ISSUES STUDIES Table 1 Washington's Possible Responses to a War between the PRC and Taiwan under Different Circumstances A war provoked by Beijing A war provoked by Taipei Interference More likely Less likely Hands-off Less likely More likely likely response to any military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.The Taiwan Relations Act(TRA)implies that "were the PRC to attempt to settle the Taiwan question by force,"the United States would react accordingly, even though the Act does not"legally mandate that the United States come to the rescue of Taiwan if it is attacked."President George W.Bush once declared that he saw the United States as having a clear obligation to defend Taiwan and that the United States was willing "to do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself"under Beijing's military attack.However, whether and to what degree the United States would get involved in a military conflict provoked by Beijing's attempt to unify China by force is unclear.At the other end of the spectrum,even if a Strait war was provoked by Taiwan's ambition for formal independence,one cannot exclude the possibility that the United States might still provide military support to Taiwan.Washington's possible responses-interference or hands-off- to a war provoked by either side of the Taiwan Strait are illustrated in table 1. Washington's ambiguous strategy toward a possible war across the Taiwan Strait is associated with the traditional U.S.policy of"dual deter- rence and dual reassurance."According to Kenneth Lieberthal,this policy has sent different signals to Beijing and Taipei: Luncheon address by U.S.Senator Craig Thomas at a Woodrow Wilson Center conference on "U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War,"May 9,2000.See Gang Lin,ed., U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War,Asia Program Special Report (Wash- ington,D.C.:Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,August 2000),9. 10Brian Knowlton,"Analysts See Comments as a Toughening of American Position,"Inter- national Herald Tribune,April 25,2001. 222 June 2007
ISSUES & STUDIES 222 June 2007 likely response to any military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) impliesthat "were the PRC to attempt to settle the Taiwan question by force," the United States would react accordingly, even though the Act does not "legally mandate that the United States come to the rescue of Taiwan if it is attacked." 9 President George W. Bush once declared that he saw the United States as having a clear obligation to defend Taiwan and that the United States was willing "to do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself" under Beijing's military attack. 10 However, whether and to what degree the United States would get involved in a military conflict provoked by Beijing's attempt to unify China by force is unclear. At the other end of the spectrum, even if a Strait war was provoked by Taiwan's ambition for formal independence, one cannot exclude the possibility that the United States might still provide military support to Taiwan. Washington's possible responses— interference or hands-off— to a war provoked by either side of the Taiwan Strait are illustrated in table 1. Washington's ambiguous strategy toward a possible war across the Taiwan Strait is associated with the traditional U.S. policy of "dual deterrence and dual reassurance." According to Kenneth Lieberthal, this policy has sent different signals to Beijing and Taipei: 9Luncheon address by U.S. Senator Craig Thomas at a Woodrow Wilson Center conference on "U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War," May 9, 2000. See Gang Lin, ed., U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War, Asia Program Special Report (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2000), 9. 10Brian Knowlton, "Analysts See Comments as a Toughening of American Position," International Herald Tribune, April 25, 2001. Table 1 Washington's Possible Responses to a War between the PRC and Taiwan under Different Circumstances Interference Hands-off A war provoked by Beijing A war provoked by Taipei More likely Less likely Less likely More likely
U.S.Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait [It]has signaled that Beijing cannot count on the United States'standing by if China attacks Taiwan and has signaled to Taiwan that it cannot count on U.S forces to defend it regardless of the circumstances that precipitate the fighting. Washington has also assured Beijing that it will not change its one-China policy unilaterally and assured Taiwan that it will not sell out the island's interests. The "dual deterrence and dual reassurance"policy was designed to prevent any unilateral change of the status quo initiated by Beijing or Taipei.The signals of deterrence sent to the two sides,however,were contradictory. The deterring message for Beijing was that it has to be prepared to fight the United States in a Strait war under any circumstances.As Con- doleezza Rice put it during President Bush's 2000 campaign,the United States should deter any trouble across the Taiwan Strait and make it in- conceivable for China to use force.12 Some American policymakers and analysts suggested that Beijing should refrain from rushing into action if Taipei were to make a formal declaration of independence,but should in- stead rely on Washington to push Taipei back into the "one-China"box.To save its own face,Kenneth Lieberthal has suggested,the PRC should ac- cept a definition of Taiwanese independence according to international law.That is,as long as "every single major country in the world not only recognizes Beijing as China's legitimate government but also shares the view...that Taiwan is not independent',"Beijing does not need to take military action against independence activities on Taiwan. The deterring message for Taipei is that it should not count on the United States to defend Taiwan,not to mention go to war with the PRC for the sake of Taiwan's independence.Washington has made it clear to Taipei that it is Taipei's responsibility to defend the island.Taipei's long delay in purchasing U.S.weapons,which were offered by President Bush as early as spring 2001,has made at least some Americans wonder whether Taiwan Kenneth Lieberthal,"Preventing a War over Taiwan,"Foreign Affairs 84,no.2(March/ April2005):53-63at55. 2Condoleeza Rice,"Campaign 2000:Promoting the National Interest,"Foreign Affairs 79 no.1 (January/February 2000),http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5-p10/;and condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html (accessed May 20, 2007). 3Lieberthal,"Preventing a War over Taiwan."59. June 2007 223
U.S. Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait June 2007 223 [It] has signaled that Beijing cannot count on the United States' standing by if China attacks Taiwan and has signaled to Taiwan that it cannot count on U.S. forces to defend it regardless of the circumstances that precipitate the fighting. Washington has also assured Beijing that it will not change its one-China policy unilaterally and assured Taiwan that it will not sell out the island's interests. 11 The "dual deterrence and dual reassurance" policy was designed to prevent any unilateral change of the status quo initiated by Beijing or Taipei. The signals of deterrence sent to the two sides, however, were contradictory. The deterring message for Beijing was that it has to be prepared to fight the United States in a Strait war under any circumstances. As Condoleezza Rice put it during President Bush's 2000 campaign, the United States should deter any trouble across the Taiwan Strait and make it inconceivable for China to use force. 12 Some American policymakers and analysts suggested that Beijing should refrain from rushing into action if Taipei were to make a formal declaration of independence, but should instead rely on Washington to push Taipei back into the "one-China" box. To save its own face, Kenneth Lieberthal has suggested, the PRC should accept a definition of Taiwanese independence according to international law. That is, as long as "every single major country in the world not only recognizes Beijing as China's legitimate government but also shares the view ... that 'Taiwan is not independent'," Beijing does not need to take military action against independence activities on Taiwan. 13 The deterring message for Taipei is that it should not count on the United States to defend Taiwan, not to mention go to war with the PRC for the sake of Taiwan's independence. Washington has made it clear to Taipei that it is Taipei's responsibility to defend the island. Taipei's long delay in purchasing U.S. weapons, which were offered by President Bush as early as spring 2001, has made at least some Americans wonder whether Taiwan 11Kenneth Lieberthal, "Preventing a War over Taiwan," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March/ April 2005): 53-63 at 55. 12Condoleeza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5-p10/; and condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html (accessed May 20, 2007). 13Lieberthal, "Preventing a War over Taiwan." 59