prepared by the Japanese and the puppets."12 Consequently,a ccp-GMD show- down was temporarily avoided. Neither the ccp nor the GMD,though,would trust the other.In the ensuing four years,until the end of the war against Japan in1945,both parties put pre- paring for a showdown between them after the war at the top of their agenda. In 1943,Jiang published a pamphlet titled China's Destiny,in which he claimed that the Communists would have no position in postwar China.The ccp an- grily criticized Jiang's"plot to establish his own dictatorship by destroying the ccp and other progressive forces in China,"calling for the Chinese people to struggle resolutely against the emergence of a"fascist China."Both GMD and ccp leaders realized that when the war ended,a life-or-death battle between the two parties was probably inevitable. The ccp's Diplomatic Initiative in Late 1944 and Early 1945 By the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945,the balance of strength be- tween the GMD and the ccp had swung further in the latter's favor.The wide- spread corruption within Jiang's government,the runaway inflation in the Nationalist-controlled areas,15 and the major military defeats of Nationalist troops in the face of the Japanese Ichi-go campaign 6 combined to weaken sig- nificantly Jiang Jieshi's stature as China's wartime national leader.In compari- son,the ccp had reached a level of strength and influence unprecedented since its establishment in 2.By late 1944 and early 1945,the party claimed that it commanded a powerful military force of goo,ooo regular troops and goo,ooo militiamen,and that party membership had reached over one million.7 In the meantime,the party had gained valuable administrative experience through the buildup of base areas in central and northern China,and Mao Zedong, through the "Rectification Campaign,"had consolidated his control over the party's strategy and policymaking. Under these circumstances,Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that with the continuous development of the party's strength,it would occupy a stronger position to compete for political power in China at the end of the war against Japan.On several occasions,Mao asserted that"this time,we must take over China.To this end,the party adopted a series of new strategies in late 1944.In a political maneuver designed to challenge Jiang's claim to a monopoly of political power in China,the ccp formally introduced the idea of replacing Jiang's one-party dictatorship with a new coalition government including the ccp and other democratic parties.20 On the military side,the ccp leadership decided to dispatch the party's best units to penetrate into the areas south of the Yangzi River,with the task of creating new base areas in south- 22 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
prepared by the Japanese and the puppets.’’12 Consequently, a ccp-gmd showdown was temporarily avoided. Neither the ccp nor the gmd, though, would trust the other. In the ensuing four years, until the end of the war against Japan in 1945, both parties put preparing for a showdown between them after the war at the top of their agenda. In 1943, Jiang published a pamphlet titled China’s Destiny, in which he claimed that the Communists would have no position in postwar China.13 The ccp angrily criticized Jiang’s ‘‘plot to establish his own dictatorship by destroying the ccp and other progressive forces in China,’’ calling for the Chinese people to struggle resolutely against the emergence of a ‘‘fascist China.’’14 Both gmd and ccp leaders realized that when the war ended, a life-or-death battle between the two parties was probably inevitable. The ccp’s Diplomatic Initiative in Late 1944 and Early 1945 By the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, the balance of strength between the gmd and the ccp had swung further in the latter’s favor. The widespread corruption within Jiang’s government, the runaway inflation in the Nationalist-controlled areas,15 and the major military defeats of Nationalist troops in the face of the Japanese Ichi-go campaign16 combined to weaken significantly Jiang Jieshi’s stature as China’s wartime national leader. In comparison, the ccp had reached a level of strength and influence unprecedented since its establishment in 1921. By late 1944 and early 1945, the party claimed that it commanded a powerful military force of 900,000 regular troops and 900,000 militiamen, and that party membership had reached over one million.17 In the meantime, the party had gained valuable administrative experience through the buildup of base areas in central and northern China, and Mao Zedong, through the ‘‘Rectification Campaign,’’ had consolidated his control over the party’s strategy and policymaking.18 Under these circumstances, Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that with the continuous development of the party’s strength, it would occupy a stronger position to compete for political power in China at the end of the war against Japan. On several occasions, Mao asserted that ‘‘this time, we must take over China.’’19 To this end, the party adopted a series of new strategies in late 1944. In a political maneuver designed to challenge Jiang’s claim to a monopoly of political power in China, the ccp formally introduced the idea of replacing Jiang’s one-party dictatorship with a new coalition government including the ccp and other democratic parties.20 On the military side, the ccp leadership decided to dispatch the party’s best units to penetrate into the areas south of the Yangzi River, with the task of creating new base areas in south- 22 the rise of the cold war in east asia
ern China.In several inner-party directives,Mao Zedong made it clear that if the ccp could expand its "liberated zones"from the North to the South,the party would occupy a more favorable position in confronting the GMD after the war But the ccp adopted the most important initiative in the diplomatic field:perceiving that the United States would play an increasingly important role in China and East Asia,the party leadership decided to pursue a closer relationship with Washington.22 Since the early days of the war in the Pacific,the ccp had been pursuing an "international united front"with the United States for two main objec- tives:first,to"improve China's War of Resistance,"and second,to enable the ccp to use the United States to check the power of the Guomindang govern- ment.23 Not until late 1944 and early 1945,however,when policymakers in Washington were actively considering using China as a base for landing opera- tions in Japan,did the ccp find a real opportunity to approach the Americans. ccp leaders realized that by offering the party's assistance to American land- ing operations,it would not only reduce American suspicion of the Chinese Communists but also allow them to use America's influence to check Jiang's power.24 The ccp thus made every effort to expose the "darkness"of Jiang's government,while taking every opportunity to convince the Americans that the Chinese Communists were nationalists at the core,and that they favored "democratic reforms"in China.25 In July 1944,the "Dixie Mission,"agroup of American military observers,arrived in Yan'an,marking the first direct official contact between the U.S.government and the ccp26 At first,the ccp's new diplomatic strategy appeared to be working well.In June 1944,Roosevelt sent his vice president,Henry Wallace,to visit China to press Jiang toward conducting democratic reforms.27 In September 1944, a controversy erupted between Jiang and Joseph Stilwell,Jiang's American chief of staff,leading President Roosevelt to request that Jiang turn over"un- restricted command"of China's military forces to Stilwell.Thus a crisis de- veloped in the relationship between Chongqing,Jiang's wartime capital,and Washington.28 The ccp's"diplomatic victory,"however,was short-lived.Realizing that his controversy with General Stilwell threatened the very foundation of his au- thority and power,Jiang rebuffed President Roosevelt's request,and,conse- quently,General Stilwell was recalled in October.In the meantime,in order to prevent the ccp-GMD friction from compromising China's war effort against Japan,President Roosevelt sent Patrick Hurley to China to help mediate the problems between the two parties.In early November,Hurley reached a five- point draft agreement with the ccp leaders in Yan'an that favored the establish- THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 23
ern China. In several inner-party directives, Mao Zedong made it clear that if the ccp could expand its ‘‘liberated zones’’ from the North to the South, the party would occupy a more favorable position in confronting the gmd after the war.21 But the ccp adopted the most important initiative in the diplomatic field: perceiving that the United States would play an increasingly important role in China and East Asia, the party leadership decided to pursue a closer relationship with Washington.22 Since the early days of the war in the Pacific, the ccp had been pursuing an ‘‘international united front’’ with the United States for two main objectives: first, to ‘‘improve China’s War of Resistance,’’ and second, to enable the ccp to use the United States to check the power of the Guomindang government.23 Not until late 1944 and early 1945, however, when policymakers in Washington were actively considering using China as a base for landing operations in Japan, did the ccp find a real opportunity to approach the Americans. ccp leaders realized that by offering the party’s assistance to American landing operations, it would not only reduce American suspicion of the Chinese Communists but also allow them to use America’s influence to check Jiang’s power.24 The ccp thus made every effort to expose the ‘‘darkness’’ of Jiang’s government, while taking every opportunity to convince the Americans that the Chinese Communists were nationalists at the core, and that they favored ‘‘democratic reforms’’ in China.25In July 1944, the ‘‘Dixie Mission,’’ a group of American military observers, arrived in Yan’an, marking the first direct official contact between the U.S. government and the ccp. 26 At first, the ccp’s new diplomatic strategy appeared to be working well. In June 1944, Roosevelt sent his vice president, Henry Wallace, to visit China to press Jiang toward conducting democratic reforms.27 In September 1944, a controversy erupted between Jiang and Joseph Stilwell, Jiang’s American chief of staff, leading President Roosevelt to request that Jiang turn over ‘‘unrestricted command’’ of China’s military forces to Stilwell. Thus a crisis developed in the relationship between Chongqing, Jiang’s wartime capital, and Washington.28 The ccp’s ‘‘diplomatic victory,’’ however, was short-lived. Realizing that his controversy with General Stilwell threatened the very foundation of his authority and power, Jiang rebuffed President Roosevelt’s request, and, consequently, General Stilwell was recalled in October. In the meantime, in order to prevent the ccp-gmd friction from compromising China’s war effort against Japan, President Roosevelt sent Patrick Hurley to China to help mediate the problems between the two parties. In early November, Hurley reached a fivepoint draft agreement with the ccp leaders in Yan’an that favored the establishthe rise of the cold war in east asia 23
ment of a coalition government.2 But when Hurley learned that Jiang firmly rejected the five-point agreement,especially the part concerning the coalition government,he agreed to a three-point plan proposed by Jiang.According to the plan,the ccp would need to earn its legal status by turning over control of its military forces to the GMD government.30 ccp leaders were genuinely offended by Hurley's"deceptive abandonment" of the five-point agreement.They rejected the three-point plan and angrily denounced Hurley as untrustworthy.3 Early in 1945,Mao personally directed a ccp propaganda campaign to criticize Washington's policy toward China. In April 1945,Hurley announced in Washington that the U.S.government fully supported the GMD and would not cooperate with the ccp.In an inner- party directive issued on7July 1945,the ccp leadership made it clear that the party would adopt a position of "opposing the mistaken U.S.China policy(a policy of supporting Jiang,opposing the Communists,and guarding against the Soviet Union)"and "challenging those imperialists within the U.S.gov- ernment(such as Hurley)."32 Underlying the ccp's harsh attitude toward the United States was a pro- found belief that the international situation was turning increasingly in the party's favor.With the Soviet Red Army's rapid advance in Europe early in 1945,Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet Union would soon become a central actor in East Asian politics.Early in February 1945, Stalin informed Mao of the convening of the Yalta Conference,which con- vinced the ccp chairman that"the possibility of the Soviet Union's voice in determining important Eastern affairs has increased."Mao thus judged that "under such circumstances,both the United States and Jiang would try to reach political compromises with us."33 Furthermore,Mao and his comrades believed that the Americans still needed the ccp's help,both logistical and operational,in conducting the counteroffensive against Japan from northern China.34 As a result,ccp leaders felt that the party was in a position to chal- lenge America's pro-Jiang policy. In the Vortex of Big-Power Politics Big-power politics,however,were much more complicated than Mao and his comrades perceived them to be.At the Yalta Conference,Stalin gained Roosevelt's promise that all former Russian rights and privileges lost to Japan during the 1904 Russo-Japanese War,including those in Manchuria,would be restored to the Soviet Union,and,in return,Stalin agreed to enter the war in Asia within two to three months of Germany's defeat.As part of the Yalta compromises,Stalin also promised Roosevelt that he would not support the 24 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
ment of a coalition government.29 But when Hurley learned that Jiang firmly rejected the five-point agreement, especially the part concerning the coalition government, he agreed to a three-point plan proposed by Jiang. According to the plan, the ccp would need to earn its legal status by turning over control of its military forces to the gmd government.30 ccp leaders were genuinely offended by Hurley’s ‘‘deceptive abandonment’’ of the five-point agreement. They rejected the three-point plan and angrily denounced Hurley as untrustworthy.31 Early in 1945, Mao personally directed a ccp propaganda campaign to criticize Washington’s policy toward China. In April 1945, Hurley announced in Washington that the U.S. government fully supported the gmd and would not cooperate with the ccp. In an innerparty directive issued on 7 July 1945, the ccp leadership made it clear that the party would adopt a position of ‘‘opposing the mistaken U.S. China policy (a policy of supporting Jiang, opposing the Communists, and guarding against the Soviet Union)’’ and ‘‘challenging those imperialists within the U.S. government (such as Hurley).’’32 Underlying the ccp’s harsh attitude toward the United States was a profound belief that the international situation was turning increasingly in the party’s favor. With the Soviet Red Army’s rapid advance in Europe early in 1945, Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet Union would soon become a central actor in East Asian politics. Early in February 1945, Stalin informed Mao of the convening of the Yalta Conference, which convinced the ccp chairman that ‘‘the possibility of the Soviet Union’s voice in determining important Eastern affairs has increased.’’ Mao thus judged that ‘‘under such circumstances, both the United States and Jiang would try to reach political compromises with us.’’33 Furthermore, Mao and his comrades believed that the Americans still needed the ccp’s help, both logistical and operational, in conducting the counteroffensive against Japan from northern China.34 As a result, ccp leaders felt that the party was in a position to challenge America’s pro-Jiang policy. In the Vortex of Big-Power Politics Big-power politics, however, were much more complicated than Mao and his comrades perceived them to be. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin gained Roosevelt’s promise that all former Russian rights and privileges lost to Japan during the 1904 Russo-JapaneseWar, including those in Manchuria, would be restored to the Soviet Union, and, in return, Stalin agreed to enter the war in Asia within two to three months of Germany’s defeat. As part of the Yalta compromises, Stalin also promised Roosevelt that he would not support the 24 the rise of the cold war in east asia
ccp in China's internal conflict.35 Roosevelt informed Jiang of the main con- tents of the Yalta agreement after the meeting,6 but Stalin did not brief the ccp leaders on the deal he had made with Roosevelt.For the Russian dictator, the strategic interests of the Soviet Union were more important than those of his Chinese Communist comrades. Since ccp leaders did not know the details of the Yalta agreement,they con- tinued to base their strategies for preparing for a showdown with the GMD on the assumption that the Soviets'entry into the anti-Japanese war would enhance the party's position in China.On 18 April 1945,two weeks after Mos- cow announced the abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty,Mao signed an important inner-party directive.The document pointed out that since the date of Soviet entry into the anti-Japanese war was approaching,the international situation in the Far East was undergoing fundamental changes. The main task of the ccp military forces would soon be to cooperate with the military operations of the Soviet Red Army.37 From 23 April to June 1945, the ccp convened its Seventh Congress in Yan'an.In his speech to the con- gress,titled"On the Coalition Government,"Mao argued that only the Soviet Union's direct entry into the anti-Japanese war would bring about "the final and thorough solution of the Pacific problem."He warned the British and American governments"not to follow a China policy that violated the Chi- nese people's will."Reviewing the ccp's development in political influence and military strength during the war years,Mao announced that the ccp"had al- ready become the center of the Chinese people's cause of liberation."38 In his concluding remarks to the congress,Mao further emphasized that the inter- national aid(the Soviet aid)to the Chinese revolution would come,and he even joked that"if it fails to come,I will let you have my head." At almost the same time that the ccp was holding its Seventh Congress,the GMD was convening its Sixth National Congress from 5 to 2I May in Chong- qing.Jiang asserted at the congress that "Japan is our enemy abroad,and the CCp is our enemy at home"and that"our central problem today is how to de- stroy the ccp."40 In order to cope with the ccp's increasing military strength and political influence,Jiang planned to convene a national affairs conference and a national assembly to confound the ccp's plans for a coalition govern- ment.#In the meantime,he ordered GMD forces to strengthen the blockade of the ccp's"liberated areas."42 Anticipating that the Soviet Union would soon enter the war in the Far East,Jiang made great efforts to reach agreements with Stalin.Early in July,Jiang sent T.V.Soong,his brother-in-law,to Mos- cow to meet Stalin.Stalin agreed to support Jiang as China's only leader and not to aid the ccp,but he also asked for several vital concessions from the GMD THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA 25
ccp in China’s internal conflict.35 Roosevelt informed Jiang of the main contents of the Yalta agreement after the meeting,36 but Stalin did not brief the ccp leaders on the deal he had made with Roosevelt. For the Russian dictator, the strategic interests of the Soviet Union were more important than those of his Chinese Communist comrades. Since ccp leaders did not know the details of the Yalta agreement, they continued to base their strategies for preparing for a showdown with the gmd on the assumption that the Soviets’ entry into the anti-Japanese war would enhance the party’s position in China. On 18 April 1945, two weeks after Moscow announced the abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty, Mao signed an important inner-party directive. The document pointed out that since the date of Soviet entry into the anti-Japanese war was approaching, the international situation in the Far East was undergoing fundamental changes. The main task of the ccp military forces would soon be to cooperate with the military operations of the Soviet Red Army.37 From 23 April to 11 June 1945, the ccp convened its Seventh Congress in Yan’an. In his speech to the congress, titled ‘‘On the Coalition Government,’’ Mao argued that only the Soviet Union’s direct entry into the anti-Japanese war would bring about ‘‘the final and thorough solution of the Pacific problem.’’ He warned the British and American governments ‘‘not to follow a China policy that violated the Chinese people’s will.’’ Reviewing the ccp’s development in political influence and military strength during the war years, Mao announced that the ccp ‘‘had already become the center of the Chinese people’s cause of liberation.’’38 In his concluding remarks to the congress, Mao further emphasized that the international aid (the Soviet aid) to the Chinese revolution would come, and he even joked that ‘‘if it fails to come, I will let you have my head.’’39 At almost the same time that the ccp was holding its Seventh Congress, the gmd was convening its Sixth National Congress from 5 to 21 May in Chongqing. Jiang asserted at the congress that ‘‘Japan is our enemy abroad, and the ccp is our enemy at home’’ and that ‘‘our central problem today is how to destroy the ccp.’’40 In order to cope with the ccp’s increasing military strength and political influence, Jiang planned to convene a national affairs conference and a national assembly to confound the ccp’s plans for a coalition government.41 In the meantime, he ordered gmd forces to strengthen the blockade of the ccp’s ‘‘liberated areas.’’42 Anticipating that the Soviet Union would soon enter the war in the Far East, Jiang made great efforts to reach agreements with Stalin. Early in July, Jiang sent T. V. Soong, his brother-in-law, to Moscow to meet Stalin. Stalin agreed to support Jiang as China’s only leader and not to aid the ccp, but he also asked for several vital concessions from the gmd the rise of the cold war in east asia 25
government,including the recognition of the independence of Outer Mon- golia and Soviet privileges in Manchuria.Jiang had sincerely hoped to reach an agreement with Stalin,but he now found the price too high.The meeting adjourned in mid-July since Stalin had to attend the Potsdam Conference.+3 Even at this late stage of the war,neither the ccp nor the GMD foresaw that the war against Japan would end soon.In a telegram dated I5 June 1945,Mao and the ccp Central Committee predicted that"the War of Resistance against Japan will not reach its final stage this year,and dramatic changes are likely the next year."44 As late as 4 August,the ccp leadership still claimed in an inner- party directive that"our estimate is that the Japanese bandits will be defeated by the winter of 1946."Accordingly,the ccp leaders believed that the party "would have about one year's time to make preparations"for an"inevitable civil war"after Japan's defeat.+5 Japan's Surrender and Stalin's "Betrayal"of the ccp On 6 and 9 August,the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on Hiro- shima and Nagasaki.On 8 August,the Soviet Red Army entered the war in the East,and on o August,Japan first offered to surrender to the Allies.It was ap- parent that China's war against Japan had come to its conclusion,and the ccp leadership acted immediately to deal with this new situation.On 9 August,one day after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan,Mao Zedong ordered the Communist forces to go all out to"cooperate with the Soviet Red Army"in the final battle to liberate China's lost territory from Japanese occupation.+6Two days later,Zhu De,commander-in-chief of the ccp's military forces,ordered CCP troops to occupy important cities and transportation links in central and northern China and,particularly,in the Northeast.+7 In an inner-party directive dated August,Mao emphasized that the end of the war against Japan would most probably be followed by a civil war with the Nationalists.He anticipated that after destroying the Japanese and puppet troops,"the GMD would start an overall offensive against our party and our troops,"and that the outcome of the civil war would be determined by the ex- tent to which the ccp had prepared for it.He therefore instructed ccp cadres and military commanders to abandon any illusion of peace between the ccp and the GMD and to "gather our forces in order to prepare for the civil war."48 Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet Union's entry into the war had created favorable conditions for the ccp to fight a renewed civil war.Although they knew that representatives from the GMD and the Soviet Union were conducting negotiations in Moscow,and that the negotiations might lead to a treaty between the GMD and Soviet governments,they tended 26 THE RISE OF THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
government, including the recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia and Soviet privileges in Manchuria. Jiang had sincerely hoped to reach an agreement with Stalin, but he now found the price too high. The meeting adjourned in mid-July since Stalin had to attend the Potsdam Conference.43 Even at this late stage of the war, neither the ccp nor the gmd foresaw that the war against Japan would end soon. In a telegram dated 15 June 1945, Mao and the ccp Central Committee predicted that ‘‘theWar of Resistance against Japan will not reach its final stage this year, and dramatic changes are likely the next year.’’44 As late as 4 August, the ccp leadership still claimed in an innerparty directive that ‘‘our estimate is that the Japanese bandits will be defeated by the winter of 1946.’’ Accordingly, the ccp leaders believed that the party ‘‘would have about one year’s time to make preparations’’ for an ‘‘inevitable civil war’’ after Japan’s defeat.45 Japan’s Surrender and Stalin’s ‘‘Betrayal’’ of the ccp On 6 and 9 August, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On 8 August, the Soviet Red Army entered the war in the East, and on 10 August, Japan first offered to surrender to the Allies. It was apparent that China’s war against Japan had come to its conclusion, and the ccp leadership acted immediately to deal with this new situation. On 9 August, one day after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, Mao Zedong ordered the Communist forces to go all out to ‘‘cooperate with the Soviet Red Army’’ in the final battle to liberate China’s lost territory from Japanese occupation.46 Two days later, Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the ccp’s military forces, ordered ccp troops to occupy important cities and transportation links in central and northern China and, particularly, in the Northeast.47 In an inner-party directive dated 11 August, Mao emphasized that the end of the war against Japan would most probably be followed by a civil war with the Nationalists. He anticipated that after destroying the Japanese and puppet troops, ‘‘the gmd would start an overall offensive against our party and our troops,’’ and that the outcome of the civil war would be determined by the extent to which the ccp had prepared for it. He therefore instructed ccp cadres and military commanders to abandon any illusion of peace between the ccp and the gmd and to ‘‘gather our forces in order to prepare for the civil war.’’48 Mao and his fellow ccp leaders believed that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war had created favorable conditions for the ccp to fight a renewed civil war. Although they knew that representatives from the gmd and the Soviet Union were conducting negotiations in Moscow, and that the negotiations might lead to a treaty between the gmd and Soviet governments, they tended 26 the rise of the cold war in east asia