上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Mao Zedong and China_Mao's China and the Cold war

revolutionary foreign policy further served as an effective-and probably the only available-way through which Mao could enhance both his authority and the legitimacy of his continuous revolution. The role of revolutionary foreign policy in Mao's continuous revolution must be understood in the context of the Chinese people's"victim mentality" and its connections to the age-old Central Kingdom concept so important in China's history and culture.During modern times,the Chinese people's per- ception of their nation's position in the world was continuously informed by a conviction that political incursion,economic exploitation,and military ag- gression by foreign imperialist countries had undermined the historical glory of the Chinese civilization and humiliated the Chinese nation.Consequently, a victim mentality gradually dominated the Chinese conceptualization of its relations with the outside world. Indeed,this mentality is extraordinary.While it is common for non- Western countries to identify themselves as victims of the Western-dominated worldwide course of modernization,the Chinese perception of their nation being a victimized member of the international community is unique,because it formed such a sharp contrast with the long-lived Central Kingdom concept. The Chinese thus felt that their nation's modern experience was more humili- ating and less tolerable than that of any other victimized non-Western country in the world,and they firmly believed that China's victim status would not end until its weaknesses had been turned into strength.So they willingly embraced Mao's revolutionary programs aimed at reviving China's central position in the world. The central role China's foreign policy played in Mao's revolution drove the ccp leadership to adopt a highly centralized decision-making structure in external affairs.The political institutions of Mao's China were characterized by tight central control;but the control over foreign policymaking certainly was the tightest.As early as August 1944,when the ccp Central Committee issued the first comprehensive inner-party directive on diplomatic affairs,Mao made it clear that party organs and cadres must not take action in diplomatic affairs without Central Committee authorization.22 On the eve of Commu- nist seizure of power,Mao stressed that"there existed no insignificant mat- ter in diplomatic affairs,and everything should be reported to and decided by the Central Committee."23 After the PRC's establishment,Mao further con- firmed that the politburo,the Central Secretariat,and,indeed,Mao himself, controlled the decision-making power.The missions of the Foreign Ministry, headed by Premier Zhou Enlai from 1949 to 1958,were defined as keeping I2 INTRODUCTION

revolutionary foreign policy further served as an effective—and probably the only available—way through which Mao could enhance both his authority and the legitimacy of his continuous revolution. The role of revolutionary foreign policy in Mao’s continuous revolution must be understood in the context of the Chinese people’s ‘‘victim mentality’’ and its connections to the age-old Central Kingdom concept so important in China’s history and culture. During modern times, the Chinese people’s per￾ception of their nation’s position in the world was continuously informed by a conviction that political incursion, economic exploitation, and military ag￾gression by foreign imperialist countries had undermined the historical glory of the Chinese civilization and humiliated the Chinese nation. Consequently, a victim mentality gradually dominated the Chinese conceptualization of its relations with the outside world. Indeed, this mentality is extraordinary. While it is common for non￾Western countries to identify themselves as victims of theWestern-dominated worldwide course of modernization, the Chinese perception of their nation being a victimized member of the international community is unique, because it formed such a sharp contrast with the long-lived Central Kingdom concept. The Chinese thus felt that their nation’s modern experience was more humili￾ating and less tolerable than that of any other victimized non-Western country in the world, and they firmly believed that China’s victim status would not end until its weaknesses had been turned into strength. So they willingly embraced Mao’s revolutionary programs aimed at reviving China’s central position in the world. The central role China’s foreign policy played in Mao’s revolution drove the ccp leadership to adopt a highly centralized decision-making structure in external affairs. The political institutions of Mao’s China were characterized by tight central control; but the control over foreign policymaking certainly was the tightest. As early as August 1944, when the ccp Central Committee issued the first comprehensive inner-party directive on diplomatic affairs, Mao made it clear that party organs and cadres must not take action in diplomatic affairs without Central Committee authorization.22 On the eve of Commu￾nist seizure of power, Mao stressed that ‘‘there existed no insignificant mat￾ter in diplomatic affairs, and everything should be reported to and decided by the Central Committee.’’23 After the prc’s establishment, Mao further con- firmed that the politburo, the Central Secretariat, and, indeed, Mao himself, controlled the decision-making power. The missions of the Foreign Ministry, headed by Premier Zhou Enlai from 1949 to 1958, were defined as keeping 12 introduction

the central leadership well informed of China's external situation and carry- ing out the central leadership's decisions.24Under these circumstances,even Zhou Enlai became more a policy carrier than a policymaker.2s During the Cultural Revolution years,this highly centralized foreign policy structure be- came more rigid when Foreign Minister Chen Yi lost virtually all power.For a time even the politburo did not matter,since the real power fell into the hands of the"Cultural Revolution Group,"the institutional instrument Mao created to implement the Cultural Revolution.26 Because of Mao's perception of the Chinese revolution's sacred mission, which was reinforced by the Chinese victim mentality,he and his comrades were filled with an exceptional sense of insecurity throughout the twenty- seven years he ruled China.In general,it is understandable that,in the divided Cold War world in which peace and stability had been severely threatened by factors such as the emergence of nuclear weapons and the intensifying con- frontation between the two superpowers,any country would feel less secure than ever before.Mao's sense of insecurity,however,was special in several respects. First,the ambitious hope on the part of Mao and the ccp leadership to change China into a central international actor conflicted with China's power status,which was still weak during the Maoist era.As long as Mao and his comrades were determined to chart their own course in the world and to make China a prominent world power,they would continue to feel insecure until China's weakness had been turned into strength. Second,since Mao and the ccp leadership emphasized the central role the Chinese revolution was to play in promoting the worldwide proletarian revo- lution,thus making China the primaryenemy of world reactionary forces,they logically felt that they faced a very threatening world.The more Mao and his comrades stressed the significance of the Chinese revolution,the less secure they would feel in face of perceived threats from the outside world. Third,Mao made this insecurity more serious when he highlighted inter- national tension and treated it as a useful tool for domestic mobilization. Through anti-foreign-imperialist propaganda,Mao and his comrades used foreign threats to mobilize the Chinese masses.This propaganda,in turn, would inevitably cause a deepening sense of insecurity on the part of Mao and his comrades. Hence,in the practical process of policymaking,Beijing broadly defined the threats to China's national security interests.Compared with policymakers in other countries,Beijing's leaders in the Maoist era were under great pressure INTRODUCTION B3

the central leadership well informed of China’s external situation and carry￾ing out the central leadership’s decisions.24 Under these circumstances, even Zhou Enlai became more a policy carrier than a policymaker.25 During the Cultural Revolution years, this highly centralized foreign policy structure be￾came more rigid when Foreign Minister Chen Yi lost virtually all power. For a time even the politburo did not matter, since the real power fell into the hands of the ‘‘Cultural Revolution Group,’’ the institutional instrument Mao created to implement the Cultural Revolution.26 Because of Mao’s perception of the Chinese revolution’s sacred mission, which was reinforced by the Chinese victim mentality, he and his comrades were filled with an exceptional sense of insecurity throughout the twenty￾seven years he ruled China. In general, it is understandable that, in the divided Cold War world in which peace and stability had been severely threatened by factors such as the emergence of nuclear weapons and the intensifying con￾frontation between the two superpowers, any country would feel less secure than ever before. Mao’s sense of insecurity, however, was special in several respects. First, the ambitious hope on the part of Mao and the ccp leadership to change China into a central international actor conflicted with China’s power status, which was still weak during the Maoist era. As long as Mao and his comrades were determined to chart their own course in the world and to make China a prominent world power, they would continue to feel insecure until China’s weakness had been turned into strength. Second, since Mao and the ccp leadership emphasized the central role the Chinese revolution was to play in promoting the worldwide proletarian revo￾lution, thus making China the primary enemy of world reactionary forces, they logically felt that they faced a very threatening world. The more Mao and his comrades stressed the significance of the Chinese revolution, the less secure they would feel in face of perceived threats from the outside world. Third, Mao made this insecurity more serious when he highlighted inter￾national tension and treated it as a useful tool for domestic mobilization. Through anti-foreign-imperialist propaganda, Mao and his comrades used foreign threats to mobilize the Chinese masses. This propaganda, in turn, would inevitably cause a deepening sense of insecurity on the part of Mao and his comrades. Hence, in the practical process of policymaking, Beijing broadly defined the threats to China’s national security interests. Compared with policymakers in other countries, Beijing’s leaders in the Maoist era were under great pressure introduction 13

to take extraordinary steps to defend and promote revolutionary China's secu- rity interests.This explains to a large extent why the PRC frequently resorted to violence in dealing with foreign policy crises.27 Because of the domestic mobilization function Mao attached to China's external policies,Beijing's use of force during the Maoist period was charac- terized by three distinctive and consistent patterns.First,Beijing's leaders re- sorted to force only when the confrontation was in one way or another related to China's territorial integrity and physical security.Even when China's pur- pose in entering a military confrontation was broader than the simple defense of its border(such as during the Korean War),Beijing's leaders always em- phasized that they had exercised the military option because China's physical security was in jeopardy.8 When China's involvement in a military confronta- tion resulted in its occupation of foreign territory,such as during the Chinese- Indian border war of 1962,Beijing's leaders ordered a retreat in order to prove that China's war aims were no more than the defense of China's borders. Second,Beijing's leaders used force always for the purpose of domestic mobilization.Mao and his comrades fully understood that the tension cre- ated by an international crisis provided them with the best means to call the whole nation to act in accordance with the will and terms of the ccp.This was particularly true when Mao met with difficulty in pushing the party and the nation to carry out his continuous-revolution programs.As shown in Chap- ter 7,Mao's decision to shell Jinmen in the summer of 1958 was closely re- lated to a nationwide wave of mass mobilization,which made it possible for the Great Leap Forward to reach a high point.On the eve of the Cultural Revolu- tion,as discussed in Chapter 8,China's involvement in the Vietnam War and the extensive mass mobilization that accompanied it created an atmosphere conducive to the rapid radicalization of China's political and social life. Third,Beijing's leaders used force only when they believed that they were in a position to justify it in a "moral"sense.If they did not morally justify their actions,the mobilization effect they hoped to achieve would be compro- mised.During the Korean War,the Beijing leadership's public war aims,"De- fend our nation!Defend our home!"and "Defeat American arrogance!"were established as central mobilization slogans.During China's involvement in the Vietnam War,Mao compared the relationship between Vietnam and China to that between "lips and teeth,"emphasizing that China had an obligation to proletarian internationalism to support the just struggle of the Vietnamese people."Justice,"indeed,became the talisman of China's international mili- tary involvement during the Cold War. 14 INTRODUCTION

to take extraordinary steps to defend and promote revolutionary China’s secu￾rity interests. This explains to a large extent why the prc frequently resorted to violence in dealing with foreign policy crises.27 Because of the domestic mobilization function Mao attached to China’s external policies, Beijing’s use of force during the Maoist period was charac￾terized by three distinctive and consistent patterns. First, Beijing’s leaders re￾sorted to force only when the confrontation was in one way or another related to China’s territorial integrity and physical security. Even when China’s pur￾pose in entering a military confrontation was broader than the simple defense of its border (such as during the Korean War), Beijing’s leaders always em￾phasized that they had exercised the military option because China’s physical security was in jeopardy.28 When China’s involvement in a military confronta￾tion resulted in its occupation of foreign territory, such as during the Chinese￾Indian border war of 1962, Beijing’s leaders ordered a retreat in order to prove that China’s war aims were no more than the defense of China’s borders. Second, Beijing’s leaders used force always for the purpose of domestic mobilization. Mao and his comrades fully understood that the tension cre￾ated by an international crisis provided them with the best means to call the whole nation to act in accordance with the will and terms of the ccp. This was particularly true when Mao met with difficulty in pushing the party and the nation to carry out his continuous-revolution programs. As shown in Chap￾ter 7, Mao’s decision to shell Jinmen in the summer of 1958 was closely re￾lated to a nationwide wave of mass mobilization, which made it possible for the Great Leap Forward to reach a high point. On the eve of the Cultural Revolu￾tion, as discussed in Chapter 8, China’s involvement in the Vietnam War and the extensive mass mobilization that accompanied it created an atmosphere conducive to the rapid radicalization of China’s political and social life. Third, Beijing’s leaders used force only when they believed that they were in a position to justify it in a ‘‘moral’’ sense. If they did not morally justify their actions, the mobilization effect they hoped to achieve would be compro￾mised. During the Korean War, the Beijing leadership’s public war aims, ‘‘De￾fend our nation! Defend our home!’’ and ‘‘Defeat American arrogance!’’ were established as central mobilization slogans. During China’s involvement in the Vietnam War, Mao compared the relationship between Vietnam and China to that between ‘‘lips and teeth,’’ emphasizing that China had an obligation to proletarian internationalism to support the just struggle of the Vietnamese people. ‘‘Justice,’’ indeed, became the talisman of China’s international mili￾tary involvement during the Cold War. 14 introduction

China's external behavior during the Maoist era was a contradictory phe- nomenon.Despite its tendency toward using force,Mao's China was not an expansionist power.It is essential to make a distinction between the pursuit of centrality and the pursuit of dominance in international affairs in terms of the fundamental goal of Chinese foreign policy.While Mao and his comrades were never shy about using force in pursuing China's foreign policy goals,what they hoped to achieve was not the expansion of China's political and military control of foreign territory or resources-which was,for Mao and his com- rades,too inferior an aim-but,rather,the spread of their influence to other "hearts and minds"around the world.Mao fully understood that only when China's superior moral position in the world had been recognized by other peoples would the consolidation of his continuous revolution's momentum at home be assured. A Brief Note on Sources The studies in this volume are supported by fresh Chinese sources made available in recent years.They include collections of party documents and leaders'papers,memoirs and diaries by those who were involved in China's Cold War decision making or implementation,scholarly articles and mono- graphs by Chinese researchers and research institutions with less restricted ar- chival access,official and semiofficial publications using classified documents, and oral history interviews.29On a limited scale,these studies also have used documents obtained from Beijing's ccp Central Archives and various pro- vincial and regional archives(including Xinjiang,Jilin,Guangxi,Fujian,and Shanghai).While these new sources are valuable in the sense that they have created previously nonexistent research opportunities,it is also clear that they were made available to scholars on a selective basis and,sometimes,by a desire other than to have the truth known.Fully realizing the limitations that re- stricted access to original historical documentation places on this study,I have tried to treat my sources critically.In particular,I have made every effort to double-check information provided by these sources,and,whenever neces- sary,in the notes I identify dubious sources or discrepancies in sources. In the introduction to his acclaimed study on the international history of the Korean War,renowned Cold War historian William Stueck confesses that in completing his book he was dominated by "a feeling of humility over the realization of how little I know about the Korean War,of how much remains to be done by those who will follow me."3 I am feeling even more humble. Much about Mao's China is yet to be studied.I plan to continue my schol- INTRODUCTION IS

China’s external behavior during the Maoist era was a contradictory phe￾nomenon. Despite its tendency toward using force, Mao’s China was not an expansionist power. It is essential to make a distinction between the pursuit of centrality and the pursuit of dominance in international affairs in terms of the fundamental goal of Chinese foreign policy.While Mao and his comrades were never shy about using force in pursuing China’s foreign policy goals, what they hoped to achieve was not the expansion of China’s political and military control of foreign territory or resources—which was, for Mao and his com￾rades, too inferior an aim—but, rather, the spread of their influence to other ‘‘hearts and minds’’ around the world. Mao fully understood that only when China’s superior moral position in the world had been recognized by other peoples would the consolidation of his continuous revolution’s momentum at home be assured. A Brief Note on Sources The studies in this volume are supported by fresh Chinese sources made available in recent years. They include collections of party documents and leaders’ papers, memoirs and diaries by those who were involved in China’s Cold War decision making or implementation, scholarly articles and mono￾graphs by Chinese researchers and research institutions with less restricted ar￾chival access, official and semiofficial publications using classified documents, and oral history interviews.29 On a limited scale, these studies also have used documents obtained from Beijing’s ccp Central Archives and various pro￾vincial and regional archives (including Xinjiang, Jilin, Guangxi, Fujian, and Shanghai). While these new sources are valuable in the sense that they have created previously nonexistent research opportunities, it is also clear that they were made available to scholars on a selective basis and, sometimes, by a desire other than to have the truth known. Fully realizing the limitations that re￾stricted access to original historical documentation places on this study, I have tried to treat my sources critically. In particular, I have made every effort to double-check information provided by these sources, and, whenever neces￾sary, in the notes I identify dubious sources or discrepancies in sources. In the introduction to his acclaimed study on the international history of the KoreanWar, renowned Cold War historianWilliam Stueck confesses that in completing his book he was dominated by ‘‘a feeling of humility over the realization of how little I know about the Korean War, of how much remains to be done by those who will follow me.’’30 I am feeling even more humble. Much about Mao’s China is yet to be studied. I plan to continue my schol￾introduction 15

arly endeavor by conducting a more comprehensive study on how Mao's China encountered the world.To what extent the new project will be successful will depend,again,upon further opening of Chinese archival sources.Indeed, only when scholars-both Chinese and non-Chinese-are able to conduct free academic inquiries with the support of unrestricted archival access will more authentic and a deeper understanding about China become possible. 16 INTRODUCTION

arly endeavor by conducting a more comprehensive study on how Mao’s China encountered the world.31 To what extent the new project will be successful will depend, again, upon further opening of Chinese archival sources. Indeed, only when scholars—both Chinese and non-Chinese—are able to conduct free academic inquiries with the support of unrestricted archival access will more authentic and a deeper understanding about China become possible. 16 introduction