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上海交通大学：《政治经济学经典导读 Comparative Political Economy》课程教学资源（比较政治经济学文献资料）Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade

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POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING EXPOSURE TO TRADE RONALD ROGOWSKI University of California Los Angeles ombining the classical theorem of Stolper and Samuelson with a model of politics derived from Becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries'external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors.A traditional three-factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land,labor, and capital,depending only on the given country's level of economic development and its land-labor ratio.A preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and con- tracting trade,and of such specific cases as the German"marriage of iron and rye,"U.S. and Latin American populism,and Asian socialism,suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis.While the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied,the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation. countries To be sure,some studies of individual have the political cleavages they do and countries,and even a few comparative why those cleavages change are among inquiries,have argued the significance of the enduring mysteries of comparative changing international trade in particular politics.Among the many factors that circumstances:one thinks,in particular, have been adduced as partial explanations of Abraham 1981,Gerschenkron 1943, are preexisting cultural and religious divi- Gourevitch 1977 and 1986,Rosenberg sions,the rapidity and timing of indus- 1943,Sunkel and Paz 1973.One author, trialization or of the grant of mass suf- Cameron (1978),has even suggested a frage,the sequence of "crises"of mod- relation,at least in recent decades, ernization,the electoral system,and- between exposure to trade and the rate of most recently-the product cycle (see, growth in state expenditure. inter alia,Binder et al.1971;Duverger Arguing much more generally,I shall 1959;Kurth 1979a,1979b;Lipset and try to show that basic results of the theory Rokkan 1967;Rokkan 1970,1981). of international trade-including,in Without denying the importance of any particular,the well-known Stolper- of these variables,I want to suggest the Samuelson Theorem(Stolper and Samuel- relevance of a factor that has,until now, son 1941)-imply that increases or been widely neglected:externally induced decreases in the costs and difficulty of changes-in countries with different fac- international trade should powerfully tor endowments-in exposure to inter- affect domestic political cleavages and national trade. should do so differently,but predictably, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL.81 NO.4 DECEMBER 1987

POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING EXPOSURE TO TRADE RONALD ROGOWSKI ~ -~ University of California Los Angeles Combining the classical theorem of Stolper and Samuelson with a model of politics derived from Becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries' external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors. A traditional three-factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land, labor, and capital, depending only on the given country's level of economic development and its land-labor ratio. A preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and contracting trade, and of such specific cases as the German "marriage of iron and rye, " U.S. and Latin American populism, and Asian socialism, suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis. While the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied, the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation. Why countries To be sure, some studies of individual have the political cleavages they do and countries, and even a few comparative why those cleavages change are among inquiries, have argued the significance of the enduring mysteries of comparative changing international trade in particular politics. Among the many factors that circumstances: one thinks, in particular, have been adduced as partial explanations of Abraham 1981, Gerschenkron 1943, are preexisting cultural and religious divi- Gourevitch 1977 and 1986, Rosenberg sions, the rapidity and timing of indus- 1943, Sunkel and Paz 1973. One author, trialization or of the grant of mass suf- Cameron (1978), has even suggested a frage, the sequence of "crises" of mod- relation, at least in recent decades, ernization, the electoral system, and- between exposure to trade and the rate of most recently-the product cycle (see, growth in state expenditure. inter alia, Binder et al. 1971; Duverger Arguing much more generally, I shall 1959; Kurth 1979a, 1979b; Lipset and try to show that basic results of the theory Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970, 1981). of international trade-including, in Without denying the importance of any particular, the well-known Stolperof these variables, I want to suggest the Samuelson Theorem (Stolper and Samuelrelevance of a factor that has, until now, son 1941)-imply that increases or been widely neglected: externally induced decreases in the costs and difficulty of changes-in countries with different fac- international trade should powerfully tor endowments-in exposure to inter- affect domestic political cleavages and national trade. should do so differently, but predictably, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 81 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1987

American Political Science Review Vol.81 in countries with different factor endow- costs,for example,is indistinguishable in ments.Moreover,I shall suggest that its impact from an across-the-board these implications conform surprisingly decrease in every affected state's tariffs well with what has been observed about (Mundell 1957,330);so is any change in patterns of cleavage and about changes in the international regime that decreases the those patterns in a great variety of coun- risks or the transaction costs of trade.The tries during four periods of global change converse is of course equally true:when a in exposure to trade,namely the "long" nation's external transport becomes sixteenth century,the nineteenth century, dearer,or its trade less secure,it is the Depression of the 1930s,and the years affected exactly as if it had imposed a since World War IⅡ. higher tariff. Nonetheless,what I present here The point is of more than academic remains conjectural and preliminary.The interest because we know,historically, evidence I shall be able to advance is sug- that major changes in the risks and costs gestive rather than conclusive.It is prin- of international trade have occurred: cipally the clarity of the logical case that notoriously,the railroads and steamships seems to me to justify further refinement of the nineteenth century brought dras- and testing. tically cheaper transportation (Landes 1969,153-54,196,201-2;Hobsbawm The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 1979,Chap.3);so,in our own genera- tion,did supertankers,cheap oil,and In 1941 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul containerization (Rosecrance 1986,142). Samuelson solved conclusively the old According to the familiar argument of riddle of gains and losses from protection Kindleberger (1973)and others,inter- (or,for that matter,from free trade). national hegemony decreases both the They showed that in any society protec- risks and the transaction costs of inter- tion benefits-and liberalization of trade national trade;and the decline of hege- harms-owners of factors in which that monic power makes trade more expen- society is poorly endowed,relative to the sive,perhaps-as,according to this inter- rest of the world,as well as producers pretation,in the 1930s-prohibitively so. who use the scarce factors intensively.1 Analyzing a much earlier period,the Conversely,protection harms-and lib- Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1939) eralization benefits-owners of factors attributed much of the final decline of the the given society holds abundantly rela- Roman Empire to the growing insecurity tive to the rest of the world,and pro- of interregional,and especially of Medi- ducers who use the abundant factors terranean,trade after 600 A.D.3 intensively.2 Thus,in a society rich in Global changes of these kinds,it labor but poor in capital,protection follows,should have had global conse- would benefit capital and harm labor;and quences.The "transportation revolu- liberalization of trade would benefit labor tions"of the sixteenth,the nineteenth, and harm capital. and scarcely less of the mid-twentieth cen- So far,the theorem is what it is usually tury must have benefited,in each affected perceived to be:merely a statement,if an country,owners and intensive employers important and sweeping one,about the of locally abundant factors and must have effects of tariff policy.The picture is harmed owners and intensive employers altered,however,when one realizes that of locally scarce factors.The events of the exogenous changes can have exactly the 1930s should have had exactly the oppo- same effects as increases or decreases in site effect.What,however,will have been protection.A cheapening of transport the political consequences of those shifts 1122

American Political Science Review Vol. 81 in countries with different factor endowments. Moreover, I shall suggest that these implications conform surprisingly well with what has been observed about patterns of cleavage and about changes in those patterns in a great variety of countries during four periods of global change in exposure to trade, namely the "long" sixteenth century, the nineteenth century, the Depression of the 1930s, and the years since World War 11. Nonetheless, what I present here remains conjectural and preliminary. The evidence I shall be able to advance is suggestive rather than conclusive. It is principally the clarity of the logical case that seems to me to justify further refinement and testing. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem In 1941 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson solved conclusively the old riddle of gains and losses from protection (or, for that matter, from free trade). They showed that in any society protection benefits-and liberalization of trade harms-owners of factors in which that society is poorly endowed, relative to the rest of the world, as well as producers who use the scarce factors intensively.1 Conversely, protection harms-and liberalization benefits-owners of factors the given society holds abundantly relative to the rest of the world, and producers who use the abundant factors intensive1y.l Thus, in a society rich in labor but poor in capital, protection would benefit capital and harm labor; and liberalization of trade would benefit labor and harm capital. So far, the theorem is what it is usually perceived to be: merely a statement, if an important and sweeping one, about the effects of tariff policy. The picture is altered, however, when one realizes that exogenous changes can have exactly the same effects as increases or decreases in protection. A cheapening of transport costs, for example, is indistinguishable in its impact from an across-the-board decrease in every affected state's tariffs (Mundell 1957, 330); so is any change in the international regime that decreases the risks or the transaction costs of trade. The converse is of course equally true: when a nation's external transport becomes dearer, or its trade less secure, it is affected exactly as if it had imposed a higher tariff. The point is of more than academic interest because we know, historically, that major changes in the risks and costs of international trade have occurred: notoriously, the railroads and steamships of the nineteenth century brought drastically cheaper transportation (Landes 1969, 153-54, 196, 201-2; Hobsbawm 1979, Chap. 3); so, in our own generation, did supertankers, cheap oil, and containerization (Rosecrance 1986, 142). According to the familiar argument of Kindleberger (1973) and others, international hegemony decreases both the risks and the transaction costs of international trade; and the decline of hegemonic power makes trade more expensive, perhaps-as, according to this interpretation, in the 1930s-prohibitively so. Analyzing a much earlier period, the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1939) attributed much of the final decline of the Roman Empire to the growing insecurity of interregional, and especially of Mediterranean, trade after 600 A.DS3 Global changes of these kinds, it follows, should have had global consequences. The "transportation revolutions" of the sixteenth, the nineteenth, and scarcely less of the mid-twentieth century must have benefited, in each affected country, owners and intensive employers of locally abundant factors and must have harmed owners and intensive employers of locally scarce factors. The events of the 1930s should have had exactly the opposite effect. What, however, will have been the political consequences of those shifts

Changing Exposure to Trade of wealth and income?To answer that whether it is advanced or backward and question we require a rudimentary model (2)whether its land-labor ratio is high or of the political process and a somewhat low.We recognize,in other words,only more definite one of the economy. economies that are (1)capital rich,land rich,and labor poor;(2)capital rich,land poor,and labor rich;(3)capital poor, Simple Models of the land rich,and labor poor;or(4)capital Polity and the Economy poor,land poor,and labor rich. I shall assume of domestic political processes only two things:(1)that the Political Effects of Increasing beneficiaries of a change will try to con- Exposure to Trade tinue and accelerate it,while the victims of the same change will endeavor to I shall now try to demonstrate that the retard or to halt it;and(2)that those who Stolper-Samuelson Theorem,applied to enjoy a sudden increase in (actual or our simple model,implies that increasing potential)4wealth and income will exposure to trade must result in urban- thereby be enabled to expand their polit- rural conflict in two kinds of economies ical influence as well (cf.Becker 1983).As and in class conflict in the two others. regards international trade,(1)implies Consider first the upper right-hand cell that the gainers from any exogenous of Figure 1:the advanced (therefore change will seek to continue and to capital-rich)economy endowed abun- expand free trade,while the losers will dantly in labor but poorly in land. seek protection (and,if that fails,imper- Expanding trade must benefit both cap- ialism);5(2)implies that those who gain, italists and workers;it harms only land- or are positioned to gain,economically owners and the pastoral and agricultural from exogenous changes in international enterprises that use land intensively.Both trade will increase their political power as capitalists and workers-that is to say, well. almost the entire urban sector-should Economically,I propose to adopt with favor free trade;agriculture should on the minor refinements the traditional three- whole be protectionist.Moreover,we factor model-land,labor,and capital- expect the capitalists and the workers to and to assume,for now,that the land- try,very likely in concert,to expand their labor ratio informs us fully about any political influence.Depending on pre- country's endowment of those two fac- existing circumstances,they may seek tors.No country,in other words,can be concretely an extension of the franchise,a rich both in land and in labor:a high reapportionment of seats,a diminution in land-labor ratio implies abundance of the powers of an upper house or of a land and scarcity of labor;a low ratio sig- gentry-based political elite,or a violent nifies the opposite.(I shall later relax this "bourgeois"revolution. assumption.)Finally,I shall simply define Urban-rural conflict should also arise in an advanced economy as one in which backward,labor-poor economies (the capital is abundant. lower left-hand cell of Figure 1)when This model of factor endowments in- trade expands,albeit with a complete evitably oversimplifies reality and will reversal of fronts.In such "frontier" require amendment.Its present simplicity, societies,both capital and labor are however,permits us in theory to place scarce:hence both are harmed by expand- any country's economy into one of four ing trade and will seek protection.Only cells (see Figure 1),according to (1) land is abundant,and therefore only agri- 1123

Changing Exposure to Trade of wealth and income? To answer that question we require a rudimentary model of the political process and a somewhat more definite one of the economy. Simple Models of the Polity and the Economy I shall assume of domestic political processes only two things: (1) that the beneficiaries of a change will try to continue and accelerate it, while the victims of the same change will endeavor to retard or to halt it; and (2) that those who enjoy a sudden increase in (actual or p~tential)~wealth and income will thereby be enabled to expand their political influence as well (cf. Becker 1983). As regards international trade, (1) implies that the gainers from any exogenous change will seek to continue and to expand free trade, while the losers will seek protection (and, if that fails, imperiali~m);~(2) implies that those who gain, or are positioned to gain, economically from exogenous changes in international trade will increase their political power as well. Economically, I propose to adopt with minor refinements the traditional threefactor model-land, labor, and capitaland to assume, for now, that the landlabor ratio informs us fully about any country's endowment of those two factors. No country, in other words, can be rich both in land and in labor: a high land-labor ratio implies abundance of land and scarcity of labor; a low ratio signifies the opposite. (I shall later relax this assumption.) Finally, I shall simply define an advanced economy as one in which capital is abundant. This model of factor endowments inevitably oversimplifies reality and will require amendment. Its present simplicity, however, permits us in theory to place any country's economy into one of four cells (see Figure I), according to (1) whether it is advanced or backward and (2)whether its land-labor ratio is high or low. We recognize, in other words, only economies that are (1)capital rich, land rich, and labor poor; (2) capital rich, land poor, and labor rich; (3) capital poor, land rich, and labor poor; or (4) capital poor, land poor, and labor rich. Political Effects of Increasing Exposure to Trade I shall now try to demonstrate that the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, applied to our simple model, implies that increasing exposure to trade must result in urbanrural conflict in two kinds of economies and in class conflict in the two others. Consider first the upper right-hand cell of Figure 1: the advanced (therefore capital-rich) economy endowed abundantly in labor but poorly in land. Expanding trade must benefit both capitalists and workers; it harms only landowners and the pastoral and agricultural enterprises that use land intensively. Both capitalists and workers-that is to say, almost the entire urban sector-should favor free trade; agriculture should on the whole be protectionist. Moreover, we expect the capitalists and the workers to try, very likely in concert, to expand their political influence. Depending on preexisting circumstances, they may seek concretely an extension of the franchise, a reapportionment of seats, a diminution in the powers of an upper house or of a gentry-based political elite, or a violent "bourgeois" revolution. Urban-rural conflict should also arise in backward, labor-poor economies (the lower left-hand cell of Figure 1)when trade expands, albeit with a complete reversal of fronts. In such "frontier" societies, both capital and labor are scarce: hence both are harmed by expanding trade and will seek protection. Only land is abundant, and therefore only agri-

American Political Science Review Vol.81 Figure 1.Four Main Types of Factor Endowments Land-Labor Ratio High Low Abundant: Abundant: Capital Capital Advanced Economy Land Labor Scarce: Scarce: Labor Land Abundant: Abundant: Land Labor Backward Economy Scarce: Scarce: Capital Capital Labor Land culture will gain from free trade.Farmers scarce,workers and labor-intensive and pastoralists will try to expand their industries will embrace protection and(if influence in some movement of a "Pop- need be)imperialism.The benefited sec- ulist"and antiurban stripe. tors will seek to expand their political Conversely,in backward economies power,if not by disfranchisement then with low land-labor ratios (the lower by curtailment of workers'economic right-hand cell of Figure 1),land and prerogatives and suppression of their capital are scarce and labor is abundant. organizations. The model therefore predicts class con- These implications of the theory of flict:labor will pursue free trade and international trade(summarized in Figure expanded political power (including,in 2)seem clear,but do they in any way some circumstances,a workers'revolu- describe reality?I shall address that ques- tion);landowners,capitalists,and tion more fully below,but for now it is capital-intensive manufacturers will unite worth observing how closely the experi- to support protection,imperialism,and a ence of three major countries-Germany, politics of continued exclusion.(Lest the Britain,and the United States-conforms picture of a rising in support of freer to this analysis in the period of rapidly markets seem too improbable a priori,I expanding trade in the last third of the observe at once its general conformity nineteenth century;and how far it can go with Popkin's 1979 astute interpretation to explain otherwise puzzling disparities of the Vietnamese revolution.) in those states'patterns of political The reverse form of class conflict is evolution. expected to arise in the final case,that of Germany and the United States were an advanced but land-rich economy (the both still relatively backward,that is, upper left-hand cell of Figure 1)under capital-poor,societies:both,in fact, increasing exposure to trade.Because imported considerable amounts of capital both capital and land are abundant, in this period(Feis 1965,24-25 and Chap. capitalists,capital-intensive industries, 3).Germany,however,was rich in labor and agriculture will all benefit from,and and poor in land;the United States,of will endorse,free trade;labor being course,was in exactly the opposite posi- 1124

American Political Science Review Vol. 81 Figure I. Four Main Types of Factor Endowments I Advanced Economy Backward Economy Land-Labor Ratio High Low Abundant: Abundant: Capital Capital Land Labor Scarce: Scarce: Labor Land Abundant: Abundant: Land Labor Scarce: Scarce: Capital Capital Labor Land culture will gain from free trade. Farmers and pastoralists will try to expand their influence in some movement of a "Populist" and antiurban stripe. Conversely, in backward economies with low land-labor ratios (the lower right-hand cell of Figure I), land and capital are scarce and labor is abundant. The model therefore predicts class conflict: labor will pursue free trade and expanded political power (including, in some circumstances, a workers' revolution); landowners, capitalists, and capital-intensive manufacturers will unite to support protection, imperialism, and a politics of continued exclusion. (Lest the picture of a rising in support of freer markets seem too improbable a priori, I observe at once its general conformity with Popkin's 1979 astute interpretation of the Vietnamese revolution.) The reverse form of class conflict is expected to arise in the final case, that of an advanced but land-rich economy (the upper left-hand cell of Figure 1)under increasing exposure to trade. Because both capital and land are abundant, capitalists, capital-intensive industries, and agriculture will all benefit from, and will endorse, free trade; labor being scarce, workers and labor-intensive industries will embrace protection and (if need be) imperialism. The benefited sectors will seek to expand their political power, if not by disfranchisement then by curtailment of workers' economic prerogatives and suppression of their organizations. These implications of the theory of international trade (summarized in Figure 2) seem clear, but do they in any way describe reality? I shall address that question more fully below, but for now it is worth observing how closely the experience of three major countries-Germany, Britain, and the United States-conforms to this analysis in the period of rapidly expanding trade in the last third of the nineteenth century; and how far it can go to explain otherwise puzzling disparities in those states' patterns of political evolution. Germany and the United States were both still relatively backward, that is, capital-poor, societies: both, in fact, imported considerable amounts of capital in this period (Feis 1965,24-25 and Chap. 3). Germany, however, was rich in labor and poor in land; the United States, of course, was in exactly the opposite posi-

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