上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Geneva, Bandung & Rapprochement_Sino-US Rapprochement_Yafeng Xia

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement,January 1969-February 1972 中 Yafeng Xia estern scholars have long assumed that opposition existed in the upper levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)to the efforts by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the late 1960s and early 1970s to reach out to the United States.'Documents and first-hand accounts published in China over the last two decades cast doubt on this argument.The new Chinese- language sources contravene the rumors that Chinese leaders were divided over the rapprochement with the United States-rumors that stem mainly from Henry Kissinger's account of the way Mao depicted Lin Biao during a meeting with Richard Nixon in February 1972. This article examines China's policymaking process vis-a-vis the United 1.During the Sino-American summit in February 1972,Mao intentionally gave this impression,tell- ing Nixon,"In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad."See"Memorandum of Conversation [Mao and Nixon],21 February 1972,"Box 91,National Security Council Files (NSCF),Nixon Presi- dential Materials Project(NPMP),National Archives II(NARA).Henry Kissinger wrote in his mem- oirs that Lin Biao,then Chinese defense minister and Mao's designated successor,opposed China's rapprochement with the United States.See Henry Kissinger,White House Years (Boston:Little, Brown,1979).pp.696-697.This allegation has been continually disseminated in Western writings. See,for example,Kenneth Lieberthal,"Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,"in Harry Harding.ed. China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s(New Haven:Yale University Press,1984),p.52:John Garver, Chinas Decision for Rapprochement with the United States,1969-1971(Boulder,CO:Westview Press, 1982),pp.134-137;Robert S.Ross,"From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping:Elite Instability and China's U.S.Policy,"China Quarterly,No.118 (June 1989),pp.267-268;Rosemary Foot,The Practice of Power:U.S.Relations with China since 1949(Oxford,UK:Clarendon Press,1995),p.105;Robert Ross,Negotiating Cooperation:The United States and China,1969-1989(Stanford,CA:Stanford Uni- versity Press,1995),p.27;and William Bundy,A Tangled Web:The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nicon Presideney (New York:Hill and Wang,1998),pp.109,165.Most recently,James Mann,About Face:A History of America's Curious Relationship with China(New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1999),p.26; and Jeffrey Kimball,Nixons Vietnam War(Lawrence:University of Kansas Press,1998),p.261.Rob- ert Garson claimed that Mao's wife,Jiang Qing,the leader of the radicals,was against rapprochement with the United States.See Robert Garson,The United States and China since 1949(Teaneck,N]: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,1994),p.123.In a recent,controversial biography of Mao Zedong.Jung Chang and Jon Halliday say nothing about Lin Biao's alleged role in Sino-American rapprochement.See Jung Chang and Jon Halliday,Mao:The Unknown Story (New York:Alfred A. Knopf.2005). lournal of Cold War Studies Vol.8,No.4,Fall 2006,pp.3-28 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

3 Xia China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969–February 1972 ✣ Yafeng Xia Western scholars have long assumed that opposition existed in the upper levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the efforts by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the late 1960s and early 1970s to reach out to the United States.1 Documents and ªrst-hand accounts published in China over the last two decades cast doubt on this argument. The new Chinese￾language sources contravene the rumors that Chinese leaders were divided over the rapprochement with the United States—rumors that stem mainly from Henry Kissinger’s account of the way Mao depicted Lin Biao during a meeting with Richard Nixon in February 1972. This article examines China’s policymaking process vis-à-vis the United 1. During the Sino-American summit in February 1972, Mao intentionally gave this impression, tell￾ing Nixon, “In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and ºed abroad.” See “Memorandum of Conversation [Mao and Nixon], 21 February 1972,” Box 91, National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presi￾dential Materials Project (NPMP), National Archives II (NARA). Henry Kissinger wrote in his mem￾oirs that Lin Biao, then Chinese defense minister and Mao’s designated successor, opposed China’s rapprochement with the United States. See Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 696–697. This allegation has been continually disseminated in Western writings. See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Harry Harding, ed., China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 52; John Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1969–1971 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 134–137; Robert S. Ross, “From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China’s U.S. Policy,” China Quarterly, No. 118 (June 1989), pp. 267–268; Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 105; Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni￾versity Press, 1995), p. 27; and William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp. 109, 165. Most recently, James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 26; and Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), p. 261. Rob￾ert Garson claimed that Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, the leader of the radicals, was against rapprochement with the United States. See Robert Garson, The United States and China since 1949 (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994), p. 123. In a recent, controversial biography of Mao Zedong, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday say nothing about Lin Biao’s alleged role in Sino-American rapprochement. See Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005). Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 2006, pp. 3–28 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Xia States during the crucial period from January 1969 to February 1972.It traces the positions of senior Chinese leaders(especially Mao,Lin,and Zhou)re- garding major events in U.S.-China relations,including the "Four Marshals Study Group";the instructions given to Lei Yang regarding the final two Sino- American ambassadorial talks;the advent of "ping-pong diplomacy;"the CCP Politburo meeting in May 1971 regarding Kissinger's secret visit in July; the rough treatment of Alexander Haig's advance team in China in January 1972;and the controversy over drafts of a joint communique during Nixon's China trip. China's Foreign Policymaking Structure under Mao: 1949-1976 Domestic politics is the"internal setting"of foreign policy.In a democratic society,domestic constraints on foreign policy include public opinion,the legislature,the media,and powerful interest groups.Under Mao's autocratic control,however,foreign policy decision-making in China was left to a small coterie of political elites.Some Western scholars have assumed that"opinion groups"in China were able to exert influence on the CCP Politburo and that factions existed within the Chinese leadership.This article challenges the "factionalism model"by focusing on China's foreign policymaking in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From the time the People's Republic of China(PRC)was founded in 1949,Mao,as the chairman of the CCP had sufficient power to set the for- eign policy agenda and guidelines on his own.He consigned Premier Zhou Enlai,who was also foreign minister,to the role of a manager overseeing day- to-day aspects of foreign affairs.The role of the five-man CCP Secretariat, and later the Standing Committee of the Politburo,was to accord legitimacy to major policy decisions made by Mao.The Politburo meetings helped him weigh the pros and cons of major foreign policy decisions and to overcome opposition and build consensus once he had made up his mind.Until the 2.Richard C.Snyder,H.W.Bruck,and Burton Sapin,"The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics,"in James N.Rosenau,ed.,International Politics and Foreign Policy:A Reader in Research and Theory (New York:Free Press,1969),p.203. 3.Andrew Nathan,"A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,"China Quarterly,No.53 (January- March 1973),p.34.Responding to Nathan's"factionalism model,"Tang Tsou argues that"Nathan's model explains only a small part of Chinese elite politics"and has a narrow focus.See Tsou,"Chinese Politics at the Top:Factionalism or Informal Politics?Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?"China Journal,No.34 (July 1995),p.122. 4.Lu Ning.The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-Making in China.2nd ed.(Boulder,CO: Westview Press,2000),pp.161-162

States during the crucial period from January 1969 to February 1972. It traces the positions of senior Chinese leaders (especially Mao, Lin, and Zhou) re￾garding major events in U.S.-China relations, including the “Four Marshals’ Study Group”; the instructions given to Lei Yang regarding the ªnal two Sino￾American ambassadorial talks; the advent of “ping-pong diplomacy;” the CCP Politburo meeting in May 1971 regarding Kissinger’s secret visit in July; the rough treatment of Alexander Haig’s advance team in China in January 1972; and the controversy over drafts of a joint communiqué during Nixon’s China trip. China’s Foreign Policymaking Structure under Mao: 1949–1976 Domestic politics is the “internal setting” of foreign policy.2 In a democratic society, domestic constraints on foreign policy include public opinion, the legislature, the media, and powerful interest groups. Under Mao’s autocratic control, however, foreign policy decision-making in China was left to a small coterie of political elites. Some Western scholars have assumed that “opinion groups” in China were able to exert inºuence on the CCP Politburo and that factions existed within the Chinese leadership.3 This article challenges the “factionalism model” by focusing on China’s foreign policymaking in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From the time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, Mao, as the chairman of the CCP, had sufªcient power to set the for￾eign policy agenda and guidelines on his own. He consigned Premier Zhou Enlai, who was also foreign minister, to the role of a manager overseeing day￾to-day aspects of foreign affairs. The role of the ªve-man CCP Secretariat, and later the Standing Committee of the Politburo, was to accord legitimacy to major policy decisions made by Mao. The Politburo meetings helped him weigh the pros and cons of major foreign policy decisions and to overcome opposition and build consensus once he had made up his mind.4 Until the 4 Xia 2. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, “The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 203. 3. Andrew Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly, No. 53 (January– March 1973), p. 34. Responding to Nathan’s “factionalism model,” Tang Tsou argues that “Nathan’s model explains only a small part of Chinese elite politics” and has a narrow focus. See Tsou, “Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?” China Journal, No. 34 (July 1995), p. 122. 4. Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-Making in China, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 161–162

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement Cultural Revolution in 1966,"Mao alone received Foreign Ministry options papers from Zhou Enlai for decision,with information copies to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping,and Peng Zhen."5 This procedure was temporarily inter- rupted during the early period of the Cultural Revolution,especially from May to August 1967.5 Mao and Zhou,however,were able to resume full con- trol of foreign policy decision-making after August 1967. Because interest groups,the media,and public opinion in China had no independent influence on foreign policy during the Maoist era(1949-1976), analysis of China's elite politics is crucial in understanding how policy was made during that time.The elite is a collectivity"having a separate identity, internal structure,and elevated status based upon its special role in the deci- sion-making and enforcing process.During the Maoist decades,China's po- litical elite consisted of the key CCB state,and military leaders,and China's foreign policy political elite included Mao,Lin,Zhou,and other Politburo members.This article analyses the positions and interactions of these key figures in the making of China's policy toward the United States from 1969 to 1972. Four Marshals'Study Group Since 1965,China and the Soviet Union had continually expanded their mili- tary forces along their shared border.Tensions between the two countries in- creased further during the Cultural Revolution,and by 1968-1969 each side had amassed several hundred thousand troops along the border.In early 1968,Sino-Soviet conflict erupted around Qilixin Island,on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri River,a prelude to large-scale armed 5.Carol Lee Hamrin,"Elite Politics and Foreign Relations,"in Thomas W.Robinson and David Shambaugh,eds.,Chinese Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice(Oxford,UK:Clarendon Press,1994), P.83. 6.From May to August 1967,the Foreign Ministry did not function normally because of the assault from the"rebel faction."All leading cadres,including Foreign Minister Chen Yi,were under fire and not allowed to work.China's relations with many countries deteriorated.The office of the British charge d'affaires in Beijing was set on fire by the "rebel faction"on 22 August 1967.After this inci- dent,Zhou Enlai,with Mao's support,regained control over foreign affairs.For a Chinese version of this period,see Jin Ge,"Zai waijiaobu 'duoquan'qianhou"[The Beginning and End of"Seizing Power"in the Foreign Ministry],in An Jianshe,ed.,Zhou Enlai de zuihou suiyue,1966-1976 [Zhou Enlai's Final Years,1966-1976](Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,1995),pp.207-243. 7.Robert A.Scalapino,"Introduction,"in Robert A.Scalapino,ed.,Elites in the Peoples Republic of China(Seattle:University of Washington Press,1972),p.vi. 8.Avery Goldstein,"Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,"China Quar- terly.No.139 (September 1994),p.714

Cultural Revolution in 1966, “Mao alone received Foreign Ministry options papers from Zhou Enlai for decision, with information copies to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen.”5 This procedure was temporarily inter￾rupted during the early period of the Cultural Revolution, especially from May to August 1967.6 Mao and Zhou, however, were able to resume full con￾trol of foreign policy decision-making after August 1967. Because interest groups, the media, and public opinion in China had no independent inºuence on foreign policy during the Maoist era (1949–1976), analysis of China’s elite politics is crucial in understanding how policy was made during that time. The elite is a collectivity “having a separate identity, internal structure, and elevated status based upon its special role in the deci￾sion-making and enforcing process.”7 During the Maoist decades, China’s po￾litical elite consisted of the key CCP, state, and military leaders,8 and China’s foreign policy political elite included Mao, Lin, Zhou, and other Politburo members. This article analyses the positions and interactions of these key ªgures in the making of China’s policy toward the United States from 1969 to 1972. Four Marshals’ Study Group Since 1965, China and the Soviet Union had continually expanded their mili￾tary forces along their shared border. Tensions between the two countries in￾creased further during the Cultural Revolution, and by 1968–1969 each side had amassed several hundred thousand troops along the border. In early 1968, Sino-Soviet conºict erupted around Qilixin Island, on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri River, a prelude to large-scale armed 5 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement 5. Carol Lee Hamrin, “Elite Politics and Foreign Relations,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 83. 6. From May to August 1967, the Foreign Ministry did not function normally because of the assault from the “rebel faction.” All leading cadres, including Foreign Minister Chen Yi, were under ªre and not allowed to work. China’s relations with many countries deteriorated. The ofªce of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing was set on ªre by the “rebel faction” on 22 August 1967. After this inci￾dent, Zhou Enlai, with Mao’s support, regained control over foreign affairs. For a Chinese version of this period, see Jin Ge, “Zai waijiaobu ‘duoquan’ qianhou” [The Beginning and End of “Seizing Power” in the Foreign Ministry], in An Jianshe, ed., Zhou Enlai de zuihou suiyue, 1966–1976 [Zhou Enlai’s Final Years, 1966–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 207–243. 7. Robert A. Scalapino, “Introduction,” in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. vi. 8. Avery Goldstein, “Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,” China Quar￾terly, No. 139 (September 1994), p. 714

Xia conflicts the following year.The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 heightened Chinese leaders'concern about Soviet intentions. When intense armed conflicts between Chinese and Soviet border forces broke out in March 1969 on Zhenbao Island (called Damansky Island in Russian)near the bank of the Ussuri River,China's security situation dramati- cally worsened.Soon border conflicts spread to other areas as tension in- creased along the entire length of the border.These incidents brought China and the Soviet Union to the brink of a major military confrontation. Kissinger claims that Soviet leaders even considered conducting a preemptive nuclear strike against their former Communist ally.It is not surprising that Mao and his colleagues felt compelled to respond to the Soviet Union by em- barking on major changes in China's foreign and security strategy. After the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969,the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution was over.Chinese ambassadors,who were recalled at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution,returned to their posts one by one, and Chinese diplomacy gradually returned to normality.The stabilization of Chinese politics was favorable to the improvement of Sino-American rela- tions.Even before the Ninth Party Congress,Zhou Enlai had been giving Mao articles about notable developments in international affairs,important commentaries,and possible Chinese responses.This was an oft-employed technique by Zhou when important policies were under consideration,inso- far it allowed him to exert discreet influence on Mao's decision-making. In mid-May,Zhou Enlai at Mao's behest asked four veteran marshals- Chen Yi,Ye Jianying,Xu Xiangqian,and Nie Rongzhen-to "pay attention to"international affairs.He urged them to meet "two to three times a month" to discuss "important issues"of international security and to provide the CCP Central Committee(CC)with their suggestions.3 Zhou told the marshals 9.Yang Kuisong,"Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi"[From the Battle at the Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement],Dangshiyanjin ziliao [Materials on Party His- tory Research],No.12 (1997),pp.7-8;and Xu Yan,"1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu"[The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969],Dangshi yanjiu ziliao,No.5(1994),pp.6-10. 10.Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that in August 1969 a Soviet diplomat in Washington inquired "what the U.S.reaction would be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities."See Kissinger,White House Years,p.183;and discussions in Yang,"Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,"p.12.Later that year the Western press also reported rumors of Soviet plans to strike at Chi- nese nuclear bases.Whether these overtures reflected actual planning or were merely part of a disinfor- mation campaign to exert psychological pressure on Chinese leaders is uncertain. 11.All Chinese ambassadors except Huang Hua in Egypt were called back to take part in the Cultural Revolution. 12.Gao Wenqian,Wannian Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai's Later Years](Hong Kong:Mirror Books,2003), p.407. 13.Xiong Xianghui,Wo de gingbao yu waijiao shengya [My Carcer in Intelligence and Diplomacyl (Beijing:Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe,1999),p.166.Because Xiong was assistant to the Four 6

conºicts the following year.9 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 heightened Chinese leaders’ concern about Soviet intentions. When intense armed conºicts between Chinese and Soviet border forces broke out in March 1969 on Zhenbao Island (called Damansky Island in Russian) near the bank of the Ussuri River, China’s security situation dramati￾cally worsened. Soon border conºicts spread to other areas as tension in￾creased along the entire length of the border. These incidents brought China and the Soviet Union to the brink of a major military confrontation. Kissinger claims that Soviet leaders even considered conducting a preemptive nuclear strike against their former Communist ally.10 It is not surprising that Mao and his colleagues felt compelled to respond to the Soviet Union by em￾barking on major changes in China’s foreign and security strategy. After the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969, the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution was over. Chinese ambassadors, who were recalled at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, returned to their posts one by one, and Chinese diplomacy gradually returned to normality.11 The stabilization of Chinese politics was favorable to the improvement of Sino-American rela￾tions. Even before the Ninth Party Congress, Zhou Enlai had been giving Mao articles about notable developments in international affairs, important commentaries, and possible Chinese responses. This was an oft-employed technique by Zhou when important policies were under consideration, inso￾far it allowed him to exert discreet inºuence on Mao’s decision-making.12 In mid-May, Zhou Enlai at Mao’s behest asked four veteran marshals— Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen—to “pay attention to” international affairs. He urged them to meet “two to three times a month” to discuss “important issues” of international security and to provide the CCP Central Committee (CC) with their suggestions.13 Zhou told the marshals 6 Xia 9. Yang Kuisong, “Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi” [From the Battle at the Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement], Dangshi yanjiu ziliao [Materials on Party His￾tory Research], No. 12 (1997), pp. 7–8; and Xu Yan, “1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu” [The Sino-Soviet Border Conºict of 1969], Dangshi yanjiu ziliao, No. 5 (1994), pp. 6–10. 10. Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that in August 1969 a Soviet diplomat in Washington inquired “what the U.S. reaction would be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities.” See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 183; and discussions in Yang, “Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 12. Later that year the Western press also reported rumors of Soviet plans to strike at Chi￾nese nuclear bases. Whether these overtures reºected actual planning or were merely part of a disinfor￾mation campaign to exert psychological pressure on Chinese leaders is uncertain. 11. All Chinese ambassadors except Huang Hua in Egypt were called back to take part in the Cultural Revolution. 12. Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai’s Later Years] (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2003), p. 407. 13. Xiong Xianghui, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya [My Career in Intelligence and Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1999), p. 166. Because Xiong was assistant to the Four

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement not to be"restricted by any established frame of reference."They should help Mao"gain an understanding of new strategic developments"in the world. Zhou stressed that Mao had assigned them the task because they were mar- shals with a good deal of military experience and clear strategic vision.Pre- sumably,they would have a much better grasp of China's position in the changing world situation.Only Mao,Zhou,the four marshals,and their two assistants-Xiong Xianghui,a high-ranking intelligence and foreign service officer;and Yao Guang,the director-general of the Foreign Ministry's Depart- ment of European and American Affairs-knew about the study group. Another major border clash,much larger than the two at Zhenbao Island in March,broke out between Chinese and Soviet garrisons in Xinjiang on 13 August.Chinese leaders warned that Moscow was preparing to launch a ma- jor war.The situation deteriorated rapidly in subsequent weeks.On 27 Au- gust,the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission issued an urgent order to set up a new "National Leading Group for the People's Air Defense,"with Zhou Enlai as the head,assigning to it the task of immediately organizing the large-scale evacuation of people and major industries from the big cities.6 On 28 August,the CCP Central Committee ordered a military mobilization in the provinces and regions bordering the Soviet Union and Mongolia.17 Although the Four Marshals'Study Group believed that the Soviet Union would probably not wage an all-out war against China,they emphasized the need for Beijing to be prepared for a worst-case scenario.Chen Yi and Ye Jianying contended that in order for China to be ready for a major confronta- tion with the Soviet Union,"the card of the United States"should be played. In a written report,"Our Views about the Current Situation,"completed on 17 September,they pointed out that although Moscow was intending to Marshals'Study Group,his account is more reliable than other Chinese sources.The marshals'first meeting was on 7 June 1969.According to Chinese scholar Wang Yongqin,Mao first instructed the four marshals on 19 February to study the international situation.He again asked them on 22 March and 19 April to survey the international scene.See Wang Yongqin,"1966-1976 Nian Zhong Mei Su guanxi jishi,lianzai 1"[Chronicle of Sino-American-Soviet Relations,1966-1976,Part I],Dangdai Zhongguashiyanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies],No.4(1997),pp.118-119,121. 14.Xiong,Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya,pp.166-167. 15.Xu,"1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu,"p.10;and Yang,"Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,"pp.11-19. 16.CCP Central Committee and Administrative Group of the Central Military Commission,"Re- port on Measures Needed to Be Taken to Enhance Air Defense,"27 August 1969,Chinese Central Archives:quoted in Yang Kuisong."The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969:From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,"Cold War Histor.Vol.1.No.1 (August 2000),pp.36-37. 17.See"The CCP Central Committee's Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and Re- gions,"28 August 1969,Cold War International History Project Bulletin.Issue No.11 (Winter 1998), Pp.168-169

not to be “restricted by any established frame of reference.” They should help Mao “gain an understanding of new strategic developments” in the world. Zhou stressed that Mao had assigned them the task because they were mar￾shals with a good deal of military experience and clear strategic vision. Pre￾sumably, they would have a much better grasp of China’s position in the changing world situation. Only Mao, Zhou, the four marshals, and their two assistants—Xiong Xianghui, a high-ranking intelligence and foreign service ofªcer; and Yao Guang, the director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s Depart￾ment of European and American Affairs—knew about the study group.14 Another major border clash, much larger than the two at Zhenbao Island in March, broke out between Chinese and Soviet garrisons in Xinjiang on 13 August.15 Chinese leaders warned that Moscow was preparing to launch a ma￾jor war. The situation deteriorated rapidly in subsequent weeks. On 27 Au￾gust, the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission issued an urgent order to set up a new “National Leading Group for the People’s Air Defense,” with Zhou Enlai as the head, assigning to it the task of immediately organizing the large-scale evacuation of people and major industries from the big cities.16 On 28 August, the CCP Central Committee ordered a military mobilization in the provinces and regions bordering the Soviet Union and Mongolia.17 Although the Four Marshals’ Study Group believed that the Soviet Union would probably not wage an all-out war against China, they emphasized the need for Beijing to be prepared for a worst-case scenario. Chen Yi and Ye Jianying contended that in order for China to be ready for a major confronta￾tion with the Soviet Union, “the card of the United States” should be played. In a written report, “Our Views about the Current Situation,” completed on 17 September, they pointed out that although Moscow was intending to 7 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement Marshals’ Study Group, his account is more reliable than other Chinese sources. The marshals’ ªrst meeting was on 7 June 1969. According to Chinese scholar Wang Yongqin, Mao ªrst instructed the four marshals on 19 February to study the international situation. He again asked them on 22 March and 19 April to survey the international scene. See Wang Yongqin, “1966–1976 Nian Zhong Mei Su guanxi jishi, lianzai 1” [Chronicle of Sino-American-Soviet Relations, 1966–1976, Part I], Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies], No. 4 (1997), pp. 118–119, 121. 14. Xiong, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya, pp. 166–167. 15. Xu, “1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu,” p. 10; and Yang, “Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 11–19. 16. CCP Central Committee and Administrative Group of the Central Military Commission, “Re￾port on Measures Needed to Be Taken to Enhance Air Defense,” 27 August 1969, Chinese Central Archives: quoted in Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 2000), pp. 36–37. 17. See “The CCP Central Committee’s Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and Re￾gions,” 28 August 1969, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 168–169