96 WORLD POLITICS -H1b.The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases follow- ing a fall in power status that decreases access to central executive power by representatives of an ethnic group. Finally,the principle of ethnic representativity of modern nation- states is also violated if groups in power are"underrepresented"in com- parison with other power-sharing partners.When smaller groups wield more power than larger groups,representatives of the larger groups can portray the situation as unfair and stir up fear of ethnic domination among their constituents.Thus,we have the next hypothesis. -H1c.The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases if the ethnic group represented by a power-sharing partner is larger compared with that of more powerful coalition partners. MOBILIZATIONAL CAPACITY:GROUP SIZE Collective action theory tells us that group motivations are insufficient to produce political mobilization and violent contestation.The moti- vational forces described above are thus a necessary,but not a sufficient, cause for ethnic conflict.Successful mobilization requires both motivation and organizational capacity.While neoclassical collective action theory in the Olsonian tradition expects free riding in large groups,nationalists may overcome such dilemmas through intragroup monitoring,by relying on preexisting social networks,and by mobilizing identity-related co- operation norms.Following resource mobilization theory,we postulate that larger excluded groups are even more able to challenge a govern- ment because they can draw on their superior numbers to recruit fighters and have a larger potential resource pool to sustain an organizational infrastructure.As argued by Cederman,Buhaug,and Rod,the politi- cal claims of larger ethnic groups also enjoy more legitimacy:given the principles of representativity that underlie the nation-state,the exclusion of large sections of the population from power is more scandalous than the exclusion of smaller groups,and minority-ruled states(ethnocracies) are among the least legitimate political regimes in the modern world.so Based on this argument,we postulate the next hypothesis. -H2.The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the ethnic group's relative demographic size. For a general argument based on intergroup comparison,see Horowitz 1985;and Gurr 2000 46 McCarthy and Zald 1977;Tilly 1978;Tilly and Tarrow 2006 47Gur2000. 4 Hechter and Okamoto 2001.Furthermore,free riding may be less problematic in many civil war situations because of the risks associated with nonparticipation;see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007. McCarthy and Zald 1977;DeNardo 1985. 50 Cederman,Buhaug,and Rod 2009;see also Cederman 1997,chap.8;Petersen 2002,51
96 world politics —H1b. The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases following a fall in power status that decreases access to central executive power by representatives of an ethnic group. Finally, the principle of ethnic representativity of modern nationstates is also violated if groups in power are “underrepresented” in comparison with other power-sharing partners. When smaller groups wield more power than larger groups, representatives of the larger groups can portray the situation as unfair and stir up fear of ethnic domination among their constituents.45 Thus, we have the next hypothesis. —H1c. The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases if the ethnic group represented by a power-sharing partner is larger compared with that of more powerful coalition partners. Mobilizational Capacity: Group Size Collective action theory tells us that group motivations are insufficient to produce political mobilization and violent contestation.46 The motivational forces described above are thus a necessary, but not a sufficient, cause for ethnic conflict. Successful mobilization requires both motivation and organizational capacity. 47 While neoclassical collective action theory in the Olsonian tradition expects free riding in large groups, nationalists may overcome such dilemmas through intragroup monitoring, by relying on preexisting social networks, and by mobilizing identity-related cooperation norms.48 Following resource mobilization theory, we postulate that larger excluded groups are even more able to challenge a government because they can draw on their superior numbers to recruit fighters and have a larger potential resource pool to sustain an organizational infrastructure.49 As argued by Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød, the political claims of larger ethnic groups also enjoy more legitimacy: given the principles of representativity that underlie the nation-state, the exclusion of large sections of the population from power is more scandalous than the exclusion of smaller groups, and minority-ruled states (ethnocracies) are among the least legitimate political regimes in the modern world.50 Based on this argument, we postulate the next hypothesis. —H2. The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the ethnic group’s relative demographic size. 45 For a general argument based on intergroup comparison, see Horowitz 1985; and Gurr 2000. 46 McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Tilly and Tarrow 2006. 47 Gurr 2000. 48 Hechter and Okamoto 2001. Furthermore, free riding may be less problematic in many civil war situations because of the risks associated with nonparticipation; see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007. 49 McCarthy and Zald 1977; DeNardo 1985. 50 Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009; see also Cederman 1997, chap. 8; Petersen 2002, 51
WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL? 97 HISTORY MATTERS:THE INFLUENCE OF PAST CONFLICT Ethnonationalist mobilization and contestation are macrohistorical processes that operate over both shortsi and long time spans.32 It may take decades until perceived humiliation and unfair ethnic status hi- erarchies give rise to political mobilization and conflict.Thus,rather than being an instant and ahistorical phenomenon,nationalist mobi- lization takes place in a historical context that might be characterized by previous episodes of ethnonationalist violence.In extreme cases of path dependency,actors may find themselves trapped in self-sustaining cycles of violence. We postulate that past conflicts influence the likelihood of present conflict through three mechanisms.First,ethnonationalist activists at- tempt to glorify their group's history through one-sided narratives that stress their own victories and attribute blame for military losses to trai- tors,weak-spirited leaders,or a ruthless enemy.This implies that leaders might not update their risk assessments and might take up arms again even when the chances of winning have not improved significantly.53 Second,past experiences of traumatic violence may live on as a part of oral tradition or they may sometimes be perpetuated in official history textbooks and public rituals,nourishing calls for revenge.sThird,prior exposure to combat means that violence is no longer unthinkable but constitutes part of the accepted repertoire of action and may help create organizational structures and identities that can be reactivated at later points in history or even create a culture of violence.ss We express these three mechanisms of path dependency in our third main hypothesis. -H3.The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the number of prior conflicts fought in the name of the same ethnic group. Needless to say,this set of hypotheses does not exhaust the links be- tween ethnicity and internal conflict.Properties of ethnic groups,such as concentrated settlement patterns,s6 cohesive internal structure,57 and sBeissinger 2002. s2 Wimmer and Min 2006. sRydgren 2007. 4 Kalyvas 2007. ss Laitin 1995;Waldman 2004.For alternative explanations of recurrent warfare,see Walter 2004. Conflict experiences involving other groups may also increase the likelihood of ethnonationalist vio- lence through diffusion mechanisms;see Lake and Rothchild 1998. sUsing the GREG(Geo-Referencing Ethnic Groups)data set,which is based on a geo-coded ver- sion of the Atlas Narodov Mira,Weidmann 2009 shows that there is a strong link between settlement concentration and conflict,thus confirming Toft 2003.Data collection that will provide a GIs-based version of EPR is under way. 7Ty1978,Gur2000
why do ethnic groups rebel? 97 History Matters: The Influence of Past Conflict Ethnonationalist mobilization and contestation are macrohistorical processes that operate over both short51 and long time spans.52 It may take decades until perceived humiliation and unfair ethnic status hierarchies give rise to political mobilization and conflict. Thus, rather than being an instant and ahistorical phenomenon, nationalist mobilization takes place in a historical context that might be characterized by previous episodes of ethnonationalist violence. In extreme cases of path dependency, actors may find themselves trapped in self-sustaining cycles of violence. We postulate that past conflicts influence the likelihood of present conflict through three mechanisms. First, ethnonationalist activists attempt to glorify their group’s history through one-sided narratives that stress their own victories and attribute blame for military losses to traitors, weak-spirited leaders, or a ruthless enemy. This implies that leaders might not update their risk assessments and might take up arms again even when the chances of winning have not improved significantly.53 Second, past experiences of traumatic violence may live on as a part of oral tradition or they may sometimes be perpetuated in official history textbooks and public rituals, nourishing calls for revenge.54 Third, prior exposure to combat means that violence is no longer unthinkable but constitutes part of the accepted repertoire of action and may help create organizational structures and identities that can be reactivated at later points in history or even create a culture of violence.55 We express these three mechanisms of path dependency in our third main hypothesis. —H3. The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the number of prior conflicts fought in the name of the same ethnic group. Needless to say, this set of hypotheses does not exhaust the links between ethnicity and internal conflict. Properties of ethnic groups, such as concentrated settlement patterns,56 cohesive internal structure,57 and 51 Beissinger 2002. 52 Wimmer and Min 2006. 53 Rydgren 2007. 54 Kalyvas 2007. 55 Laitin 1995; Waldman 2004. For alternative explanations of recurrent warfare, see Walter 2004. Conflict experiences involving other groups may also increase the likelihood of ethnonationalist violence through diffusion mechanisms; see Lake and Rothchild 1998. 56 Using the greg (Geo-Referencing Ethnic Groups) data set, which is based on a geo-coded version of the Atlas Narodov Mira, Weidmann 2009 shows that there is a strong link between settlement concentration and conflict, thus confirming Toft 2003. Data collection that will provide a gis-based version of epr is under way. 57 Tilly 1978; Gurr 2000