当前位置：和泉文库 > 思想政治 > 《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Use of History and Sociology in International Political Economy）Everyday Legitimacy and International Financial Orders

《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Use of History and Sociology in International Political Economy）Everyday Legitimacy and International Financial Orders

文件格式：PDF，文件大小：144.03KB，售价：5.61元

文档详细内容（约19页）

New Political Economy,Vol.12,No.1,March 2007 s】Routledge Twior Francis Group 1sn6n Everyday Legitimacy and International N S6.20 Financial Orders:The Social Sources of Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance LEONARD SEABROOKE 益 How do states build financial power in the international political economy?The conventional focus is to examine changes at what we may consider the 'big end of town'-the stock exchange,the large banks,institutional investors and domi- nant corporations'-or historical shifts between principal financial centres over the longue duree.?While institutions at the big end of town',and actors who work within them,undoubtedly represent the 'sharp end'where financial strength is most concentrated,this article investigates the more everyday sources of finan- cial power. It does so on the basis of the following proposition:that states that enable the majority of their citizens to access credit and build wealth are more able to recycle capital through the domestic system and,in so doing,improve their inter- national financial capacity to export and attract capital,as well as to have a regu- latory and normative influence on the character of the international financial order. It is perhaps not so surprising that states that exercise financial power within the international political economy need to ground it in a stronger basis than only elites.Indeed,the history of international financial orders speaks not only to how elites build financial power,but also to how fragile their grasp upon it can become.This may especially be the case when there is a broad social perception that finance is unstable because it is concentrated in the hands of the few and requires state intervention. If a state's financial power is not autonomous from broader society but is instead drawn from society,then understanding its social sources requires us to ascribe some role to non-elite actors.One way to address this aim would be to take the rationalist tack and argue that over the centuries liberal democratic states can more easily build financial power because citizens can punish political representatives at the ballot box,but this explanation requires us to see the voter as having stable incentives over time (not to mention the issue of who can vote in different periods of time).Alternatively,one could take the Gramscian route and Leonard Seabrooke,International Center for Business and Politics,Copenhagen Business School, Steen Blichers Vej 22,2000 Frederiksberg,Denmark. ISSN 1356-3467 print:ISSN 1469-9923 online/07/010001-18 C 2007 Taylor Francis D0:10.1080/13563460601068453

Downloaded By: [University of Sydney] At: 02:46 7 August 2007 Everyday Legitimacy and International Financial Orders: The Social Sources of Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance LEONARD SEABROOKE How do states build financial power in the international political economy? The conventional focus is to examine changes at what we may consider the ‘big end of town’ – the stock exchange, the large banks, institutional investors and dominant corporations1 – or historical shifts between principal financial centres over the longue dure´e. 2 While institutions at the ‘big end of town’, and actors who work within them, undoubtedly represent the ‘sharp end’ where financial strength is most concentrated, this article investigates the more everyday sources of financial power.3 It does so on the basis of the following proposition: that states that enable the majority of their citizens to access credit and build wealth are more able to recycle capital through the domestic system and, in so doing, improve their international financial capacity to export and attract capital, as well as to have a regulatory and normative influence on the character of the international financial order. It is perhaps not so surprising that states that exercise financial power within the international political economy need to ground it in a stronger basis than only elites. Indeed, the history of international financial orders speaks not only to how elites build financial power, but also to how fragile their grasp upon it can become. This may especially be the case when there is a broad social perception that finance is unstable because it is concentrated in the hands of the few and requires state intervention. If a state’s financial power is not autonomous from broader society but is instead drawn from society, then understanding its social sources requires us to ascribe some role to non-elite actors. One way to address this aim would be to take the rationalist tack and argue that over the centuries liberal democratic states can more easily build financial power because citizens can punish political representatives at the ballot box,4 but this explanation requires us to see the voter as having stable incentives over time (not to mention the issue of who can vote in different periods of time). Alternatively, one could take the Gramscian route and New Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2007 Leonard Seabrooke, International Center for Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Steen Blichers Vej 22, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. ISSN 1356-3467 print; ISSN 1469-9923 online=07=010001-18 # 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080=13563460601068453

Leonard Seabrooke argue that elite actors have a greater capacity to manipulate the broader population into viewing a certain order of things as legitimate and as the 'common sense'5 1sn6n Such a perspective explains how elites operate within the international political economy,but,unintentionally,tends to diminish the agency of non-elite actors N to shape change beyond organised resistance.Similarly,we could take the Constructivist route,but then we may end up in a similar position whereby non-elites actors have little capacity to change their environment against the persuasions of norm entrepreneurs.8 An alternative is to focus on the legitimation of relations between the state and non-elites as a 'two-way street'that is important to a state's financial power.From this view,legitimation extends beyond the ballot box and can be found in everyday practices as well as organised collective resistance and advocacy.This view would also emphasise differences in legitimacy claims made by a state to effect policy change and how non-elites alter economic and social conventions in line with how they think the economy should work.0 While the focus on legitimacy 益 in the past has been on 'deficits'between those governing and those governed during a period that could be understood as a crisis,the implementation of poli- cies forged in crisis is tested in how they affect conventions in everyday life.For this article,exploring how non-elites'changing conventions and expectations are encouraged or hindered by different kinds of financial institutions and instruments may reveal the domestic bases of different kinds of international financial orders This article explores the domestic bases of English imperialism in global finance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,and US hegemony in global finance in the late twentieth century-the last two periods of intensive financial globalisation.3 It does so through a focus on policies that have a strong impact on everyday life,such as property,credit and tax -what I call the 'financial reform nexus'-for people on below median income (I use the shorthand 'LIGs' for people in lower-income groupings).How the state treats LIGs provides insight into its capacity to recycle and build a deep pool of domestic capital and,from this capacity,influence the international financial order.I argue that this is especially the case for people in what we would commonly understand as the 'middle classes'and 'lower-middle classes',rather than very low-income individuals associated with 'the poor'.14This is warranted given that LIGs who perceive them- selves as 'nearly there'in terms of their access to credit and property,or their rela- tive tax burdens,can provide the state with either a powerful financial resource,or a mass of political,economic,and social frustration.As we will see,the legiti- mation of a financial reform nexus is directly related to whether a state's inter- national financial capacity has an 'imperialist'or 'hegemonic'character, including the ability to switch between the two through what I call a 'rentier shift'. The article is structured as follows.First,I discuss everyday legitimacy and social mechanisms of change.Second,I discuss the English case,s breaking down the financial reform nexus into its credit,tax and property dimensions before relating them to imperialist behaviour in the 'international rentier economy'.Third,I discuss the US case,tracing the tax,property and credit poli- tics of the financial reform nexus before arriving at US hegemonic influence in the 'international creditor economy'.Fourth,I conclude by briefly reflecting on whether the USA between 2000 and the present has been going through a 2

Downloaded By: [University of Sydney] At: 02:46 7 August 2007 argue that elite actors have a greater capacity to manipulate the broader population into viewing a certain order of things as legitimate and as the ‘common sense’.5 Such a perspective explains how elites operate within the international political economy, but, unintentionally, tends to diminish the agency of non-elite actors to shape change beyond organised resistance.6 Similarly, we could take the Constructivist route,7 but then we may end up in a similar position whereby non-elites actors have little capacity to change their environment against the persuasions of norm entrepreneurs.8 An alternative is to focus on the legitimation of relations between the state and non-elites as a ‘two-way street’ that is important to a state’s financial power. From this view, legitimation extends beyond the ballot box and can be found in everyday practices as well as organised collective resistance and advocacy.9 This view would also emphasise differences in legitimacy claims made by a state to effect policy change and how non-elites alter economic and social conventions in line with how they think the economy should work.10 While the focus on legitimacy in the past has been on ‘deficits’ between those governing and those governed during a period that could be understood as a crisis,11 the implementation of policies forged in crisis is tested in how they affect conventions in everyday life.12 For this article, exploring how non-elites’ changing conventions and expectations are encouraged or hindered by different kinds of financial institutions and instruments may reveal the domestic bases of different kinds of international financial orders. This article explores the domestic bases of English imperialism in global finance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and US hegemony in global finance in the late twentieth century – the last two periods of intensive financial globalisation.13 It does so through a focus on policies that have a strong impact on everyday life, such as property, credit and tax – what I call the ‘financial reform nexus’ – for people on below median income (I use the shorthand ‘LIGs’ for people in lower-income groupings). How the state treats LIGs provides insight into its capacity to recycle and build a deep pool of domestic capital and, from this capacity, influence the international financial order. I argue that this is especially the case for people in what we would commonly understand as the ‘middle classes’ and ‘lower-middle classes’, rather than very low-income individuals associated with ‘the poor’.14 This is warranted given that LIGs who perceive themselves as ‘nearly there’ in terms of their access to credit and property, or their relative tax burdens, can provide the state with either a powerful financial resource, or a mass of political, economic, and social frustration. As we will see, the legitimation of a financial reform nexus is directly related to whether a state’s international financial capacity has an ‘imperialist’ or ‘hegemonic’ character, including the ability to switch between the two through what I call a ‘rentier shift’. The article is structured as follows. First, I discuss everyday legitimacy and social mechanisms of change. Second, I discuss the English case,15 breaking down the financial reform nexus into its credit, tax and property dimensions before relating them to imperialist behaviour in the ‘international rentier economy’.16 Third, I discuss the US case, tracing the tax, property and credit politics of the financial reform nexus before arriving at US hegemonic influence in the ‘international creditor economy’. Fourth, I conclude by briefly reflecting on whether the USA between 2000 and the present has been going through a Leonard Seabrooke 2

Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance rentier shift that is transforming the character of its influence in the international financial order from hegemonic to imperialist. 1sn6m Everyday legitimacy and mechanisms for institutional change S6.20 We can move away from elite-driven analyses of how change occurs in the world economy by viewing legitimacy as contestation between claims by those who seek to govern,and the conferral or rejection of such claims in everyday practice by those being governed.In doing so we may learn from the literature on 'everyday politicsA crucial aspect of this literature is the notion that defiance and resistance need not be organised in advocacy groups to be effective.Rather,it may also occur incrementally and provide impulses for those governing to reform institutions to be in line with economic and social conventions.Everyday practices range widely but may include non-compliance with regulations as well as new practices that reflect a change in attitudes about how the economy should work(from songs,to cheating,to 益 a reordering of life priorities).For Benedict Kerkvliet,such everyday politics provides a'way for the relatively powerless to venture claims and put some pressure on more powerful people to take them into account?o Everyday practices may be informed by what I refer to as 'axiorational'beha- utrou np o ermr Importantly,this rescues us from the view that non-elite actors will simply conform to a 'logic of consequences'or a 'logic of appropriateness',and permits us to see non-elite actors as viewing the capacity to crossover between conventions as more fluid or liquid'.?2 Such a view of reason allows us to place greater stress on intentions and expectations that inform interests and,in doing so,permits a better understanding of how non-elites'intersubjective under- standings can change and,through everyday practices,influence institutional change. To see all this in action,I argue that there are three linked social mechanisms at play in the two cases discussed in this article.23 The first is public or private con- testation from LIGs over the legitimacy of the financial reform nexus.Such con- testation may be expressed through protest by advocacy groups or,more subtly, through changing economic and social conventions related to taxation,credit and property.Either way,changes from LIGs provide impulses to the state that are either taken aboard or rejected and lead to a redistribution of political and economic assets and access.This redistribution either goes some way towards meeting LIGs'expectations about how the economy should work or violates them by favouring rentier interests and,in extreme cases,enables a rentier shift that reorders political and economic relations in a socially regressive manner.Either way,the state will engage in a propagation of economic social norms that seeks to persuade LIGs about how the economy should work.Such proclamations -legitimacy claims-provide feedback for the process to start again.The three mechanisms are anchored by focal points related to the financial reform nexus,namely credit and property access and relative tax burdens.How these mechanisms play out then informs the character of the state's influence on the international financial order. 3

Downloaded By: [University of Sydney] At: 02:46 7 August 2007 rentier shift that is transforming the character of its influence in the international financial order from hegemonic to imperialist. Everyday legitimacy and mechanisms for institutional change We can move away from elite-driven analyses of how change occurs in the world economy by viewing legitimacy as contestation between claims by those who seek to govern, and the conferral or rejection of such claims in everyday practice by those being governed. In doing so we may learn from the literature on ‘everyday politics’.17 A crucial aspect of this literature is the notion that defiance and resistance need not be organised in advocacy groups to be effective. Rather, it may also occur incrementally and provide impulses for those governing to reform institutions to be in line with economic and social conventions.18 Everyday practices range widely but may include non-compliance with regulations as well as new practices that reflect a change in attitudes about how the economy should work (from songs, to cheating, to a reordering of life priorities).19 For Benedict Kerkvliet, such everyday politics provides a ‘way for the relatively powerless to venture claims and put some pressure on more powerful people to take them into account’.20 Everyday practices may be informed by what I refer to as ‘axiorational’ behaviour – that is, action that is neither purely instrumental nor purely value-oriented, but grounded in reasons that one’s peers will most likely confer legitimacy upon.21 Importantly, this rescues us from the view that non-elite actors will simply conform to a ‘logic of consequences’ or a ‘logic of appropriateness’, and permits us to see non-elite actors as viewing the capacity to crossover between conventions as more fluid or ‘liquid’.22 Such a view of reason allows us to place greater stress on intentions and expectations that inform interests and, in doing so, permits a better understanding of how non-elites’ intersubjective understandings can change and, through everyday practices, influence institutional change. To see all this in action, I argue that there are three linked social mechanisms at play in the two cases discussed in this article.23 The first is public or private contestation from LIGs over the legitimacy of the financial reform nexus. Such contestation may be expressed through protest by advocacy groups or, more subtly, through changing economic and social conventions related to taxation, credit and property. Either way, changes from LIGs provide impulses to the state that are either taken aboard or rejected and lead to a redistribution of political and economic assets and access. This redistribution either goes some way towards meeting LIGs’ expectations about how the economy should work or violates them by favouring rentier interests and, in extreme cases, enables a rentier shift that reorders political and economic relations in a socially regressive manner. Either way, the state will engage in a propagation of economic social norms that seeks to persuade LIGs about how the economy should work. Such proclamations – legitimacy claims – provide feedback for the process to start again.24 The three mechanisms are anchored by focal points related to the financial reform nexus, namely credit and property access and relative tax burdens. How these mechanisms play out then informs the character of the state’s influence on the international financial order. Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance 3

Leonard Seabrooke Social sources of the international rentier economy During the latter half of the nineteenth century much of the wealth within the 1sn6n L booming English financial system was not in the City of London but in the provinces.England's capacity to create a deep and broad domestic pool of capital had been created by its unique mixing of 'state capitalism'with private capitalism that permitted networks for capital flows in the country to flourish.At this time England had a financial system with a much broader social basis than its European neighbours,leading Adolph Weber to comment in 1902 that in the mid nineteenth century English joint-stock banks took capital from all classes without exception'?6 While we certainly should not exaggerate the capacity of LIGs to invest in the banking system (which is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon),depositors were further down the society ladder than we may assume.Stanley Chapman,for example,describes the typical joint-stock bank in the period as holding deposits of which nearly 益 70 per cent came from people in middle-class occupations(in order of represen- tation:cotton spinners,retailers,corn merchants,linen merchants)with only 18 per cent represented by 'Gentlemen'and ten percent by professionals (mainly lawyers and doctors).As such,and at a time when provincial banks were more powerful than those in the City of London,they were drawing from a wide social base rather than a narrow concentrated elite. In addition to these banks,the state began to intervene in a positive manner for LIGs,including W.E.Gladstone's efforts in the 1860s to create a postal saving system that could extend the capacity for personal savings beyond the wealthy and tackle the 'anti-social and immoral'treatment of LIGs on credit and property.28 While LIGs'expectations concerning property ownership were not high at this point,the desire was growing.There was not,however, any significant change to their access to property,and mortgages as a pro- portion of financial assets within the English financial system nearly halved between 1850 and 1913,especially as other instruments associated with rentier investments grew in prominence.This situation worsened with the post-1890 rentier shift. English credit politics After 1890,there was a significant change in English finance as the City of London was able to assert itself and successfully draw in capital from the provinces. Accordingly,while the ratio of provincial assets to London joint-stock bank assets was 3.2:1 in 1844,it was 1:1.06 by 1880 and worsened thereafter.30 Tracing these dynamics,Edgar Jaffe commented in 1905: Is it not amazing that only in the 90s was the survival of provincial banks threatened when capital city banks turned the tables and sought to get hold of an advantage through the extension into the Provinces ..leading to today's principle,that only big banks that are established both in London and the Provinces are competi- tive enough to fight their way through with a view of success

Downloaded By: [University of Sydney] At: 02:46 7 August 2007 Social sources of the international rentier economy During the latter half of the nineteenth century much of the wealth within the booming English financial system was not in the City of London but in the provinces. England’s capacity to create a deep and broad domestic pool of capital had been created by its unique mixing of ‘state capitalism’ with private capitalism that permitted networks for capital flows in the country to flourish.25 At this time England had a financial system with a much broader social basis than its European neighbours, leading Adolph Weber to comment in 1902 that in the mid nineteenth century English joint-stock banks took capital ‘from all classes without exception’.26 While we certainly should not exaggerate the capacity of LIGs to invest in the banking system (which is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon), depositors were further down the society ladder than we may assume. Stanley Chapman, for example, describes the typical joint-stock bank in the period as holding deposits of which nearly 70 per cent came from people in middle-class occupations (in order of representation: cotton spinners, retailers, corn merchants, linen merchants) with only 18 per cent represented by ‘Gentlemen’ and ten percent by professionals (mainly lawyers and doctors).27 As such, and at a time when provincial banks were more powerful than those in the City of London, they were drawing from a wide social base rather than a narrow concentrated elite. In addition to these banks, the state began to intervene in a positive manner for LIGs, including W. E. Gladstone’s efforts in the 1860s to create a postal saving system that could extend the capacity for personal savings beyond the wealthy and tackle the ‘anti-social and immoral’ treatment of LIGs on credit and property.28 While LIGs’ expectations concerning property ownership were not high at this point, the desire was growing. There was not, however, any significant change to their access to property, and mortgages as a proportion of financial assets within the English financial system nearly halved between 1850 and 1913, especially as other instruments associated with rentier investments grew in prominence.29 This situation worsened with the post-1890 rentier shift. English credit politics After 1890, there was a significant change in English finance as the City of London was able to assert itself and successfully draw in capital from the provinces. Accordingly, while the ratio of provincial assets to London joint-stock bank assets was 3.2 : 1 in 1844, it was 1 : 1.06 by 1880 and worsened thereafter.30 Tracing these dynamics, Edgar Jaffe´ commented in 1905: Is it not amazing that only in the 90s was the survival of provincial banks threatened when capital city banks turned the tables and sought to get hold of an advantage through the extension into the Provinces ... leading to today’s principle, that only big banks that are established both in London and the Provinces are competitive enough to fight their way through with a view of success.31 Leonard Seabrooke 4

点击进入文档下载页（PDF格式）

共19页，可试读7页，点击继续阅读 ↓↓

您可能感兴趣的文档

点击购买下载（PDF）

下载及服务说明

购买前请先查看本文档预览页，确认内容后再进行支付；
如遇文件无法下载、无法访问或其它任何问题，可发送电子邮件反馈，核实后将进行文件补发或退款等其它相关操作；
邮箱：

文档浏览记录