上海交通大学：《政治经济学经典导读 Comparative Political Economy》课程教学资源（比较政治经济学文献资料）Where do high growth political economies come from

World Development,Vol.22,No.9.pp.1269-1293.1994 Pergamon Copyright1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain.All rights reserved 0305-750X/94$7.00+0.00 0305.750X(94)00051-4 Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From?The Japanese Lineage of Korea's "Developmental State" ATUL KOHLI* Princeton University.New lersey Summary.-While many scholars have sought to analyze South Korea's economic success,not enough attention has been paid to the impact of Japanese colonialism.Japanese colonial influence on Korea in 1905-45.while brutal and humiliating,was also decisive in shaping a political economy that later evolved into the high-growth South Korean path to development.More specifically,three state- society characteristics that we now readily associate as elements of the South Korean "model"originated during the colonial period:Korean state under the Japanese influence was transformed from a relatively corrupt and ineffective social institution into a highly authoritarian,penetrating organization,capable of simultaneously controlling and transforming Korean society:production-oriented alliances involving the state and dominant classes evolved,leading up to considerable expansion of manufacturing,including "exports:"and the lower classes in both the city and the countryside came to be systematically con- trolled by the state and dominant classes.While there were impurtan discontinuities following WWIl. when the dust settled.South Korea under Park Chung-Hee fell back into the grooves of colonial origins and traveled along them,well into the 1980s. Questions about the wide range of (economic)perfor- ment,the current debate bogs down over the interpre- mance of underdeveloped countries today ..belong as tation of this role,i.e.over the extent to which state much to history as (they)do to economic analysis. intervention was "market conforming"versus "mar- Sir Arthur Lewis ket distorting,"or to use a related set of concepts,the [We]turn to history and only to history if what we are extent to which the state "led"rather than"followed" seeking are the actual causes,sources,and conditions of the market.2 overt changes of patterns and structures in society. Interesting and significant as this debate is,it is Robert Nisbet also incomplete,Much of it revolves around unravel- ing the economic role of the South Korean state and,in turn.tracing the impact of this role on economic out- 1.INTRODUCTION comes.The prior question of why the South Korean state was able to do what it did,and the related genetic Three decades of sustained.high economic growth issue of the historical roots of the Korean political has made South Korea a "model of development." economy thus tend to be underemphasized.Since Performance of other developing countries is now there is much to be learned about the Korean"model often judged against that of "East Asian newly indus- of development"by adopting a longer historical per- trializing countries (NICs),"including South Korea. Scholars and policy makers around the world have become curious:"How did South Korea do it?;"Can *I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the others learn from the experience?"A large body of lit- anonymous reviewers and the following:Bruce Cumings erature has developed-some of it of rather high Anthony D'Costa,Frank Dobbin,Cary Fraser,Stephan quality-attempting to interpret the Korean political Haggard,Koichi Hamada,Chung-in Moon.James Palais. economy.A central debate in this literature concerns Gustav Ranis,Benjamin Schneider,Robert Wade and John the relative roles of the state and of the market in Waterbury.This paper was written during 1992-93.while I was on sabbatical and,thanks to T.N.Srinivasan.a visitor at explaining South Korea's economic success.While the Economic Growth Center.Yale University.Financial hardly any sensible observer continues to deny the support from Ford Foundation is also acknowledged.Final state's extensive role in Korean economic develop- revision accepted:March 15,1994. 1269

Pergamon World Developpmenr, Vol. 22, No. 9, pp. 1269-l 293, 1994 Copyright 0 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0305-750x/94 $7.00 + 0.00 0305-750x(94)00051-4 Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s “Developmental State” ATUL KOHLI* Princeton University, New Jersey Summary. - While many scholars have sought to analyze South Korea’s economic success, not enough attention has been paid to the impact of Japanese colonialism. Japanese colonial influence on Korea in 1905-45, while brutal and humiliating, was also decisive in shaping a political economy that later evolved into the high-growth South Korean path to development. More specifically, three state￾society characteristics that we now readily associate as elements of the South Korean “model” originated during the colonial period: Korean state under the Japanese influence was transformed from a relatively corrupt and ineffective social institution into a highly authoritarian, penetrating organization, capable of simultaneously controlling and transforming Korean society; production-oriented alliances involving the state and dominant classes evolved, leading up to considerable expansion of manufacturing, including “exports;” and the lower classes in both the city and the countryside came to be systematically con￾trolled by the state and dominant classes. While there were important discontinuities following WWII. when the dust settled, South Korea under Park Chung-Hee fell back into the grooves of colonial origins and traveled along them, well into the 1980s Questions about the wide range of (economic) perfor￾mance of underdeveloped countries today . belong as much to history as (they) do to economic analysis. Sir Arthur Lewis [We] turn to history and only to history if what we are seeking are the actual causes, sources, and conditions of overt changes of patterns and structures in society. Robert Nisbet 1, INTRODUCTION Three decades of sustained, high economic growth has made South Korea a “model of development.” Performance of other developing countries is now often judged against that of “East Asian newly indus￾trializing countries (NICs),” including South Korea. Scholars and policy makers around the world have become curious: “How did South Korea do it?; “Can others learn from the experience?” A large body of lit￾erature has developed - some of it of rather high quality - attempting to interpret the Korean political economy.’ A central debate in this literature concerns the relative roles of the state and of the market in explaining South Korea’s economic success. While hardly any sensible observer continues to deny the state’s extensive role in Korean economic develop￾ment, the current debate bogs down over the interpre￾tation of this role, i.e. over the extent to which state intervention was “market conforming” versus “mar￾ket distorting,” or to use a related set of concepts, the extent to which the state “led” rather than “followed” the market.’ Interesting and significant as this debate is, it is also incomplete. Much of it revolves around unravel￾ing the economic role of the South Korean state and, in turn, tracing the impact of this role on economic out￾comes. The prior question of why the South Korean state was able to do what it did, and the related genetic issue of the historical roots of the Korean political economy thus tend to be underemphasized. Since there is much to be learned about the Korean “model of development” by adopting a longer historical per- *I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers and the following: Bruce Cumings. Anthony D’Costa, Frank Dobbin, Cary Fraser, Stephan Haggard, Koichi Hamada, Chung-in Moon, James Palais, Gustav Ranis, Benjamin Schneider, Robert Wade and John Waterbury. This paper was written during 1992-93, while I was on sabbatical and, thanks to T. N. Srinivasan. a visitor at the Economic Growth Center, Yale University. Financial support from Ford Foundation is also acknowledged. Final revision accepted: March 15, 1994. 1269

1270 WORLD DEVELOPMENT spective,especially tracing its origins back to its Korea had competing historical legacies:e.g.,there Japanese colonial lineage.this neglect is unfortunate. was the distant legacy of Choson (i.e.of Korea under For example,few "developmentalists."if any, the rule of Yi dynasty)of corrupt court politics at the ascribe much significance to the continuities that link apex;then there were indigenous revolutionary ten- colonial and posteolonial Korea.This is certainly so dencies that found expression in North Korea;and among the more strictly economic analysts of South there was the possibility of considerable American Korean growth experience:however,somewhat sur- influence.Moreover.completely new paths could prisingly and unfortunately.this problem also charac- have been charted.Subsequent decisions were thus terizes the works of several institutionally sensitive critical in putting South Korea on a path that reestab- scholars of South Korea.Among the latter.some dis- lished historical continuities.Nevertheless,it is diffi- cuss the colonial period but quickly conclude that the cult to imagine South Korea adopting a growth path impact was not of lasting significance (e.g..Jones and that it did without a deeply influential lapanese colo- Sakong,1980,pp.22-37).others deny the contribu- nial past. tions of this past altogether.and yet others virtually More specifically.I trace below the colonial ori- ignore it.presumably because of a view that signifi- gins of three patterns that we now readily associate as cant changes in South Korean economy began only elements of the South Korean"model."First,I discuss after the adoption of an "export-led model of develop- how the Korean state under the Japanese influence ment"in the early 1960s.5 Korean scholarship on was transformed from a relatively corrupt and ineffec- Korea has its own,albeit understandable,blind spots: tive social institution into a highly authoritarian, the nationalist impulse often leads to a denial of any penetrating organization.capable of simultaneously continuity between colonial and postcolonial periods. controlling and transforming the Korean socicty.This lest the contemporary achievements be viewed as a is followed by an analysis of a second pattern.namely product of a much disliked colonial rule.Only a the new state's production-oriented alliances with the handful of Korean specialists,especially those with a dominant classes,an alliance that buttressed the strong historical bent,have understood and empha- state's capacity to both control and transform. sized the Japanese colonial roots of the more recent. Relatedly,it is also important to take note of the struc- high-growth Korean political cconomy.Building on tural changes in the economy:not only did the colo- the insights of this last group of Korean specialists.I nial economy experience steady growth and industri- attempt in this essay to reinterpret some specific his- alization.but it also became rather heavily torical materials with the hope of deriving general export-oriented,including exports of manufactured lessons of interest to scholars of comparative and products.Finally,there was the third pattern of brutal international development. repression and systematic control of the lower classes The argument below is that Japanese colonial in both the cities and the countryside.The cumulative influence on Korea.in 1905-45,was decisive in shap- impact of these state-class configurations was to help ing a political economy that later evolved into the create a framework for the evolution of a high-growth high-growth South Korean path to development. political economy.I also,toward the end of this dis- Japanese colonialism differed in important respects cussion,briefly suggest-though not develop,leav- from the colonialism of European powers.As late ing that for another essay-how these patterns con- developers,the Japanese made extensive use of state tinued into subsequent periods. power for their own economic development,and they It is important to reiterate that the main task of this used the same state power to pry open and transform paper is not to set the historical record straight.That is Korea in a relatively short period.Japanese colonial for historians of Korea:they are already busy doing so impact was thus more intense.more brutal and deeply and I am only building on some of their work.Given architectonic;it also left Korea with three and a half the importance of the South Korean case in the con- decades of economic growth (the average,annual temporary discourse on development,it is important growth rate in production was more than 3%)and a that developmentalists understand what country spe- relatively advanced level of industrialization (nearly ciafists already know:I thus hope to reinterpret and 35%of Korea's "national production"in 1940 origi- synthesize some specific materials with general impli- nated in mining and manufacturing).*While there cations.Three sets of general ideas will be debated via were important discontinuities in the postcolonial the historical materials.First.there are Korea-related period,the grooves that Japanese colonialism carved comparative questions.For example,how much on the Korean social soil cut deep.The decade and a choice does a developing country really have when half following the departure of the lapanese was at adopting a specific development strategy:ie.to what least chaotic,and often tragic.When the dust settled, extent was South Korea a beneficiary of its historical however.South Korea under Park Chung-Hee fell inheritance,as distinct from creating anew a high- back into the grooves of an earlier origin and traversed growth.export-oriented "model of development?" along them.well into the 1980s.Of course,this was Closely related is the issue of transferability of the not inevitable:historical continuities seldom are. Korean "model"across national boundaries:if the

1270 WORLD DEVELOPMENT spective, especially tracing its origins back to its Japanese colonial lineage. this neglect is unfortunate. For example, few “developmentalists,” if any, ascribe much significance to the continuities that link colonial and postcolonial Korea. This is certainly so among the more strictly economic analysts of South Korean growth experience;? however, somewhat sur￾prisingly and unfortunately. this problem also charac￾terizes the works of several institutionally sensitive scholars of South Korea. Among the latter, some dis￾cuss the colonial period but quickly conclude that the impact was not of lasting significance (e.g., Jones and Sakong, 1980, pp. 22-37). others deny the contribu￾tions of this past altogether? and yet others virtually ignore it, presumably because of a view that signifi￾cant changes in South Korean economy began only after the adoption of an “export-led model of develop￾ment” in the early 1960~.~ Korean scholarship on Korea has its own, albeit understandable, blind spots; the nationalist impulse often leads to a denial of any continuity between colonial and postcolonial periods, lest the contemporary achievements be viewed as a product of a much disliked colonial rule.” Only a handful of Korean specialists, especially those with a strong historical bent, have understood and empha￾sized the Japanese colonial roots of the more recent. high-growth Korean political economy.’ Building on the insights of this last group of Korean specialists, I attempt in this essay to reinterpret some specific his￾torical materials with the hope of derivjing general lessons of interest to scholars of comparative and international development. The argument below is that Japanese colonial influence on Korea, in 1905-45, was decisive in shap￾ing a political economy that later evolved into the high-growth South Korean path to development. Japanese colonialism differed in important respects from the colonialism of European powers. As late developers, the Japanese made extensive use of state power for their own economic development, and they used the same state power to pry open and transform Korea in a relatively short period. Japanese colonial impact was thus more intense, more brutal and deeply architectonic; it also left Korea with three and a half decades of economic growth (the average, annual growth rate in production was more than 3%) and a relatively advanced level of industrialization (nearly 35% of Korea’s “national production” in I940 origi￾nated in mining and manufacturing).* While there were important discontinuities in the postcolonial period, the grooves that Japanese colonialism carved on the Korean social soil cut deep. The decade and a half following the departure of the Japanese was at least chaotic, and often tragic. When the dust settled, however, South Korea under Park Chung-Hee fell back into the grooves of an earlier origin and traversed along them, well into the 1980s. Of course, this was not inevitable: historical continuities seldom are. Korea had competing historical legacies: e.g., there was the distant legacy of Chosen (i.e. of Korea under the rule of Yi dynasty) of corrupt court politics at the apex; then there were indigenous revolutionary ten￾dencies that found expression in North Korea; and there was the possibility of considerable American influence. Moreover, completely new paths could have been charted. Subsequent decisions were thus critical in putting South Korea on a path that reestab￾lished historical continuities. Nevertheless, it is diffi￾cult to imagine South Korea adopting a growth path that it did without a deeply influential Japanese colo￾nial past. More specifically, I trace below the colonial ori￾gins of three patterns that we now readily associate as elements of the South Korean “model.” First, I discuss how the Korean state under the Japanese influence was transformed from a relatively corrupt and ineffec￾tive social institution into a highly authoritarian, penetrating organization, capable of simultaneously controlling and transforming the Korean society. This is followed by an analysis of a second pattern, namely, the new state’s production-oriented alliances with the dominant classes. an alliance that buttressed the state’s capacity to both control and transform. Relatedly, it is also important to take note of the struc￾tural changes in the economy: not only did the colo￾nial economy experience steady growth and industri￾alization, but it also became rather heavily export-oriented, including exports of manufactured products. Finally, there was the third pattern of brutal repression and systematic control of the lower classes in both the cities and the countryside. The cumulative impact of these state-class configurations was to help create a framework for the evolution of a high-growth political economy. I also, toward the end of this dis￾cussion, briefly suggest - though not develop, leav￾ing that for another essay - how these patterns con￾tinued into subsequent periods. It is important to reiterate that the main task of this paper is not to set the historical record straight. That is for historians of Korea; they are already busy doing so and 1 am only building on some of their work. Given the importance of the South Korean case in the con￾temporary discourse on development, it is important that developmentalists understand what country spe￾cialists already know; I thus hope to reinterpret and synthesize some specific materials with general impli￾cations. Three sets of general ideas will be debated via the historical materials. First, there are Korea-related comparative questions. For example, how much choice does a developing country really have when adopting a specific development strategy: i.e. to what extent was South Korea a beneficiary of its historical inheritance. as distinct from creating anew a high￾growth. export-oriented “model of development‘!” Closely related is the issue of transferability of the Korean “model” across national boundaries: if the

JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA'S"DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1271 roots of contemporary South Korean political econ- officials-cum-aristocrats,the Yangban,mutually omy are indeed as deep as a relatively unique colonial checked each others powers.The power of the experience.can others really emulate the experience? Yangban class rested in part on access to hereditary Second,at a higher level of generality,there are theo- land wealth but also on a close identification with the retical issues revolving around the concept of"devel- centralized bureaucracy,which helped both secure opmental states":what characterizes them and where socioeconomic privileges and was a further source of do they come from?Finally,at the most general level. wealth and power.Royal authority,in turn,was sel- there is at least an implication in this essay that some dom all that great.Being under Chinese suzerainty, of the variations we notice today among the more or Korean emperors did not enjoy the "mandate of less dynamic Third World political economies may heaven"that the Chinese emperors possessed.In addi- have some of their roots in a variable colonial past.If tion,the recruitment of the aristocracy to the bureau- so,a further investigation of this analytical claim cracy via the examination system enabled landed would require reopening the issue of the colonial roots power to be deeply embedded all through the Korean of the contemporary Third World that has unfortu- state,checking the scope of Royal authority vis-a-vis nately been lost in the postdependency scholarship on the Yangban.10 While this balance of power was a development. source of stability for several centuries,as external pressures grew,and along with it the state's need for taxes and other socioeconomic resources,it also 2.THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COLONIAL became a major constraint on monarchial power to STATE initiate reforms:The monarchial state,according to Palais,"could not solve the problem of creating ade- (a)The old,"predatory"state quate political authority for the achievement of national goals."Yi state was thus simultaneously By the time the Japanese gained decisive influence "centralized and weak." over Korea-say around 1905.after the Japanese vic- In addition to the limiting balance of power tory in Russo-Japanese war of 1904-the old state between the monarchy and the Yangban,there were within Choson was already in an advanced state of other factors at work that contributed to the Yi state's disintegration.While it is not necessary to recall his- ineffectiveness.First,it was not merely the presence torical details,a brief understanding of the state-soci- of a powerful land-controlling strata in society that ety links in late Choson are essential to appreciate limited the state's capacity.As I discuss below,the changes wrought by Japanese colonial power.The Yi colonial state in Korea carved out a different type of dynasty had provided continuous and,for the most ruling alliance with the same landowning class,but part,stable rule to Korea for nearly 500 years.The with a vastly more effective state.The key factor at same intricate state and class alliances that were work in Yi Korea was thus the direct control that responsible for this stability,however,also became landed groups exercised on state offices (Fairbank. major constraints on successful adaptation to chang- Reischauer and Craig,1978,p.307).Second,the ing external pressures,especially in the second half of Korean monarchy remained to the end a highly per- the nineteenth century.For example,the clearest man- sonalistic,patrimonial institution.In the words of ifestation of the powerlessness of a centralized monar- Cumings (1981),the Korean monarchs were incap- chial state was the continued inability to collect taxes able of acting along"the modern distinction between owed to the state on agrarian incomes,especially from public and private realms"and thus incapable of the powerful Yangban elite,the landowning-official designing state-led national goals of economic devel- class of Korea(Palais,1975).This recurring inability, opment (p.10).Third,the ruling strata below the in turn.came to be associated with several problem- monarch was highly factionalized,2 Such strife in the atic political trends:First,the state resorted to squeez- ruling strata made it difficult to design cohesive ing the peasantry via"taxation"(e.g.,corvee labor and responses to growing challenges.Finally,it is impor- military service),contributing to brigandage and a tant to note that the reach of the Yi state from the cen- restive peasant population.Second,the state's limited ter to the periphery was rather limited.While provin- resources exacerbated the competition and tensions in cial and county officials were directly appointed from what was already a personalized and factionalized Seoul,each county magistrate was responsible for elite at the apex of the political pyramid.Finally, governing nearly 40,000 people (there being some financial limitations made it difficult to mobilize any 330 magistrates for about 12 million Koreans).3 Since serious military response to growing external pres- these magistrates were rotated frequently,they often sures. depended on the well-entrenched Yangban elite for How does one explain powerlessness in a central- local governance.Moreover,the lower level officials ized polity?The leading historian of late Yi Korea, below the magistrate-were not salaried employ James Palais,traces the roots of this conundrum back ees.They were rather a hereditary group who were to the manner in which the monarchy and the Korean allowed to collect and keep some local taxes as com-

JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA’S “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE” 1271 roots of contemporary South Korean political econ￾omy are indeed as deep as a relatively unique colonial experience, can others really emulate the experience? Second, at a higher level of generality, there are theo￾retical issues revolving around the concept of “devel￾opmental states”: what characterizes them and where do they come from? Finally, at the most general level, there is at least an implication in this essay that some of the variations we notice today among the more or less dynamic Third World political economies may have some of their roots in a variable colonial past. If so, a further investigation of this analytical claim would require reopening the issue of the colonial roots of the contemporary Third World that has unfortu￾nately been lost in the postdependency scholarship on development. 2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COLONIAL STATE (a) The old, “predatory” state By the time the Japanese gained decisive influence over Korea-say around 1905, after the Japanese vic￾tory in Russo-Japanese war of 1904 - the old state within Chosbn was already in an advanced state of disintegration. While it is not necessary to recall his￾torical details, a brief understanding of the state-soci￾ety links in late Chosen are essential to appreciate changes wrought by Japanese colonial power.‘The Yi dynasty had provided continuous and, for the most part, stable rule to Korea for nearly 500 years. The same intricate state and class alliances that were responsible for this stability, however, also became major constraints on successful adaptation to chang￾ing external pressures, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, the clearest man￾ifestation of the powerlessness of a centralized monar￾chial state was the continued inability to collect taxes owed to the state on agrarian incomes, especially from the powerful Yangban elite, the landowning-official class of Korea (Palais, 1975). This recurring inability, in turn, came to be associated with several problem￾atic political trends: First, the state resorted to squeez￾ing the peasantry via “taxation” (e.g., corvee labor and military service), contributing to brigandage and a restive peasant population. Second, the state’s limited resources exacerbated the competition and tensions in what was already a personalized and factionalized elite at the apex of the political pyramid. Finally, financial limitations made it difficult to mobilize any serious military response to growing external pres￾sures. How does one explain powerlessness in a central￾ized polity? The leading historian of late Yi Korea, James Palais, traces the roots of this conundrum back to the manner in which the monarchy and the Korean officials-cum-aristocrats, the Yangban, mutually checked each others powers. The power of the Yangban class rested in part on access to hereditary land wealth but also on a close identification with the centralized bureaucracy, which helped both secure socioeconomic privileges and was a further source of wealth and power. Royal authority, in turn, was sel￾dom all that great. Being under Chinese suzerainty, Korean emperors did not enjoy the “mandate of heaven” that the Chinese emperors possessed. In addi￾tion, the recruitment of the aristocracy to the bureau￾cracy via the examination system enabled landed power to be deeply embedded all through the Korean state, checking the scope of Royal authority vis-d-vis the Yangban. I0 While this balance of power was a source of stability for several centuries, as external pressures grew, and along with it the state’s need for taxes and other socioeconomic resources, it also became a major constraint on monarchial power to initiate reforms: The monarchial state, according to Palais, “could not solve the problem of creating ade￾quate political authority for the achievement of national goals.” Yi state was thus simultaneously “centralized and weak.“” In addition to the limiting balance of power between the monarchy and the Yangban, there were other factors at work that contributed to the Yi state’s ineffectiveness. First, it was not merely the presence of a powerful land-controlling strata in society that limited the state’s capacity. As I discuss below, the colonial state in Korea carved out a different type of ruling alliance with the same landowning class, but with a vastly more effective state. The key factor at work in Yi Korea was thus the direct control that landed groups exercised on state offices (Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, 1978, p. 307). Second, the Korean monarchy remained to the end a highly per￾sonalistic, patrimonial institution. In the words of Cumings (1981) the Korean monarchs were incap￾able of acting along “the modern distinction between public and private realms” and thus incapable of designing state-led national goals of economic devel￾opment (p. 10). Third, the ruling strata below the monarch was highly factionalized.r2 Such strife in the ruling strata made it difficult to design cohesive responses to growing challenges. Finally, it is impor￾tant to note that the reach of the Yi state from the cen￾ter to the periphery was rather limited. While provin￾cial and county officials were directly appointed from Seoul, each county magistrate was responsible for governing nearly 40,000 people (there being some 330 magistrates for about 12 million Koreans).” Since these magistrates were rotated frequently, they often depended on the well-entrenched Yangban elite for local governance. Moreover, the lower level officials -below the magistrate - were not salaried employ￾ees. They were rather a hereditary group who were allowed to collect and keep some local taxes as com-

1272 WORLD DEVELOPMENT pensation for their services.These petty functionaries regional power competition for quite some time operated virtually as local ezars.not easily influenced (Conroy.1960).Given the mercantilist nature of from above and responsible for the "venality and Japanese political economy.however.it does not exploitation of the peasant population"(Lee in Eckert make much sense to raise the old question on imperi- eral,199.p.111. alism of whether security was more important than In sum.the ineffectiveness of the Yi state was economic interests.More than in the case of most rooted in part in the pattern of state-class linkages and imperial powers.the Meiji oligarchs of Japan readily in part in the design of the state itself.Regarding the associated national power with national wealth and latter.a personalistic apex.a factionalized ruling national wealth with overseas economic opportunities strata,and a limited downward reach of central (Duus.1984.Pp.132-133. authorities.were all significant characteristics con- Certain unique aspects of Japanese imperialism are tributing to the state's powerlessness.This state- essential to note for a full understanding of the colo- weak from the inside and hemmed in by powerful nial impact on Korea (Peattie,1984,pp.3-60).First, social actors from the outside-contributed little,if the Japanese had themselves barely escaped being any.to sustained economic progress.4 Worse,when imperialized.As both late developers and late imperi faced with growing security challenges and related alists.Japan colonized neighboring states with whom fiscal crises,the Yi state turned on its own society. they shared racial and cultural traits:it was as if becoming rapacious and predatory.The views of sev- England had colonized a few.across-the-channcl con- eral historians and observers of the day converge on tinental states.Proximity meant that many more such a perspective on the precolonial Korean state: Japanese ended up playing a direct role in colonial programs of the Yi government became "embezzle- rulc.including a much larger role of military and ment facilities for a rapacious officialdom"(Lew in police,than was ever the case in European overseas Eckert et al..1990,p.179):"maladministration...of colonies.The near geographical contiguity and shared the native Yi dynasty had affected adversely the culural and racial traits also implied that the Japanese whole of Korean public service"(Ireland.1926.p. could realistically consider their rule to be permanent, 92):"one of the strongest and most fixed impressions leading eventually to a full integration of colonies into made (during my travels to Korea)was that of the an expanded Japan.As will be discussed below,this well-nigh hopeless corruption of Korean court:and possibility.in turn,influenced both the economic and the Korean government "takes from the people political strategies of Japan in Korea.especially the directly and indirectly.everything that they carn over Japanese-initiated industrialization of Korea. and above a bare subsistence.and gives them in return Furthermore.Japanese colonial strategy was practically nothing."I deeply informed by their own successful domestic Since corrupt and ineffective states are indeed a reform efforts following the Meiji restoration.Of all common feature in parts of the contemporary Third the colonizing nations,Japan stands out as nearly the World.one may genuinely wonder:how was Korea's only one with a successful record of deliberate,state- "predatory"state historically transformed into what led political and economic transformation.By trial some may describe as a"developmental"state The and error the Meiji oligarchs had designed a political impact of Japanese colonial power was decisive in economy that was well suited for the task of"catching altering both the nature of the Korean state and the up"with advanced Western powers.The essential ele- relationship of this state to various social classes.The ments of this political economy are well known and transformation of the state is discussed immediately can be briefly reiterated:the creation of an effective below and the changing relationship of the state to centralized state capable of both controlling and trans- social classes in subsequent sections. forming Japanese society:deliberate state interven- tion aimed.first at agricultural development.and sec- ond at rapid industrial growth:and production of a (b)Toward a "developmental"state disciplined,obedient and educated work force.It was this model of deliherate development.with its empha- The Japanese military victory over the Russians in sis on state building and on the use of state power to 1904 marked the emergence of Japan as the major facilitate socioeconomic change-in contrast say,to regional power,a power that had been rising steadily the British.who having created a private property since the Meiji restoration in the 1860s.Subsequently. regime,waited in vain for Bengali samtindars in India Japan.with the acquiescence of Western powers,had to turn into a sheep farming gentry-that moved the a relatively free hand in dominating and molding Japanese colonizers.I%In Peattie's words,much of Korea.Japanese motives in Korea,like the motives of what Japan undertook in its colonies "was based upon all imperial powers.were mixed:they sought to con- Meiji experience in domestic reform"(Peattie.1984. trol it politically and to transform it economically for P.29. their own advantage.Security concerns were probably It is not surprising that the earliest Japanese efforts dominant insofar as Korea had been an object of in Korea were focused on reforming the disintegrating

I272 WORLD DEVELOPMENT pensation for their service\. These petty functionaries operated virtually as local czars. not easily influenced from above and responsible for the “venality and exploitation of the peasant population” (Lee in Eckert er LII.. 1990. p. 1 I I). In sum. the ineffectiveness of the Yi state was rooted in part in the pattern of state-class linkages and in part in the design of the state itself. Regarding the latter, a personalistic apex. a factionalized ruling strata, and a limited downward reach of central authorities. were all significant characteristics con￾tributing to the state’s powerlessness. This state - weak from the inside and hemmed in by powerful social actors from the outside - contributed little. if any, to sustained economic progress? Worse, when faced with growing security challenges and related fiscal crises, the Yi state turned on its own society, becoming rapacious and predatory. The views of sev￾eral historians and observers of the day converge on such a perspective on the precolonial Korean state: programs of the Yi government became “embezzle￾ment facilities for a rapacious officialdom” (Lew in Eckert et crl., 1990. p. 179); “maladministration of the native Yi dynasty had affected adversely the whole of Korean public service” (Ireland. 1926. p, 92): “one of the strongest and most fixed impressions made (during my travels to Korea) WI\ that of the well-nigh hopeless corruption of Korean court:“‘i and the Korean govermnent “takes from the people directly and indirectly, everything that they earn ovel and above a bare subsistence. and gives them in return practically nothing.“l(> Since corrupt and ineffecti\;e states arc indeed a common feature in parts of the contemporary Third World. one may genuinely wonder: how ~a\ Korea’s “predatory” state historically transformed into what some may describe as a “developmental” state?” The impact of Japanese colonial pow’er was decisive in altering both the nature of the Korean state and the relationship of this state to various social classes. The transformation of the state is discussed immediately below and the changing relationship of the state to social classes in subsequent sections,. The Japanese military victory over the Russians in 1904 marked the emergence of Japan as the major regional power. a power that had been ri\ing ste&ly since the Meiji restoration in the 1860s. Subsequently. Japan. with the acquiescence of Wcstcrn powers. had a relatively free hand in dominating and molding Korea. Japanese motives in Korea. like the motives of all imperial powers. were mixed; they sought to con￾trol it politically and to transform it economically lip their own advantage. Security concern\ were probably dominant insofar as Korea had been an ob.jcct of regional power competition for quite some time (Conroy. 1960). Given the mercantilist nature of Japanese political economy. however, it does not make much sense to raise the old question on imperi￾alism of whether security was more important than economic interests. More than in the case of most imperial powers. the Meiji oligarchs of Japan readily associated national power with national wealth and national wealth with overseas economic opportunities (Duus. 1984, pp. 132-133). Certain unique aspects of Japanese imperialism are essential to note for a full understanding of the colo￾nial impact on Korea (Peattie. 1984, pp. 3-60). First, the Japanese had themselves barely escaped being imperialized. As both late developers and late imperi￾alists. Japan colonized neighboring states with whom they shared racial and cultural traits; it was as if England had colonized a few, across-the-channel con￾tinental states. Proximity meant that many more Japanese ended up playing a direct role in colonial rule. including a much larger role of military and police. than was ever the case in European overseas colonies. The near geographical contiguity and shared cultural and racial traits also implied that the Japanese could realistically consider their rule to be permanent, leading eventually to a full integration of colonies into an expanded Japan. As will be discussed below. this possibility, in turn, influenced both the economic and political strategies of Japan in Korea. especially the Japanese-initiated industrialization of Korea. Furthermore. Japanese colonial strategy was deeply informed by their own successful domestic reform efforts following the Meiji restoration. Of all the colonizing nations. Japan stands out as nearly the only one with a successful record of deliberate. state￾led political and economic transformation. By trial and error the Meiji oligarchs had designed a political economy that was well suited for the task of “catching up” with advanced Western powers. The essential ele￾ments of this political economy are well known and can be briefly reiterated: the creation of an effective centralized state capable of both controlling and trans￾forming Japanese society: deliberate state interven￾tion aimed. first at agricultural development. and Tee￾trnd at rapid industrial growth: and production of a disciplined. obedient and educated work force. It was this model of deliberate development. with its empha￾si\ on state building and on the use of state power to facilitate socioeconomic change - in contrast say, to the British, who having created a private property regime. waited in vain for Bengali ~ctminclar.s in India to turn into a sheep farming gentry -that moved the Japanejc colonizers. IH In Peattie’s words, much of v, hat Japan undertook in its colonies “was based upon Meiji experience in domestic reform” (Peattie, 1984. p. 2Y). It is not surprising that the earliest Japanese efforts in Korea were focused on reforming the disintegrating

JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA'S"DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1273 Choson state;both political control and economic General,1909,p.45);scholarly observers have in transformation depended on it.A fair number of polit- retrospect characterized the Japanese colonial civil ical reforms had thus in fact been put into place during service as "outstanding,"composed of"hard working 1905-10.especially 1907-09,even prior to the formal and trusted cadres,"who deserve "high marks as a annexation of Korea in 1910.Subsequently,the group"(Peattie,1984,p.26).Elements of the highly decade of 1910-20 was again critical,whcn,undcr devclopcd,Japancsc stylc of burcaucratic govcrnment very harsh authoritarian circumstances,a highly were thus transferred directly to Korea. bureaucratized and a deeply penetrating state was con- structed. (i)The new civil service A key architect of the early reforms in 1907-09, While other colonial powers in other parts of the whose role helps us trace the origins of the design of world also created a competent civil service (e.g.,the the new Korean state,was the Meiji oligarch and the British in India),the Japanese colonial project was former Meiji era premier of Japan,Ito Hirubumi.Ito qualitatively distinct;both the extent and the intensity as a young man had been one of the handful of leaders of bureaucratic penetration was unique.There were who had led the Meiji"revolution"and who had sub- some 10,000 officials in the Japanese-Korean govern- sequently participated in the reform efforts that fol- ment in 1910:by 1937.this number was up to 87.552 lowed the destruction of Tokugawa Shogunate.Ito More than half of these government officials in 1937, had travelled extensively in Europe and had been fas- 52,270 to be exact,were Japanese.Contrast this with cinated with Prussian bureaucracy as a model for the French in Vietnam (where,by the way,the pres- Japan:the Prussian "model"offered to him a route to ence of the French was already more significant than Western rationality and modernity without"succumb- say,that of the British in Africa),who ruled a nearly ing"to Anglo-American liberalism (Halliday,1975, similar sized colony with some 3,000 French;in other p.37).Within Japan,Ito in 1878 had "led the cam- words.there were nearly 15 Japanese officials in paign to make the bureaucracy the absolutely unas- Korea for every French administrator in Vietnam sailable base and center of political power in the state (Robinson,in Eckert et al.,1990,p.257).The pres- system."Subsequently,Ito helped reorganize Tokyo ence of Korean bureaucrats,trained and employed by University in 1881 as a "school for government the Japanese,was also sizable:nearly 40,000 Koreans bureaucrats"and by 1887,"a basic civil service and qualified as government officials just before WWIl. entrance apprenticeship based on the Prussian model While most of the Koreans did not occupy senior posi- was installed."19 With this experience behind him, tions in the colonial government,there can be little when Ito was appointed in the early 1900s to run the doubt that,over the four decades of colonial rule,they Korean protectorate,and where his powers as became an integral part of a highly bureaucratic form Resident-General were near absolute "The of government.Moreover,during WWIl.as the uncrowned King of Korea"-he was quite self-con- demand for Japanese officials grew elsewhere,many scious of his task:"Korea can hardly be called an Koreans moved higher up in the bureaucratic hierar- organized state in the modern sense:I am trying to chy.I will return below to the issue of continuity:this make it such"(Ladd,1908.pp.435 and 174). sizable cadre of Japanese-trained Korean bureaucrats Ito and his successors set out to deliberately con- virtually took over the day-to-day running of a trun- struct a new Japanese-controlled Korean state.The cated South Korea,first under US military government first task was to gain central control.With superior and eventually when a sovereign state was formed. military power behind them,the Japanese in 1907 dis- One further characteristic of the colonial govern- mantled the Korean army,repressed those who ment that needs to be underlined is the successful links "mutinied."incorporated other army officers into a that the Japanese created between a highly concen- Japanese-controlled gendarmery,and forced the trated power center in Seoul,and a densely bureaucra- Korean monarch to abdicate.Having captured the tized periphery.All bureaucracies face the problem of heart of the state.the colonial rulers sought to system- how to ensure that central commands are faithfully atically create a depersonalized "public arena,"to implemented by the officials at the bottom rung.This, spread their power both wide and deep,and to coopt in turn,requires ensuring that lower level officials and/or repress native Korean political forces.For respond mainly to those above them in the bureau example,the patrimonial elements of the monarchial cratic hierarchy.rather than to personal interests,or to state were destroyed rather early,and replaced by a the interests of societal actors with whom they inter- cabinet-style government run by Japanese burcau- act.The Japanese in Korea were quite self-conscious crats.20 Since the appointments of these and other of this problem and repeatedly experimented till they lower level bureaucrats were governed by "elaborate arrived at arrangements deemed satisfactory. rules and regulations which,in the main follow(ed) Of course,certain circumstances were helpful in the lines of the Imperial Japanese services."the new establishing authority links between the center and the Korean state quickly acquired a "rational"character periphery:ruling arrangements in Seoul were highly (Ireland,1926,p.104;and H.I.J.M.'s Residency authoritarian-the power of the Japanese Governor

JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA’S “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE” 1213 Chosbn state; both political control and economic transformation depended on it. A fair number of polit￾ical reforms had thus in fact been put into place during 1905-10, especially 1907-09, even prior to the formal annexation of Korea in 1910. Subsequently, the decade of 1910-20 was again critical, when, under very harsh authoritarian circumstances, a highly bureaucratized and a deeply penetrating state was con￾structed. A key architect of the early reforms in 1907-09, whose role helps us trace the origins of the design of the new Korean state, was the Meiji oligarch and the former Meiji era premier of Japan, Ito Hirubumi. Ito as a young man had been one of the handful of leaders who had led the Meiji “revolution” and who had sub￾sequently participated in the reform efforts that fol￾lowed the destruction of Tokugawa Shogunate. Ito had travelled extensively in Europe and had been fas￾cinated with Prussian bureaucracy as a model for Japan: the Prussian “model” offered to him a route to Western rationality and modernity without “succumb￾ing” to Anglo-American liberalism (Halliday, 1975, p. 37). Within Japan, Ito in 1878 had “led the cam￾paign to make the bureaucracy the absolutely unas￾sailable base and center of political power in the state system.” Subsequently, Ito helped reorganize Tokyo University in 1881 as a “school for government bureaucrats” and by 1887, “a basic civil service and entrance apprenticeship based on the Prussian model was installed.“19 With this experience behind him, when Ito was appointed in the early 1900s to run the Korean protectorate, and where his powers as Resident-General were near absolute - “The uncrowned King of Korea” -he was quite self-con￾scious of his task: “Korea can hardly be called an organized state in the modem sense; I am trying to make it such” (Ladd, 1908, pp. 435 and 174). Ito and his successors set out to deliberately con￾struct a new Japanese-controlled Korean state. The first task was to gain central control. With superior military power behind them, the Japanese in 1907 dis￾mantled the Korean army, repressed those who “mutinied,” incorporated other army officers into a Japanese-controlled gendarmery, and forced the Korean monarch to abdicate. Having captured the heart of the state, the colonial rulers sought to system￾atically create a depersonalized “public arena,” to spread their power both wide and deep, and to coopt and/or repress native Korean political forces. For example, the patrimonial elements of the monarchial state were destroyed rather early, and replaced by a cabinet-style government run by Japanese bureau￾crats.20 Since the appointments of these and other lower level bureaucrats were governed by “elaborate rules and regulations which, in the main follow(ed) the lines of the Imperial Japanese services,” the new Korean state quickly acquired a “rational” character (Ireland, 1926, p. 104; and H.I.J.M.‘s Residency General, 1909, p. 45); scholarly observers have in retrospect characterized the Japanese colonial civil service as “outstanding,” composed of “hard working and trusted cadres,” who deserve “high marks as a group” (Peattie, 1984, p. 26). Elements of the highly developed, Japanese style of bureaucratic government were thus transferred directly to Korea. (i) The new civil service While other colonial powers in other parts of the world also created a competent civil service (e.g., the British in India), the Japanese colonial project was qualitatively distinct; both the extent and the intensity of bureaucratic penetration was unique. There were some 10,000 officials in the Japanese-Korean govem￾ment in 1910; by 1937. this number was up to 87,552. More than half of these government officials in 1937, 52,270 to be exact, were Japanese. Contrast this with the French in Vietnam (where, by the way, the pres￾ence of the French was already more significant than, say, that of the British in Africa), who ruled a nearly similar sized colony with some 3,000 French; in other words, there were nearly 15 Japanese officials in Korea for every French administrator in Vietnam (Robinson, in Eckert et al., 1990, p. 257). The pres￾ence of Korean bureaucrats, trained and employed by the Japanese, was also sizable: nearly 40,000 Koreans qualified as government officials just before WWII. While most of the Koreans did not occupy senior posi￾tions in the colonial government, there can be little doubt that, over the four decades of colonial rule, they became an integral part of a highly bureaucratic form of government. Moreover, during WWII, as the demand for Japanese officials grew elsewhere, many Koreans moved higher up in the bureaucratic hierar￾chy. I will return below to the issue of continuity: this sizable cadre of Japanese-trained Korean bureaucrats virtually took over the day-to-day running of a trun￾cated South Korea, first under US military government and eventually when a sovereign state was formed. One further characteristic of the colonial govem￾ment that needs to be underlined is the successful links that the Japanese created between a highly concen￾trated power center in Seoul, and a densely bureaucra￾tized periphery. All bureaucracies face the problem of how to ensure that central commands are faithfully implemented by the officials at the bottom rung. This, in turn, requires ensuring that lower level officials respond mainly to those above them in the bureau￾cratic hierarchy, rather than to personal interests, or to the interests of societal actors with whom they inter￾act. The Japanese in Korea were quite self-conscious of this problem and repeatedly experimented till they arrived at arrangements deemed satisfactory. Of course, certain circumstances were helpful in establishing authority links between the center and the periphery: ruling arrangements in Seoul were highly authoritarian - the power of the Japanese Governor