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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Use of History and Sociology in International Political Economy）The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development

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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation By DARON ACEMOGLU,SIMON JOHNSON,AND JAMES A.ROBINSON* We exploit differences in European mortaliry rates to estimate the effect of institu- tions on economic performance.Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies,with different associated institutions.In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates,they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions.These institutions persisted to the present.Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions,we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita.Once the effect of institutions is controlled for,countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes.(JEL O11,P16,P51) What are the fundamental causes of the tionary policies will invest more in physical large differences in income per capita across and human capital,and will use these factors countries?Although there is still little con- more efficiently to achieve a greater level of sensus on the answer to this question,differ- income (e.g.,Douglass C.North and Robert ences in institutions and property rights have P.Thomas,1973;Eric L.Jones,1981;North, received considerable attention in recent 1981).This view receives some support from years.Countries with better "institutions," cross-country correlations between measures more secure property rights,and less distor- of property rights and economic development (e.g.,Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer,1995; Paulo Mauro,1995;Robert E.Hall and Acemoglu:Department of Economics,E52-380b Charles I.Jones,1999;Dani Rodrik,1999), Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge,MA and from a few micro studies that investigate 02319,and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (e-mail:daron@mit.edu);Johnson:Sloan School of Man- the relationship between property rights and agement,Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cam- investment or output (e.g.,Timothy Besley, bridge,MA 02319 (e-mail:sjohnson@mit.edu);Robinson: 1995;Christopher Mazingo,1999;Johnson et Department of Political Science and Department of Eco- al,1999). nomics,210 Barrows Hall,University of California,Berke- At some level it is obvious that institutions ley,CA 94720(e-mail:jamesar@socrates.berkeley.edu). We thank Joshua Angrist,Abhijit Banerjee,Esther Duflo, matter.Witness,for example,the divergent Stan Engerman,John Gallup,Claudia Goldin,Robert paths of North and South Korea,or East and Hall,Chad Jones,Larry Katz,Richard Locke,Andrei West Germany,where one part of the country Shleifer,Ken Sokoloff,Judith Tendler,three anonymous stagnated under central planning and collec- referees,and seminar participants at the University of tive ownership,while the other prospered California-Berkeley,Brown University,Canadian Insti- tute for Advanced Research,Columbia University,Har- with private property and a market economy vard University,Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nevertheless,we lack reliable estimates of National Bureau of Economic Research,Northwestern the effect of institutions on economic perfor- University,New York University,Princeton University, mance.It is quite likely that rich economies University of Rochester,Stanford University,Toulouse University,University of California-Los Angeles,and the choose or can afford better institutions.Per- World Bank for useful comments.We also thank Robert haps more important,economies that are dif- McCaa for guiding us to the data on bishops'mortality. ferent for a variety of reasons will differ both 1369

The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation By DARONACEMOGLU, SIMON JOHNSON, AND JAMES A. ROBINSON* We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic pe@ormance. Europeans adopted very dzrerent colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes. (JEL 011, P16, P51) What are the fundamental causes of the large differences in income per capita across countries? Although there is still little consensus on the answer to this question, differences in institutions and property rights have received considerable attention in recent years. Countries with better "institutions," more secure property rights, and less distor- * Acemoglu: Department of Economics, E52-380b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02319, and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (e-mail: daron@mit.edu); Johnson: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02319 (e-mail: sjohnson@mit.edu); Robinson: Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, 210 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720 (e-mail: jamesar@socrates.berkeley.edu). We thank Joshua Angrist, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Stan Engerman, John Gallup, Claudia Goldin, Robert Hall, Chad Jones, Larry Katz, Richard Locke, Andrei Shleifer, Ken Sokoloff, Judith Tendler, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the University of California-Berkeley, Brown University, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Columbia University, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, National Bureau of Economic Research, Northwestern University, New York University, Princeton University, University of Rochester, Stanford University, Toulouse University, University of California-Los Angeles, and the World Bank for useful comments. We also thank Robert McCaa for guiding us to the data on bishops' mortality. tionary policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and will use these factors more efficiently to achieve a greater level of income (e.g., Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, 1973; Eric L. Jones, 1981; North, 1981). This view receives some support from cross-country correlations between measures of property rights and economic development (e.g., Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 1995; Paulo Mauro, 1995; Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, 1999; Dani Rodrik, 1999), and from a few micro studies that investigate the relationship between property rights and investment or output (e.g., Timothy Besley, 1995; Christopher Mazingo, 1999; Johnson et al., 1999). At some level it is obvious that institutions matter. Witness, for example, the divergent paths of North and South Korea, or East and West Germany, where one part of the country stagnated under central planning and collective ownership, while the other prospered with private property and a market economy. Nevertheless, we lack reliable estimates of the effect of institutions on economic performance. It is quite likely that rich economies choose or can afford better institutions. Perhaps more important, economies that are different for a variety of reasons will differ both

1370 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 200 in their institutions and in their income per current institutions in these countries.2 More capita. specifically,our theory can be schematically To estimate the impact of institutions on eco- summarized as nomic performance,we need a source of exog- enous variation in institutions.In this paper,we (potential)settler propose a theory of institutional differences mortality →settlements among countries colonized by Europeans,'and exploit this theory to derive a possible source of exogenous variation.Our theory rests on three early current → institutions 出 institutions premises: 1.There were different types of colonization current → policies which created different sets of insti- performance. tutions.At one extreme,European powers set up "extractive states,"exemplified by the Bel- We use data on the mortality rates of soldiers, gian colonization of the Congo.These institu- bishops,and sailors stationed in the colonies be- tions did not introduce much protection for tween the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. private property,nor did they provide checks largely based on the work of the historian Philip and balances against government expropria- D.Curtin.These give a good indication of the tion.In fact,the main purpose of the extractive mortality rates faced by settlers.Europeans were state was to transfer as much of the resources well informed about these mortality rates at the of the colony to the colonizer. time,even though they did not know how to At the other extreme,many Europeans mi- control the diseases that caused these high mor- grated and settled in a number of colonies, tality rates. creating what the historian Alfred Crosby Figure 1 plots the logarithm of GDP per (1986)calls"Neo-Europes."The settlers tried capita today against the logarithm of the settler to replicate European institutions,with strong mortality rates per thousand for a sample of 75 emphasis on private property and checks countries (see below for data details).It shows a against government power.Primary examples strong negative relationship.Colonies where of this include Australia,New Zealand,Can- Europeans faced higher mortality rates are to- ada,and the United States. day substantially poorer than colonies that were 2.The colonization strategy was influenced by healthy for Europeans.Our theory is that this the feasibility of settlements.In places where relationship reflects the effect of settler mortal- the disease environment was not favorable to ity working through the institutions brought by European settlement,the cards were stacked Europeans.To substantiate this,we regress cur- against the creation of Neo-Europes,and the rent performance on current institutions,and formation of the extractive state was more instrument the latter by settler mortality rates. likely. Since our focus is on property rights and checks 3.The colonial state and institutions persisted against government power,we use the protec- even after independence. tion against"risk of expropriation"index from Political Risk Services as a proxy for institu- Based on these three premises,we use the tions.This variable measures differences in in- mortality rates expected by the first European stitutions originating from different types of settlers in the colonies as an instrument for states and state policies.3 There is a strong By "colonial experience"we do not only mean the 2 Note that although only some countries were colonized, direct control of the colonies by European powers,but more there is no selection bias here.This is because the question generally,European influence on the rest of the world.So we are interested in is the effect of colonization policy according to this definition,Sub-Saharan Africa was conditional on being colonized. strongly affected by "colonialism"between the sixteenth 3 Government expropriation is not the only institutional and nineteenth centuries because of the Atlantic slave trade. feature that matters.Our view is that there is a "cluster of

1370 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2001 in their institutions and in their income per capita. To estimate the impact of institutions on economic performance, we need a source of exogenous variation in institutions. In this paper, we propose a theory of institutional differences among countries colonized by ~uro~eans, ' and exploit this theory to derive a possible source of exogenous variation. Our theory rests on three premises: 1. There were different types of colonization policies which created different sets of institutions. At one extreme, European powers set up "extractive states," exemplified by the Belgian colonization of the Congo. These institutions did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances against government expropriation. In fact, the main purpose of the extractive state was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer. At the other extreme, many Europeans migrated and settled in a number of colonies, creating what the historian Alfred Crosby (1986) calls "Neo-Europes." The settlers tried to replicate European institutions, with strong emphasis on private property and checks against government power. Primary examples of this include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. 2. The colonization strategy was influenced by the feasibility of settlements. In places where the disease environment was not favorable to European settlement, the cards were stacked against the creation of Neo-Europes, and the formation of the extractive state was more likely. 3. The colonial state and institutions persisted even after independence. Based on these three premises, we use the mortality rates expected by the first European settlers in the colonies as an instrument for ' By "colonial experience" we do not only mean the direct control of the colonies by European powers, but more generally, European influence on the rest of the world. So according to this definition, Sub-Saharan Africa was strongly affected by "colonialism" between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries because of the Atlantic slave trade. current institutions in these countrie~.~ More specifically, our theory can be schematically summarized as (potential) settler 3 settlements mortality early current institutions institutions current 3 performance. We use data on the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, largely based on the work of the historian Philip D. Curtin. These give a good indication of the mortality rates faced by settlers. Europeans were well informed about these mortality rates at the time, even though they did not know how to control the diseases that caused these high mortality rates. Figure 1 plots the logarithm of GDP per capita today against the logarithm of the settler mortality rates per thousand for a sample of 75 countries (see below for data details). It shows a strong negative relationship. Colonies where Europeans faced higher mortality rates are today substantially poorer than colonies that were healthy for Europeans. Our theory is that this relationship reflects the effect of settler mortality working through the institutions brought by Europeans. To substantiate this, we regress current performance on current institutions, and instrument the latter by settler mortality rates. Since our focus is on property rights and checks against government power, we use the protection against "risk of expropriation" index from Political Risk Services as a proxy for institutions. This variable measures differences in institutions originating from different types of states and state policies.3 There is a strong 'Note that although only some countries were colonized, there is no selection bias here. This is because the question we are interested in is the effect of colonization policy conditional on being colonized. Government expropriation is not the only institutional feature that matters. Our view is that there is a "cluster of

VOL.91 NO.5 ACEMOGLU ET AL:THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF DEVELOPMENT 1371 10 MLT CHH MUS ZAFYS PAN GAB 墨 O FJI IDN ddd GUY LKWD AGO PAKIND SDN GN卷 GMB BGD NGA QA MLI Jed TZA SLE ETH 8 6 8 Log of Settler Mortality FIGURE 1.REDUCED-FORM RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND SETTLER MORTALITY (first-stage)relationship between settler mortal- institutions to the level of Chile could,in the ity rates and current institutions,which is inter- long run,lead to as much as a 7-fold increase in esting in its own right.The regression shows Nigeria's income (in practice Chile is over 11 that mortality rates faced by the settlers more times as rich as Nigeria). than 100 years ago explains over 25 percent The exclusion restriction implied by our in- of the variation in current institutions.We also strumental variable regression is that,condi- document that this relationship works through tional on the controls included in the regression, the channels we hypothesize:(potential)settler the mortality rates of European settlers more mortality rates were a major determinant of than 100 years ago have no effect on GDP per settlements;settlements were a major determi- capita today,other than their effect through nant of early institutions (in practice,institu- institutional development.The major concern tions in 1900);and there is a strong correlation with this exclusion restriction is that the mor- between early institutions and institutions to- tality rates of settlers could be correlated with day.Our two-stage least-squares estimate of the the current disease environment,which may effect of institutions on performance is rela- have a direct effect on economic performance. tively precisely estimated and large.For ex- In this case,our instrumental-variables esti- ample,it implies that improving Nigeria's mates may be assigning the effect of diseases on income to institutions.We believe that this is unlikely to be the case and that our exclusion restriction is plausible.The great majority of institutions,"including constraints on government expropri European deaths in the colonies were caused by ation,independent judiciary,property rights enforcement, malaria and yellow fever.Although these dis- and institutions providing equal access to education and ensuring civil liberties,that are important to encourage eases were fatal to Europeans who had no im- investment and growth.Expropriation risk is related to all munity,they had limited effect on indigenous these institutional features.In Acemoglu et al.(2000),we adults who had developed various types of im- reported similar results with other institutions variables. munities.These diseases are therefore unlikely 4 Differences in mortality rates are not the only,or even the main,cause of variation in institutions.For our empir- to be the reason why many countries in Africa ical approach to work,all we need is that they are a source and Asia are very poor today (see the discussion of exogenous variation. in Section III,subsection A).This notion is

VOL. 91 NO. 5 ACEMOGLU ET AL.: THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF DEVELOPMEN7 ETH 4 6 Log of Settler Mortality FIGURE1. REDUCED-FORM RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND SETTLER MORTALITY (first-stage) relationship between settler mortality rates and current institutions, which is interesting in its own right. The regression shows that mortality rates faced by the settlers more than 100 years ago explains over 25 percent of the variation in current institution^.^ We also document that this relationship works through the channels we hypothesize: (potential) settler mortality rates were a major determinant of settlements; settlements were a major determinant of early institutions (in practice, institutions in 1900); and there is a strong correlation between early institutions and institutions today. Our two-stage least-squares estimate of the effect of institutions on performance is relatively precisely estimated and large. For example, it implies that improving Nigeria's institutions," including constraints on government expropriation, independent judiciary, property rights enforcement, and institutions providing equal access to education and ensuring civil liberties, that are important to encourage investment and growth. Expropriation risk is related to all these institutional features. In Acemoglu et al. (2000),we reported similar results with other institutions variables. Differences in mortality rates are not the only, or even the main, cause of variation in institutions. For our empirical approach to work, all we need is that they are a source of exogenous variation. institutions to the level of Chile could, in the long run, lead to as much as a 7-fold increase in Nigeria's income (in practice Chile is over 11 times as rich as Nigeria). The exclusion restriction implied by our instrumental variable regression is that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, the mortality rates of European settlers more than 100 years ago have no effect on GDP per capita today, other than their effect through institutional development. The major concern with this exclusion restriction is that the mortality rates of settlers could be correlated with the current disease environment, which may have a direct effect on economic performance. In this case, our instrumental-variables estimates may be assigning the effect of diseases on income to institutions. We believe that this is unlikelv to be the case and that our exclusion restriction is plausible. The great majority of European deaths in the colonies were caused by malaria and yellow fever. Although these diseases were fatal to Europeans who had no immunity, they had limited effect on indigenous adults who had developed various types of immunities. These diseases are therefore unlikely to be the reason why many countries in Africa and Asia are very poor today (see the discussion in Section 111, subsection A). This notion is

1372 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2001 supported by the mortality rates of local people mortality)and the current fraction of the popu- in these areas.For example,Curtin (1968 Table lation of European descent. 2)reports that the annual mortality rates of local Naturally,it is impossible to control for all troops serving with the British army in Bengal possible variables that might be correlated with and Madras were respectively 11 and 13 in settler mortality and economic outcomes.Fur- 1,000.These numbers are quite comparable to, thermore,our empirical approach might capture in fact lower than,the annual mortality rates of the effect of settler mortality on economic per- British troops serving in Britain,which were formance,but working through other channels. approximately 15 in 1,000.In contrast,the mor- We deal with these problems by using a simple tality rates of British troops serving in these overidentification test using measures of Euro- colonies were much higher because of their lack pean migration to the colonies and early insti- of immunity.For example,mortality rates in tutions as additional instruments.We then use Bengal and Madras for British troops were be- overidentification tests to detect whether settler tween 70 and 170 in 1,000.The view that the mortality has a direct effect on current perfor- disease burden for indigenous adults was not mance.The results are encouraging for our unusual in places like Africa or India is also approach;they generate no evidence for a direct supported by the relatively high population den- effect of settler mortality on economic sities in these places before Europeans arrived outcomes. (Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones,1975). We are not aware of others who have pointed We document that our estimates of the effect out the link between settler mortality and insti- of institutions on performance are not driven by tutions,though scholars such as William H. outliers.For example,excluding Australia,New McNeill (1976),Crosby (1986),and Jared M. Zealand,Canada,and the United States does not Diamond (1997)have discussed the influence of change the results,nor does excluding Africa. diseases on human history.Diamond (1997),in Interestingly,we show that once the effect of particular,emphasizes comparative develop- institutions on economic performance is con- ment,but his theory is based on the geograph- trolled for,neither distance from the equator nor ical determinants of the incidence of the the dummy for Africa is significant.These re- neolithic revolution.He ignores both the impor- sults suggest that Africa is poorer than the rest tance of institutions and the potential causes of of the world not because of pure geographic divergence in more recent development,which or cultural factors,but because of worse are the main focus of our paper.Work by Ro- institutions. nald E.Robinson and John Gallagher (1961), The validity of our approach-i.e.,our exclu- Lewis H.Gann and Peter Duignan (1962), sion restriction-is threatened if other factors Donald Denoon (1983),and Philip J.Cain and correlated with the estimates of settler mortality Anthony G.Hopkins (1993)emphasizes that affect income per capita.We adopt two strate- settler colonies such as the United States and gies to substantiate that our results are not New Zealand are different from other colonies, driven by omitted factors.First,we investigate and point out that these differences were impor- whether institutions have a comparable effect tant for their economic success.Nevertheless, on income once we control for a number of this literature does not develop the link between variables potentially correlated with settler mor- mortality,settlements,and institutions. tality and economic outcomes.We find that Our argument is most closely related to work none of these overturn our results;the estimates on the influence of colonial experience on insti- change remarkably little when we include con- tutions.Frederich A.von Hayek (1960)argued trols for the identity of the main colonizer,legal that the British common law tradition was su- origin,climate,religion,geography,natural re- perior to the French civil law,which was devel- sources,soil quality,and measures of ethnolin- oped during the Napoleonic era to restrain guistic fragmentation.Furthermore,the results judges'interference with state policies (see also are also robust to the inclusion of controls for Seymour M.Lipset,1994).More recently, the current disease environment (e.g.,the prev- Rafael La Porta et al.(1998,1999)emphasize alence of malaria,life expectancy,and infant the importance of colonial origin (the identity of

1372 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2001 supported by the mortality rates of local people in these areas. For example, Curtin (1968 Table 2) reports that the annual mortality rates of local troops serving with the British army in Bengal and Madras were respectively 11 and 13 in 1,000. These numbers are quite comparable to, in fact lower than, the annual mortality rates of British troops serving in Britain, which were approximately 15 in 1,000. In contrast, the mortality rates of British troops serving in these colonies were much higher because of their lack of immunity. For example, mortality rates in Bengal and Madras for British troops were between 70 and 170 in 1,000. The view that the disease burden for indigenous adults was not unusual in laces like kfrica or India is also supported b; the relatively high population densities in these places before Europeans arrived (Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, 1975). We document that our estimates of the effect of institutions on performance are not driven by outliers. For example, excluding Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States does not change the results, nor does excluding Africa. Interestingly, we show that once the effect of institutions on economic performance is controlled for, neither distance-from the equator nor the dummy for Africa is significant. These results suggest that Africa is poorer than the rest of the world not because of pure geographic or cultural factors. but because of worse institutions. The validity of our approach-i.e., our exclusion restriction-is threatened if other factors correlated with the estimates of settler mortalitv affect income per capita. We adopt two strategies to substantiate that our results are not driven by omitted factors. First, we investigate whether institutions have a comparable effect on income once we control for a number of variables potentially correlated with settler mortality and economic outcomes. We find that none of these overturn our results: the estimates change remarkably little when we include controls for the identity of the main colonizer, legal origin, climate, religion, geography, natural resources, soil quality, and measures of ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Furthermore, the results are also robust to the inclusion of controls for the current disease environment (e.g., the prevalence of malaria, life expectancy, and infant mortality) and the current fraction of the population of European descent. Naturally, it is impossible to control for all possible variables that might be correlated with settler mortality and economic outcomes. Furthermore, our empirical approach might capture the effect of settler mortality on economic performance, but working through other channels. We deal with these problems by using a simple overidentification test using measures of European migration to the colonies and early institutions as additional instruments. We then use overidentification tests to detect whether settler mortality has a direct effect on current performance. The results are encouraging for our approach; they generate no evidence for a direct effect of settler mortality on economic outcomes. We are not aware of others who have pointed out the link between settler mortality and institutions, though scholars such as William H. McNeill (1976), Crosby (1986), and Jared M. Diamond (1997) have discussed the influence of diseases on human history. Diamond (1997), in particular, emphasizes comparative development, but his theory is based on the geographical determinants of the incidence of the neolithic revolution. He ignores both the importance of institutions and the potential causes of divergence in more recent development, which are the main focus of our paper. Work by Ronald E. Robinson and John Gallagher (1961), Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan (1962), Donald Denoon (1983), and Philip J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins (1993) emphasizes that settler colonies such as the United States and New Zealand are different from other colonies, and point out that these differences were important for their economic success. Nevertheless, this literature does not develop the link between mortality, settlements, and institutions. Our argument is most closely related to work on the influence of colonial experience on institutions. Frederich A. von Hayek (1960) argued that the British common law tradition was superior to the French civil law, which was developed during the Napoleonic era to restrain judges' interference with state policies (see also Seymour M. Lipset, 1994). More recently, Rafael La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) emphasize the importance of colonial origin (the identity of

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