in the Parisian basin, with the remainder of the immigrants concentrated in the industrialregionssurroundingLyon, Marseilles, and Strasbourg.19 This spatial concentration of migrants is attributed to several factors. Paul White enumerates the economic,social, political, and geographic forces that affect migrant destinations in the host countries, the most important of which are the initial economic pull of labor markets and the subsequent reinforcement of migrant concentration through migrant networks or ‘‘chain migration.’’ 20 This brief overview indicates that the spatial concentration of immigrants in host countriesis well documented empirically and well understood theoretically.The political signi cance of this concentration, however, has been widely overlooked. One factor that may diminish the signi cance of the immigrant community’s geographic concentration—and may account for why this aspect of immigration has been ignored in political analyses of immigration policy—is internal migration.21 Internal migration tendsto distribute the economic costs and bene ts more evenly among the indigenous population. Furthermore, the social impact of immigration is reduced by the self-selected out-migration of individualswith the least tolerance for immigrants. There are two reasons, however, to believe that internal migration does not mitigate entirely the consequences of immigrants’ geographic concentration. First, internal migration is never so complete that it entirely separates the indigenous and immigrant communities.Therefore, for better or worse, interaction between the two populations is always higher in some areas than in others. Second, what appears to be a recent trend in internal out-migration may, in fact, intensify relations between the two communities by increasing the ratio of immigrants to the remaining indigenous population. The argument is straightforward. Because immigrant communities are spatially concentrated, the impact of the immigrant community is not evenly spread across the indigenous population. For better or worse, interaction between the host and immigrant populationsis higher where they are concentrated. Internal migration may diminish the impact of spatial concentration but does not erase it. So we need to examine the spatial distribution of both the bene ts and costs of immigration in order to understand the politics of immigration control. It is this interaction that I attempt to model in the next section, followed by an analysis of how local preferences in sup- 19. See Martin and Midgley 1994 for the United States; Kopras 1993 for Australia; Cross 1993, 124, for Britain; and King 1993 for France. 20. See White 1993a; King 1993; and Massey 1987, 1989. 21. See Borjas 1994; and Frey 1994 for the United States; for Britain, see Cross 1993; and for Europe more broadly,see White 1993b. Political Geography of Immigration Control 691
692 International Organization port of and in opposition to immigration are filtered through specific national politi- cal institutions to affect political outcomes. I begin with a model of immigration policy as a function of domestic political interests.I assume,following the "regulation school"of politics,that politicians maximize the likelihood of(re)election by promising and producing policies that maximize political support while minimizing political opposition.2 Immigration con- trol can be modeled as a function of the support for and opposition to immigrant flows,arising from distinct societal sources.However,I focus on the local support for and opposition to immigration,the politicization of immigration in local politics, and its translation onto the national political agenda.I draw on the literature on immigration control but apply it at the local level. Support for Immigration On the demand side,firms are the primary actors with an interest in immigrant labor and an incentive to lobby government regarding immigration issues.I argue that local support for immigration varies over time in response to employers'labor mar- ket needs.Local support is strongest in periods of low unemployment;however, support will be mitigated by flexible labor markets and high capital mobility. Other factors being equal,low levels of local unemployment put pressure on local wage levels.Local labor market conditions,however,may be insufficiently attractive to generate internal migration,giving rise to geographically segmented labor markets and geographically specific corporate demands for immigrant labor.Regardless of conditions in the economy as a whole,local labor market conditions may intensify the demand for immigrant labor. Other factors are not always equal however.Firms with high capital mobility,such as manufacturing firms with standardized technology,can choose to export capital to sites of cheap foreign labor,whereas other firms have no alternative but to petition for the importation of labor.Natural resource-based firms,agricultural producers, and service firms (in-person delivery of services)are spatially fixed and therefore unable to reduce labor costs through capital exports.Firms in declining sectors of the economy also lack capital mobility.Given equal levels of unemployment,support for immigration will be strongest among firms with limited capital mobility.Therefore, local demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where firms with limited capital mobility dominate the local economy. Firms also confront variation in labor market flexibility.Numerous studies demon- strate that migrant labor provides desired flexibility by participating in the secondary labor market.23 That is,immigrants permit the expansion of dual labor markets and increase flexibility of production.Firms confronting inflexible labor markets will prefer higher levels of immigration than firms confronting flexible labor markets. Given equal levels of unemployment and similar levels of capital mobility,local 22.Peltzman 1976. 23.Piore1979
port of and in opposition to immigration are ltered through speci c national political institutionsto affect political outcomes. I begin with a model of immigration policy as a function of domestic political interests. I assume, following the ‘‘regulation school’’ of politics, that politicians maximize the likelihood of (re)election by promising and producing policies that maximize politicalsupport while minimizing politicalopposition.22 Immigration control can be modeled as a function of the support for and opposition to immigrant ows, arising from distinct societal sources. However, I focus on the local support for and opposition to immigration, the politicization of immigration in local politics, and its translation onto the national political agenda. I draw on the literature on immigration control but apply it at the local level. Support for Immigration On the demand side, rms are the primary actors with an interest in immigrant labor and an incentive to lobby government regarding immigration issues. I argue that local support for immigration varies over time in response to employers’labor market needs. Local support is strongest in periods of low unemployment; however, support will be mitigated by exible labor markets and high capital mobility. Other factors being equal, low levels of local unemployment put pressure on local wage levels. Local labor market conditions,however, may be insufficiently attractive to generate internal migration, giving rise to geographically segmented labor markets and geographically speci c corporate demands for immigrant labor. Regardless of conditions in the economy as a whole, local labor market conditions may intensify the demand for immigrant labor. Other factors are not always equal however. Firms with high capital mobility,such as manufacturing rms with standardized technology, can choose to export capital to sites of cheap foreign labor, whereas other rms have no alternative but to petition for the importation of labor. Natural resource–based rms, agricultural producers, and service rms (in-person delivery of services) are spatially xed and therefore unable to reduce labor coststhrough capital exports. Firms in declining sectors of the economy also lack capital mobility.Given equal levels of unemployment,support for immigration will be strongest among rms with limited capital mobility. Therefore, local demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where rms with limited capital mobility dominate the local economy. Firms also confront variation in labor market exibility.Numerousstudies demonstrate that migrant labor provides desired exibility by participating in the secondary labor market.23 That is, immigrants permit the expansion of dual labor markets and increase exibility of production. Firms confronting in exible labor markets will prefer higher levels of immigration than rms confronting exible labor markets. Given equal levels of unemployment and similar levels of capital mobility, local 22. Peltzman 1976. 23. Piore 1979. 692 International Organization
Political Geography of Immigration Control 693 demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where employers experience inflexible labor markets. Opposition to Immigration I argue that local conditions trigger anti-immigrant sentiment through the level of native-immigrant competition.Although this thesis is not original,I clarify the con- ditions under which competition increases and diminishes,thereby isolating those factors that intensify opposition to immigration.This competition contains at least three dimensions.The first dimension,labor market competition,is triggered by economic recession.The second dimension,competition over state resources,is trig- gered by economic recession and the rate of growth of the immigrant community,as well as the level of immigrant access to publicly provided goods.The third dimen- sion,competition over societal identity,is triggered by the size of the immigrant community but is offset by assimilation of the immigrant community into the native population.The argument is conjunctural;that is,opposition to immigration that becomes politically important is triggered by the presence of an immigrant commu- nity in conjunction with economic recession.It is aggravated by the degree to which the migrant community challenges the preeminence of the native community. Competition over market-based resources.A considerable amount of controversy exists regarding the position of the migrant vis-a-vis the native workforce.24 Some economists argue that migrants complement the native workforce and actually en- hance the returns of the native population by increasing their productivity and,hence, their wages.Others argue that the immigrant labor force substitutes for the native workforce;in this view,immigrants obtain employment at the expense of the native population.For example,where indigenous labor is skilled and immigrant labor un- skilled,immigrants may be employed to increase the productivity of the native work- force,thereby increasing the wages of those workers.In contrast,unskilled immi- grant workers may compete with and displace native unskilled workers,thereby reducing the wages of those workers.Because the labor market is never completely segmented,undoubtedly there is some truth to both propositions.I focus on the variation in labor market segmentation during periods of recession and economic prosperity that modifies the level of competition between the native and immigrant workforce. Economic recession places the native and immigrant labor forces in more direct competition than in periods of economic prosperity.The dynamic proceeds because workers are often willing to take otherwise unacceptableemployment during periods of economic downturn.To be sure,this willingness is mitigated by the presence of a "reservation wage,"the remuneration available from nonwork sources,such as un- employment benefits and family allowances.To the extent that employment exists at greater than the reservation wage,unemployed workers accept employment that is 24.See Borjas 1994 for an overview of the debate as well as extensive citations of the literature
demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where employers experience in exible labor markets. Opposition to Immigration I argue that local conditions trigger anti-immigrant sentiment through the level of native–immigrant competition.Although this thesis is not original, I clarify the conditions under which competition increases and diminishes, thereby isolating those factors that intensify opposition to immigration. This competition contains at least three dimensions. The rst dimension, labor market competition, is triggered by economic recession. The second dimension, competition over state resources, is triggered by economic recession and the rate of growth of the immigrant community, as well as the level of immigrant access to publicly provided goods. The third dimension, competition over societal identity, is triggered by the size of the immigrant community but is offset by assimilation of the immigrant community into the native population. The argument is conjunctural; that is, opposition to immigration that becomes politically important is triggered by the presence of an immigrant community in conjunction with economic recession. It is aggravated by the degree to which the migrant community challengesthe preeminence of the native community. Competition over market-based resources. A considerable amount of controversy exists regarding the position of the migrant vis-a`-vis the native workforce.24 Some economists argue that migrants complement the native workforce and actually enhance the returns of the native populationby increasing their productivityand, hence, their wages. Others argue that the immigrant labor force substitutes for the native workforce; in this view, immigrants obtain employment at the expense of the native population. For example, where indigenouslabor is skilled and immigrant labor unskilled, immigrantsmay be employed to increase the productivity of the nativeworkforce, thereby increasing the wages of those workers. In contrast, unskilled immigrant workers may compete with and displace native unskilled workers, thereby reducing the wages of those workers. Because the labor market is never completely segmented, undoubtedly there is some truth to both propositions. I focus on the variation in labor market segmentation during periods of recession and economic prosperity that modi es the level of competition between the native and immigrant workforce. Economic recession places the native and immigrant labor forces in more direct competition than in periods of economic prosperity. The dynamic proceeds because workers are often willing to take otherwise unacceptable employment during periods of economic downturn. To be sure, this willingnessis mitigated by the presence of a ‘‘reservation wage,’’ the remuneration available from nonwork sources, such as unemployment bene ts and family allowances. To the extent that employment exists at greater than the reservation wage, unemployed workers accept employment that is 24. See Borjas 1994 for an overview of the debate as well as extensive citations of the literature. Political Geography of Immigration Control 693