《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Realism and Liberalism in Political Economy）Taking Preferences Seriously A Liberal Theory of International Politics

Liberal Theory of International Politics 517 Liberal theory rests on a"bottom-up"view of politics in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics.Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society,understood as an aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes,social com- mitments,and resource endowments.Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective action.6 Individuals and groups are assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material and ideal welfare.7 For liberals,the definition of the interests of societal actors is theoretically central. Liberal theory rejects the utopian notion that an automatic harmony of interest exists among individuals and groups in society;scarcity and differentiation introduce an inevitable measure of competition.Where social incentives for exchange and collec- tive action are perceived to exist,individuals and groups exploit them:the greater the expected benefits,the stronger the incentive to act.In pursuing these goals,individu- als are on the average risk-averse;that is,they strongly defend existing investments but remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains.What is true about people on the average,however,is not necessarily true in every case: some individuals in any given society may be risk-acceptant or irrational. Liberal theory seeks to generalize about the social conditions under which the behavior of self-interested actors converges toward cooperation or conflict.Conflict- ual societal demands and the willingness to employ coercion in pursuit of them are associated with a number of factors,three of which are relevant to this discussion: divergent fundamental beliefs,conflict over scarce material goods,and inequalities in political power.Deep,irreconcilable differences in beliefs about the provision of public goods,such as borders,culture,fundamental political institutions,and local social practices,promote conflict,whereas complementary beliefs promote harmony and cooperation.Extreme scarcity tends to exacerbate confict over resources by increasing the willingness of social actors to assume cost and risk to obtain them. Relative abundance,by contrast,lowers the propensity for conflict by providing the opportunity to satisfy wants without inevitable conflict and giving certain individuals and groups more to defend.Finally,where inequalities in societal influence are large, conflict is more likely.Where social power is equitably distributed,the costs and benefits of actions are more likely to be internalized to individuals-for example, through the existence of complex,cross-cutting patterns of mutually beneficial inter- action or strong and legitimate domestic political institutions-and the incentive for selective or arbitrary coercion is dampened.By contrast,where power asymmetries permit groups to evade the costs of redistributing goods,incentives arise for exploit- ative,rent-seeking behavior,even if the result is inefficient for society as a whole.8 6.This does not imply a "pre-social"conception of the individual unencumbered by nation,commu- nity,family,or other collective identities but only that these identities enter the political realm when individuals and groups engage in political exchange on the basis of them;see,for example,Coleman 1990. 7.Kant1991,44. 8.Milgrom and Roberts 1990,86-87

Liberal Theory of International Politics 517 Liberal theory rests on a "bottom-up" view of politics in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics. Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, understood as an aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes, social com￾mitments, and resource endowments. Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective a~tion.~ Individuals and groups are assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material and ideal welfare.' For liberals, the definition of the interests of societal actors is theoretically central. Liberal theory rejects the utopian notion that an automatic harmony of interest exists among individuals and groups in society; scarcity and differentiation introduce an inevitable measure of competition. Where social incentives for exchange and collec￾tive action are perceived to exist, individuals and groups exploit them: the greater the expected benefits, the stronger the incentive to act. In pursuing these goals, individu￾als are on the average risk-averse; that is, they strongly defend existing investments but remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains. What is true about people on the average, however, is not necessarily true in every case: some individuals in any given society may be risk-acceptant or irrational. Liberal theory seeks to generalize about the social conditions under which the behavior of self-interested actors converges toward cooperation or conflict. Conflict￾ual societal demands and the willingness to employ coercion in pursuit of them are associated with a number of factors, three of which are relevant to this discussion: divergent fundamental beliefs, conflict over scarce material goods, and inequalities in political power. Deep, irreconcilable differences in beliefs about the provision of public goods, such as borders, culture, fundamental political institutions, and local social practices, promote conflict, whereas complementary beliefs promote harmony and cooperation. Extreme scarcity tends to exacerbate conflict over resources by increasing the willingness of social actors to assume cost and risk to obtain them. Relative abundance, by contrast, lowers the propensity for conflict by providing the opportunity to satisfy wants without inevitable conflict and giving certain individuals and groups more to defend. Finally, where inequalities in societal influence are large, conflict is more likely. Where social power is equitably distributed, the costs and benefits of actions are more likely to be internalized to individuals-for example, through the existence of complex, cross-cutting patterns of mutually beneficial inter￾action or strong and legitimate domestic political institutions-and the incentive for selective or arbitrary coercion is dampened. By contrast, where power asymmetries permit groups to evade the costs of redistributing goods, incentives arise for exploit￾ative, rent-seeking behavior, even if the result is inefficient for society as a whole. 6. This does not imply a "pre-social" conception of the individual unencumbered by nation, commu￾nity, family, or other collective identities but only that these identities enter the political realm when individuals and groups engage in political exchange on the basis of them; see, for example, Coleman 1990. 7. Kant 1991,44. 8. Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 86-87

518 International Organization Assumption 2:Representation and State Preferences States (or other political institutions)represent some subset of domestic society,on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purpo- sively in world politics. In the liberal conception of domestic politics,the state is not an actor but a repre- sentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture,construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors.Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical"transmission belt"by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve efficiently.9 Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities,interests,and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus)who constantly pres- sure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences. This is not to adopt a narrowly pluralist view of domestic politics in which all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy,nor one in which the structure of state institutions is irrelevant.No government rests on universal or unbi- ased political representation;every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others.In an extreme hypothetical case,representation might empower a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual,such as an ideal-typical Pol Pot or Josef Stalin.Between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy,many representative institutions and practices exist,each of which privi- leges particular demands;hence the nature of state institutions,alongside societal interests themselves,is a key determinant of what states do internationally. Representation,in the liberal view,is not simply a formal attribute of state institu- tions but includes other stable characteristics of the political process,formal or infor- mal,that privilege particular societal interests.Clientalistic authoritarian regimes may distinguish those with familial,bureaucratic,or economic ties to the governing elite from those without.Even where government institutions are formally fair and open,a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property,risk,information,or organi- zational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy.Similarly,the way in which a state recognizes individual rights may shape opportunities for voice.10 Certain domestic representational processes may tend to select as leaders individuals,groups,and bureaucracies socialized with particular attitudes toward information,risk,and loss.Finally,cost-effective exit options,such as emigration,noncompliance,or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments,may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation.1I 9.Representative political institutions and practices result from prior contracts and can generally be taken for granted in explaining foreign policy;but where the primary interests and allegiances of indi- viduals and private groups are transferred to subnational or supranational institutions empowered to repre- sent them effectively,a liberal analysis would naturally shift to these levels. 10.Doyle1997,251-300. 11.North and Thomas 1973,87

518 International Organization Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state offzcials dejne state preferences and act purpo￾sively in world politics. In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a repre￾sentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical "transmission belt" by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy. Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve effi~iently.~ Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pres￾sure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences. This is not to adopt a narrowly pluralist view of domestic politics in which all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy, nor one in which the structure of state institutions is irrelevant. No government rests on universal or unbi￾ased political representation; every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others. In an extreme hypothetical case, representation might empower a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual, such as an ideal-typical Pol Pot or Josef Stalin. Between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy, many representative institutions and practices exist, each of which privi￾leges particular demands; hence the nature of state institutions, alongside societal interests themselves, is a key determinant of what states do internationally. Representation, in the liberal view, is not simply a formal attribute of state institu￾tions but includes other stable characteristics of the political process, formal or infor￾mal, that privilege particular societal interests. Clientalistic authoritarian regimes may distinguish those with familial, bureaucratic, or economic ties to the governing elite from those without. Even where government institutions are formally fair and open, a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property, risk, information, or organi￾zational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy. Similarly, the way in which a state recognizes individual rights may shape opportunities for voice.1° Certain domestic representational processes may tend to select as leaders individuals, groups, and bureaucracies socialized with particular attitudes toward information, risk, and loss. Finally, cost-effective exit options, such as emigration, noncompliance, or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments, may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation. '' 9. Representative political institutions and practices result from prior contracts and can generally be taken for granted in explaining foreign policy; but where the primary interests and allegiances of indi￾viduals and private groups are transferred to subnational or supranational institutions empowered to repre￾sent them effectively, a liberal analysis would naturally shift to these levels. 10. Doyle 1997,251-300. 11. North and Thomas 1973,87

Liberal Theory of International Politics 519 Societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices alter"state preferences."This term designates an ordering among underlying substantive out- comes that may result from international political interaction.Here it is essential- particularly given the inconsistency of common usage-to avoid conceptual confu- sion by keeping state“preferences”distinct from national“strategies,.”“tactics,” and "policies,"that is,the particular transient bargaining positions,negotiating de- mands,or policy goals that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy.State preferences,as the concept is employed here,comprise a set of fundamental interests defined across "states of the world."Preferences are by definition causally indepen- dent of the strategies of other actors and,therefore,prior to specific interstate politi- cal interactions,including external threats,incentives,manipulation of information, or other tactics.By contrast,strategies and tactics-sometimes also termed "prefer- ences"in game-theoretical analyses-are policy options defined across intermediate political aims,as when governments declare an "interest"in "maintaining the bal- ance of power,,”“containing'or“appeasing'an adversary,.or exercising“global leadership."12 Liberal theory focuses on the consequences for state behavior of shifts in fundamental preferences,not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which states pursue them. Representative institutions and practices determine not merely which social coali- tions are represented in foreign policy,but how they are represented.Two distinc- tions are critical.First,states may act in either a unitary or "disaggregated"way.In many traditional areas of foreign policy,"politics stops at the water's edge,"and there is strong coordination among national officials and politicians.In other areas, the state may be"disaggregated,"with different elements-executives,courts,cen- tral banks,regulatory bureaucracies,and ruling parties,for example-conducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests.13 Sec- ond,domestic decision making may be structured so as to generate state preferences that satisfy a strong rationality condition,such as transitivity or strict expected utility maximization,or so as to satisfy only the weaker rationality criterion of seeking efficient means.Recently,formal theorists have derived specific conditions under which nonunitary state behavior can be analyzed"as if"it were unitary and rational, implying that much superficially "nonrational"or "nonunitary"behavior should actually be understood in terms of shifting state preferences.4 Taken together,assumptions 1 and 2 imply that states do not automatically maxi- mize fixed,homogeneous conceptions of security,sovereignty,or wealth per se,as realists and institutionalists tend to assume.Instead they are,in Waltzian terms,"func- tionally differentiated";that is,they pursue particular interpretations and combina- tions of security,welfare,and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups 12.The phrase "country A changed its preferences in response to an action by country B"is thus a misuse of the term as defined here,implying less than consistently rational behavior;see Sebenius 1991, 207. 13.See Slaughter 1995;and Keohane and Nye 1971. 14.Achen1995

Liberal Theory of International Politics 519 Societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices alter "state preferences." This term designates an ordering among underlying substantive out￾comes that may result from international political interaction. Here it is essential￾particularly given the inconsistency of common usage-to avoid conceptual confu￾sion by keeping state "preferences" distinct from national "strategies," "tactics," and "policies," that is, the particular transient bargaining positions, negotiating de￾mands, or policy goals that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy. State preferences, as the concept is employed here, comprise a set of fundamental interests defined across "states of the world." Preferences are by definition causally indepen￾dent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate politi￾cal interactions, including external threats, incentives, manipulation of information, or other tactics. By contrast, strategies and tactics-sometimes also termed "prefer￾ences" in game-theoretical analyses-are policy options defined across intermediate political aims, as when governments declare an "interest" in "maintaining the bal￾ance of power," "containing" or "appeasing" an adversary, or exercising "global leadership."12 Liberal theory focuses on the consequences for state behavior of shifts in fundamental preferences, not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which states pursue them. Representative institutions and practices determine not merely which social coali￾tions are represented in foreign policy, but how they are represented. Two distinc￾tions are critical. First, states may act in either a unitary or "disaggregated" way. In many traditional areas of foreign policy, "politics stops at the water's edge," and there is strong coordination among national officials and politicians. In other areas, the state may be "disaggregated," with different elements-executives, courts, cen￾tral banks, regulatory bureaucracies, and ruling parties, for example-conducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests.I3 Sec￾ond, domestic decision making may be structured so as to generate state preferences that satisfy a strong rationality condition, such as transitivity or strict expected utility maximization, or so as to satisfy only the weaker rationality criterion of seeking efficient means. Recently, formal theorists have derived specific conditions under which nonunitary state behavior can be analyzed "as if" it were unitary and rational, implying that much superficially "nonrational" or "nonunitary" behavior should actually be understood in terms of shifting state preferences. l4 Taken together, assumptions 1 and 2 imply that states do not automatically maxi￾mize fixed, homogeneous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se, as realists and institutionalists tend to assume. Instead they are, in Waltzian terms, "func￾tionally differentiated"; that is, they pursue particular interpretations and combina￾tions of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups 12. The phrase "country A changed its preferences in response to an action by country B" is thus a misuse of the term as defined here, implying less than consistently rational behavior; see Sebenius 1991, 207. 13. See Slaughter 1995; and Keohane and Nye 1971. 14. Achen 1995

520 International Organization enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.15 As Arnold Wolfers,John Ruggie,and others have observed,the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose-even apparently fundamental concerns like the defense of politi- cal and legal sovereignty,territorial integrity,national security,or economic welfare- varies decisively with the social context.16 It is not uncommon for states knowingly to surrender sovereignty,compromise security,or reduce aggregate economic wel- fare.In the liberal view,trade-offs among such goals,as well as cross-national differ- ences in their definition,are inevitable,highly varied,and causally consequential.7 Assumption 3:Interdependence and the International System The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior. For liberals,state behavior reflects varying patterns of state preferences.States require a"purpose,"a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand,in order to provoke conflict,propose cooperation,or take any other significant foreign policy action.The precise nature of these stakes drives policy.This is not to assert that each state simply pursues its ideal policy,oblivious of others;instead,each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the prefer- ences of other states.Thus liberal theory rejects not just the realist assumption that state preferences must be treated as if naturally conflictual,but equally the institution- alist assumption that they should be treated as if they were partially convergent, compromising a collective action problem.18 To the contrary,liberals causally privi- lege variation in the configuration of state preferences,while treating configurations of capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or endogenous to state preferences. The critical theoretical link between state preferences,on the one hand,and the behavior of one or more states,on the other,is provided by the concept of policy interdependence.Policy interdependence is defined here as the set of costs and ben- efits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences,that is,the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes.Liberal theory assumes that the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state behavior. Patterns of interdependence or externalities induced by efforts to realize state pref- erences can be divided into three broad categories,corresponding to the strategic situation (the pattern of policy externalities)that results.19 Where preferences are naturally compatible or harmonious,that is,where the externalities of unilateral poli- 15.Ruggie1983,265. 16.Ruggie1982,1983 17.On the contradictions within Waltz's effort to avoid these ambiguities,see Baldwin 1997,21-22. 18.Keohane 1984,10;1986,193.Note that these are all "as if"assumptions.The world must be consistent with them,but need not fulfill them precisely. 19.See Stein 1982:Snidal 1985;and Martin 1992

520 International Organization enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.15 As Arnold Wolfers, John Ruggie, and others have observed, the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose--even apparently fundamental concerns like the defense of politi￾cal and legal sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, or economic welfare￾varies decisively with the social context.16 It is not uncommon for states knowingly to surrender sovereignty, compromise security, or reduce aggregate economic wel￾fare. In the liberal view, trade-offs among such goals, as well as cross-national differ￾ences in their definition, are inevitable, highly varied, and causally ~onsequential.'~ Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior: For liberals, state behavior reflects varying patterns of state preferences. States require a "purpose," a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand, in order to provoke conflict, propose cooperation, or take any other significant foreign policy action. The precise nature of these stakes drives policy. This is not to assert that each state simply pursues its ideal policy, oblivious of others; instead, each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the prefer￾ences of other states. Thus liberal theory rejects not just the realist assumption that state preferences must be treated as if naturally conflictual, but equally the institution￾alist assumption that they should be treated as if they were partially convergent, compromising a collective action problem.l8 To the contrary, liberals causally privi￾lege variation in the configuration of state preferences, while treating configurations of capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or endogenous to state preferences. The critical theoretical link between state preferences, on the one hand, and the behavior of one or more states, on the other, is provided by the concept of policy interdependence. Policy interdependence is defined here as the set of costs and ben￾efits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes. Liberal theory assumes that the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state behavior. Patterns of interdependence or externalities induced by efforts to realize state pref￾erences can be divided into three broad categories, corresponding to the strategic situation (the pattern of policy externalities) that results.19 Where preferences are naturally compatible or harmonious, that is, where the externalities of unilateral poli- 15. Ruggie 1983,265. 16. Ruggie 1982, 1983. 17. On the contradictions within Waltz's effort to avoid these ambiguities, see Baldwin 1997, 21-22. 18. Keohane 1984, 10; 1986, 193. Note that these are all "as if" assumptions. The world must be consistent with them, but need not fulfill them precisely. 19. See Stein 1982;Snidal 1985; and Martin 1992

Liberal Theory of International Politics 521 cies are optimal for others (or insignificant),there are strong incentives for coexist- ence with low conflict. Where,by contrast,underlying state preferences are zero-sum or deadlocked,that is,where an attempt by dominant social groups in one country to realize their prefer- ences through state action necessarily imposes costs(negative externalities)on domi- nant social groups in other countries,governments face a bargaining game with few mutual gains and a high potential for interstate tension and conflict.The decisive precondition for costly attempts at coercion,for example,is neither a particular con- figuration of power,as realists assert,nor of uncertainty,as institutionalists maintain, but a configuration of preferences conflictual enough to motivate willingness to ac- cept high cost and risk.20 In other words,intense conflict requires that an aggressor or revisionist state advance demands to which other states are unwilling to submit. Revisionist preferences-underlying,socially grounded interests in revising the sta- tus quo-are distinct from revisionist "strategies,"that is,a need to alter the status quo to protect enduring interests under new strategic circumstances.Liberals focus on the former,realists (and institutionalists)on the latter.Hence while both theories predict security confict,they do so under different circumstances.For example,in- creased military spending in response to an adversary's arms buildup is a change in strategy with fixed preferences consistent with realism;increased spending initiated by a new ruling elite ideologically committed to territorial aggrandizement is a pref- erence-induced change in strategy consistent with liberalism.21 Where,finally,motives are mixed such that an exchange of policy concessions through coordination or precommitment can improve the welfare of both parties relative to unilateral policy adjustment(i.e.,a collective action problem),states have an incentive to negotiate policy coordination.Games like coordination,assurance, prisoner's dilemma,and suasion have distinctive dynamics,as well as impose pre- cise costs,benefits,and risks on the parties.Within each qualitative category,incen- tives vary further according to the intensity of preferences. For liberals,the form,substance,and depth of cooperation depends directly on the nature of these patterns of preferences.Hence where "Pareto-inefficient"'outcomes are observed-trade protection is a commonly cited example-liberals turn first to countervailing social preferences and unresolved domestic and transnational distribu- tional conflicts,whereas institutionalists and realists,respectively,turn to uncertainty and particular configurations of interstate power.22 Liberal Theory as Systemic Theory These liberal assumptions,in particular the third-in essence,"what states want is the primary determinant of what they do"'-may seem commonsensical,even tauto- logical.Yet mainstream IR theory has uniformly rejected such claims for the past 20.Note that some rationalist analyses dismiss such risk-acceptant preferences as "irrational";see Fearon 1995. 21.For example,Van Evera 1990-91,32. 22.Grieco's study of NTB regulation is discussed later

Liberal Theory of International Politics 521 cies are optimal for others (or insignificant), there are strong incentives for coexist￾ence with low conflict. Where, by contrast, underlying state preferences are zero-sum or deadlocked, that is, where an attempt by dominant social groups in one country to realize their prefer￾ences through state action necessarily imposes costs (negative externalities) on domi￾nant social groups in other countries, governments face a bargaining game with few mutual gains and a high potential for interstate tension and conflict. The decisive precondition for costly attempts at coercion, for example, is neither a particular con￾figuration of power, as realists assert, nor of uncertainty, as institutionalists maintain, but a configuration of preferences conflictual enough to motivate willingness to ac￾cept high cost and risk.20 In other words, intense conflict requires that an aggressor or revisionist state advance demands to which other states are unwilling to submit. Revisionist preferences-underlying, socially grounded interests in revising the sta￾tus quo-are distinct from revisionist "strategies," that is, a need to alter the status quo to protect enduring interests under new strategic circumstances. Liberals focus on the former, realists (and institutionalists) on the latter. Hence while both theories predict security conflict, they do so under different circumstances. For example, in￾creased military spending in response to an adversary's arms buildup is a change in strategy with fixed preferences consistent with realism; increased spending initiated by a new ruling elite ideologically committed to territorial aggrandizement is a pref￾erence-induced change in strategy consistent with liberali~m.~' Where, finally, motives are mixed such that an exchange of policy concessions through coordination or precommitment can improve the welfare of both parties relative to unilateral policy adjustment (i.e., a collective action problem), states have an incentive to negotiate policy coordination. Games like coordination, assurance, prisoner's dilemma, and suasion have distinctive dynamics, as well as impose pre￾cise costs, benefits, and risks on the parties. Within each qualitative category, incen￾tives vary further according to the intensity of preferences. For liberals, the form, substance, and depth of cooperation depends directly on the nature of these patterns of preferences. Hence where "Pareto-inefficient" outcomes are observed-trade protection is a commonly cited example-liberals turn first to countervailing social preferences and unresolved domestic and transnational distribu￾tional conflicts, whereas institutionalists and realists, respectively, turn to uncertainty and particular configurations of interstate power.22 Liberal Theory as Systemic Theory These liberal assumptions, in particular the third-in essence, "what states want is the primary determinant of what they do"-may seem commonsensical, even tauto￾logical. Yet mainstream IR theory has uniformly rejected such claims for the past 20. Note that some rationalist analyses dismiss such risk-acceptant preferences as "irrational"; see Fearon 1995. 21. For example, Van Evera 199G91,32. 22. Grieco's study of NTB regulation is discussed later