CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 207 Tseng wanted the battalion officers to have authority to replace troops found to be undesirable,with new recruits from among the natives of Chihli,including those who had never been in the register of hereditary Green Standard families.1+The battalion officer himself was to be chosen by a high Green Standard officer-the general-in-chief or brigade general. Under the law of avoidance,the generals and in fact all Green Standard officers down to the second captains had to be natives of other provinces. While the retrained Green Standard troops and officers could not enjoy the native-place ties that characterized most yung-ying units,Tseng hoped that the middle-grade officers of the lien-cbiin could at least serve longer terms and could establish rapport with the brigade generals or generals-in-chief who were given the additional title of t'ug-ling,commanders of the lien- chiin.The regulations drafted by Tseng and approved by the throne in April 187o provided for a pay scale for the lien-cbiin officers and men,which was higher than that of their counterparts in the usual Green Standard units.But Tseng refrained from recommending the overhaul of the entire Green Standard system so as to reduce the number of worthless troops.He hoped that revenue for the lien-cbiin could come from new sources.'s Actually,the throne,during the preceding four years,had approved the proposals of other provincial officials that Green Standard troops in certain provincial commands be reduced so that the funds saved could be applied to the pay and weapons of the remaining Green Standard troops. Tso Tsung-t'ang,governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang until 1867, had begun reorganizing the Fukien Green Standard forces on this basis, and Ting Jih-ch'ang,governor of Kiangsu,with imperial sanction had reduced in 1869 the number of his 'governor's direct command'(fu-piao) from 1,6oo to I,oo0.16(See volume Io,page jo3.)Ting was seriously interested in transforming the I,ooo men under his personal command into a nucleus for the general reform of the Green Standard Army in Kiangsu- a plan left unrealized when Ting himself had to leave in 187o to mourn the death of his mother. Having found in Tseng Kuo-fan's proposals the hope that the Green Standard system could as a whole be saved and improved,the throne in 187I ordered each province to reduce its existing yung-ying forces to less than 8,ooo men,except in such strategic provinces as Kiangsu and Chihli.7 1 TWCKCC,Tsou-kao,28.19b,36. 15bid.28.2ob;2913,6,18b-19. t6 Tso Tsung-t'ang,Tro Wen-isiang eung eb'dan-chi (Complete collection of Tso Tsung-t'ang's papers;hereafter TWHK),14.17;19.16-21.Lu Shih-ch'iang,Ting Jib-ch'ang yf fzu-cb'iang yto-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement),186-7.Huang-cb'ao cbeng- tien lei-fruan,325.4b,8-10. 7Liu Chin-tsao,ed.Ch'ing-cb'ao bru wen-brien 'ng-'ao(Encyclopaedia of the historical records of the Ch'ing dynasty,continued),202.9,sos.Kwang-Ching Liu,'The limits of regional power in the late Ch'ing period:a reappraisal',Ch'ing-bua breb-pao,Ns,to.2(July 1974)217. Cambridge Histories OnlineCambridge University Press,2008
CH ING ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 207 Tseng wanted the battalion officers to have authority to replace troops found to be undesirable, with new recruits from among the natives of Chihli, including those who had never been in the register of hereditary Green Standard families.14 The battalion officer himself was to be chosen by a high Green Standard officer - the general-in-chief or brigade general. Under the law of avoidance, the generals and in fact all Green Standard officers down to the second captains had to be natives of other provinces. While the retrained Green Standard troops and officers could not enjoy the native-place ties that characterized mostyung-ying units, Tseng hoped that the middle-grade officers of the lien-chun could at least serve longer terms and could establish rapport with the brigade generals or generals-in-chief who were given the additional title of t'ung-ling, commanders of the lienchun. The regulations drafted by Tseng and approved by the throne in April 1870 provided for a pay scale for the lien-chun officers and men, which was higher than that of their counterparts in the usual Green Standard units. But Tseng refrained from recommending the overhaul of the entire Green Standard system so as to reduce the number of worthless troops. He hoped that revenue for the lien-chun could come from new sources.15 Actually, the throne, during the preceding four years, had approved the proposals of other provincial officials that Green Standard troops in certain provincial commands be reduced so that the funds saved could be applied to the pay and weapons of the remaining Green Standard troops. Tso Tsung-t'ang, governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang until 1867, had begun reorganizing the Fukien Green Standard forces on this basis, and Ting Jih-ch'ang, governor of Kiangsu, with imperial sanction had reduced in 1869 the number of his 'governor's direct command' (fu-piao) from 1,600 to 1,000.l6 (See volume 10, page 503.) Ting was seriously interested in transforming the 1,000 men under his personal command into a nucleus for the general reform of the Green Standard Army in Kiangsu - a plan left unrealized when Ting himself had to leave in 1870 to mourn the death of his mother. Having found in Tseng Kuo-fan's proposals the hope that the Green Standard system could as a whole be saved and improved, the throne in 1871 ordered each province to reduce its existing yung-ying forces to less than 8,000 men, except in such strategic provinces as Kiangsu and Chihli." '• TWCKCC, Tsou-kao, 28.19b, 36. " Ibid. 28.20b; 29.13, 16, 18ID-19. 16 Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tso Wen-bsiang kung cb'iian-chi (Complete collection of Tso Tsung-t'ang's papers; hereafter TH^HK), 14.17; 19.16-21. Lii Shih-ch'iang, Ting Jib-cb'angyS t^u-ch'iang yun-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement), 186-7. Huang-ch'ao cbengtitn Iti-tsuan, 325.4b, 8-10. 17 Liu Chin-tsao, ed. Ch'ing-cb'ao bsu wen-bsien t'ung-k'ao (Encyclopaedia of the historical records of the Ch'ing dynasty, continued), 202.9, 505. Kwang-Ching Liu, 'The limits of regional power in the late Ch'ing period: a reappraisal', Cb'ing-bua bsueb-pao, NS, 10.2 (July 1974) 217. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2o8 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE While this guideline concerning the yung-ying was only loosely followed, the loyal provincial administrators now found convenient formulas to accommodate the vested interests of the Green Standard Army in each province.Some provinces(Kiangsu,Chekiang,Fukien and Kwangtung) followed the precedents set by Tso Tsung-t'ang and Ting Jih-ch'ang,and reduced the troops of certain commands which,at least in theory,raised the pay of the remaining Green Standard troops.Other provinces (Shantung,Honan,Shansi and Hunan)adopted in toto Tseng's regulations for Chihli and organized lien-chiin battalions out of the Green Standard personnel-a method for which the Board of War indicated its preference in 1873.18 The court did not object to the infiltration of the Green Standard system by yung-ying officers.As part of the dynasty's system of conferring recognition,many yung-ying officers since the 18sos had been given the brevet status of Green Standard officer.More of them were now allowed to fill actual Green Standard vacancies from second captain up to pro- vincial general-in-chief,posts still controlled by the Board of War and,in the case of high commanders,by the throne itself. While Tseng's lien-chiin formula infused some new elements into the Green Standard Army at all levels,large amounts of deadwood un- doubtedly remained.In the late seventies and eighties the number of Green Standard troops was still around 400,oo0,costing annually more than 6 million taels to maintain.From the dynasty's standpoint,this large expenditure was not a total waste,for the retrained Green Standard forces, equipped with comparatively modern arms and deployed in revolt-prone areas of the provinces,maintained general internal tranquillity in the remaining years of the century.But for large-scale campaigns such as the Muslim wars in Shensi,Kansu and Sinkiang,to say nothing of conflicts with European powers or Japan,the yang-ying continued to be the only instrument that could possibly be effective. Yet the organizational principle of the yung ying remained incompatible with modern military practice.For all the interpersonal rapport between its troops and officers,the yung-ying hierarchy gave the middle-and upper- level officers a status which could place them above direct participation in combat.It was extremely difficult to get the battalion or even company officers to participate in rigorous training,especially in Western-style drill. Ever since 1862-3,Li Hung-chang had hoped that his officers'would learn Huang-cb'ao cbeng-tien lei-truan,326.6b-8. Memorial dated Jan.1884 of Prince Kung and other Tsungli Yamen ministers,YWYT,526. See also Chang P'ei-lun,Chian-yi cbi(Memorials of Chang P'ei-lun),6.10. ao See Lo Erh-kang,Lfi-ying ping-cbib,72-3(nn.70-3).The uses of lien-cbiin in suppressing local revolts are now more fully documented in Kung-cbung-fang Kuang-bru ch'ao trou-cbe (Secret palace memorials of the Kuang-hsu period,1875-1908),e.g,2.02.664,667;3.172,318, 323,399,445,5I8,753 Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
2O8 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE While this guideline concerning the yung-ying was only loosely followed, the loyal provincial administrators now found convenient formulas to accommodate the vested interests of the Green Standard Army in each province. Some provinces (Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung) followed the precedents set by Tso Tsung-t'ang and Ting Jih-ch'ang, and reduced the troops of certain commands which, at least in theory, raised the pay of the remaining Green Standard troops. Other provinces (Shantung, Honan, Shansi and Hunan) adopted in toto Tseng's regulations for Chihli and organized lien-chun battalions out of the Green Standard personnel - a method for which the Board of War indicated its preference in 1873.'8 The court did not object to the infiltration of the Green Standard system ty yung-ying officers. As part of the dynasty's system of conferring recognition, many yung-ying officers since the 1850s had been given the brevet status of Green Standard officer. More of them were now allowed to fill actual Green Standard vacancies from second captain up to provincial general-in-chief, posts still controlled by the Board of War and, in the case of high commanders, by the throne itself. While Tseng's lien-chun formula infused some new elements into the Green Standard Army at all levels, large amounts of deadwood undoubtedly remained. In the late seventies and eighties the number of Green Standard troops was still around 400,000, costing annually more than 6 million taels to maintain.1 ' From the dynasty's standpoint, this large expenditure was not a total waste, for the retrained Green Standard forces, equipped with comparatively modern arms and deployed in revolt-prone areas of the provinces, maintained general internal tranquillity in the remaining years of the century.20 But for large-scale campaigns such as the Muslim wars in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang, to say nothing of conflicts with European powers or Japan, the yung-ying continued to be the only instrument that could possibly be effective. Yet the organizational principle of the yung-ying remained incompatible with modern military practice. For all the interpersonal rapport between its troops and officers, theyung-jing hierarchy gave the middle- and upperlevel officers a status which could place them above direct participation in combat. It was extremely difficult to get the battalion or even company officers to participate in rigorous training, especially in Western-style drill. Ever since 1862-3, Li Hung-chang had hoped that his officers 'would learn 18 Huang-ch'ao cbcng-tien Ui-ttuan, 326.6D-8. '• Memorial dated Jan. 1884 of Prince Kung and other Tsungli Yamen ministers, YWYT, 526. See also Chang P'ei-lun, Cbien-yu cbi (Memorials of Chang P'ei-lun), 6.10. 20 See Lo Erh-kang, Ui-yingping-cbib, 72-3 (nn. 70-}). The uses ollien-cbun in suppressing local revolts are now more fully documented in Kung-cbung-tang Kuang-btu cb'ao tsou-cbe (Secret palace memorials of the Kuang-hsu period, 1875-1908), e.g., 2.302, 664, 667; 3.172, 318, 3*3. 399. 445. 5»8. 753- Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 209 one or two secret methods from the Westerners',21 but apart from con- ferring officer status on a few men originally trained by foreign drill- masters in the Ever-Victorious Army (for example,Lo Jung-kuang and Yuan Chiu-kao),Li's method was merely for Western instructors to drill the troops in his 'foreign arms corps'.The few Westerners who remained with the Anhwei Army after 1864,including the Frenchman who became a Ch'ing subject,J.Pennell,were unable to provide widespread and system- atic instruction to either officers or men.Apparently the Chinese had reservations about the applicability and overall utility of Western tactics. Charles G.Gordon noted in 1864 that Ch'ing officers admired the foreign- style infantry square,but thought it unlikely their men would stand'.The Chinese 'allow of our superiority in Artillery,but think they are far in advance in infantry'.Moreover,while yung-ying officers acknowledged the value of Western artillery,they were disinclined to learn artillery drill. Gordon noted that they were reluctant even to learn to 'shout their words of command'.22 Could the Chinese accept Western help and yet remain self-reliant?On the other hand,could the ymg-ying forces do without foreign training and yet acquire the essential discipline and skills demanded by modern warfare? This dilemma is revealed in the history of the training programme at Feng- huang-shan(twenty-five miles from Shanghai),initiated by Gordon him- self in May I864 immediately after the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army.*3 Enthusiastically endorsed by the British minister and his consul in Shanghai,the Feng-huang-shan training programme received 'verbal assurances'of support from the Tsungli Yamen and was welcomed by Li Hung-chang initially because of the faith he reposed in Gordon.To Gordon,Li entrusted in June 1864 1,3oo of the Anhwei Army troops under two or three of his best officers. The British interest in this programme was many-faceted.Gordon,who did not regard centralized leadership of the decayed Manchu government as feasible,thought that the British should help to develop a Chinese army 'through the Futais [governors],not through the Peking govt.who are a very helpless lot'.+Minister Bruce,while not entirely in agreement with Gordon on Ch'ing politics,none the less believed in rendering military assistance to the Chinese.But it was the attitude of Harry Parkes,the at Ssu-yu Teng and John K.Fairbank,China'r rerponse to the Wert,69. 2 Gordon Papers(British Museum),Add.MSS.52,389,26 Aug.1864;52,393,'Confidential memo on the imperialist sphere'(1864). For details see Richard J.Smith,'Foreign training and China's self-strengthening:the case of Feng-huang-shan,1864-1873',MAS,10.2 (1976)195-223. 4 Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,389,19 June 1864. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'IN G ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 209 one or two secret methods from the Westerners',21 but apart from conferring officer status on a few men originally trained by foreign drillmasters in the Ever-Victorious Army (for example, Lo Jung-kuang and Yuan Chiu-kao), Li's method was merely for Western instructors to drill the troops in his 'foreign arms corps'. The few Westerners who remained with the Anhwei Army after 1864, including the Frenchman who became a Ch'ing subject, J. Pennell, were unable to provide widespread and systematic instruction to either officers or men. Apparently the Chinese had reservations about the applicability and overall utility of Western tactics. Charles G. Gordon noted in 1864 that Ch'ing officers admired the foreignstyle infantry square, 'but thought it unlikely their men would stand'. The Chinese 'allow of our superiority in Artillery, but think they are far in advance in infantry'. Moreover, whileyung-ying officers acknowledged the value of Western artillery, they were disinclined to learn artillery drill. Gordon noted that they were reluctant even to learn to 'shout their words of command'." Could the Chinese accept Western help and yet remain self-reliant ? On the other hand, could the yung-ying forces do without foreign training and yet acquire the essential discipline and skills demanded by modern warfare ? This dilemma is revealed in the history of the training programme at Fenghuang-shan (twenty-five miles from Shanghai), initiated by Gordon himself in May 1864 immediately after the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army.23 Enthusiastically endorsed by the British minister and his consul in Shanghai, the Feng-huang-shan training programme received 'verbal assurances' of support from the Tsungli Yamen and was welcomed by Li Hung-chang initially because of the faith he reposed in Gordon. To Gordon, Li entrusted in June 1864 1,300 of the Anhwei Army troops under two or three of his best officers. The British interest in this programme was many-faceted. Gordon, who did not regard centralized leadership of the decayed Manchu government as feasible, thought that the British should help to develop a Chinese army 'through the Futais [governors], not through the Peking govt. who are a very helpless lot'.24 Minister Bruce, while not entirely in agreement with Gordon on Ch'ing politics, none the less believed in rendering military assistance to the Chinese. But it was the attitude of Harry Parkes, the 11 Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's response to the West, 69. 22 Gordon Papers (British Museum), Add. MSS. 52,589, 26 Aug. 1864; 52,593, 'Confidential memo on the imperialist sphere' (1864). 25 For details see Richard J. Smith, 'Foreign training and China's self-strengthening: the case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873', MAS, 10.2(1976) 195-223. 24 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, 19 June 1864. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2I0 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE British consul at Shanghai,that put Li Hung-chang on his guard.Parkes wanted primarily to train Chinese troops who could defend Shanghai against possible further unrest in that area.He was also jealous of the French,who still maintained a small camp for training Chinese troops near Shanghai(troops who were not returned to the Chinese authorities until mid-1865).Li imputed to Parkes the intent of taking over our military authority and squandering our financial resources'.2s In late 1864,however,Gordon abandoned the training programme to return to England.Li had to accept Parkes'nominee as Feng-huang-shan's new drillmaster-Lieutenant Jebb of the British Army.In an agreement dated November 1864,Parkes accepted Li's guid pro guo that a commander of the Anhwei Army,P'an Ting-hsin,should have complete control over promotion and demotion of Chinese officers and troops,as well as their pay and equipment.The programme was to be financed from the maritime customs revenue.Jebb's duties were confined to drill and instruction, including the supervision of fifteen foreign staff members,also paid by the Chinese.Jebb proved,however,to be a bad choice,frequently absent from the camp and,when on duty,rigidly insistent on adherence to 'the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book'.*6 When,in June 1865,Li was ordered by the throne to send troops and artillery to Chihli to guard its border against the Niens,he had no hesitation in pulling an entire battalion out from Feng-huang-shan,together with a 3oo-man artillery corps under training there,to be dispatched to the north under P'an Ting-hsin.Consul Parkes protested vehemently.Although Li agreed to replace the 8so men taken from Feng-huang-shan with other Anhwei Army troops,he no longer had, by this time,any faith in the Feng-huang-shan programme and repeatedly rejected requests for its expansion. The camp's subsequent history was marked by Sino-Western friction as well as the exposure of the weaknesses of both the foreign instructors and the Anhwei Army itself.In July 1865 Lieutenant Jebb was transferred back to England,and Ting Jih-ch'ang,the Shanghai faotai,quickly manoeuvred to get W.Winstanley,a former subordinate of Gordon's,to replace him. The British consul's insistence on appointing a regular British officer was overruled by the legation in Peking.Winstanley was apparently reasonable and conscientious but he lacked sufficient authority,and his mediocre foreign instructors did little to inspire confidence among the troops.The yung-ying officers,for their part,behaved scandalously.Although the com- s ISM-TC,25.27.Li none the less believed,in July 1864,that with Gordon in charge of the training programme,'there will be no great trouble in the future';LW CK,P'eng-liao ban-kao (Letters),5.21. as Ting Jih-ch'ang,'Ting Chung-ch'eng cheng-shu'(Political papers of Governor Ting), 7.1ob-11.Alfted E.Hakc,Events in the Taiping Rebellion,526-7. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
2IO THE MILITARY CHALLENGE British consul at Shanghai, that put Li Hung-chang on his guard. Parkes wanted primarily to train Chinese troops who could defend Shanghai against possible further unrest in that area. He was also jealous of the French, who still maintained a small camp for training Chinese troops near Shanghai (troops who were not returned to the Chinese authorities until mid-1865). Li imputed to Parkes the intent of 'taking over our military authority and squandering our financial resources'.25 In late 1864, however, Gordon abandoned the training programme to return to England. Li had to accept Parkes' nominee as Feng-huang-shan's new drillmaster - Lieutenant Jebb of the British Army. In an agreement dated November 1864, Parkes accepted Li's quid pro quo that a commander of the Anhwei Army, P'an Ting-hsin, should have complete control over promotion and demotion of Chinese officers and troops, as well as their pay and equipment. The programme was to be financed from the maritime customs revenue. Jebb's duties were confined to drill and instruction, including the supervision of fifteen foreign staff members, also paid by the Chinese. Jebb proved, however, to be a bad choice, frequently absent from the camp and, when on duty, rigidly insistent on adherence to 'the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book'.26 When, in June 1865, Li was ordered by the throne to send troops and artillery to Chihli to guard its border against the Niens, he had no hesitation in pulling an entire battalion out from Feng-huang-shan, together with a 300-man artillery corps under training there, to be dispatched to the north under P'an Ting-hsin. Consul Parkes protested vehemently. Although Li agreed to replace the 850 men taken from Feng-huang-shan with other Anhwei Army troops, he no longer had, by this time, any faith in the Feng-huang-shan programme and repeatedly rejected requests for its expansion. The camp's subsequent history was marked by Sino-Western friction as well as the exposure of the weaknesses of both the foreign instructors and the Anhwei Army itself. In July 1865 Lieutenant Jebb was transferred back to England, and Ting Jih-ch'ang, the Shanghai taotai, quickly manoeuvred to get W. Winstanley, a former subordinate of Gordon's, to replace him. The British consul's insistence on appointing a regular British officer was overruled by the legation in Peking. Winstanley was apparently reasonable and conscientious but he lacked sufficient authority, and his mediocre foreign instructors did little to inspire confidence among the troops. The yung-jing officers, for their part, behaved scandalously. Although the com- *» 1WSM-TC, 25.27. Li none the less believed, in July 1864, that with Gordon in charge of the training programme, 'there will be no great trouble in the future'; L.WCK, P'eng-liao ban-kao (Letters), 5.21. 26 Ting Jih-ch'ang, 'Ting Chung-ch'eng cheng-shu' (Political papers of Governor Ting), 7>iob-i 1. Alfred E. Hake, Events in the Taiping Rebellion, 526-7. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 2II pany officers always appeared in parades and displays,they seldom parti- cipated in the actual training.Moreover,they and their superiors profited by withholding fifty Mexican dollars per company from the stipends of the men and lower officers on each pay day.Winstanley praised the adeptness of the troops in infantry,howitzer and rocket drills.But as in the banner and the Green Standard establishments,many yung-ying troops and officers at Feng-huang-shan were habitual opium-smokers.The troops were also unruly tiouble-makers.27 On occasion they showed resentment against foreigners:training had to be suspended in the aftermath of the Tientsin Massacre(June I87o).But after the routine was resumed,the wrath of the men turned against their corrupt yimg-ying superiors,indicating the limita- tions of the system's rapport between troops and officers.Mutiny broke out twice in 1872,provoked by the officers'abuses of power including unjust punishment ordered by a battalion commander.In May 1873, after having spent nearly 1.5 million taels over a nine-year period,the programme was abruptly terminated despite vigorous protest from the British consul.Once envisaged by a British officer as the 'Aldershot of China',Feng-huang-shan was never actually designed to train officers,but it did teach a considerable number of Anhwei Army troops to use modern weapons. By the early 187os,the Ch'ing forces undoubtedly had acquired the capacity to suppress rebellion in most areas of China proper.But it remained questionable as to whether they could stand up to foreign invaders on the coast or even deal with rebels in the difficult terrain of the North-West or Central Asia. THE MUSLIM REVOLTS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS The great Muslim revolts in the Ch'ing empire during the third quarter of the nineteenth century are particularly difficult to study because of the paucity of firm documentation on the Muslim side.The several Islamic revolts varied in the intensity of their ethno-religious consciousness,as well as in their circumstances and geographic location.In China proper,the rebellions in Yunnan(1856-73,also known as the Panthay Rebellion)and in Shensi and Kansu (1862-73,also known as the Tungan Rebellion) shared a background of community feuds.These resulted from the Muslim minority leading a distinctive life in their separate villages or urban 7 Ting Jih-ch'ang,Fa-Wu kung-tu (Official papers of the governor of Kiangsu),5o.8.FO 228:453 and 49z,Winstanley's reports,zo Nov.1868 and 13 Jan.1870. a FO 228:524,Winstanley's memo,6 Jan.1873. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'iNG ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 211 pany officers always appeared in parades and displays, they seldom participated in the actual training. Moreover, they and their superiors profited by withholding fifty Mexican dollars per company from the stipends of the men and lower officers on each pay day. Winstanley praised the adeptness of the troops in infantry, howitzer and rocket drills. But as in the banner and the Green Standard establishments, many yung-ying troops and officers at Feng-huang-shan were habitual opium-smokers. The troops were also unruly trouble-makers.27 On occasion they showed resentment against foreigners: training had to be suspended in the aftermath of the Tientsin Massacre (June 1870). But after the routine was resumed, the wrath of the men turned against their corruptyung-ying superiors, indicating the limitations of the system's rapport between troops and officers. Mutiny broke out twice in 1872, provoked by the officers' abuses of power including unjust punishment ordered by a battalion commander.28 In May 1873, after having spent nearly 1.5 million taels over a nine-year period, the programme was abruptly terminated despite vigorous protest from the British consul. Once envisaged by a British officer as the 'Aldershot of China', Feng-huang-shan was never actually designed to train officers, but it did teach a considerable number of Anhwei Army troops to use modern weapons. By the early 1870s, the Ch'ing forces undoubtedly had acquired the capacity to suppress rebellion in most areas of China proper. But it remained questionable as to whether they could stand up to foreign invaders on the coast or even deal with rebels in the difficult terrain of the North-West or Central Asia. THE MUSLIM REVOLTS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS The great Muslim revolts in the Ch'ing empire during the third quarter of the nineteenth century are particularly difficult to study because of the paucity of firm documentation on the Muslim side. The several Islamic revolts varied in the intensity of their ethno-religious consciousness, as well as in their circumstances and geographic location. In China proper, the rebellions in Yunnan (1856-73, also known as the Panthay Rebellion) and in Shensi and Kansu (1862-73, also known as the Tungan Rebellion) shared a background of community feuds. These resulted from the Muslim minority leading a distinctive life in their separate villages or urban 17 Ting Jih-ch'ang, Fu-Wu kung-fu (Official papers of the governor of Kiangsu), 50.8. FO 228: 455 and 492, Winstanley's reports, 20 Nov. 1868 and IJ Jan. 1870. " FO 228: 524, Winstanley's memo, 6 Jan. 1873. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008