上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Mao Zedong and China_Mao's China and the Cold war

ideology served as a central force to unite Communist states and parties in the world.After World War II,when national identity consciousness was stronger than ever before,this force did not produce a monolithic international Com- munist movement with Moscow as its supreme headquarters;but it did create, and in turn was enhanced by,a profound conviction among Communists all over the world that "history is on our side,"thus allowing them to pose a seri- ous challenge to international capitalism,while,at the same time,constructing the moral foundation on which the"socialist camp"was established.It should also be pointed out that,forty years later,the final collapse of this conviction led to the dismantling of the socialist camp and,in the wake of that,the end of the Cold War. As far as the external policies of Mao's China are concerned,the role played by ideology is evident.The ccp leadership adopted the"lean-to-one-side"ap- proach when it established the People's Republic of China(PRC),which,in a practical political sense,meant allying China with the Soviet Union as well as other socialist countries and confronting the Western "imperialist powers."In October 195o,only one year after the Communists seized power in China,the ccp leadership decided to enter the Korean War.In a series of internal discus- sions and correspondence,Mao used highly ideological language to argue that if China failed to intervene,the "Eastern revolution"and the world revolu- tion would suffer.6 Throughout the r9sos and 196os,Beijing's foreign policy consistently demonstrated a strong ideological color.For example,in October 1956,the ccp leadership urged Moscow to suppress the"reactionary rebel- lion"in Hungary for the sake of the international Communist movement.7In the mid-196os,Beijing,under the banner of fulfilling China's duties of"prole- tarian internationalism,"provided Vietnamese Communists with substantial support,including the dispatch of320,oo0 Chinese engineering and antiair- craft troops to North Vietnam in 1965-69.18 All of these developments clearly suggest that the role of ideology in Beijing's external policies cannot be over- looked. In a deeper sense,ideology's impact upon China's Cold War experience is reflected in Mao's"continuous revolution"as his central theme in shaping Chinese foreign policyand security strategy.Mao's revolution never took as its ultimate goal the Communist seizure of power in China;rather,as the chair- man repeatedly made clear,his revolution aimed at transforming China's state, population,and society,and simultaneously reasserting China's central posi- tion in the world.The domestic and international goals of the revolution were deeply connected.On the one hand,it was precisely by virtue of the revolu- tion's domestic mission that the revolution's international aim became justi- INTRODUCTION 7

ideology served as a central force to unite Communist states and parties in the world. AfterWorld War II, when national identity consciousness was stronger than ever before, this force did not produce a monolithic international Com￾munist movement with Moscow as its supreme headquarters; but it did create, and in turn was enhanced by, a profound conviction among Communists all over the world that ‘‘history is on our side,’’ thus allowing them to pose a seri￾ous challenge to international capitalism, while, at the same time, constructing the moral foundation on which the ‘‘socialist camp’’ was established. It should also be pointed out that, forty years later, the final collapse of this conviction led to the dismantling of the socialist camp and, in the wake of that, the end of the Cold War. As far as the external policies of Mao’s China are concerned, the role played by ideology is evident. The ccp leadership adopted the ‘‘lean-to-one-side’’ ap￾proach when it established the People’s Republic of China (prc), which, in a practical political sense, meant allying China with the Soviet Union as well as other socialist countries and confronting theWestern ‘‘imperialist powers.’’ In October 1950, only one year after the Communists seized power in China, the ccp leadership decided to enter the Korean War. In a series of internal discus￾sions and correspondence, Mao used highly ideological language to argue that if China failed to intervene, the ‘‘Eastern revolution’’ and the world revolu￾tion would suffer.16 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing’s foreign policy consistently demonstrated a strong ideological color. For example, in October 1956, the ccp leadership urged Moscow to suppress the ‘‘reactionary rebel￾lion’’ in Hungary for the sake of the international Communist movement.17 In the mid-1960s, Beijing, under the banner of fulfilling China’s duties of ‘‘prole￾tarian internationalism,’’ provided Vietnamese Communists with substantial support, including the dispatch of 320,000 Chinese engineering and antiair￾craft troops to North Vietnam in 1965–69.18 All of these developments clearly suggest that the role of ideology in Beijing’s external policies cannot be over￾looked. In a deeper sense, ideology’s impact upon China’s Cold War experience is reflected in Mao’s ‘‘continuous revolution’’ as his central theme in shaping Chinese foreign policy and security strategy. Mao’s revolution never took as its ultimate goal the Communist seizure of power in China; rather, as the chair￾man repeatedly made clear, his revolution aimed at transforming China’s state, population, and society, and simultaneously reasserting China’s central posi￾tion in the world. The domestic and international goals of the revolution were deeply connected. On the one hand, it was precisely by virtue of the revolu￾tion’s domestic mission that the revolution’s international aim became justi￾introduction 7

fied;on the other hand,the international aspect of the revolution served as a constant source of domestic mobilization,helping to legitimate the revolu- tion at home and to maintain its momentum.Mao's and his comrades'belief in Marxist-Leninist ideology was always interwoven with their devotion to using ideology as a means to transform China's state,its society,and its international outlook.This belief stood at the core of their conceptual realm,providing legitimacy to the Chinese Communist revolution. It is here we see the complicated interplay between the Mao generation's conversion to Communist ideology and its continuous exposure to the influ- ence of China's age-old history and culture.At a glance,the two experiences are contradictory.As twentieth-century revolutionaries,Mao and his com- rades were highly critical of the Chinese past,declaring that their revolution would render a thorough transformation of China's"old"state,society,and culture.But when Mao and his comrades were posing challenges to the Chi- nese past,the ideology on which they depended as the lodestar and guiding philosophy for the transformation had to be articulated through the discourse, symbols,norms,and identities that had been a part of the Chinese past.Con- sequently,a profound continuity existed between the Mao generation's revo- lutionary behavior and the"old"China they meant to destroy.In this regard,a conspicuous example is the impact that the age-old"Central Kingdom"men- tality had on Mao and his comrades.Their aspiration for promoting a world proletarian revolution by following the model of China revealed unmistakably how deeply their conceptual realm had been penetrated by that mentality. The message delivered here is of broad theoretical significance:in a cross- cultural environment,the creation,transmission,and representation of an ideological belief must be subjected to the definition and interpretation of the discourse,symbols,norms,and values that formed a particular actor's histori- cally/culturally bound conceptual lens.The outcome of the process could lead either to convergence of or to divergence between actors with the same ideo- logical belief.Consequently,ideology,like religious faith,could either bring people together or split them apart,and,in certain circumstances,even cause them to engage in deadly confrontations with one another.Indeed,have we not witnessed enough examples of conflicts and wars between different sects within the same religion in world history? A fundamental flaw of the "old"Cold War history lay in scholars'inability to comprehend this complicated dual function of ideology.As a result of an oversimplified "ideology versus national security interest"dichotomy,a pre- vailing assumption was that if countries with shared ideological beliefs(such as China and the Soviet Union)were to disagree,then that shared faith must have 8 INTRODUCTION

fied; on the other hand, the international aspect of the revolution served as a constant source of domestic mobilization, helping to legitimate the revolu￾tion at home and to maintain its momentum. Mao’s and his comrades’ belief in Marxist-Leninist ideology was always interwoven with their devotion to using ideology as a means to transform China’s state, its society, and its international outlook. This belief stood at the core of their conceptual realm, providing legitimacy to the Chinese Communist revolution. It is here we see the complicated interplay between the Mao generation’s conversion to Communist ideology and its continuous exposure to the influ￾ence of China’s age-old history and culture. At a glance, the two experiences are contradictory. As twentieth-century revolutionaries, Mao and his com￾rades were highly critical of the Chinese past, declaring that their revolution would render a thorough transformation of China’s ‘‘old’’ state, society, and culture. But when Mao and his comrades were posing challenges to the Chi￾nese past, the ideology on which they depended as the lodestar and guiding philosophy for the transformation had to be articulated through the discourse, symbols, norms, and identities that had been a part of the Chinese past. Con￾sequently, a profound continuity existed between the Mao generation’s revo￾lutionary behavior and the ‘‘old’’ China they meant to destroy. In this regard, a conspicuous example is the impact that the age-old ‘‘Central Kingdom’’ men￾tality had on Mao and his comrades. Their aspiration for promoting a world proletarian revolution by following the model of China revealed unmistakably how deeply their conceptual realm had been penetrated by that mentality. The message delivered here is of broad theoretical significance: in a cross￾cultural environment, the creation, transmission, and representation of an ideological belief must be subjected to the definition and interpretation of the discourse, symbols, norms, and values that formed a particular actor’s histori￾cally/culturally bound conceptual lens. The outcome of the process could lead either to convergence of or to divergence between actors with the same ideo￾logical belief. Consequently, ideology, like religious faith, could either bring people together or split them apart, and, in certain circumstances, even cause them to engage in deadly confrontations with one another. Indeed, have we not witnessed enough examples of conflicts and wars between different sects within the same religion in world history? A fundamental flaw of the ‘‘old’’ Cold War history lay in scholars’ inability to comprehend this complicated dual function of ideology. As a result of an oversimplified ‘‘ideology versus national security interest’’ dichotomy, a pre￾vailing assumption was that if countries with shared ideological beliefs (such as China and the Soviet Union) were to disagree, then that shared faith must have 8 introduction

been overwhelmed by a conflict in national interests.In the study of China's Cold War history,scholars have often used Beijing's split with Moscow and rapprochement with Washington to prove this assumption. Careful study of the history of Sino-Soviet relations demonstrates that the split was not caused by uncompromising conflicts in national interests but rather by different understandings and interpretations of the same ideology. When serious disagreements began to emerge between Beijing and Moscow in the mid-and late rosos,China and the Soviet Union had more shared "national interests"than ever:given the hostility of the United States and other West- ern countries toward the PRC,Beijing's strategic alliance with Moscow served China's national security needs well;the Western economic embargo against China made Sino-Soviet trade relations ever more valuable for Beijing;and China's economic reconstruction benefited greatly from Soviet aid.In turn, China's support significantly enhanced the Soviet Union's position in a global confrontation with the United States.The national interests of China and the Soviet Union were highly compatible at that time,or at least should have greatly outweighed any explicit or implicit conflict that might have existed be- tween them. But it was exactly at such a moment that conflicts between Beijing and Mos- cow surfaced.As demonstrated by discussions in Chapter 3,the key to the con- flicts lay in Mao's changing perceptions of China's relations with the Soviet Union.After Stalin's death,Mao increasingly perceived the ccp,and him- self in particular,as qualified to claim centrality in the international Commu- nist movement.In its criticism of Moscow's"big-power chauvinism"and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization effort,Maoist discourse was dominated by metaphors,myths,and symbols crucial to the promotion of Mao's continuous revolution,which also caused Beijing's deepening dis- cord with Moscow.All of these developments served as the prelude to the great Sino-Soviet polemic debate in the 16os,eventually leading to each of the Communist giants to regard the other as a "traitor"to true Marxism- Leninism.Following the intensifying ideological warfare,the state-to-state relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated substantially,caus- ing sharp confict in their"national security interests."It was the deepening discrepancy over how to define/interpret the same ideology,rather than con- flict over national security interests,that should be identified as the primary cause for the Sino-Soviet split. Ideology matters,yet not without fundamental limits.As indicated by China's Cold War experience,while ideology was central in legitimizing im- portant foreign policy decisions,ideological terms alone could not guarantee INTRODUCTION 9

been overwhelmed by a conflict in national interests. In the study of China’s Cold War history, scholars have often used Beijing’s split with Moscow and rapprochement with Washington to prove this assumption. Careful study of the history of Sino-Soviet relations demonstrates that the split was not caused by uncompromising conflicts in national interests but rather by different understandings and interpretations of the same ideology. When serious disagreements began to emerge between Beijing and Moscow in the mid- and late 1950s, China and the Soviet Union had more shared ‘‘national interests’’ than ever: given the hostility of the United States and other West￾ern countries toward the prc, Beijing’s strategic alliance with Moscow served China’s national security needs well; the Western economic embargo against China made Sino-Soviet trade relations ever more valuable for Beijing; and China’s economic reconstruction benefited greatly from Soviet aid. In turn, China’s support significantly enhanced the Soviet Union’s position in a global confrontation with the United States. The national interests of China and the Soviet Union were highly compatible at that time, or at least should have greatly outweighed any explicit or implicit conflict that might have existed be￾tween them. But it was exactly at such a moment that conflicts between Beijing and Mos￾cow surfaced. As demonstrated by discussions in Chapter 3, the key to the con- flicts lay in Mao’s changing perceptions of China’s relations with the Soviet Union. After Stalin’s death, Mao increasingly perceived the ccp, and him￾self in particular, as qualified to claim centrality in the international Commu￾nist movement. In its criticism of Moscow’s ‘‘big-power chauvinism’’ and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization effort, Maoist discourse was dominated by metaphors, myths, and symbols crucial to the promotion of Mao’s continuous revolution, which also caused Beijing’s deepening dis￾cord with Moscow. All of these developments served as the prelude to the great Sino-Soviet polemic debate in the 1960s, eventually leading to each of the Communist giants to regard the other as a ‘‘traitor’’ to true Marxism￾Leninism. Following the intensifying ideological warfare, the state-to-state relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated substantially, caus￾ing sharp conflict in their ‘‘national security interests.’’ It was the deepening discrepancy over how to define/interpret the same ideology, rather than con- flict over national security interests, that should be identified as the primary cause for the Sino-Soviet split. Ideology matters, yet not without fundamental limits. As indicated by China’s Cold War experience, while ideology was central in legitimizing im￾portant foreign policy decisions, ideological terms alone could not guarantee introduction 9

"legitimacy."Thus Mao and his comrades always tried to present important foreign policy decisions in terms of both ideological and other concerns.For example,when Beijing's leaders decided to enter the Korean War,they an- nounced to the Chinese people and the whole world that if they did not par- ticipate China's security interests would be seriously jeopardized.In the Tai- wan Strait crisis of 1958,Mao argued that shelling Jinmen was necessary to prevent the U.S.imperialists from permanently separating Taiwan from the socialist motherland.In these cases,security concerns were real,but they also helped justify decisions made primarily based on the leadership's ideological commitments. Ideology's role also withers along with the ideology's declining"inner"sup- port from the people-this was particularly true in the case of communism. As a utopian vision,communism was most beautiful when it was not a politi- cal philosophy in action.When Communist ideology was put into practice in a favorable historical/social environment-such as in twentieth-century China,where radical revolutions had accumulated tremendous momentum and strength-it ignited popular enthusiasm and support.But when commu- nism repeatedly failed the test of people's lived experience with its inability to turn the utopian vision into reality,popular enthusiasm and support even- tually died.In Mao's China,Maoist continuous-revolution programs such as the“Great Leap Forward”and the“Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” suffered this fate.Consequently,ideology would no longer be able to legiti- mate Chinese Communist policies-which was in itself a sign that the Chinese Communist regime was losing its legitimacy. Mao and Foreign Policy Patterns of Mao's China In any historical study,scholars must pay special attention to the role of personalities,and it is imperative in a study about Mao's China.As revealed in the chapters that follow,Mao was ccP/PRc's single most important policy- maker.Behind every crucial decision-such as China's intervention in Korea, its alliance and split with the Soviet Union,its shelling of Jinmen,its support to the Vietnamese Communists,and its rapprochement with the United States- Mao always was the central figure.In order to understand the dynamics and logic of the PRc's revolutionary foreign policy,one must comprehend Mao's concept of continuous revolution.Underlying the concept was Mao's "post- revolution anxiety,"a psychological/conceptual force constantly pushing him to persist in a revolutionary agenda for China's domestic and external policies. As discussed earlier,Mao's revolution aimed to transform China's "old" INTRODUCTION

‘‘legitimacy.’’ Thus Mao and his comrades always tried to present important foreign policy decisions in terms of both ideological and other concerns. For example, when Beijing’s leaders decided to enter the Korean War, they an￾nounced to the Chinese people and the whole world that if they did not par￾ticipate China’s security interests would be seriously jeopardized. In the Tai￾wan Strait crisis of 1958, Mao argued that shelling Jinmen was necessary to prevent the U.S. imperialists from permanently separating Taiwan from the socialist motherland.19 In these cases, security concerns were real, but they also helped justify decisions made primarily based on the leadership’s ideological commitments. Ideology’s role also withers along with the ideology’s declining ‘‘inner’’ sup￾port from the people—this was particularly true in the case of communism. As a utopian vision, communism was most beautiful when it was not a politi￾cal philosophy in action. When Communist ideology was put into practice in a favorable historical/social environment—such as in twentieth-century China, where radical revolutions had accumulated tremendous momentum and strength—it ignited popular enthusiasm and support. But when commu￾nism repeatedly failed the test of people’s lived experience with its inability to turn the utopian vision into reality, popular enthusiasm and support even￾tually died. In Mao’s China, Maoist continuous-revolution programs such as the ‘‘Great Leap Forward’’ and the ‘‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’’ suffered this fate. Consequently, ideology would no longer be able to legiti￾mate Chinese Communist policies—which was in itself a sign that the Chinese Communist regime was losing its legitimacy. Mao and Foreign Policy Patterns of Mao’s China In any historical study, scholars must pay special attention to the role of personalities, and it is imperative in a study about Mao’s China. As revealed in the chapters that follow, Mao was ccp/prc’s single most important policy￾maker. Behind every crucial decision—such as China’s intervention in Korea, its alliance and split with the Soviet Union, its shelling of Jinmen, its support to the Vietnamese Communists, and its rapprochement with the United States— Mao always was the central figure. In order to understand the dynamics and logic of the prc’s revolutionary foreign policy, one must comprehend Mao’s concept of continuous revolution. Underlying the concept was Mao’s ‘‘post￾revolution anxiety,’’ a psychological/conceptual force constantly pushing him to persist in a revolutionary agenda for China’s domestic and external policies. As discussed earlier, Mao’s revolution aimed to transform China’s ‘‘old’’ 10 introduction

state and society as well as to destroy the "old"world.Mao never concealed his ambition that his revolution would finally turn China into a land of uni- versal justice and equality and that the Chinese revolution would serve as a model and revive China's central position in the world.China's domestic and external policies thus were deeply interrelated. When the ccp seized power in 1949,Mao claimed that this event was only "the completion of the first step in the long march of the Chinese revolution," and that carrying out the "revolution after the revolution"was for the ccp a task more complicated and challenging.How to prevent the continuous revolution from losing momentum emerged as one of Mao's major concerns. Around 1956,as the nationwide "socialist transformation"(e.g.,nationaliz- ing industry and commerce and collectivizing agriculture)was nearly com- pleted,Mao's concerns changed into worries because he sensed that many of the party's cadres and ordinary members were becoming less interested in deepening the continuous revolution.After the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1958-60,Mao realized that even among the Communist elite,his revolution was losing crucial "inner support."As Mao approached the last de- cade of his life,he found that in pursuing the ideals he cherished he had be- come a"lone monk with a leaky umbrella,"2 and a majority of the Communist elite were unable-or unwilling-to follow the development of his thinking. A pivotal challenge obsessed Mao constantly:through what means could he transform China and the world?Even with his seemingly unrestricted political power,he often found himself powerless.What he encountered was a paradox sitting deeply in the challenge itself:he had to find the means needed for trans- forming the "old"world from the very "old"world that was yet to be trans- formed.Throughout Mao's twenty-seven-year reign in China,he was never able to overcome this profound anxiety. In order to maintain the momentum of his continuous revolution,Mao needed to find the means to mobilize the masses.It was in the process of searching for such means that he realized that the adoption of a revolution- ary foreign policy had great relevance.As indicated in the chapters ahead on Beijing's management of the Korean War,the Taiwan Strait crisis,and the Vietnam War,during the early years of the PRC,a revolutionary foreign policy helped to make Mao's various state and societal transformation pro- grams powerful unifying and national themes supplanting many local,regional, or factional concerns.When tension between Mao and other members of the Communist elite,as well as between the Communist regime and China's ordi- nary people,intensified following the failure of the Great Leap Forward,a INTRODUCTION II

state and society as well as to destroy the ‘‘old’’ world. Mao never concealed his ambition that his revolution would finally turn China into a land of uni￾versal justice and equality and that the Chinese revolution would serve as a model and revive China’s central position in the world. China’s domestic and external policies thus were deeply interrelated. When the ccp seized power in 1949, Mao claimed that this event was only ‘‘the completion of the first step in the long march of the Chinese revolution,’’ and that carrying out the ‘‘revolution after the revolution’’ was for the ccp a task more complicated and challenging.20 How to prevent the continuous revolution from losing momentum emerged as one of Mao’s major concerns. Around 1956, as the nationwide ‘‘socialist transformation’’ (e.g., nationaliz￾ing industry and commerce and collectivizing agriculture) was nearly com￾pleted, Mao’s concerns changed into worries because he sensed that many of the party’s cadres and ordinary members were becoming less interested in deepening the continuous revolution. After the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1958–60, Mao realized that even among the Communist elite, his revolution was losing crucial ‘‘inner support.’’ As Mao approached the last de￾cade of his life, he found that in pursuing the ideals he cherished he had be￾come a ‘‘lone monk with a leaky umbrella,’’21 and a majority of the Communist elite were unable—or unwilling—to follow the development of his thinking. A pivotal challenge obsessed Mao constantly: through what means could he transform China and the world? Even with his seemingly unrestricted political power, he often found himself powerless.What he encountered was a paradox sitting deeply in the challenge itself: he had to find the means needed for trans￾forming the ‘‘old’’ world from the very ‘‘old’’ world that was yet to be trans￾formed. Throughout Mao’s twenty-seven-year reign in China, he was never able to overcome this profound anxiety. In order to maintain the momentum of his continuous revolution, Mao needed to find the means to mobilize the masses. It was in the process of searching for such means that he realized that the adoption of a revolution￾ary foreign policy had great relevance. As indicated in the chapters ahead on Beijing’s management of the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, and the Vietnam War, during the early years of the prc, a revolutionary foreign policy helped to make Mao’s various state and societal transformation pro￾grams powerful unifying and national themes supplanting many local, regional, or factional concerns. When tension between Mao and other members of the Communist elite, as well as between the Communist regime and China’s ordi￾nary people, intensified following the failure of the Great Leap Forward, a introduction 11