上海交通大学：《政治经济学经典导读 Comparative Political Economy》课程教学资源（比较政治经济学文献资料）Coordination, Commitment, and enforcement.pdf

746 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY cient coercive power to do these things also has the power to withhold protection or confiscate private wealth,undermining the foundations of the market economy.In the particular case of medieval cities, these threats were sometimes realized,discouraging trade by foreign merchants to the mutual disadvantage of the ruler and the mer- chants.It is our thesis that merchant guilds emerged with the encour- agement of the rulers of trading centers to be a countervailing power, enhancing the ruler's ability to commit and laying an important insti- tutional foundation for the growing trade of that period. European economic growth between the tenth and the fourteenth centuries was facilitated by the "Commercial Revolution of the Mid- dle Ages"-the reemergence of Mediterranean and European long- distance trade after an extended period of decline(e.g.,Lopez 1976). For this commercial expansion to be possible,institutions had to be created to mitigate the many kinds of contractual problems associated with long-distance trade.Assessing the significance of these institu- tions requires a subtle analysis.Indeed,the effectiveness of institu- tions for punishing contract violations is sometimes best judged like that of peacetime armies:by how little they must be used.Thus,when one reads the historical record to determine whether a major role of merchant institutions was to ensure contract compliance,the number of instances of enforcement is not a useful indicator.Instead,one must ask,What were the things that threatened,and on occasion thwarted,efficient trading?Can the powers and organizational details of merchant institutions be explained as responses to those threats? Did failures of enforcement trigger major changes in these institu- tions? A comprehensive analysis of a contract enforcement institution must consider why the institution was needed,what sanctions were to be used to deter undesirable behavior,who was to apply the sanc- tions,how the sanctioners learned or decided what sanctions to apply, why they did not shirk from their duty,and why the offender did not flee to avoid the sanction.Some analyses meeting these criteria have been developed.One is Greif's (1989,1993a)analysis of the contractual relations between merchants and their overseas agents in eleventh-century Mediterranean trade.To reap the benefit of em- ploying overseas agents,an institution was required to enable the agents to commit to act on behalf of the merchants.One group of merchants known as the "Maghribi traders"managed their agency relations by forming a coalition whose members ostracized and retali- ated against agents who violated their commercial code.Interrelated contractual arrangements motivated merchants to participate in the collective retaliation against agents who had cheated,and close com- munity ties assured that each member had the necessary information

746 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY cient coercive power to do these things also has the power to withhold protection or confiscate private wealth, undermining the foundations of the market economy. In the particular case of medieval cities, these threats were sometimes realized, discouraging trade by foreign merchants to the mutual disadvantage of the ruler and the merchants. It is our thesis that merchant guilds emerged with the encouragement of the rulers of trading centers to be a countervailing power, enhancing the ruler's ability to commit and laying an important institutional foundation for the growing trade of that period. European economic growth between the tenth and the fourteenth centuries was facilitated by the "Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages"-the reemergence of Mediterranean and European longdistance trade after an extended period of decline (e.g., Lopez 1976). For this commercial expansion to be possible, institutions had to be created to mitigate the many kinds of contractual problems associated with long-distance trade. Assessing the significance of these institutions requires a subtle analysis. Indeed, the effectiveness of institutions for punishing contract violations is sometimes best judged like that of peacetime armies: by how little they must be used. Thus, when one reads the historical record to determine whether a major role of merchant institutions was to ensure contract compliance, the number of instances of enforcement is not a useful indicator. Instead, one must ask, What were the things that threatened, and on occasion thwarted, efficient trading? Can the powers and organizational details of merchant institutions be explained as responses to those threats? Did failures of enforcement trigger major changes in these institutions? A comprehensive analysis of a contract enforcement institution must consider why the institution was needed, what sanctions were to be used to deter undesirable behavior, who was to apply the sanctions, how the sanctioners learned or decided what sanctions to apply, why they did not shirk from their duty, and why the offender did not flee to avoid the sanction. Some analyses meeting these criteria have been developed. One is Greif's (1989, 1993a) analysis of the contractual relations between merchants and their overseas agents in eleventh-century Mediterranean trade. To reap the benefit of employing overseas agents, an institution was required to enable the agents to commit to act on behalf of the merchants. One group of merchants known as the "Maghribi traders" managed their agency relations by forming a coalition whose members ostracized and retaliated against agents who violated their commercial code. Interrelated contractual arrangements motivated merchants to participate in the collective retaliation against agents who had cheated, and close community ties assured that each member had the necessary information

MERCHANT GUILD 747 to participate in sanctions when necessary.Similarly,Milgrom, North,and Weingast(1990)have argued that the use of merchant courts in the Champagne fairs during the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries can be analyzed as an institution that created proper incen- tives for gathering information,honoring agreements,reporting dis- putes,and adhering to the judgments of the merchant courts.More- over,by centralizing certain record-keeping functions and effectively permitting only merchants in good standing to remain at the fairs, this institution also achieved significant economies in transaction costs relative to other feasible enforcement institutions. The cited papers provide consistent analyses of institutions used to overcome contractual problems among individual merchants active in long-distance trade.Individual merchants,however,were not the only important parties:the rulers of the trading centers at which the merchants met and brought their goods were an important indepen- dent force.Trading centers needed to be organized in ways that secured the person and property of the visiting merchants.Before a trading center became established,its ruler might be inclined to pledge that alien traders would be secure and that their rights would be respected.Once trade was established,however,the medieval ruler faced the temptation to renege on that pledge,failing to provide the promised protection or abusing the merchants'property rights by using his coercive power.In the age prior to the emergence of the nation-state,alien merchants could expect little military or political aid from their countrymen.Without something tangible to secure the ruler's pledge,alien merchants were not likely to frequent that trad- ing center-an outcome that could be costly for both the ruler and the merchants.That rulers recognized the importance of this prob- lem is well reflected in the words of the English king,Edward I,who noticed in 1283 that because alien merchants'property rights were not properly protected,"many merchants are put off from coming to this land with their merchandise to the detriment of merchants and of the whole kingdom"(English Historical Documents,3:420).? On the basis of the theory of repeated games,one might conjecture that since trade relationships between a specific merchant and ruler consist of a potentially long sequence of trading visits,the rulers' commitment problem could be overcome by either a bilateral reputa- I For an analysis of the institution that governed agency relations in twelfth-century Genoa,see Greif(1993b).For game-theoretical and comparative historical analysis of the evolution and functioning of various trading institutions among the twelfth-century Genoese and the eleventh-century Maghribi traders from the Muslim world,see Greif (1994). The recognition that unprotected alien merchants would not come to England is also expressed in the Carta Mercatoria of 1303 (English Historical Documents,3:515)

MERCHANT GUILD 747 to participate in sanctions when necessary.' Similarly, Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) have argued that the use of merchant courts in the Champagne fairs during the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries can be analyzed as an institution that created proper incentives for gathering information, honoring agreements, reporting disputes, and adhering to the judgments of the merchant courts. Moreover, by centralizing certain record-keeping functions and effectively permitting only merchants in good standing to remain at the fairs, this institution also achieved significant economies in transaction costs relative to other feasible enforcement institutions. The cited papers provide consistent analyses of institutions used to overcome contractual problems among individual merchants active in long-distance trade. Individual merchants, however, were not the only important parties: the rulers of the trading centers at which the merchants met and brought their goods were an important independent force. Trading centers needed to be organized in ways that secured the person and property of the visiting merchants. Before a trading center became established, its ruler might be inclined to pledge that alien traders would be secure and that their rights would be respected. Once trade was established, however, the medieval ruler faced the temptation to renege on that pledge, failing to provide the promised protection or abusing the merchants' property rights by using his coercive power. In the age prior to the emergence of the nation-state, alien merchants could expect little military or political aid from their countrymen. Without something tangible to secure the ruler's pledge, alien merchants were not likely to frequent that trading center-an outcome that could be costly for both the ruler and the merchants. That rulers recognized the importance of this problem is well reflected in the words of the English king, Edward I, who noticed in 1283 that because alien merchants' property rights were not properly protected, "many merchants are put off from coming to this land with their merchandise to the detriment of merchants and of the whole kingdom" (English Historical Documents, 3:420).2 On the basis of the theory of repeated games, one might conjecture that since trade relationships between a specific merchant and ruler consist of a potentially long sequence of trading visits, the rulers' commitment problem could be overcome by either a bilateral reputaI For an analysis of the institution that governed agency relations in twelfth-century Genoa, see Greif (1993b). For game-theoretical and comparative historical analysis of the evolution and functioning of various trading institutions among the twelfth-century Genoese and the eleventh-century Maghribi traders from the Muslim world, see Greif (1994). 2 The recognition that unprotected alien merchants would not come to England is also expressed in the Carta Mercatoria of 1303 (English Historical Documents, 3:515)

748 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY tion mechanism,in which a merchant whose rights were abused ceased trading,or a multilateral reputation mechanism,in which the cheated merchant and his close associates ceased trading.Yet the historical records indicate that,by and large,the ruler-merchant relations were governed by neither bilateral nor informal multilateral arrangements. On the contrary,ruler-merchant relations were governed by adminis- trative bodies rooted outside the territory of the ruler,which held certain regulatory powers over their member merchants in their own territory and supervised the operation of these merchants in foreign lands.What roles could these administrative bodies theoretically play in overcoming the ruler's commitment problem?What roles did they play in fact? To investigate these questions,we utilize historical records to de- velop a series of game-theoretic models corresponding to different institutional arrangements.The theoretical analyses indicate that al- though some trade is possible even without supporting organizations, sustaining the efficient level of trade is more demanding.Without administrative bodies capable of coordinating and sometimes compel- ling merchants'responses to a ruler's transgressions,trade could not expand to its efficient level.The corresponding historical analysis then suggests that during the late medieval commercial revolution, a specific institution-the merchant guild-developed the necessary attributes to enforce agreements with rulers,thus overcoming the commitment problem and enabling trade expansion.Merchant guilds exhibited a range of administrative forms from subdivision of a city administration to an intercity organization.Yet these forms all shared the common function of ensuring the coordination and internal en- forcement required to surmount the commitment problem by permit- ting effective collective action.We emphasize two points at the outset. First,our argument concerns merchant guilds and not craft guilds.3 Second,we define merchant guilds according to their function rather than their "official,"late medieval name.Hence,as we discuss below, our theory applies to a wider range of medieval merchant organiza- tions than those labeled as merchant guilds. The evaluation of merchant guilds as supporting efficient trade is complementary to the view more common among economic histori- ans that merchant guilds emerged to reduce negotiation costs,to administer trade and taxation,to extract privileges from foreign cities,and to shift rent in their own city (see,e.g.,Gross 1890;Thrupp 1965;North and Thomas 1973).While the existence of merchant s Economists have long associated the latter with the monopolization of a given craft within a specific town.For a recent economic analysis of craft guilds,see Hickson and Thompson (1991).See also Gustafsson (1987)

748 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY tion mechanism, in which a merchant whose rights were abused ceased trading, or a multilateral reputation mechanism, in which the cheated merchant and his close associates ceased trading. Yet the historical records indicate that, by and large, the ruler-merchant relations were governed by neither bilateral nor informal multilateral arrangements. On the contrary, ruler-merchant relations were governed by administrative bodies rooted outside the territory of the ruler, which held certain regulatory powers over their member merchants in their own territory and supervised the operation of these merchants in foreign lands. What roles could these administrative bodies theoretically play in overcoming the ruler's commitment problem? What roles did they play in fact? To investigate these questions, we utilize historical records to develop a series of game-theoretic models corresponding to different institutional arrangements. The theoretical analyses indicate that although some trade is possible even without supporting organizations, sustaining the efficient level of trade is more demanding. Without administrative bodies capable of coordinating and sometimes compelling merchants' responses to a ruler's transgressions, trade could not expand to its efficient level. The corresponding historical analysis then suggests that during the late medieval commercial revolution, a specific institution-the merchant guild-developed the necessary attributes to enforce agreements with rulers, thus overcoming the commitment problem and enabling trade expansion. Merchant guilds exhibited a range of administrative forms from subdivision of a city administration to an intercity organization. Yet these forms all shared the common function of ensuring the coordination and internal enforcement required to surmount the commitment problem by permitting effective collective action. We emphasize two points at the outset. First, our argument concerns merchant guilds and not craft guilds.3 Second, we define merchant guilds according to their function rather than their "official," late medieval name. Hence, as we discuss below, our theory applies to a wider range of medieval merchant organizations than those labeled as merchant guilds. The evaluation of merchant guilds as supporting efficient trade is complementary to the view more common among economic historians that merchant guilds emerged to reduce negotiation costs, to administer trade and taxation, to extract privileges from foreign cities, and to shift rent in their own city (see, e.g., Gross 1890; Thrupp 1965; North and Thomas 1973). While the existence of merchant 3 Economists have long associated the latter with the monopolization of a given craft within a specific town. For a recent economic analysis of craft guilds, see Hickson and Thompson (1991). See also Gustafsson (1987)