上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Mao Zedong and China_Mao's China and the Cold war

to believe that"()the Soviet Union would not allow the emergence of an American-backed fascist China in the East after the end of the war,and(2)Sta- lin,as a Marxist,would not sign a treaty with the GMD government that would restrict the development of the Chinese revolution."49 In ordering the ccp troops to take aggressive actions in northern China and the Northeast,Mao's fundamental estimation was that the Soviet Red Army might not offer direct support to ccp forces but would adopt a cooperative attitude toward the ccp's military maneuvers.5o Further,Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet entry into the war would restrict the aggressiveness of U.S.policy toward China,forcing"the United States not to support [Jiang]in China's civil war."51 Although the ccp chairman,following his longtime revolutionary experience,suggested that the ccp and its forces should never give up"self- reliance"as a guiding principle,he did regard the international situation cre- ated by the Soviet entry into the war in the East and support from the Soviet Red Army as two decisive conditions for the party to win a showdown with the GMD.52 Jiang fully understood that he could ill afford to lose the competition with the ccp over the lost territory,as he,too,anticipated a civil war would come sooner or later.On 12 August,Jiang used his authority as the leader of China's legal government to order the ccp forces to stay where they were and not to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet troops,a directive the ccp rejected angrily.ss Jiang knew that since most of his troops were still in the remote"Great Rear,"s4 he needed to take extraordinary steps to win the com- petition with the Communists.He thus authorized T.V.Soong to sign the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance,"in which Jiang ac- knowledged the independence of Outer Mongolia,the Soviet military occu- pation of Luishun(Port Arthur),and Soviet privileges regarding the Chinese Changchun Railroad.In return,the Soviet Union agreed to respect Jiang's position as the leader of China's legal government and acknowledged that Jiang's troops had the right to take over China's lost territory,especially that in the Northeast.s5 On14 August,the same day that the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed,Jiang telegraphed Mao to invite him to come to Chongqing to"discuss questions related to reestablishing peace in China." The Jiang-Stalin compromise undermined the optimism that had domi- nated the ccp leaders'strategic thinking,which was further diminished when the Soviet dictator directly pressured his Chinese Communist comrades to negotiate with Jiang.On z0 and 22 August,respectively,Stalin sent two urgent telegrams to the ccp leaders,advising them that with the surrender of Japan, the ccp should enter discussions with the GMD about the restoration of peace THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 27

to believe that ‘‘(1) the Soviet Union would not allow the emergence of an American-backed fascist China in the East after the end of the war, and (2) Sta￾lin, as a Marxist, would not sign a treaty with the gmd government that would restrict the development of the Chinese revolution.’’49 In ordering the ccp troops to take aggressive actions in northern China and the Northeast, Mao’s fundamental estimation was that the Soviet Red Army might not offer direct support to ccp forces but would adopt a cooperative attitude toward the ccp’s military maneuvers.50 Further, Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet entry into the war would restrict the aggressiveness of U.S. policy toward China, forcing ‘‘the United States not to support [Jiang] in China’s civil war.’’51 Although the ccp chairman, following his longtime revolutionary experience, suggested that the ccp and its forces should never give up ‘‘self￾reliance’’ as a guiding principle, he did regard the international situation cre￾ated by the Soviet entry into the war in the East and support from the Soviet Red Army as two decisive conditions for the party to win a showdown with the gmd. 52 Jiang fully understood that he could ill afford to lose the competition with the ccp over the lost territory, as he, too, anticipated a civil war would come sooner or later. On 12 August, Jiang used his authority as the leader of China’s legal government to order the ccp forces to stay where they were and not to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet troops, a directive the ccp rejected angrily.53 Jiang knew that since most of his troops were still in the remote ‘‘Great Rear,’’54 he needed to take extraordinary steps to win the com￾petition with the Communists. He thus authorized T. V. Soong to sign the ‘‘Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance,’’ in which Jiang ac￾knowledged the independence of Outer Mongolia, the Soviet military occu￾pation of Lüshun (Port Arthur), and Soviet privileges regarding the Chinese Changchun Railroad. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to respect Jiang’s position as the leader of China’s legal government and acknowledged that Jiang’s troops had the right to take over China’s lost territory, especially that in the Northeast.55 On 14 August, the same day that the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed, Jiang telegraphed Mao to invite him to come to Chongqing to ‘‘discuss questions related to reestablishing peace in China.’’56 The Jiang-Stalin compromise undermined the optimism that had domi￾nated the ccp leaders’ strategic thinking, which was further diminished when the Soviet dictator directly pressured his Chinese Communist comrades to negotiate with Jiang. On 20 and 22 August, respectively, Stalin sent two urgent telegrams to the ccp leaders, advising them that with the surrender of Japan, the ccp should enter discussions with the gmd about the restoration of peace the rise of the cold war in east asia 27

and the reconstruction of the country."If a civil war were to break out," warned Stalin,"the Chinese nation would face self-destruction."57 Stalin's attitude reflected his understanding of how Soviet interests in China would best be served.He not only lacked confidence in the ccp's ability to win a civil war against the GMD,but he also was extremely reluctant to commit the strength of the Soviet Union to supporting his Chinese comrades by risk- ing a direct conflict with the Americans,who were then planning large-scale landing operations in northern China.He had gained much through signing a treaty with the Chinese GMD government and was eager to retain those ad- vancements.However,for Mao and his fellow ccp leaders,Stalin's policy was a cruel betrayal.ss It had shaken the very foundation of the party's strategy to pursue the Chinese revolution's victory through a head-to-head confrontation with the GMD.59 Under these circumstances,the ccp leadership made fundamental adjust- ments to the party's aggressive strategy vis-a-vis the GMD.On 23 August,the ccp politburo met to discuss the party's response to Stalin's telegrams.Mao made a long speech at the meeting,telling the participants that the Soviet Union had signed a treaty with the GMD government allowing the GMD to take over the Northeast."Confined by the need to maintain international peace,as well as by the Sino-Soviet treaty,"Mao told his comrades,"the Soviet Union is not in a position to act freely to support us...because if the Soviet Union were to assist us,the United States would certainly support Jiang,and,as a result,the cause of international peace would suffer and a world war might follow."Mao believed that the ccp had to adjust its strategies in accordance with this situation and"acknowledge that Jiang Jieshi has the legitimate right to accept Japan's surrender"and"to occupy the big cities."The party,Mao suggested,should adopt"peace,democracy,and unity"as the central slogan. Accordingly,Mao believed that he should accept Jiang's invitation to visit Chongqing to discuss how to maintain peace in China.Most of the partici- pants agreed,0 and on 26 August,the ccp politburo formally authorized Mao to meet with Jiang in Chongqing.61 In an inner-party circular,the ccp Central Committee made it clear that the main reason for Mao's meeting with Jiang was that "neither the Soviet Union nor the United States favors a civil war in China,"and that"the party therefore has to make major concessions"in order to achieve a"new scenario of democracy and peace in China."62 On 28 August,Mao Zedong,accompanied by Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruo- fei,two top ccp leaders,arrived in Chongqing.In the following forty days, Mao and Jiang discussed how to democratize China's politics and nationalize the GMD's and ccp's troops.However,the negotiations proved extremely dif- 28 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA

and the reconstruction of the country. ‘‘If a civil war were to break out,’’ warned Stalin, ‘‘the Chinese nation would face self-destruction.’’57 Stalin’s attitude reflected his understanding of how Soviet interests in China would best be served. He not only lacked confidence in the ccp’s ability to win a civil war against the gmd, but he also was extremely reluctant to commit the strength of the Soviet Union to supporting his Chinese comrades by risk￾ing a direct conflict with the Americans, who were then planning large-scale landing operations in northern China. He had gained much through signing a treaty with the Chinese gmd government and was eager to retain those ad￾vancements. However, for Mao and his fellow ccp leaders, Stalin’s policy was a cruel betrayal.58 It had shaken the very foundation of the party’s strategy to pursue the Chinese revolution’s victory through a head-to-head confrontation with the gmd. 59 Under these circumstances, the ccp leadership made fundamental adjust￾ments to the party’s aggressive strategy vis-à-vis the gmd. On 23 August, the ccp politburo met to discuss the party’s response to Stalin’s telegrams. Mao made a long speech at the meeting, telling the participants that the Soviet Union had signed a treaty with the gmd government allowing the gmd to take over the Northeast. ‘‘Confined by the need to maintain international peace, as well as by the Sino-Soviet treaty,’’ Mao told his comrades, ‘‘the Soviet Union is not in a position to act freely to support us . . . because if the Soviet Union were to assist us, the United States would certainly support Jiang, and, as a result, the cause of international peace would suffer and a world war might follow.’’ Mao believed that the ccp had to adjust its strategies in accordance with this situation and ‘‘acknowledge that Jiang Jieshi has the legitimate right to accept Japan’s surrender’’ and ‘‘to occupy the big cities.’’ The party, Mao suggested, should adopt ‘‘peace, democracy, and unity’’ as the central slogan. Accordingly, Mao believed that he should accept Jiang’s invitation to visit Chongqing to discuss how to maintain peace in China. Most of the partici￾pants agreed,60 and on 26 August, the ccp politburo formally authorized Mao to meet with Jiang in Chongqing.61 In an inner-party circular, the ccp Central Committee made it clear that the main reason for Mao’s meeting with Jiang was that ‘‘neither the Soviet Union nor the United States favors a civil war in China,’’ and that ‘‘the party therefore has to make major concessions’’ in order to achieve a ‘‘new scenario of democracy and peace in China.’’62 On 28 August, Mao Zedong, accompanied by Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruo￾fei, two top ccp leaders, arrived in Chongqing. In the following forty days, Mao and Jiang discussed how to democratize China’s politics and nationalize the gmd’s and ccp’s troops. However, the negotiations proved extremely dif- 28 the rise of the cold war in east asia

ficult.The central issue was whether the ccp would be allowed to maintain an independent army.While Jiang insisted that the ccp should place its military forces under the command of the government,Mao was willing only to cut the size of the Communist troops and would do so only on the condition that the GMD would also reduce its forces.The two sides also failed to reach an agreement on how China's government and politics would be"democratized." On Io October,Jiang and Mao issued a communique asserting that they had agreed on convening a political consultative conference as the first step toward constructing peace and democracy in China,but the Jiang-Mao meetings as a whole failed to produce an agreement that would allow peace to prevail.63 The lack of concrete results from the negotiations in Chongqing was by no means surprising given that neither the GMD nor the ccp had any confi- dence in reaching peace through compromise.Indeed,the only reason either party entered the negotiations at all was to demonstrate publicly its own desire for peace.At the same time that Jiang and Mao were meeting in Chong- qing,military clashes between GMD and ccp troops escalated in northern and northeastern China.The Americans helped transport large numbers of GMD troops from the"Great Rear"to northern China,and the forces immediately entered into competition with the Communists to recover the"lost territory." In some areas of Shandong,Shanxi,Hebei,and Suiyuan provinces,several major battles took place between GMD and ccp forces.It appeared that the better equipped and more numerous GMD forces generally held the upper hand overall,especially in northern China. How Manchuria Became the ccP's Revolutionary Base Under great pressure from the GMD forces,the ccp leaders were determined to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy.However,they had to find the best geographic location to carry out their plans.Their vision quickly focused on the North- east.As discussed earlier,after Soviet entry into the war,the ccp leadership decided to control the Northeast with the support of the Soviet forces there. Stalin's cautious attitude and the Sino-Soviet treaty made it difficult for the ccp to carry out this decision as originally intended.64 But the ccp did not give up the plan.Late in August and early in September,the party leadership received several reports from the commanders of ccp military units in the Northeast that the Soviet army was willing to accept the ccp's cooperation.s5 In the meantime,the party also noted that Moscow sharply criticized"China's reactionary forces"for their attempt to drag China backward.66 The party leadership realized that there was room for maneuver in pursuit of its own ob- iectives in the Northeast within the framework of the Sino-Soviet treaty.On THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 29

ficult. The central issue was whether the ccp would be allowed to maintain an independent army. While Jiang insisted that the ccp should place its military forces under the command of the government, Mao was willing only to cut the size of the Communist troops and would do so only on the condition that the gmd would also reduce its forces. The two sides also failed to reach an agreement on how China’s government and politics would be ‘‘democratized.’’ On 10 October, Jiang and Mao issued a communiqué asserting that they had agreed on convening a political consultative conference as the first step toward constructing peace and democracy in China, but the Jiang-Mao meetings as a whole failed to produce an agreement that would allow peace to prevail.63 The lack of concrete results from the negotiations in Chongqing was by no means surprising given that neither the gmd nor the ccp had any confi- dence in reaching peace through compromise. Indeed, the only reason either party entered the negotiations at all was to demonstrate publicly its own desire for peace. At the same time that Jiang and Mao were meeting in Chong￾qing, military clashes between gmd and ccp troops escalated in northern and northeastern China. The Americans helped transport large numbers of gmd troops from the ‘‘Great Rear’’ to northern China, and the forces immediately entered into competition with the Communists to recover the ‘‘lost territory.’’ In some areas of Shandong, Shanxi, Hebei, and Suiyuan provinces, several major battles took place between gmd and ccp forces. It appeared that the better equipped and more numerous gmd forces generally held the upper hand overall, especially in northern China. How Manchuria Became the ccp’s Revolutionary Base Under great pressure from the gmd forces, the ccp leaders were determined to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy. However, they had to find the best geographic location to carry out their plans. Their vision quickly focused on the North￾east. As discussed earlier, after Soviet entry into the war, the ccp leadership decided to control the Northeast with the support of the Soviet forces there. Stalin’s cautious attitude and the Sino-Soviet treaty made it difficult for the ccp to carry out this decision as originally intended.64 But the ccp did not give up the plan. Late in August and early in September, the party leadership received several reports from the commanders of ccp military units in the Northeast that the Soviet army was willing to accept the ccp’s cooperation.65 In the meantime, the party also noted that Moscow sharply criticized ‘‘China’s reactionary forces’’ for their attempt to drag China backward.66 The party leadership realized that there was room for maneuver in pursuit of its own ob￾jectives in the Northeast within the framework of the Sino-Soviet treaty. On the rise of the cold war in east asia 29

Image Not Available Soviet Red Army soldiers with Chinese Communist soldiers in Manchuria,August 1945. Xinbua News Agency. 29 August,in an inner-party directive,the ccp Central Committee stated that while the Soviet Red Army,restricted by the Sino-Soviet treaty,would not offer direct support to the ccp forces in the Northeast,it was also true that the Soviet Union still supported China's"cause of progressive democracy."There- fore,so long as the ccp's actions in the Northeast did not force the Soviets to violate their obligations under the Sino-Soviet treaty,the Soviets would allow the ccp to develop its influence and strength in the Northeast.67 In the next three weeks,ccp troops entered the Northeast in large num- bers,and they found that the Soviet Red Army's attitude was generally co- operative.On 14 September,Lieutenant Colonel Belunosov,a representative of Marshal Rodion Malinovskii,commander of the Soviet forces in the Far East,arrived at Yan'an.The meetings between him and the top ccp leaders resulted in a series of agreements:While the ccp troops in the Northeast would not enter big cities there,the Soviets would allow them to occupy the countryside and some small and midsize cities.When the Soviet troops had withdrawn from the Northeast,they would not automatically hand over areas under their occupation to the GMD,but would"let the Chinese solve the mat- ter by themselves."68 Under these circumstances,on 19 September,the ccp 30 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA

Soviet Red Army soldiers with Chinese Communist soldiers in Manchuria, August 1945. Xinhua News Agency. 29 August, in an inner-party directive, the ccp Central Committee stated that while the Soviet Red Army, restricted by the Sino-Soviet treaty, would not offer direct support to the ccp forces in the Northeast, it was also true that the Soviet Union still supported China’s ‘‘cause of progressive democracy.’’ There￾fore, so long as the ccp’s actions in the Northeast did not force the Soviets to violate their obligations under the Sino-Soviet treaty, the Soviets would allow the ccp to develop its influence and strength in the Northeast.67 In the next three weeks, ccp troops entered the Northeast in large num￾bers, and they found that the Soviet Red Army’s attitude was generally co￾operative. On 14 September, Lieutenant Colonel Belunosov, a representative of Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, commander of the Soviet forces in the Far East, arrived at Yan’an. The meetings between him and the top ccp leaders resulted in a series of agreements: While the ccp troops in the Northeast would not enter big cities there, the Soviets would allow them to occupy the countryside and some small and midsize cities. When the Soviet troops had withdrawn from the Northeast, they would not automatically hand over areas under their occupation to the gmd, but would ‘‘let the Chinese solve the mat￾ter by themselves.’’68 Under these circumstances, on 19 September, the ccp 30 the rise of the cold war in east asia Image Not Available

leadership formally adopted a grand strategy of "maintaining a defensive pos- ture in the south while waging an offensive in the north"in the confrontation with the GMD.69 Jiang Jieshi and the GMD high command also understood the Northeast's strategic importance and decided to send the GMD's best units there.With the help of the Americans,large numbers of GMD troops were transported by air or sea to several Northeast ports.Late in September,U.S.Marines began large- scale landing operations in Tianjin and several other northern ports.Their role,as the ccp perceived it,was essentially to check the movements of ccp troops and to support the actions of the GMD forces.70 The cooperative nature of American-GMD military actions in northern China and the Northeast sent a warning signal to Moscow,producing fur- ther conflict between American and Soviet policies in East Asia.Almost at the same time that the ccp-GMD conflict over control of the Northeast was escalating,the foreign ministers from the United States,the Soviet Union, Britain,France,and China met in London to discuss important Far Eastern issues,especially the question of military control of Japan.When the Ameri- cans made it clear that they would exercise exclusive control of the occupation of Japan,the Soviets immediately decided to harden their policy toward the United States in East Asia and the GMD in China.71 The Soviets were now willing to break their obligation under the Sino- Soviet treaty.Beginning in early October their attitude toward the North- east issue changed further in the ccp's favor.The Soviet Red Army began to create barriers against the GMD troops'movement into the Northeast,claim- ing that until an overall solution of the Northeast issue had been worked out,they would not allow GMD troops to enter the areas they occupied.72 In the meantime,the Soviets increased their support for the ccp.On 4 Octo- ber,the Soviets advised the ccp Northeast Bureau that the Chinese Com- munists should move as many as 300,oo0 troops into the Northeast in one month's time,and that the Soviets would provide them with large numbers of weapons.73 On 1 October,the ccp leadership decided to"go all out to control the entire Northeast."74 The new Soviet policy toward the Northeast resulted in a serious crisis between the Soviet Union and the GMD government.When the Soviets re- fused to observe the Sino-Soviet treaty,the GMD government took dramatic action.It informed the Soviet Union on I5 November that because the GMD's takeover of the Northeast had been hindered by the Soviet forces there,the GMD's Northeast administration headquarters would move out of the North- east on 17 November.75 At the same time,Jiang Jieshi telegraphed President THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 3I

leadership formally adopted a grand strategy of ‘‘maintaining a defensive pos￾ture in the south while waging an offensive in the north’’ in the confrontation with the gmd. 69 Jiang Jieshi and the gmd high command also understood the Northeast’s strategic importance and decided to send the gmd’s best units there.With the help of the Americans, large numbers of gmd troops were transported by air or sea to several Northeast ports. Late in September, U.S. Marines began large￾scale landing operations in Tianjin and several other northern ports. Their role, as the ccp perceived it, was essentially to check the movements of ccp troops and to support the actions of the gmd forces.70 The cooperative nature of American-gmd military actions in northern China and the Northeast sent a warning signal to Moscow, producing fur￾ther conflict between American and Soviet policies in East Asia. Almost at the same time that the ccp-gmd conflict over control of the Northeast was escalating, the foreign ministers from the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China met in London to discuss important Far Eastern issues, especially the question of military control of Japan. When the Ameri￾cans made it clear that they would exercise exclusive control of the occupation of Japan, the Soviets immediately decided to harden their policy toward the United States in East Asia and the gmd in China.71 The Soviets were now willing to break their obligation under the Sino￾Soviet treaty. Beginning in early October their attitude toward the North￾east issue changed further in the ccp’s favor. The Soviet Red Army began to create barriers against the gmd troops’ movement into the Northeast, claim￾ing that until an overall solution of the Northeast issue had been worked out, they would not allow gmd troops to enter the areas they occupied.72 In the meantime, the Soviets increased their support for the ccp. On 4 Octo￾ber, the Soviets advised the ccp Northeast Bureau that the Chinese Com￾munists should move as many as 300,000 troops into the Northeast in one month’s time, and that the Soviets would provide them with large numbers of weapons.73 On 19 October, the ccp leadership decided to‘‘go all out to control the entire Northeast.’’74 The new Soviet policy toward the Northeast resulted in a serious crisis between the Soviet Union and the gmd government. When the Soviets re￾fused to observe the Sino-Soviet treaty, the gmd government took dramatic action. It informed the Soviet Union on 15 November that because the gmd’s takeover of the Northeast had been hindered by the Soviet forces there, the gmd’s Northeast administration headquarters would move out of the North￾east on 17 November.75 At the same time, Jiang Jieshi telegraphed President the rise of the cold war in east asia 31