1274 WORLD DEVELOPMENT Generals in both policy making and implementation during 1915-20,about 2,000 policemen-or nearly was absolute and nearly all of them were senior mili- one out of every 10 available policemen-were tary men-and Korea was not a very large country sternly disciplined every year for transgression of (again,for example,note the contrast with the role of police rules (Chen,1984,pp.236-239). the British in India).The Japanese,however,took This extensive and closely supervised police force additional actions2 For example,when confronted that penetrated every Korean village,performed with corrupt regional or local officials,the central numerous functions other than "normal"police duties authorities experimented-in line with"new"insti- of law and order maintenance.Powers granted to tutional cconomics -with paying these officials police included control over"politics,education,reli- higher salaries.especially "entertainment-allow- gion,morals,health and public welfare,and tax col- ance,"with the hope that,if more satisfied,they may lection"(Robinson in Eckert et al.,1990,p.259).The perform public tasks better.When this did not work. police,who presented themselves in military uni- or at least not fully,the colonial authorities further forms,again replete with swords.also had summary centralized,leading up to even less discretion,and powers to judge and punish minor offenders,includ- more rule-governed behavior for lower level officials ing the punishment of whipping.Even in production, These officials in the early colonial period were even local police were known to have"compelled villages required to wear crisp uniforms,replete with swords, to switch from existing food crops"to cash crops and so as to distinguish them sharply from an average citi- to adopt"new techniques"in rice production so as to zen -thus creating a state-society,or a public-pri- facilitate exports to Japan.Moreover,during land sur- vate,distinction through the use of symbolic politics veys (conducted during 1910-18;more on this as well as to convey the will of the state in the far below),as a result of which tenancy and conflicts over reaches of the society.When such efforts also failed to land increased,local police "always intervened in secure full compliance.Korean officials would be favor of landlords."23 It is thus not surprising that even replaced by the more socialized and complying a Japanese observer was led to conclude that Terauchi Japanese officials,at least until more suitable (the first Japanese Governor General of Korea.fol- Koreans,who were likely to comply,could be found lowing Ito and formal annexation)and his successors for the job. had transformed the "entire Korean peninsula into a military camp." (ii)The police force One final aspeet of the police role eoncerns the In addition to the civil bureaucracy,the other links between the police and local society via local essential arm of the new Korean state that the elites.The police successfully utilized the proverbial Japanese helped develop was a well-organized police carrot and stick to incorporate "village elders"and force.Once again,there is nothing unique about colo- others into a ruling "alliance."The police thus but- nial powers developing a police force;what is note- tressed their already extensive powers by working worthy here are both the extensive and the intensive with,rather than against,indigenous authority struc- nature of police supervision in colonial Korea.The tures.So armed,the police used the knowledge and colonial police force was designed on the lines of the influence of the local elites to mold the behavior of Meiji police force insofar as it was highly centralized, average citizens in such diverse matters as,"birth con- well disciplined and played an extensive role in social trol.types of crops grown,count and movement of and economic reforms.22 The police force in colonial people,prevention of spread of diseases,mobilization Korea grew rapidly:from some 6.222 gendarmes and of forced labor and to report on transgressions"(Chen. police in 1910 to 20,777 in 1922 and again to over 1984,p.226).The police and many local elites thus 60,000 in 1941 (Robinson in Eckert et al.,1990,p. came to be viewed and despised by Koreans at large as 259).One scholar suggests that at the height of the "collaborationists";unfortunately for Koreans,while colonial rule,there were enough police so that the many of the landed elite were indeed eventually elim- lowest level policeman knew "every man in the vil- inated as a political force (i.e.via land reforms follow- lage"(Chen.1984,p.225).While senior police offi- ing the Korean War),much of the colonial police force cers were normally Japanese,over half the police was incorporated directly into the new state structure force was made up of Koreans,often lower class of South Korea. Koreans.These Koreans were trained by the Japanese In sum,the personalized and factionalized Yi state in police academies,especially established within with a limited reach in society came to be replaced by Korea for the purpose.Records indicate that for every a colonial state with considerable capacity to penetrate Korean police position there were 10-20 applicants and control the society;this state was simultaneously (Chen.1984,p.236),suggesting a level of coopera- oppressive and efficacious.A highly centralised apex tion between Koreans and Japanese that probably with near absolute powers of legislation and exccution pains the modern Korean nationalist sentiments. -and thus of setting and implementing "national" Beyond formal training,the Japanese maintained very goals-and a pervasive,disciplined civil and police close supervision over their police force;for example, bureaucracies constituted the cores of the new state
1214 WORLD DEVELOPMENT Generals in both policy making and implementation was absolute and nearly all of them were senior military men - and Korea was not a very large country (again, for example, note the contrast with the role of the British in India). The Japanese, however, took additional actions.” For example, when confronted with corrupt regional or local officials, the central authorities experimented - in line with “new” institutional economics - with paying these officials higher salaries, especially “entertainment-allowance,” with the hope that, if more satisfied, they may perform public tasks better. When this did not work, or at least not fully, the colonial authorities further centralized, leading up to even less discretion, and more rule-governed behavior for lower level officials. These officials in the early colonial period were even required to wear crisp uniforms, replete with swords, so as to distinguish them sharply from an average citizen - thus creating a state-society, or a public-private, distinction through the use of symbolic politics - as well as to convey the will of the state in the far reaches of the society. When such efforts also failed to secure full compliance, Korean officials would be replaced by the more socialized and complying Japanese officials, at least until more suitable Koreans, who were likely to comply, could be found for the job. (ii) The poiicr jbrce In addition to the civil bureaucracy, the other essential arm of the new Korean state that the Japanese helped develop was a well-organized police force. Once again, there is nothing unique about colonial powers developing a police force; what is noteworthy here are both the extensive and the intensive nature of police supervision in colonial Korea. The colonial police force was designed on the lines of the Meiji police force insofar as it was highly centralized, well disciplined and played an extensive role in social and economic reforms.-?2 The police force in colonial Korea grew rapidly: from some 6,222 gendarmes and police in I9 IO to 20,777 in 1922 and again to over 60,000 in 1941 (Robinson in Eckert et al., 1990, p. 259). One scholar suggests that at the height of the colonial rule, there were enough police so that the lowest level policeman knew “every man in the village” (Chen, 1984, p. 225). While senior police officers were normally Japanese, over half the police force was made up of Koreans, often lower class Koreans. These Koreans were trained by the Japanese in police academies, especially established within Korea for the purpose. Records indicate that for every Korean police position there were 30-20 applicants (Chen, 1984, p. 236), suggesting a level of cooperation between Koreans and Japanese that probably pains the modern Korean nationalist sentiments. Beyond formal training, the Japanese maintained very close supervision over their police force; for example, during 19 15-20, about 2,000 policemen - or nearly one out of every 10 available policemen - were sternly disciplined every year for transgression of police rules (Chen, 1984, pp. 236-239). This extensive and closely supervised police force, that penetrated every Korean village, performed numerous functions other than “normal” police duties of law and order maintenance. Powers granted to police included control over “politics, education, religion, morals, health and public welfare, and tax collection” (Robinson in Eckert et cd., 1990, p. 259). The police, who presented themselves in military uniforms, again replete with swords, also had summary powers to judge and punish minor offenders, including the punishment of whipping. Even in production, local police were known to have “compelled villages to switch from existing food crops” to cash crops and to adopt “new techniques” in rice production so as to facilitate exports to Japan. Moreover, during land surveys (conducted during 1910&l 8; more on this below), as a result of which tenancy and conflicts over land increased, local police “always intervened in favor of landlords.“” It is thus not surprising that even a Japanese observer was led to conclude that Terauchi (the first Japanese Governor General of Korea, following Ito and formal annexation) and his successors had transformed the “entire Korean peninsula into a military camp.“‘” One final aspect of the police role concerns the links between the police and local society via local elites. The police successfully utilized the proverbial carrot and stick to incorporate “village elders” and others into a ruling “alliance.” The police thus buttressed their already extensive powers by working with, rather than against, indigenous authority structures. So armed, the police used the knowledge and influence of the local elites to mold the behavior of average citizens in such diverse matters as, “birth control. types of crops grown, count and movement of people, prevention of spread of diseases, mobilization of forced labor and to report on transgressions” (Chen. 1984, p. 226). The police and many local elites thus came to be viewed and despised by Koreans at large as “collaborationists”; unfortunately for Koreans, while many of the landed elite were indeed eventually eliminated as a political force (i.e. via land reforms following the Korean War), much of the colonial police force was incorporated directly into the new state structure of South Korea. In sum, the personalized and factionalized Yi state with a limited reach in society came to be replaced by a colonial state with considerable capacity to penetrate and control the society; this state was simultaneously oppressive and efficacious. A highly centralised apex with near absolute powers of legislation and execution - and thus of setting and implementing “national” goals - and a pervasive, disciplined civil and police bureaucracies constituted the cores of the new state
JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA'S"DEVELOPMENTAL STATE" 1275 (iii)The politics of the new state rated into the new system of colonial rule.Second,and The politics practiced by the new rulers added to relatedly,the colonial state forged numerous implicit the state's capacity to convey its will to the society. and explicit "alliances"with Korean propertied Except for a somewhat liberal interlude in the 1920s, classes.The nature of these turned out to be of critical for the most part,the political practices of the long-term significance.While I return to a detailed Japanese colonial state in Korea were brutally author- discussion of this issue below.it should be noted here itarian.For example,Korean newspapers were either that,on the whole,Korean monied groups-in both suspended or heavily censored,political protest was the city and the countryside-did not oppose colonial met with swift retribution,and political organizations rle.Most of them benefited from this rule and gener- and public gatherings were generally banned.Those ally went along-some even with enthusiasm-with professing Korean nationalist sentiments were thus the colonial project.Third,the Japanese undertook either exiled or remained fragmented:while there was considerable expansion of education,facilitating latent and scattered sympathy for nationalists and for propaganda and political resocialization.Whereas in communists all through the colonial period,a coherent 1910 nearly 10,000 students attended some sort of nationalist movement was never allowed to develop.25 school,by 1941 this number was up to 1.7 million and The Japanese used "thought police"to detect and the rate of literacy by 1945 was nearly 50%.The focus eliminate political dissidence,and also developed a was on primary education and the curricula was "spy system"to buttress the civil and police bureau- designed with the "objcct"of raising "practical men cracy that was "probably better developed in Korea able to meet the requirements of the state."27 than anywhere in the world"(Grajdanzev,1944,p. To conclude this subsection,the Japanese colo- 55). nialists in Korca replaced the decrepit Yi statc with a The colonial authorities were quite self-conscious centralized and powerful state.This was no liberal about their use of repression as a means to instill fear state;it was more statist vis-a-vis the Korean society, in the minds of Koreans and thus to minimize dissi- and considerably more repressive,than even the statist dence and reinforce bureaucratic control:in order to and illiberal Japanese political economy of the period. avoid"restlessness"in the "popular mind,"note gov- Central decision making was highly concentrated in ernment reports of the period,it was "essential"to the office of the Governor General.The Governor "maintain unshakable the dignity of the government" General's will,reflecting the imperial design and and"to impress the people with the weight of the new goals,was translated into implemented policies via regime"(Government-General of Chosen,1914,pp. the use of an extensive,well-designed and disciplined 2-3).When Koreans still resisted.Governor General bureaucracy.The new state also achieved consider- Terauchi Masatake supposedly responded,"I will able downward penetration:both the civil and police whip you with scorpions"(quoted in Peattie,1984,p. bureaucracies reached into the nooks and crannies of 18).and when eventually the Koreans succumbed,the the society,while continuing to respond to central gloating satisfaction is also obvious in official docu- directives:Korean elites in the localities were incor- ments:"they have gradually yielded their obstinate porated into the ruling "alliance";and,when all else prejudices and their disdainful attitude” failed in the Japanese efforts to control and transform (Government-General of Chosen,1935,p.81). Korea,there existed a well-functioning intelligence In spite of the awesome state that the Japanese cre- service to buttress the state's supervisory role.While a ated,it would be a mistake to believe that a thorough fuller understanding of how power was generated in bureaucratic penetration and politics of fear were the this system.and the uses to which it was put,will only ruling instruments in the hands of the colonial- emerge in due course,it should already be evident as ists.There is no doubt that bureaucratic growth to how the precolonial,ineffective state was trans- enabled the new state to undertake many more eco- formed into a state that-for better or for worse- nomic activities that contributed to economic growth could get things done. (more on this below),and that repression enabled the establishment of order,freeing the state elite to focus on other "developmental"matters.Nevertheless, 3.THE COLONIAL STATE,PROPERTIED bureaucratic and repressive power are seldom enough CLASSES AND ECONOMIC CHANGE to elicit a measure of cooperation--from,at least. some groups in society-that is essential for gener- The colonial state in Korea was a busy state.While ating economic dynamism.We must thus also take pursuing the imperial interests of Japan,it evolved a note of some other,nonrepressive ruling instruments full policy agenda,including the goal of economic that the new colonial state put to use. transformation of Korea.The broad strategy of trans- First,a segment of the Korean political elite in the formation was two pronged:the state utilized its precolonial period was quite favourably inclined bureaucratic capacities to directly undertake quitc a toward Japan.26 These Koreans from the political few economic tasks;and,more important,the state class were both officially and unofficially incorpo- involved propertied groups-both in the countryside
JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA’S “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE” 1215 (iii) The politics ofthe new state The politics practiced by the new rulers added to the state’s capacity to convey its will to the society. Except for a somewhat liberal interlude in the 1920s for the most part, the political practices of the Japanese colonial state in Korea were brutally authoritarian. For example, Korean newspapers were either suspended or heavily censored, political protest was met with swift retribution, and political organizations and public gatherings were generally banned. Those professing Korean nationalist sentiments were thus either exiled or remained fragmented; while there was latent and scattered sympathy for nationalists and for communists all through the colonial period, a coherent nationalist movement was never allowed to develop.25 The Japanese used “thought police” to detect and eliminate political dissidence, and also developed a “spy system” to buttress the civil and police bureaucracy that was “probably better developed in Korea than anywhere in the world” (Grajdanzev, 1944, p. 55). The colonial authorities were quite self-conscious about their use of repression as a means to instill fear in the minds of Koreans and thus to minimize dissidence and reinforce bureaucratic control: in order to avoid “restlessness” in the “popular mind,” note government reports of the period, it was “essential” to “maintain unshakable the dignity of the government” and “to impress the people with the weight of the new regime” (Government-General of Chosen, 1914, pp. 2-3). When Koreans still resisted, Governor General Terauchi Masatake supposedly responded, “I will whip you with scorpions” (quoted in Peattie, 1984, p. 18), and when eventually the Koreans succumbed, the gloating satisfaction is also obvious in official documents: “they have gradually yielded their obstinate prejudices and their disdainful attitude” (Government-General of Chosen, 1935, p. 8 1). In spite of the awesome state that the Japanese created, it would be a mistake to believe that a thorough bureaucratic penetration and politics of fear were the only ruling instruments in the hands of the colonialists. There is no doubt that bureaucratic growth enabled the new state to undertake many more economic activities that contributed to economic growth (more on this below), and that repression enabled the establishment of order, freeing the state elite to focus on other “developmental” matters. Nevertheless, bureaucratic and repressive power are seldom enough to elicit a measure of cooperation - from, at least, some groups in society -that is essential for generating economic dynamism. We must thus also take note of some other, nonrepressive ruling instruments that the new colonial state put to use. First, a segment of the Korean political elite in the precolonial period was quite favourably inclined toward Japan.26 These Koreans from the political class were both officially and unofficially incorporated into the new system of colonial rule. Second, and relatedly, the colonial state forged numerous implicit and explicit “alliances” with Korean propertied classes. The nature of these turned out to be of critical long-term significance. While I return to a detailed discussion of this issue below, it should be noted here that, on the whole, Korean monied groups - in both the city and the countryside-did not oppose colonial rule. Most of them benefited from this rule and generally went along - some even with enthusiasm-with the colonial project. Third, the Japanese undertook considerable expansion of education, facilitating propaganda and political resocialization. Whereas in 1910 nearly 10,000 students attended some sort of school, by 1941 this number was up to 1.7 million and the rate of literacy by 1945 was nearly 50%. The focus was on primary education and the curricula was designed with the “object” of raising “practical men able to meet the requirements of the state.” 27 To conclude this subsection, the Japanese colonialists in Korea replaced the decrepit Yi state with a centralized and powerful state. This was no liberal state; it was more statist vis-&vis the Korean society, and considerably more repressive, than even the statist and illiberal Japanese political economy of the period. Central decision making was highly concentrated in the office of the Governor General. The Governor General’s will, reflecting the imperial design and goals, was translated into implemented policies via the use of an extensive, well-designed and disciplined bureaucracy. The new state also achieved considerable downward penetration: both the civil and police bureaucracies reached into the nooks and crannies of the society, while continuing to respond to central directives: Korean elites in the localities were incorporated into the ruling “alliance”; and, when all else failed in the Japanese efforts to control and transform Korea, there existed a well-functioning intelligence service to buttress the state’s supervisory role. While a fuller understanding of how power was generated in this system, and the uses to which it was put, will emerge in due course, it should already be evident as to how the precolonial, ineffective state was transformed into a state that - for better or for worse - could get things done. 3. THE COLONIAL STATE, PROPERTIED CLASSES AND ECONOMIC CHANGE The colonial state in Korea was a busy state. While pursuing the imperial interests of Japan, it evolved a full policy agenda, including the goal of economic transformation of Korea. The broad strategy of transformation was two pronged: the state utilized its bureaucratic capacities to directly undertake quite a few economic tasks; and, more important, the state involved propertied groups -both in the countryside
1276 WORLD DEVELOPMENT and in the cities,and both Japanese and Koreans-in pressure was maintained on respective Governor- production-oriented alliances leading up to sustained Generals to boost the cost-efficiency of public ser- economic change.The results measured by the criteria vices.Unlike many other governments.the colonial of growth and industrialization(though not by such state in Korea did not operate with a"soft budget con- other criteria as human rights,national self-determi- straint."On the contrary,there was consistent pressure nation and fair economic distribution)were a consid- to economize,"hardening"the budget constraint,with erable success.Since successes generally begets emu- significant,positive "trickle-down"effect on the effi- lation and continuity,it is important to analyze the ciency of the bureaucracy,including the economic colonial economic strategy. bureaucracy. Two general observations ought to be noted at the outset.First,while the Governor-General in Korea possessed near absolute powers.he was nevertheless (a)Increased state capacity an agent of the Japanese imperial government.The colonial state in Korea thus pursued,not Korean,but The increased capacity of the new colonial state in Japanese needs and interests that changed over time.28 Korea to directly undertake economic tasks is evident In broad brush strokes,during the early phase,say,the fairly early in the historical record.For example,there first decade of the colonial rule.Japan treated Korea was the issue of state capacity to collect taxes.The old mainly as a strategic gain that could also be exploited Yi state,one may recollect,proved quite incapable of in a fairly classic fashion:exchange of agricultural extracting taxes from society,especially revenues products for manufactured goods.Subsequently,as from landowners.The contrasting performance of the Japanese demand for food outpaced its own supply, colonial state is notable.Land revenue in 1905.the the colonial state aggressively undertook measures to year the Japanese influence in Korea started to grow. increase food production in Korea.Manufacturing was some 4.9 million yen:by 1908.this had jumped to was discouraged in this carly phase,again in a fairly 6.5 million yen.or a real increase of some 30%in classic fashion,to protect Japanese exports to Korea. three years.3 Subsequently,numerous other sources Following WWI,however,with swollen company of revenue were added to that obtained from land- profits,Japan sought opportunities for export of capi- e.g.,railways,post office and customs:and receipts tal and thus relaxed restrictions against production of from the ginseng monopoly and from such public manufactured products in Korea.At the same time. undertakings as salt manufacture,coal mines.timber following the need to coopt nationalistic pressures work and printing bureaus-and the jump in revenue within Korea,the colonial state also involved selected intake was phenomenal.Whereas the total revenue in and prominent Korean businessmen in the growth of 1905 (land and other revenues)was 7.3 million yen. manufacturing.Aggressive industralization of Korea by 191I one year after formal annexation.the total occurred only in the 1930s.This was in part a result of revenue intake was 24 million yen.or an increase of Japan's strategy to cope with the depression-i.e.to more than 300%.32 The factors that help explain this create a protected,high-growth economy on an increased state capacity were two-fold.First.the colo- empire-wide scale-and in part a result of Japan's nial state.backed by superior coercive power.snapped aggressive industrialization,again on an empire-wide the stranglehold landowning groups had on the Yi scale,that reflected national power considerations.2 state.pensioning off the Yangban elite,and replacing Japan was able to switch its imperial policies in Korea them by Japanese career bureaucrats:I will return to frequently and decisively;this,in turn,underlined the this issue below.Second.the colonial elite utilized the highly centralized nature of authority within the newly created civil and police bureaucracy to collect Japanese controlled Korean state. taxes.More specifically.as early as 1906.36 revenue The second related observation concerns the collection officers.again replete with uniforms and pressures on the Governor-General in Korea to simul- swords.were posted all over Korea to identify cult- taneously pursue imperial interests and run a vated land,owners of the land.and the revenue due cost-effective government.Reading through from the land (H.I.J.M.'s Residency General,1908. historical documents of the time,especially the annual Chapter V).While the rate of taxation on land was not reports of the Governor-General in Korea,it becomes increased,it was regularized.In addition.uniformed clear that,among their various achievements.the revenue officers worked in conjunction with local colonial authorities in Korea wanted to emphasize police officers in the process of tax collection.lest any their repeated efforts to enhance revenues and to one forget this newly established separation of state minimize expenditures.especially by rationalizing and society,or the willful presence of the new state in the bureaucracy.30 Since any shortfall between rev- society. enues and expenditures within Korea had to be The successful land survey that the Japanese con- financed by the Japanese Imperial government- ducted in Korea during 1910-18 similarly highlighted and typically,there was a net revenue inflow from the efficacy of the new state.The Yi state had repeat- Japan to Korea-one presumes that constant and firm edly discussed such a comprehensive land survey but
1276 WORLD DEVELOPMENT and in the cities, and both Japanese and Koreans - in production-oriented alliances leading up to sustained economic change. The results measured by the criteria of growth and industrialization (though not by such other criteria as human rights, national self-determination and fair economic distribution) were a considerable success. Since successes generally begets emulation and continuity, it is important to analyze the colonial economic strategy. Two general observations ought to be noted at the outset. First, while the Governor-General in Korea possessed near absolute powers, he was nevertheless an agent of the Japanese imperial government. The colonial state in Korea thus pursued, not Korean, but Japanese needs and interests that changed over time.?” In broad brush strokes, during the early phase, say, the first decade of the colonial rule, Japan treated Korea mainly as a strategic gain that could also be exploited in a fairly classic fashion: exchange of agricultural products for manufactured goods. Subsequently, as Japanese demand for food outpaced its own supply, the colonial state aggressively undertook measures to increase food production in Korea. Manufacturing was discouraged in this early phase, again in a fairly classic fashion, to protect Japanese exports to Korea. Following WWI, however, with swollen company profits, Japan sought opportunities for export of capital and thus relaxed restrictions against production of manufactured products in Korea. At the same time, following the need to coopt nationalistic pressures within Korea, the colonial state also involved selected and prominent Korean businessmen in the growth of manufacturing. Aggressive industrialization of Korea occurred only in the 1930s. This was in part a result of Japan’s strategy to cope with the depression - i.e. to create a protected, high-growth economy on an empire-wide scale - and in part a result of Japan’s aggressive industrialization, again on an empire-wide scale, that reflected national power considerations.‘” Japan was able to switch its imperial policies in Korea frequently and decisively; this, in turn, underlined the highly centralized nature of authority within the Japanese controlled Korean state. The second related observation concerns the pressures on the Governor-General in Korea to simultaneously pursue imperial interests and run a cost-effective government. Reading through historical documents of the time, especially the annual reports of the Governor-General in Korea, it becomes clear that, among their various achievements, the colonial authorities in Korea wanted to emphasize their repeated efforts to enhance revenues and to minimize expenditures, especially by rationalizing the bureaucracy.30 Since any shortfall between revenues and expenditures within Korea had to be financed by the Japanese Imperial government - and typically, there was a net revenue inflow from Japan to Korea-one presumes that constant and firm pressure was maintained on respective GovernorGenerals to boost the cost-efficiency of public services. Unlike many other governments. the colonial state in Korea did not operate with a “soft budget constraint.” On the contrary, there was consistent pressure to economize, “hardening” the budget constraint, with significant. positive “trickle-down” effect on the efficiency of the bureaucracy, including the economic bureaucracy. (a) Incrensed state capnci9 The increased capacity of the new colonial state in Korea to directly undertake economic tasks is evident fairly early in the historical record. For example, there was the issue of state capacity to collect taxes. The old Yi state, one may recollect, proved quite incapable of extracting taxes from society, especially revenues from landowners. The contrasting performance of the colonial state is notable. Land revenue in 1905. the year the Japanese influence in Korea started to grow. was some 4.9 million yen; by 1908, this had jumped to 6.5 million yen, or a real increase of some 30% in three years.” Subsequently, numerous other sources of revenue were added to that obtained from land - e.g., railways, post office and customs; and receipts from the ginseng monopoly and from such public undertakings as salt manufacture, coal mines. timber work and printing bureaus - and the jump in revenue intake was phenomenal. Whereas the total revenue in 1905 (land and other revenues) was 7.3 million yen, by 191 1 one year after formal annexation, the total revenue intake was 24 million yen. or an increase of more than 300%.3’ The factors that help explain this increased state capacity were two-fold. First, the colonial state. backed by superior coercive power, snapped the stranglehold landowning groups had on the Yi state, pensioning off the Yangban elite, and replacing them by Japanese career bureaucrats: I will return to this issue below. Second. the colonial elite utilized the newly created civil and police bureaucracy to collect taxes. More specifically. as early as 1906, 36 revenue collection officers, again replete with uniforms and swords. were posted all over Korea to identify cultivated land, owners of the land, and the revenue due from the land (H.I.J.M.‘s Residency General, 1908. Chapter V). While the rate oftaxation on land was not increased, it was regularized. In addition. uniformed revenue officers worked in conjunction with local police officers in the process of tax collection, lest any one forget this newly established separation of state and society, or the willful presence of the new state in society. The successful land survey that the Japanese conducted in Korea during I9 IO- I8 similarly highlighted the efficacy of the new state. The Yi state had repeatedly discussed such a comprehensive land survey but
JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA'S"DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1277 never carried it out:the bureaucratic capacity was corresponding sums of deposits being 120,000 yen in absent,as was the power to confront land controlling 1909 and 981.000 yen in 1913)(Government-General groups who wanted to hide the extent of their taxable of Chosen,1914,p.19).Later during the colonial rule, lands.By contrast.the colonial state made an exhaus- the Government-General required Koreans to buy tive land survey a priority.Over a period of eight years government bonds that helped finance the industrial- the Japanese invested some 30 million yen in the pro- ization drive of the 1930s.While capital inflows from ject (compared,say,to the total revenue intake of the Japan remained the dominant source,local capital Government-General in 1911 of 24 million yen).The accumulation also increased considerably.The colo- survey "mapped all plots of land.classified it accord- nial state in Korea.even more than the Japanese Meiji ing to type,graded its productivity and established state on which it was modeled,became heavily and ownership."While Japanese civil servants super- directly involved in economic tasks.and judged vised the entire project.Korean landowners cooper- strictly by economic criteria,performed these tasks ated and eventually benefited;local land investigation rather effectively. committees,for example,who were responsible for More significant than the state's direct economic investigating the "ownership,location,boundaries role was the indirect role that led up to the involve- and class of land"were composed of "land-owners ment of wealthy groups in productive activities.The themselves"(Government-General of Chosen,1912, mechanics of how these state-private sector alliances p.13).As a result of the survey,the colonial state were created are important because similar arrange secured a revenue base and,less obviously,enhanced ments were later central to South Korea's phenomenal its control over the Korean agrarian sector by involv- economic success.The dynamics of change in both ing the landowning classes as ruling partners.What the agrarian and industrial sectors thus deserve our the Korean landlords lost in terms of autonomy from, attention. and influence over,the traditional Yi state,they made up by.first,securing new,Western-style,legal private property rights and later (as discussed below),by (b)The state and the agrarian sector enhanced profits from land(Robinson in Eckert et al., 1990,pp.266-267). The colonial state restructured its relationship with Over time.the colonial state in Korea undertook the Korean landed classes.The highest Yangban elite numerous other projects of economic value.This is no who held offices in the Yi state were pensioned off place for a comprehensive discussion;I simply wish (Government-General of Chosen,1911,pp.18-19). to flag some of the main areas.34 First,the Govern- As career bureaucrats took over official functions,the ment-General invested heavily in infrastructure,so direct control of landed classes on the state weakened. much so that Korea's roads and railways were among The successful land survey further confirmed the the finest that a developing country inherited from supremacy of the new state because,as a result of it. their colonial past.Second,as mentioned above,the the capacity of the landed classes to evade the reach of Japanese made significant investments in Korea in the state had shrunk.In return,however,the state primary education.Given the long gestation period, offered the landowners plenty,so as to not only not however,the returns on this investment were probably alienate them,but to make them active partners in exe- reaped,less by colonial Korea,but more by the two cuting the state's goals.For example,the Japanese sovereign Koreas who inherited a relatively literate introduced a new legal code-based on the Meiji labor force.Third,the colonial government ran a num- legal code-that created Western-style legal private ber of economic enterprises directly:e.g.,railways. property,thus securing the control of Korean landed communications.opium,salt and tobacco.Judged by groups over land in perpetuity.While the Japanese in the regular financial contribution that these public the process ended up owning significant amount of undertakings made to public revenues,they were run agricultural land in Korea,most Koreans who con- relatively efficiently.Finally,the Government- trolled land prior to the arrival of the Japanese main- General played an important role in the overall tained,nay,even expanded their land ownership.35 process of capital accumulation.While I will return to Moreover,as mentioned above,many among the this issue again below,and the direct role of the new landed elite were incorporated into local governance, colonial state in extracting taxes has already been cooperating with and helping local agents of the state noted,a few other points also deserve attention.The maintain control over villages.While students of colo- currency and banking reforms that the new colonial nialism often distinguish direct and indirect colonial state undertook rather early led to a significant jump in rule,the Japanese political arrangement in Korea uti- private,institutional savings:e.g.,deposits in the lized both forms:direct bureaucratic penetration was Bank of Chosen (Korea)doubled from some 18 mil- buttressed by the authority of local influentials.This lion yen in 1911 to 37 million yen in 1913 and the arrangement also suggests that,contrary to some number of depositors in the postal savings bank went recent arguments,the presence of a landowning class up from about 20,000 in 1909 to 420.000 in 1913 (the does not necessarily inhibit the formation of a power-
JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA’S “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE” 1277 never carried it out; the bureaucratic capacity was absent, as was the power to confront land controlling groups who wanted to hide the extent of their taxable lands. By contrast. the colonial state made an exhaustive land survey a priority. Over a period of eight years the Japanese invested some 30 million yen in the project (compared, say, to the total revenue intake of the Government-General in 1911 of 24 million yen). The survey “mapped all plots of land, classified it according to type, graded its productivity and established ownership.“?? While Japanese civil servants supervised the entire project, Korean landowners cooperated and eventually benefited; local land investigation committees, for example, who were responsible for investigating the “ownership, location, boundaries and class of land” were composed of “land-owners themselves” (Government-General of Chosen, 1912, p. 13). As a result of the survey, the colonial state secured a revenue base and, less obviously, enhanced its control over the Korean agrarian sector by involving the landowning classes as ruling partners. What the Korean landlords lost in terms of autonomy from, and influence over, the traditional Yi state, they made up by, first, securing new, Western-style, legal private property rights and later (as discussed below), by enhanced profits from land (Robinson in Eckert er al., 1990, pp. 266-267). Over time, the colonial state in Korea undertook numerous other projects of economic value. This is no place for a comprehensive discussion; I simply wish to flag some of the main areas.34 First, the Govemment-General invested heavily in infrastructure, so much so that Korea’s roads and railways were among the finest that a developing country inherited from their colonial past. Second, as mentioned above, the Japanese made significant investments in Korea in primary education. Given the long gestation period, however, the returns on this investment were probably reaped, less by colonial Korea, but more by the two sovereign Koreas who inherited a relatively literate labor force. Third, the colonial government ran a number of economic enterprises directly: e.g., railways, communications, opium, salt and tobacco. Judged by the regular financial contribution that these public undertakings made to public revenues, they were run relatively efficiently. Finally, the GovernmentGeneral played an important role in the overall process of capital accumulation. While I will return to this issue again below, and the direct role of the new colonial state in extracting taxes has already been noted, a few other points also deserve attention. The currency and banking reforms that the new colonial state undertook rather early led to a significant jump in private, institutional savings: e.g., deposits in the Bank of Chosen (Korea) doubled from some 18 million yen in 1911 to 37 million yen in 1913 and the number of depositors in the postal savings bank went up from about 20,000 in 1909 to 420,000 in 19 13 (the corresponding sums of deposits being 120,000 yen in 1909 and 98 1,000 yen in 19 13) (Government-General of Chosen, 19 14, p. 19). Later during the colonial rule, the Government-General required Koreans to buy government bonds that helped finance the industrialization drive of the 1930s. While capital inflows from Japan remained the dominant source, local capital accumulation also increased considerably. The colonial state in Korea, even more than the Japanese Meiji state on which it was modeled, became heavily and directly involved in economic tasks, and judged strictly by economic criteria, performed these tasks rather effectively. More significant than the state’s direct economic role was the indirect role that led up to the involvement of wealthy groups in productive activities. The mechanics of how these state-private sector alliances were created are important because similar arrangements were later central to South Korea’s phenomenal economic success. The dynamics of change in both the agrarian and industrial sectors thus deserve our attention. (b) The state and the agrarian sector The colonial state restructured its relationship with the Korean landed classes. The highest Yangban elite who held offices in the Yi state were pensioned off (Government-General of Chosen, 1911, pp. 18-19). As career bureaucrats took over official functions, the direct control of landed classes on the state weakened. The successful land survey further confirmed the supremacy of the new state because, as a result of it, the capacity of the landed classes to evade the reach of the state had shrunk. In return, however, the state offered the landowners plenty, so as to not only not alienate them, but to make them active partners in executing the state’s goals. For example, the Japanese introduced a new legal code - based on the Meiji legal code - that created Western-style legal private property, thus securing the control of Korean landed groups over land in perpetuity. While the Japanese in the process ended up owning significant amount of agricultural land in Korea, most Koreans who controlled land prior to the arrival of the Japanese maintained, nay, even expanded their land ownership.35 Moreover, as mentioned above, many among the landed elite were incorporated into local governance, cooperating with and helping local agents of the state maintain control over villages. While students of colonialism often distinguish direct and indirect colonial rule, the Japanese political arrangement in Korea utilized both forms: direct bureaucratic penetration was buttressed by the authority of local influentials. This arrangement also suggests that, contrary to some recent arguments, the presence of a landowning class does not necessarily inhibit the formation of a power-