404 International Organization appendix to this article.5 In an open-economy Heckscher-Ohlin(HO)model,trade can offset the impact of immigration as an economy adjusts to any change in fac- tor supplies by importing less of the goods that can now be produced locally at a lower cost.Again assuming low-skilled immigrants,it is possible that an economy can absorb new workers simply by altering the mix of output of tradable goods, increasing production of low-skill-intensive goods and decreasing production of other goods(in line with the Rybcynski theorem).Wages will not change at all if the local economy is small enough that a change in its output mix has no effect on world prices-a result known as"factor price insensitivity."There are two poss- ible exceptions.If the local economy is very large relative to the rest of the world, of course,the change in output mix can produce a decline in the world prices of low-skill-intensive goods and a subsequent decline in the real wages of low- skilled labor.But this result does not seem applicable for the individual European countries.Alternatively,if the inflow of immigration is itself large,it might induce a change in the set of tradable products that the local economy produces,thus causing a decline in the real wages of low-skilled labor.Yet this also seems like an extreme result,and not one that could be a reasonable basis for calculations about the effects of immigration in most European nations. The theoretical picture becomes no clearer if we allow that the skills of workers can be highly "specific"to particular industries-the standard approach taken in most theoretical recent work on international trade.7 If all goods are traded,so that prices are fixed in world markets,it can be shown that inflows of low-skilled workers will indeed lower real wages for low-skilled natives while raising real wages for high-skilled workers in all industries.(The latter benefits will be larger for high-skilled workers in sectors that use low-skilled labor more intensively.) On the flip side,inflows of any type of high-skilled workers will raise real wages for low-skilled workers while lowering real wages for all high-skilled workers (the latter losses being larger for those who own the same specific skills as the immigrants).While these distributive effects match the predictions generated by the simple closed-economy FP model,they are overturned with the inclusion of nontraded goods in the model.If immigration can lead to a reduction in the price of nontraded goods (that is,if it raises the output of such goods more rapidly than it raises aggregate demand for them),it is unclear whether native workers with skills similar to those of immigrants will be worse off in real terms.(The outcome will depend in part on their consumption tastes.)The effects of immigration inflows on real earnings are similarly ambiguous in the specific-factors model when the country in question is large relative to world markets.18 15.This appendix and other supplements referred to in later sections are available for download at the authors'Web site at (http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-jhainm/research.htm). 16.Leamer and Levinsohn 1995. 17.See Jones 1971;and Grossman and Helpman 1994. 18.Note that,while we have concentrated on the labor-market effects here,there is also consider- able debate over the impact of immigration on government spending and tax revenues.One common
appendix to this article+ 15 In an open-economy Heckscher-Ohlin ~HO! model, trade can offset the impact of immigration as an economy adjusts to any change in factor supplies by importing less of the goods that can now be produced locally at a lower cost+ Again assuming low-skilled immigrants, it is possible that an economy can absorb new workers simply by altering the mix of output of tradable goods, increasing production of low-skill-intensive goods and decreasing production of other goods ~in line with the Rybcynski theorem!+ Wages will not change at all if the local economy is small enough that a change in its output mix has no effect on world prices—a result known as “factor price insensitivity+” 16 There are two possible exceptions+ If the local economy is very large relative to the rest of the world, of course, the change in output mix can produce a decline in the world prices of low-skill-intensive goods and a subsequent decline in the real wages of lowskilled labor+ But this result does not seem applicable for the individual European countries+ Alternatively, if the inflow of immigration is itself large, it might induce a change in the set of tradable products that the local economy produces, thus causing a decline in the real wages of low-skilled labor+ Yet this also seems like an extreme result, and not one that could be a reasonable basis for calculations about the effects of immigration in most European nations+ The theoretical picture becomes no clearer if we allow that the skills of workers can be highly “specific” to particular industries—the standard approach taken in most theoretical recent work on international trade+ 17 If all goods are traded, so that prices are fixed in world markets, it can be shown that inflows of low-skilled workers will indeed lower real wages for low-skilled natives while raising real wages for high-skilled workers in all industries+ ~The latter benefits will be larger for high-skilled workers in sectors that use low-skilled labor more intensively+! On the flip side, inflows of any type of high-skilled workers will raise real wages for low-skilled workers while lowering real wages for all high-skilled workers ~the latter losses being larger for those who own the same specific skills as the immigrants!+ While these distributive effects match the predictions generated by the simple closed-economy FP model, they are overturned with the inclusion of nontraded goods in the model+ If immigration can lead to a reduction in the price of nontraded goods ~that is, if it raises the output of such goods more rapidly than it raises aggregate demand for them!, it is unclear whether native workers with skills similar to those of immigrants will be worse off in real terms+ ~The outcome will depend in part on their consumption tastes+! The effects of immigration inflows on real earnings are similarly ambiguous in the specific-factors model when the country in question is large relative to world markets+ 18 15+ This appendix and other supplements referred to in later sections are available for download at the authors’ Web site at ^http:00www+people+fas+harvard+edu0;jhainm0research+htm&+ 16+ Leamer and Levinsohn 1995+ 17+ See Jones 1971; and Grossman and Helpman 1994+ 18+ Note that, while we have concentrated on the labor-market effects here, there is also considerable debate over the impact of immigration on government spending and tax revenues+ One common 404 International Organization
Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 405 Other types of general equilibrium models raise more doubts about the impact we should expect immigration to have on the wages of similarly skilled native workers.If we allow for economies of scale in production in the industries employ- ing immigrants,inflows of new workers can be shown to generate higher real wages for native workers with similar skills in an open-economy model.19 If we treat immigration inflows as a component in the growth of the labor supply,in a fully specified dynamic model of the economy,the impact of such flows on wages over time will depend on the rates of capital accumulation and population growth(and how these are affected by immigration),as well as the rate of skill acquisition among immigrants-points noted by Bhagwati.20 All in all,it is extremely diffi- cult to make firm predictions about the equilibrium effects of immigration on wages and employment opportunities among local workers. If the economic impact of immigration is actually quite small,as both theory and empirics tend to suggest,then what explains the strong negative association between education and anti-immigration sentiments?One clear explanation is pro- vided by theories that relate education to higher levels of ethnic and racial toler- ance among individuals and to a preference for cultural diversity.This is an interpretation favored by many scholars who have made note of the connection between education and individual support for immigration.2 There is a large lit- erature showing that education tends to socialize students to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world.22 As Gang and colleagues note,most Western educational systems are designed quite explicitly to increase social tolerance.23 Chandler and Tsai point out that education fosters tolerance,not just by increasing students'knowledge of foreign cultures and raising levels of critical thinking,but also by generating more diverse and cosmopolitan social networks,especially at the college level.24 On a related theme,Betts argues that support for immigration among the college educated is one aspect of a larger class identity associated with cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse cultures.25 We provide tests of these accounts in the analysis below. concern is that low-skilled immigrants,because they tend to earn less and thus pay less in taxes than natives,and because they are more likely to draw unemployment and other welfare benefits from gov- ernment,are a net drain on government coffers.Economists are divided on whether this is actually the case (see Krugman and Obstfeld 2000,166).Notice,however,that to the extent it is true,since the added tax burden of immigration would fall disproportionately on richer,more highly skilled native workers,these distributional effects would run counter to(and thus mitigate)the types of distribu- tional wage effects emphasized in closed-economy FP models of labor-market competition. 19.See Brezis and Krugman 1993. 20.Bhagwati 2000. 21.See,for example,Betts 1988;Espenshade and Calhoun 1993;Espenshade and Hempstead 1996: Citrin et al.1997;Fetzer 2000;Chandler and Tsai 2001;and Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002. 22.See,for example,Campbell et al.1960,475-81;Erikson,Luttbeg,and Tedin 1991,155-56; McClosky and Brill 1983;and Schuman,Steeh,and Bobo 1985. 23.Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002,13. 24.Chandler and Tsai 2001.See also Case,Greeley,and Fuchs 1989;and Allport 1954. 25.Betts1988
Other types of general equilibrium models raise more doubts about the impact we should expect immigration to have on the wages of similarly skilled native workers+ If we allow for economies of scale in production in the industries employing immigrants, inflows of new workers can be shown to generate higher real wages for native workers with similar skills in an open-economy model+ 19 If we treat immigration inflows as a component in the growth of the labor supply, in a fully specified dynamic model of the economy, the impact of such flows on wages over time will depend on the rates of capital accumulation and population growth ~and how these are affected by immigration!, as well as the rate of skill acquisition among immigrants—points noted by Bhagwati+ 20 All in all, it is extremely diffi- cult to make firm predictions about the equilibrium effects of immigration on wages and employment opportunities among local workers+ If the economic impact of immigration is actually quite small, as both theory and empirics tend to suggest, then what explains the strong negative association between education and anti-immigration sentiments? One clear explanation is provided by theories that relate education to higher levels of ethnic and racial tolerance among individuals and to a preference for cultural diversity+ This is an interpretation favored by many scholars who have made note of the connection between education and individual support for immigration+ 21 There is a large literature showing that education tends to socialize students to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world+ 22 As Gang and colleagues note, most Western educational systems are designed quite explicitly to increase social tolerance+ 23 Chandler and Tsai point out that education fosters tolerance, not just by increasing students’ knowledge of foreign cultures and raising levels of critical thinking, but also by generating more diverse and cosmopolitan social networks, especially at the college level+ 24 On a related theme, Betts argues that support for immigration among the college educated is one aspect of a larger class identity associated with cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse cultures+ 25 We provide tests of these accounts in the analysis below+ concern is that low-skilled immigrants, because they tend to earn less and thus pay less in taxes than natives, and because they are more likely to draw unemployment and other welfare benefits from government, are a net drain on government coffers+ Economists are divided on whether this is actually the case ~see Krugman and Obstfeld 2000, 166!+ Notice, however, that to the extent it is true, since the added tax burden of immigration would fall disproportionately on richer, more highly skilled native workers, these distributional effects would run counter to ~and thus mitigate! the types of distributional wage effects emphasized in closed-economy FP models of labor-market competition+ 19+ See Brezis and Krugman 1993+ 20+ Bhagwati 2000+ 21+ See, for example, Betts 1988; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Citrin et al+ 1997; Fetzer 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; and Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002+ 22+ See, for example, Campbell et al+ 1960, 475–81; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991, 155–56; McClosky and Brill 1983; and Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985+ 23+ Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002, 13+ 24+ Chandler and Tsai 2001+ See also Case, Greeley, and Fuchs 1989; and Allport 1954+ 25+ Betts 1988+ Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 405
406 International Organization Note that one might simply suggest that the actual economic effects of immi- gration are less relevant than people's perceptions of those effects,and that stories reported by the media or statements made by politicians perhaps lead people to believe that immigration poses a larger economic threat to blue-collar workers than it actually does.26 This type of assertion seems quite plausible,but it begs for a theoretical explanation of how and why individuals misperceive the threat posed by immigration.The most obvious explanation for people-and especially less- educated individuals-being prone to see immigrants as an economic threat no matter what the actual labor-market effects,would seem simply to be an argument that links low education levels with xenophobic or racist predilections.That is, such an argument would seem ultimately to rest on the same (noneconomic)cul- tural or ideological factors just discussed,and these factors become the critical determinants of anti-immigrant sentiments rather than the real economic effects of immigration. Besides tolerance and support for cultural diversity,of course,there are a vari- ety of other noneconomic variables that have been identified as predictors of atti- tudes toward immigrants (and which are not so closely connected to education levels).Age tends to be negatively associated with support for immigration,for instance,and women seem generally more opposed to immigration than do men.27 Children of foreigners are predictably more supportive of immigration,as are mem- bers of minority ethnic groups.28 The latter finding would appear to support claims that members of marginalized groups often form common political bonds.29 Mean- while,individuals with right-wing or conservative political ideologies,and those evincing more national pride,are generally more likely to oppose immigration.30 Anti-immigration sentiment in Europe seems to be more intense in communities where immigrants are concentrated,suggesting that more contact with immigrants or perceived strains on locally provided government services foster nativist feel- ings.31 We attempt to account for all of these possibilities in the empirical analysis below. New Data from the European Social Survey We draw our data from the fifth edition of the recently administered European Social Survey.32 The survey covers twenty-two European countries:Austria,France, Norway,Sweden,Finland,Britain,Belgium,Ireland,the Netherlands,Denmark, 26.See Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002,7;and Citrin et al.1997,859. 27.Citrin et al.1997;Dustmann and Preston 2001;and Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002. 28.Citrin et al.1997:and Chandler and Tsai 2001. 29.See Espenshade and Calhoun 1993;and Betz 1994. 30.Chandler and Tsai 2001. 31.Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002. 32.See Stoop,Jowell,and Mohler 2002.A detailed description of the survey can be found at (http:/ www.europeansocialsurvey.org).Accessed 2 February 2007
Note that one might simply suggest that the actual economic effects of immigration are less relevant than people’s perceptions of those effects, and that stories reported by the media or statements made by politicians perhaps lead people to believe that immigration poses a larger economic threat to blue-collar workers than it actually does+ 26 This type of assertion seems quite plausible, but it begs for a theoretical explanation of how and why individuals misperceive the threat posed by immigration+ The most obvious explanation for people—and especially lesseducated individuals—being prone to see immigrants as an economic threat no matter what the actual labor-market effects, would seem simply to be an argument that links low education levels with xenophobic or racist predilections+ That is, such an argument would seem ultimately to rest on the same ~noneconomic! cultural or ideological factors just discussed, and these factors become the critical determinants of anti-immigrant sentiments rather than the real economic effects of immigration+ Besides tolerance and support for cultural diversity, of course, there are a variety of other noneconomic variables that have been identified as predictors of attitudes toward immigrants ~and which are not so closely connected to education levels!+ Age tends to be negatively associated with support for immigration, for instance, and women seem generally more opposed to immigration than do men+ 27 Children of foreigners are predictably more supportive of immigration, as are members of minority ethnic groups+ 28 The latter finding would appear to support claims that members of marginalized groups often form common political bonds+ 29 Meanwhile, individuals with right-wing or conservative political ideologies, and those evincing more national pride, are generally more likely to oppose immigration+ 30 Anti-immigration sentiment in Europe seems to be more intense in communities where immigrants are concentrated, suggesting that more contact with immigrants or perceived strains on locally provided government services foster nativist feelings+ 31 We attempt to account for all of these possibilities in the empirical analysis below+ New Data from the European Social Survey We draw our data from the fifth edition of the recently administered European Social Survey+ 32 The survey covers twenty-two European countries: Austria, France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Britain, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, 26+ See Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002, 7; and Citrin et al+ 1997, 859+ 27+ Citrin et al+ 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2001; and Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002+ 28+ Citrin et al+ 1997; and Chandler and Tsai 2001+ 29+ See Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; and Betz 1994+ 30+ Chandler and Tsai 2001+ 31+ Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002+ 32+ See Stoop, Jowell, and Mohler 2002+ A detailed description of the survey can be found at ^http:00 www+europeansocialsurvey+org&+ Accessed 2 February 2007+ 406 International Organization
Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 407 Germany,Italy,Luxembourg,Switzerland,Greece,Spain,Portugal,Israel,Czech Republic,Hungary,Poland,and Slovenia.It consists of answers of up to 42,000 respondents to an hour-long questionnaire,with an average country sample of about 2,000 respondents.The broad coverage provides substantial cross-national varia- tion in social,political,and economic contexts.The stratified random sample was designed to be representative of the residential population of each nation,aged sixteen years and above,regardless of their nationality,citizenship,or legal status.33 The questionnaire consists of a "core"module that contains a large range of socioeconomic and demographic questions and several rotating,topic-specific mod- ules,one of which focuses on the issue of immigration.Our primary empirical tests involve individual responses to a set of questions taking the following form: To what extent do you think [respondent's country]should allow people from source]to come and live here? Allow many to come and live here ·Allow some ·Allow a few ·Allow none ·Don't know There are four different versions of this question in which the source of the immigrants is identified alternatively as: The richer countries in Europe The poorer countries in Europe The richer countries outside Europe The poorer countries outside Europe For each of the questions we created a dichotomous variable that equals 1 (pro-immigration)if the answer was“allow many'”or“allow some”and0(anti- immigration)if the answer was "allow a few"or"allow none."34 The dichoto- mous dependent variables just allow a simpler and more intuitive summary of the basic results than alternative treatments using the "raw"categorical variables and estimating ordered probit models (which would require reporting the marginal effects that each independent variable has on the probability of a response falling into each possible category).In the section below on robustness tests,we describe the sensitivity analysis we have performed using ordered probit models and also rerunning all the analysis reported below using all alternative cutoff points for 33.The majority (55 percent)of the questionnaires were administered in face-to-face interviews. For a full discussion of the EES methodology,see Stoop,Jowell,and Mohler 2002. 34.We excluded the few "don't know"and missing answers from the sample.Including these obser- vations as either pro-or anti-immigration answers does not change any of the substantive results we report since only 4 to 5 percent of the answers to each question fall in this category
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Israel, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia+ It consists of answers of up to 42,000 respondents to an hour-long questionnaire, with an average country sample of about 2,000 respondents+ The broad coverage provides substantial cross-national variation in social, political, and economic contexts+ The stratified random sample was designed to be representative of the residential population of each nation, aged sixteen years and above, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or legal status+ 33 The questionnaire consists of a “core” module that contains a large range of socioeconomic and demographic questions and several rotating, topic-specific modules, one of which focuses on the issue of immigration+ Our primary empirical tests involve individual responses to a set of questions taking the following form: To what extent do you think @respondent’s country# should allow people from @source# to come and live here? • Allow many to come and live here • Allow some • Allow a few • Allow none • Don’t know There are four different versions of this question in which the source of the immigrants is identified alternatively as: • The richer countries in Europe • The poorer countries in Europe • The richer countries outside Europe • The poorer countries outside Europe For each of the questions we created a dichotomous variable that equals 1 ~pro-immigration! if the answer was “allow many” or “allow some” and 0 ~antiimmigration! if the answer was “allow a few” or “allow none+” 34 The dichotomous dependent variables just allow a simpler and more intuitive summary of the basic results than alternative treatments using the “raw” categorical variables and estimating ordered probit models ~which would require reporting the marginal effects that each independent variable has on the probability of a response falling into each possible category!+ In the section below on robustness tests, we describe the sensitivity analysis we have performed using ordered probit models and also rerunning all the analysis reported below using all alternative cutoff points for 33+ The majority ~55 percent! of the questionnaires were administered in face-to-face interviews+ For a full discussion of the EES methodology, see Stoop, Jowell, and Mohler 2002+ 34+ We excluded the few “don’t know” and missing answers from the sample+ Including these observations as either pro- or anti-immigration answers does not change any of the substantive results we report since only 4 to 5 percent of the answers to each question fall in this category+ Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 407
408 International Organization dichotomization of the dependent variable.None of our findings is sensitive at all to the choice of cutoff point. The crucial advantage gained from examining these ESS data,compared to data from alternative surveys used in previous research,is that separate questions have been posed about specific categories of immigrants that are likely to have very different skill characteristics.These distinctions allow for a much more direct test of the arguments about labor-market competition.Prior studies have rested on the assumption that respondents must always have low-skilled immigrants in mind when answering a general survey question about immigration.35 Here we can assume that respondents will have substantially different expectations about the average skill levels of immigrants from "richer"countries than of those from "poorer"countries.The questions were asked consecutively in the survey,making it clear to respondents that"richer"versus "poorer"was the critical difference-a difference that is most obviously meaningful as it bears upon the expected skill levels of immigrants.Respondents are more likely to associate immigrants from the richer nations with higher-skilled individuals (for example,professional and managerial employees from Germany,France,Britain,and the United States),while associating immigrants from poorer nations with lower-skilled individuals (for example,manual workers and refugees from eastern and southern Europe and from Africa).This set of expectations seems intuitively compelling,but we can also verify that it is empirically very accurate.Immigrants from richer nations do have higher skills,on average,than immigrants from poorer nations. To verify this we examined evidence on the skill levels of immigrants compiled in the International File of Immigration Surveys (IFIS)database by van Tuber- gen.36 This database combines survey data on more than 300,000 immigrants from 180 countries of origin and eighteen destination countries,extracted from the Euro- pean Union's Labour Force Survey,national censuses,and additional country- specific immigrant surveys.37 For the European destination nations the IFIS provides data on immigrants from fifty-one origins:twenty-six European and twenty-five non-European countries.38 The data include codes for whether the individual immi- grants had low,middle,or high levels of educational attainment (these corre- 35.See Scheve and Slaughter 2001a,135. 36.van Tubergen 2004. 37.All surveys were harmonized and pooled by van Tubergen into a cross-national data set that provides comparable individual-level information on immigrants,classified by country of origin,for the period 1980-2001.To our knowledge this represents the most comprehensive data set on immi- grant populations currently available.We are indebted to Frank van Tubergen for allowing us to use these data here. 38.The fourteen European destination nations in the IFIS database are Austria,Belgium,Denmark, Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Ireland,Luxembourg,Netherlands,Portugal,Spain,Sweden,and the United Kingdom.In addition to these fourteen,the European origin countries included Albania, Bulgaria,Ex-Czechoslovakia,Ex-Yugoslavia,Hungary,Iceland,Italy,Malta,Norway,Poland,Roma- nia,and Switzerland.The non-European origin nations are Algeria,Argentina,Australia,Brazil,Cam- bodia,Canada,China,Cyprus,Egypt,Ex-Russia,India,Indonesia,Japan,Lebanon,Mexico,Morocco, New Zealand,Pakistan,Philippine,South Africa,Thailand,Tunisia,Turkey,the United States,and Vietnam
dichotomization of the dependent variable+ None of our findings is sensitive at all to the choice of cutoff point+ The crucial advantage gained from examining these ESS data, compared to data from alternative surveys used in previous research, is that separate questions have been posed about specific categories of immigrants that are likely to have very different skill characteristics+ These distinctions allow for a much more direct test of the arguments about labor-market competition+ Prior studies have rested on the assumption that respondents must always have low-skilled immigrants in mind when answering a general survey question about immigration+ 35 Here we can assume that respondents will have substantially different expectations about the average skill levels of immigrants from “richer” countries than of those from “poorer” countries+ The questions were asked consecutively in the survey, making it clear to respondents that “richer” versus “poorer” was the critical difference—a difference that is most obviously meaningful as it bears upon the expected skill levels of immigrants+ Respondents are more likely to associate immigrants from the richer nations with higher-skilled individuals ~for example, professional and managerial employees from Germany, France, Britain, and the United States!, while associating immigrants from poorer nations with lower-skilled individuals ~for example, manual workers and refugees from eastern and southern Europe and from Africa!+ This set of expectations seems intuitively compelling, but we can also verify that it is empirically very accurate+ Immigrants from richer nations do have higher skills, on average, than immigrants from poorer nations+ To verify this we examined evidence on the skill levels of immigrants compiled in the International File of Immigration Surveys ~IFIS! database by van Tubergen+ 36 This database combines survey data on more than 300,000 immigrants from 180 countries of origin and eighteen destination countries, extracted from the European Union’s Labour Force Survey, national censuses, and additional countryspecific immigrant surveys+ 37 For the European destination nations the IFIS provides data on immigrants from fifty-one origins: twenty-six European and twenty-five non-European countries+ 38 The data include codes for whether the individual immigrants had low, middle, or high levels of educational attainment ~these corre- 35+ See Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 135+ 36+ van Tubergen 2004+ 37+ All surveys were harmonized and pooled by van Tubergen into a cross-national data set that provides comparable individual-level information on immigrants, classified by country of origin, for the period 1980–2001+ To our knowledge this represents the most comprehensive data set on immigrant populations currently available+ We are indebted to Frank van Tubergen for allowing us to use these data here+ 38+ The fourteen European destination nations in the IFIS database are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom+ In addition to these fourteen, the European origin countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Ex-Czechoslovakia, Ex-Yugoslavia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Switzerland+ The non-European origin nations are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ex-Russia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippine, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, and Vietnam+ 408 International Organization