Uncorrected Proofs:Copyright Cornell University 6 Constructing the International Economy why differently inclined scholars should accept that social construction could matter for what they care about explaining,and why it consequently deserves consideration as a plausible alternative in their research designs.To this end we lay out four different "paths to constructivism":rationales that start from different theoretical positions but all suggest that social construction matters. We then address the much-discussed divide between nonconstructivist "causal- explanatory"scholarship and the constructivist focus on meaning and "consti- tutiveness."We argue that many constructivist claims are more open to direct engagement with traditional causal-explanatory schemas than skeptics on either side may realize.One does not have to "give up on causation"or "devolve into mere description"to take constructivism seriously.Some constructivist scholar- ship does resist causal claims,of course,but we suggest that even across an ex- plicit version of this epistemological divide,scholars can usefully engage much more than they do. In sum,we aim to bring constructivism into conversation with the mainstream of rationalist-materialist theorizing in IPE.In important ways this effort at pro- moting engagement also seeks to reverse a growing geographical segregation in political economy.In European journals and faculties that are otherwise in- creasingly integrated with American social-science debates,arguments about social construction have become very influential in studies of international or- ganizations,trade,finance,and markets.In American IPE,meanwhile,success- ful careers are still routinely made without any real engagement of any variant of constructivism (whatever its provenance)(Cohen 2007;Higgot and Watson 2008;Ravenhill 2008).From our point of view,this means that large numbers of smart,well-meaning scholars on both sides of the Atlantic are forgoing de- bates that could improve all their arguments.They should and can fruitfully debate one another. Why American IPE Is Different,and Why This Matters Although scholars outside the United States do not need reminding of this fact, it is worth recalling how "American"the origins of IPE are (see Cohen 2007, 2008).The origins of IPE date to a period when concern over the United States' putatively terminal economic and military decline was at its height-or depth, as it were-during the 197os and 198os.More comparatively oriented schol- ars picked up this declinist thesis too,through the analysis of how some states handled the oil and inflation shocks of the 197os better than others,and sought to explain this variation accordingly(Katzenstein 1976b).For others scholars, though,most notably Robert Gilpin,what we were seeing,once again,was an ex- ample of hegemonic decline (Gilpin 1981).Indeed,whether the United States was seen as a“malignant'”or“benign”hegemon(Russett 1985)ran second- ary to the consensus that the United States was in fact in decline,and the main research problem was then how to understand this and,if possible,arrest it. E_ As a consequence,the entire research program of hegemonic stability theory L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 6 1125/20098:4609AM
6 Constructing the International Economy why differently inclined scholars should accept that social construction could matter for what they care about explaining, and why it consequently deserves consideration as a plausible alternative in their research designs. To this end we lay out four different “paths to constructivism”: rationales that start from different theoretical positions but all suggest that social construction matters. We then address the much-discussed divide between nonconstructivist “causalexplanatory” scholarship and the constructivist focus on meaning and “constitutiveness.” We argue that many constructivist claims are more open to direct engagement with traditional causal-explanatory schemas than skeptics on either side may realize. One does not have to “give up on causation” or “devolve into mere description” to take constructivism seriously. Some constructivist scholarship does resist causal claims, of course, but we suggest that even across an explicit version of this epistemological divide, scholars can usefully engage much more than they do. In sum, we aim to bring constructivism into conversation with the mainstream of rationalist-materialist theorizing in IPE. In important ways this effort at promoting engagement also seeks to reverse a growing geographical segregation in political economy. In European journals and faculties that are otherwise increasingly integrated with American social-science debates, arguments about social construction have become very infl uential in studies of international organizations, trade, fi nance, and markets. In American IPE, meanwhile, successful careers are still routinely made without any real engagement of any variant of constructivism (whatever its provenance) (Cohen 2007; Higgot and Watson 2008; Ravenhill 2008). From our point of view, this means that large numbers of smart, well-meaning scholars on both sides of the Atlantic are forgoing debates that could improve all their arguments. They should and can fruitfully debate one another. Why American IPE Is Different, and Why This Matters Although scholars outside the United States do not need reminding of this fact, it is worth recalling how “American” the origins of IPE are (see Cohen 2007, 2008). The origins of IPE date to a period when concern over the United States’ putatively terminal economic and military decline was at its height—or depth, as it were—during the 1970s and 1980s. More comparatively oriented scholars picked up this declinist thesis too, through the analysis of how some states handled the oil and infl ation shocks of the 1970s better than others, and sought to explain this variation accordingly (Katzenstein 1976b). For others scholars, though, most notably Robert Gilpin, what we were seeing, once again, was an example of hegemonic decline (Gilpin 1981). Indeed, whether the United States was seen as a “malignant” or “benign” hegemon (Russett 1985) ran secondary to the consensus that the United States was in fact in decline, and the main research problem was then how to understand this and, if possible, arrest it. As a consequence, the entire research program of hegemonic stability theory S_ E_ L_ 3050-544_01Intro.indd 6 11/25/2009 8:46:09 AM Uncorrected Proofs: Copyright Cornell University
Uncorrected Proofs:Copyright Cornell University Introduction 7 (Gilpin 1981;McKeown 198g)about how international regimes might "stave off"the inevitable undersupply of international public goods that the hegemon provides (Krasner 1982),and how international institutions could be second- best solutions to decline (Keohane 1984),came to the fore and dominated the field for a decade.? What is of interest here,then,is how,despite the certainty pertaining to this scholarship and its thoroughly materialist underpinnings,practically all its key claims ran aground on the unexpected politics and historical events of the late 198os and early 1ggos.The end of the Soviet Union,the unification of Ger- many,the renaissance of the European Union,and the reemergence of global finance as a major force in international politics combined to send the suppos- edly rising hegemon,Japan,into a recession now in its second decade,while the declining hegemon was suddenly,and quite unexpectedly,upgraded to "hy- perpower"status.That such a large swath of the field missed what was going on by such a wide margin might have suggested that focusing only on material factors,such as relative shares of world trade,was perhaps less illuminating than one might hope.In reply to this failure,mainstream IPE picked itself up and set about looking for the materialist determinants of political action under new conditions.They quickly settled on internationalization and globalization(Frie- den 1991b;Keohane and Milner 1996). While attentive to new shifts in the global economy that had blindsided the older school,such as the sudden importance of finance as well as trade,this next- generation school committed the same error of assuming too much stability and predictability in the world based on seeing the environment as a materialist obstacle course.For example,some of the most influential materialist analy- ses of how financial globalization would affect agents'interests provide clear predictions as to which sectors and which actors,with which assets,would win and lose under globalization(Frieden 1991b;Keohane and Milner 1996).Thus predictions about preferences and likely coalitions could be made.Unfortu- nately,although these models provide clear predictions,the reality they purport to explain has not,once again,been very compliant.As empirical work on the preferences of real financial actors shows clearly,some sectors do not organize despite their assets,and some actors have exactly the opposite or even no prefer- ences at all over alternative policies (McNamara 1998;Mosley 2003;Jabko 2006; Abdelal 2006;see also Crystal 2o03b).Similarly,consider materialist scholar- ship on the future of the welfare state which saw open capital flows leading to a race to the bottom in taxes,the death of expensive models of welfare,and a convergence on a neoliberal form of capitalism(Kurzer 1993).Instead,what we see today are the high-spending and high-taxing social democratic welfare states ranking among the most economically successful in the global economy. 7.Indeed,the two positions that dominated the field,realism and neoliberal institutionalism, differed on little more than the imputed behavioral rule governing state behavior(Baldwin 1993; Powell 1994). E L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 7 1125/20098:4609AM
Introduction 7 (Gilpin 1981; McKeown 1983) about how international regimes might “stave off ” the inevitable undersupply of international public goods that the hegemon provides (Krasner 1982), and how international institutions could be secondbest solutions to decline (Keohane 1984), came to the fore and dominated the fi eld for a decade.7 What is of interest here, then, is how, despite the certainty pertaining to this scholarship and its thoroughly materialist underpinnings, practically all its key claims ran aground on the unexpected politics and historical events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of the Soviet Union, the unifi cation of Germany, the renaissance of the European Union, and the reemergence of global fi nance as a major force in international politics combined to send the supposedly rising hegemon, Japan, into a recession now in its second decade, while the declining hegemon was suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, upgraded to “hyperpower” status. That such a large swath of the fi eld missed what was going on by such a wide margin might have suggested that focusing only on material factors, such as relative shares of world trade, was perhaps less illuminating than one might hope. In reply to this failure, mainstream IPE picked itself up and set about looking for the materialist determinants of political action under new conditions. They quickly settled on internationalization and globalization (Frieden 1991b; Keohane and Milner 1996). While attentive to new shifts in the global economy that had blindsided the older school, such as the sudden importance of fi nance as well as trade, this nextgeneration school committed the same error of assuming too much stability and predictability in the world based on seeing the environment as a materialist obstacle course. For example, some of the most infl uential materialist analyses of how fi nancial globalization would affect agents’ interests provide clear predictions as to which sectors and which actors, with which assets, would win and lose under globalization (Frieden 1991b; Keohane and Milner 1996). Thus predictions about preferences and likely coalitions could be made. Unfortunately, although these models provide clear predictions, the reality they purport to explain has not, once again, been very compliant. As empirical work on the preferences of real fi nancial actors shows clearly, some sectors do not organize despite their assets, and some actors have exactly the opposite or even no preferences at all over alternative policies (McNamara 1998; Mosley 2003; Jabko 2006; Abdelal 2006; see also Crystal 2003b). Similarly, consider materialist scholarship on the future of the welfare state which saw open capital fl ows leading to a race to the bottom in taxes, the death of expensive models of welfare, and a convergence on a neoliberal form of capitalism (Kurzer 1993). Instead, what we see today are the high-spending and high-taxing social democratic welfare states ranking among the most economically successful in the global economy. 7. Indeed, the two positions that dominated the fi eld, realism and neoliberal institutionalism, differed on little more than the imputed behavioral rule governing state behavior (Baldwin 1993; Powell 1994). _S _E _L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 7 11/25/2009 8:46:09 AM Uncorrected Proofs: Copyright Cornell University