《社会保障概论》课程教学资源（课后阅读资料）APSR_Volume112. Issue 4.Nov 2018_Exclusion_and_Cooperation_in_Diverse_Societies_Experimental_Evidence_from_Israel

American Political Science Review (2018)112.4.742-757 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000266 American Political Science Association 2018 Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies:Experimental Evidence from Israel RYAN D.ENOS Harvard University NOAM GIDRON Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Princeton University t is well-established that in diverse societies,certain groups prefer to exclude other groups from power and often from society entirely.Yet as many societies are diversifying at an increasingly rapid pace,the need for cross-group cooperation to solve collective action problems has intensified.Do preferences for exclusion inhibit the ability of individuals to cooperate and,therefore,diminish the ability for societies to collectively provide public goods?Turning to Israel,a society with multiple overlapping and politically salient cleavages,we use a large-scale lab-in-the-field design to investigate how preferences for exclusion among the Jewish majority predict discriminatory behavior toward Palestinian Citizens of Israel.We establish that preferences for exclusion are likely symbolic attitudes,and therefore stable and dominating of other attitudes;are held especially strongly by low-status majority group members;and powerfully predict costly non-cooperation.This preferences/behavior relationship appears unaffected by mitigating factors proposed in the intergroup relations literature.The demonstrated influence of symbolic attitudes on behavior calls for further examination of the social roots of exclusionary preferences. t is well-understood that across groups and soci- regation in the United States,white citizens had to de- eties,people hold discriminatory attitudes toward cide whether to cooperate with African Americans cit- social outgroups.One of the most politically conse- izens or to retreat into enclaves of non-cooperation, quential ways these attitudes can manifest is in prefer- thus hindering the provision of public goods such as ences for exclusion,including exclusion from political schools.In South Africa,a similar challenge was faced institutions and power(Sidanius and Pratto 2001),the with the end of apartheid and the increase in inter- "imagined community"of a nation (Anderson 1983), actions across racial groups.Currently,anti-immigrant or the country itself via restrictive immigration poli- political parties and candidates in the United States cies(Citrin and Sides 2008).Yet,despite such barriers and Western Europe have gained support,yet immigra- and opposition,the ethnic and religious composition tion to these places continues;to what degree are sup- of many Western democracies continue to diversify porters of anti-immigrant policies willing to cooperate and,in recent decades,at an accelerating pace (Putnam with immigrants in their communities?And in Israel. 2007).Within this context of growing diversity,cooper- are Jewish citizens willing to cooperate with Palestinian 是 ation across social groups is necessary for building and Citizens of Israel(PCI)-despite the prevalence of ex- maintaining successful and well-functioning societies clusionary preferences toward this large and growing (Habyarimana et al.2009;Singh 2011).A crucial ques- national minority？ tion then emerges:Can individuals with a strong pref- Put in more general terms,the issue at stake is erence for outgroup exclusion nevertheless put these whether and to what degree exclusionary attitudes hin- preferences aside to cooperate and solve challenges of der cooperation.This question has implications for collective action? both the success of outgroup members in making po- There are many examples of the relevance of this litical and economic gains and the ability of society as question.Following the decline of de jure racial seg- a whole to work together for the greater good.Are ex- clusionary attitudes separable from behaviors?Even if members of the hegemonic group express a preference Ryan D.Enos is a Professor of Government,Department of Govern- for the exclusion of outgroup members,will they still ment,Harvard University,1737 Cambridge Street,Cambridge,MA work with outgroup members for their mutual benefit 02138 (renos@gov.harvard.edu). Noam Gidron is a Research Fellow at the Niehaus Center for in the creation and allocation of public goods? Globalization and Governance at Princeton University and an As- On the one hand,there is reason to believe that at- sistant Professor of Political Science,Hebrew University,Mount Sco- titudes are separable from behaviors.Cooperation is pus,Jerusalem (Noam.Gidron@mail.huji.ac.il). often treated as a strategic choice that can be updated Both authors contributed equally.Support for this research was with repeated interactions with outgroup members and provided by the Harvard Center for Jewish Studies,the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies,and the Multidisci. other learning processes (Axelrod 2006).There is also plinary Program in Inequality and Social Policy at Harvard Uni- evidence that private attitudes toward outgroups may versity.A previous version of this article was presented at the 2017 not predict certain behaviors because the behaviors are Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting and the 2017 guided by social norms(Paluck 2009)or because atti- Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop.We thank Stanley Feld- tudes,as reported in surveys,are unstable and do not man and Eric Arias for comments and Riley Carney and Alexan- der Sahn for additional assistance.Replication files are available at reflect the more careful deliberation that may proceed the American Political Science Review Dataverse:https://doi.org/10. behavior (Zaller 1992).Yet,on the other hand,atti- 7910/DVN/DAR560 tudes may strongly predict non-cooperative behaviors Received:June 14,2017;revised:February 26,2018;accepted:May in light of evidence that exclusionary preferences are a 14,2018.First published online:July 13,2018. matter of deeply held prejudicial distaste(Hainmueller 742

American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 742–757 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000266 © American Political Science Association 2018 Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel RYAN D. ENOS Harvard University NOAM GIDRON Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Princeton University I t is well-established that in diverse societies, certain groups prefer to exclude other groups from power and often from society entirely. Yet as many societies are diversifying at an increasingly rapid pace,the need for cross-group cooperation to solve collective action problems has intensified. Do preferences for exclusion inhibit the ability of individuals to cooperate and, therefore, diminish the ability for societies to collectively provide public goods? Turning to Israel, a society with multiple overlapping and politically salient cleavages, we use a large-scale lab-in-the-field design to investigate how preferences for exclusion among the Jewish majority predict discriminatory behavior toward Palestinian Citizens of Israel. We establish that preferences for exclusion are likely symbolic attitudes, and therefore stable and dominating of other attitudes; are held especially strongly by low-status majority group members; and powerfully predict costly non-cooperation. This preferences/behavior relationship appears unaffected by mitigating factors proposed in the intergroup relations literature. The demonstrated influence of symbolic attitudes on behavior calls for further examination of the social roots of exclusionary preferences. I t is well-understood that across groups and soci￾eties, people hold discriminatory attitudes toward social outgroups. One of the most politically conse￾quential ways these attitudes can manifest is in prefer￾ences for exclusion, including exclusion from political institutions and power (Sidanius and Pratto 2001), the “imagined community” of a nation (Anderson 1983), or the country itself via restrictive immigration poli￾cies (Citrin and Sides 2008). Yet, despite such barriers and opposition, the ethnic and religious composition of many Western democracies continue to diversify and, in recent decades, at an accelerating pace (Putnam 2007).Within this context of growing diversity, cooper￾ation across social groups is necessary for building and maintaining successful and well-functioning societies (Habyarimana et al. 2009; Singh 2011). A crucial ques￾tion then emerges: Can individuals with a strong pref￾erence for outgroup exclusion nevertheless put these preferences aside to cooperate and solve challenges of collective action? There are many examples of the relevance of this question. Following the decline of de jure racial seg￾Ryan D. Enos is a Professor of Government, Department of Govern￾ment, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (renos@gov.harvard.edu). Noam Gidron is a Research Fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University and an As￾sistant Professor of Political Science, Hebrew University,Mount Sco￾pus, Jerusalem (Noam.Gidron@mail.huji.ac.il). Both authors contributed equally. Support for this research was provided by the Harvard Center for Jewish Studies, the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and the Multidisci￾plinary Program in Inequality and Social Policy at Harvard Uni￾versity. A previous version of this article was presented at the 2017 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting and the 2017 Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop. We thank Stanley Feld￾man and Eric Arias for comments and Riley Carney and Alexan￾der Sahn for additional assistance. Replication files are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10. 7910/DVN/DAR56O. Received: June 14, 2017; revised: February 26, 2018; accepted: May 14, 2018. First published online: July 13, 2018. regation in the United States, white citizens had to de￾cide whether to cooperate with African Americans cit￾izens or to retreat into enclaves of non-cooperation, thus hindering the provision of public goods such as schools. In South Africa, a similar challenge was faced with the end of apartheid and the increase in inter￾actions across racial groups. Currently, anti-immigrant political parties and candidates in the United States and Western Europe have gained support, yet immigra￾tion to these places continues; to what degree are sup￾porters of anti-immigrant policies willing to cooperate with immigrants in their communities? And in Israel, are Jewish citizens willing to cooperate with Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCI)—despite the prevalence of ex￾clusionary preferences toward this large and growing national minority? Put in more general terms, the issue at stake is whether and to what degree exclusionary attitudes hin￾der cooperation. This question has implications for both the success of outgroup members in making po￾litical and economic gains and the ability of society as a whole to work together for the greater good. Are ex￾clusionary attitudes separable from behaviors? Even if members of the hegemonic group express a preference for the exclusion of outgroup members, will they still work with outgroup members for their mutual benefit in the creation and allocation of public goods? On the one hand, there is reason to believe that at￾titudes are separable from behaviors. Cooperation is often treated as a strategic choice that can be updated with repeated interactions with outgroup members and other learning processes (Axelrod 2006). There is also evidence that private attitudes toward outgroups may not predict certain behaviors because the behaviors are guided by social norms (Paluck 2009) or because atti￾tudes, as reported in surveys, are unstable and do not reflect the more careful deliberation that may proceed behavior (Zaller 1992). Yet, on the other hand, atti￾tudes may strongly predict non-cooperative behaviors in light of evidence that exclusionary preferences are a matter of deeply held prejudicial distaste (Hainmueller 742 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266

Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies and Hiscox 2010:Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; predicted by some social-psychology theory,levels Hopkins,Sides,and Citrin 2016). of exclusionary preferences are highest among low- These two approaches have very different implica- status Jews (the relatively poor and uneducated ultra- tions for addressing the challenges faced by diverse Orthodox population)-we explore the nature of these societies.If cooperation is mostly a strategic choice preferences and find that(3)exclusionary attitudes ap- then economic incentives,interactions,or learning can pear symbolic in nature,indicating they are stable and result in a stable equilibrium of cooperation.But if powerfully affect other attitudes.We then turn to the non-cooperation reflects prejudicial exclusionary pref- behaviors associated with these attitudes,and (4)find erences,it might not be addressed simply by material that the cooperation of Jewish and PCI is strongly pre- incentives for cooperation or by providing new infor- dicted by preferences for exclusion:Jews who endorse mation about outgroups. greater exclusion of Arabs,that is,greater social dis- The connection between cooperation and exclusion tance,systematically cooperate less with PCI.Finally, remains underexplored in the theoretical and empiri- we ask if this strong connection between attitudes and cal literature because the two components of the re- behaviors can be moderated by factors thought to pro- 4 lationship,cooperative behaviors and intergroup atti- mote cooperation and we find that(5)the relationship tudes,tend to be studied separately in political science. holds even when accounting for perceptions of Arabs' Political scientists have developed a powerful standard trustworthiness,suggesting that outgroup exclusionary toolkit for studying cooperative behaviors but have fo- attitudes do not merely reflect statistical,stereotype- cused on institutional and contextual moderators of based discrimination.We also look at measures of re- cooperation rather than on intergroup attitudes.Thus peated interaction between groups and find that the whether exclusionary attitudes,in fact,predict discrim- connection between exclusionary attitudes and coop- inatory behavior remains understudied,as reflected in eration is unaffected.In short,we find that exclusionary long-standing debates about the topic in other disci- attitudes are a robust predictor of cooperative behav- plines,including sociology and psychology (LaPiere ior,one that appears to be deeply rooted in individual 4r元 1934;Pager and Quillian 2005;Paluck 2009). psychology and not easily modifiable. We combine these two elements,deploying a large- Substantively,the strong link between attitudes and scale multi-site lab-in-the-field study and in-depth sur- behaviors suggests that diverse societies must di- vey in Israel to examine actual costly cooperation and rectly address the sources of exclusionary preferences how it is related to exclusionary attitudes of the Jew- to overcome collective action problems rather then ish majority toward PCI.We measure cooperative merely focus on the material benefits of coopera- behaviors using an economic decision-making game, tion,provide information about the trustworthiness the public goods game,that captures the challenge of (or other stereotypes)of minorities,or assume that cooperation in diverse societies (Habyarimana et al. repeated interactions will by themselves induce co- 2009).In measuring exclusionary preferences,we rely operation.These findings resonate with important re- on an underutilized measure among political scientists: search on the limited ability of material benefits to ad- social distance (Bogardus 1926).The social distance dress core elements of national conflicts in general and scale captures individuals'preference for sharing social the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular (Manekin space with a member of another group,by asking them Grossman,and Mitts 2016).Additionally,our findings to choose the degree of proximity to which they would that low-status members within the hegemonic major- accept outgroup members,ranging from a family rela- ity are,in fact,more likely to hold exclusionary pref- tive (closest)to none at all (most distant),with other erences toward and to practice non-cooperation with relationships in between.This scale is widely used in the low-status minority (and see also Gidron and Hall psychology and sociology but has largely been over- (2017)),sheds light on the deep barriers for political looked by political scientists,especially in the context cooperation across low-status groups. of behavioral games.Despite the relative lack of atten- Theoretically,these findings contribute to the lit- tion to social distance,because it captures the inclusion erature on intergroup relations in diverse societies or exclusion of minority groups,it has implications for (Alesina,Baqir,and Easterly 1999;Lieberman and Mc- the study of immigration,pluralism,and a wide range Clendon 2013;Uslaner 2012),which has largely ne- of other scholarship.To our knowledge,this is the first glected psychological characteristics.Our analysis also direct exploration of the relationship between social contributes to research on ethnic and racial discrimi- distance and cooperation.In the aggregate,such a rela- nation,not only in political science,but also in sociol- 四 tionship is likely to carry major implications for diverse ogy and economics(Charles and Guryan 2011;Hain- societies. mueller and Hangartner 2013;Pager and Shepherd In this article,we make several contributions.First 2008:Zussman2013). we explore the levels of exclusionary preferences Methodologically,our combination of survey and among the Jewish majority toward PCI.We find that experimental evidence allows us to address a long- (1)levels of exclusionary attitudes are high:(2)as standing debate regarding the relationship between discriminatory attitudes and discriminatory behaviors Because collecting behavioral data is often costly and This minority group is also sometimes referred to as Israeli Arabs We follow previous literature on the topic and use the term Pales- cumbersome,much research assumes,without empiri- tinian Citizens of Israel (PCl)(Canetti-Nisim,Ariely.and Halperin cal validation,that survey measures of discrimination 2008). are proxies for discriminatory behaviors(Pager and 743

Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin 2016). These two approaches have very different implica￾tions for addressing the challenges faced by diverse societies. If cooperation is mostly a strategic choice, then economic incentives, interactions, or learning can result in a stable equilibrium of cooperation. But if non-cooperation reflects prejudicial exclusionary pref￾erences, it might not be addressed simply by material incentives for cooperation or by providing new infor￾mation about outgroups. The connection between cooperation and exclusion remains underexplored in the theoretical and empiri￾cal literature because the two components of the re￾lationship, cooperative behaviors and intergroup atti￾tudes, tend to be studied separately in political science. Political scientists have developed a powerful standard toolkit for studying cooperative behaviors but have fo￾cused on institutional and contextual moderators of cooperation rather than on intergroup attitudes. Thus, whether exclusionary attitudes, in fact, predict discrim￾inatory behavior remains understudied, as reflected in long-standing debates about the topic in other disci￾plines, including sociology and psychology (LaPiere 1934; Pager and Quillian 2005; Paluck 2009). We combine these two elements, deploying a large￾scale multi-site lab-in-the-field study and in-depth sur￾vey in Israel to examine actual costly cooperation and how it is related to exclusionary attitudes of the Jew￾ish majority toward PCI.1 We measure cooperative behaviors using an economic decision-making game, the public goods game, that captures the challenge of cooperation in diverse societies (Habyarimana et al. 2009). In measuring exclusionary preferences, we rely on an underutilized measure among political scientists: social distance (Bogardus 1926). The social distance scale captures individuals’ preference for sharing social space with a member of another group, by asking them to choose the degree of proximity to which they would accept outgroup members, ranging from a family rela￾tive (closest) to none at all (most distant), with other relationships in between. This scale is widely used in psychology and sociology but has largely been over￾looked by political scientists, especially in the context of behavioral games. Despite the relative lack of atten￾tion to social distance, because it captures the inclusion or exclusion of minority groups, it has implications for the study of immigration, pluralism, and a wide range of other scholarship. To our knowledge, this is the first direct exploration of the relationship between social distance and cooperation. In the aggregate, such a rela￾tionship is likely to carry major implications for diverse societies. In this article, we make several contributions. First we explore the levels of exclusionary preferences among the Jewish majority toward PCI. We find that (1) levels of exclusionary attitudes are high; (2) as 1 This minority group is also sometimes referred to as Israeli Arabs. We follow previous literature on the topic and use the term Pales￾tinian Citizens of Israel (PCI) (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin 2008). predicted by some social-psychology theory, levels of exclusionary preferences are highest among low￾status Jews (the relatively poor and uneducated ultra￾Orthodox population)—we explore the nature of these preferences and find that (3) exclusionary attitudes ap￾pear symbolic in nature, indicating they are stable and powerfully affect other attitudes. We then turn to the behaviors associated with these attitudes, and (4) find that the cooperation of Jewish and PCI is strongly pre￾dicted by preferences for exclusion: Jews who endorse greater exclusion of Arabs, that is, greater social dis￾tance, systematically cooperate less with PCI. Finally, we ask if this strong connection between attitudes and behaviors can be moderated by factors thought to pro￾mote cooperation and we find that (5) the relationship holds even when accounting for perceptions of Arabs’ trustworthiness, suggesting that outgroup exclusionary attitudes do not merely reflect statistical, stereotype￾based discrimination. We also look at measures of re￾peated interaction between groups and find that the connection between exclusionary attitudes and coop￾eration is unaffected. In short, we find that exclusionary attitudes are a robust predictor of cooperative behav￾ior, one that appears to be deeply rooted in individual psychology and not easily modifiable. Substantively, the strong link between attitudes and behaviors suggests that diverse societies must di￾rectly address the sources of exclusionary preferences to overcome collective action problems rather then merely focus on the material benefits of coopera￾tion, provide information about the trustworthiness (or other stereotypes) of minorities, or assume that repeated interactions will by themselves induce co￾operation. These findings resonate with important re￾search on the limited ability of material benefits to ad￾dress core elements of national conflicts in general and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular (Manekin, Grossman, and Mitts 2016). Additionally, our findings that low-status members within the hegemonic major￾ity are, in fact, more likely to hold exclusionary pref￾erences toward and to practice non-cooperation with the low-status minority (and see also Gidron and Hall (2017)), sheds light on the deep barriers for political cooperation across low-status groups. Theoretically, these findings contribute to the lit￾erature on intergroup relations in diverse societies (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Lieberman and Mc￾Clendon 2013; Uslaner 2012), which has largely ne￾glected psychological characteristics. Our analysis also contributes to research on ethnic and racial discrimi￾nation, not only in political science, but also in sociol￾ogy and economics (Charles and Guryan 2011; Hain￾mueller and Hangartner 2013; Pager and Shepherd 2008; Zussman 2013). Methodologically, our combination of survey and experimental evidence allows us to address a long￾standing debate regarding the relationship between discriminatory attitudes and discriminatory behaviors. Because collecting behavioral data is often costly and cumbersome, much research assumes, without empiri￾cal validation, that survey measures of discrimination are proxies for discriminatory behaviors (Pager and 743 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266

Ryan D.Enos and Noam Gidron Ouillian 2005).However.currently"most of the exist- sures a person's willingness to participate in relation- ing literature on discrimination finds that stated atti- ships of varying degrees of closeness with a member of tudes are practically useless in explaining behaviour' a group in order to capture "personal-group relations" (Zussman 2013,436).2 In fact,recent scholarship has (Bogardus 1933)-that is,the affective feelings of an also claimed that even implicit measures of prejudice individual toward a group.Psychological studies have (Greenwald,McGhee,and Schwartz 1998)are poor treated social distance as a "commonly accepted gen- predictors of discriminatory behavior(Mitchell and eral measure of ethnic prejudice"(Weaver 2008,779)3 Tetlock 2017).By showing the strong and robust con- but for the purposes of political science research,it is nection between exclusionary attitudes and coopera- especially useful because it captures behavioral inten- tion,we present a counterpoint to these claims.We tions(Binder et al.2009)about the political question of suggest that a possible path forward in research on prej- exclusion,so that a stated desire to exclude may trans- udice and discrimination,rather than relying on noisy late into political behavior,such as voting (see,for ex- self-reported measures of behavior or poorly under- ample,Hainmueller and Hangartner(2013)). stood laboratory constructs,is to make use of the social The scale,developed by Bogardus,measures the de- distance scale next to well-validated tools of behavioral gree to which respondents prefer to exclude outgroup economics. members by asking whether they would accept a mem- Relatedly,our evidence for a direct connection be- ber of the group at increasing levels of closeness.The tween attitudes and behaviors also represents an im- scale ranges from family relative(minimal distance)to portant improvement over much of the literature on friend,neighbor,coworker,citizen,visitor,and none intergroup relations-a literature plagued by unre (maximal distance).Agreement with any one of the solved controversies over the nature and meaning of items implies agreement with the previous items.For survey attitudes (e.g..Sniderman and Tetlock (1986): instance,it is assumed that if someone will accept a per- Hochschild (2000)).Because we focus on questions son as a family member,they will also accept them as that directly measure exclusion and connect these to visitor and everything in between revealed behaviors in an economic game,our outcomes This scale has attractive properties that may improve are less likely than many others to reflect artifacts over other common measures of intergroup attitudes. of measurement error(Achen 1975),capture nonat- Political scientists often measure intergroup attitudes titudes (Zaller 1992),or suffer from false positives through culturally specific stereotypes (e.g.,asking if a (Kramer 1986).It is,perhaps,not surprising if a sur- group is "intelligent"(Kinder and Kam 2009))through vey attitude is correlated with another survey attitude questions specific to one group,such as African Amer- measuring a similar concept,especially given the large icans (e.g.,Tarman and Sears(2005));or through ques- menu of survey items often available to researchers. tions about specific policy measures,such as immigra- However,as discussed above,it is not obvious that a tion (e.g.,Enos (2014)).While these measures can all survey attitude will correlate with a behavior,espe- certainly be useful,group-specific measures make it cially a potentially costly one like non-cooperation.By difficult to compare attitudes across different groups demonstrating this connection,we move beyond deter- (e.g.,African Americans and Muslims)and individu- mining the meaning of survey attitudes by examining als may also hold negative feelings about a group with- other survey attitudes and,instead,show that these at- out endorsing specific stereotypes (Cuddy,Fiske,and S5.501g titudes are meaningful because they are tied to costly Glick 2007).Furthermore,attitudes about specific poli- behaviors. cies are problematic for capturing the attitudes of the large majority of most mass publics that have low en- EXCLUSION gagement in politics and hold unstable attitudes(Zaller 1992). We define exclusion as closing all or part of a society The social distance scale.in contrast,was intended from certain groups of people.Conflicts over the legal as a general measure to be used across multiple groups exclusion of low-status populations have been central (Bogardus 1926).It captures basic affective attitudes: to the politics of countries across the globe (Sidanius a person does not have to endorse specific stereotypes and Pratto 2001)and are at the heart of many political to know that they do not want to have a person from conflicts in advanced democracies.We focus on pref- an outgroup as a spouse or coworker.This allows erences for exclusion,not just from the country in the comparisons across groups,so that,for example,in the form of restricting immigration,but from national and American context.attitudes about African Americans subnational communities,in the form of excluding in- can be compared to attitudes about Latino immigrants dividuals from local institutions,such as a workplace. Thus,in Israel,we can usefully compare exclusion to- To measure exclusion,we turn to the concept of so- ward PCI to exclusion of other social groups,for in- cial distance.Social distance is a commonly used con- stance,as we do in this study,different groups of Jews. cept in sociology and psychology (see,for example Other measures commonly found in political science, Liviatan,Trope,and Liberman (2008)),but has seen lit- such as feeling thermometers,have similar properties tle use in political science (but see,in the Israeli context. Halperin,Canetti-Nisim,and Pedahzur(2007)).It mea- See also Marger(2003)and Simpson and Yinger(2013). For example,Binder et al.(2009,848)argues that social distance "generalizes to the outgroup as a whole without any reference to a 2 For a review of related literature,see Pager and Shepherd(2008). specific context or interaction.' 744 3

Ryan D. Enos and Noam Gidron Quillian 2005). However, currently “most of the exist￾ing literature on discrimination finds that stated atti￾tudes are practically useless in explaining behaviour” (Zussman 2013, 436).2 In fact, recent scholarship has also claimed that even implicit measures of prejudice (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) are poor predictors of discriminatory behavior (Mitchell and Tetlock 2017). By showing the strong and robust con￾nection between exclusionary attitudes and coopera￾tion, we present a counterpoint to these claims. We suggest that a possible path forward in research on prej￾udice and discrimination, rather than relying on noisy self-reported measures of behavior or poorly under￾stood laboratory constructs, is to make use of the social distance scale next to well-validated tools of behavioral economics. Relatedly, our evidence for a direct connection be￾tween attitudes and behaviors also represents an im￾portant improvement over much of the literature on intergroup relations—a literature plagued by unre￾solved controversies over the nature and meaning of survey attitudes (e.g., Sniderman and Tetlock (1986); Hochschild (2000)). Because we focus on questions that directly measure exclusion and connect these to revealed behaviors in an economic game, our outcomes are less likely than many others to reflect artifacts of measurement error (Achen 1975), capture nonat￾titudes (Zaller 1992), or suffer from false positives (Kramer 1986). It is, perhaps, not surprising if a sur￾vey attitude is correlated with another survey attitude measuring a similar concept, especially given the large menu of survey items often available to researchers. However, as discussed above, it is not obvious that a survey attitude will correlate with a behavior, espe￾cially a potentially costly one like non-cooperation. By demonstrating this connection, we move beyond deter￾mining the meaning of survey attitudes by examining other survey attitudes and, instead, show that these at￾titudes are meaningful because they are tied to costly behaviors. EXCLUSION We define exclusion as closing all or part of a society from certain groups of people. Conflicts over the legal exclusion of low-status populations have been central to the politics of countries across the globe (Sidanius and Pratto 2001) and are at the heart of many political conflicts in advanced democracies. We focus on pref￾erences for exclusion, not just from the country in the form of restricting immigration, but from national and subnational communities, in the form of excluding in￾dividuals from local institutions, such as a workplace. To measure exclusion, we turn to the concept of so￾cial distance. Social distance is a commonly used con￾cept in sociology and psychology (see, for example, Liviatan, Trope, and Liberman (2008)), but has seen lit￾tle use in political science (but see,in the Israeli context, Halperin,Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur (2007)). It mea- 2 For a review of related literature, see Pager and Shepherd (2008). sures a person’s willingness to participate in relation￾ships of varying degrees of closeness with a member of a group in order to capture “personal-group relations” (Bogardus 1933)—that is, the affective feelings of an individual toward a group. Psychological studies have treated social distance as a “commonly accepted gen￾eral measure of ethnic prejudice” (Weaver 2008, 779)3 but for the purposes of political science research, it is especially useful because it captures behavioral inten￾tions (Binder et al. 2009) about the political question of exclusion, so that a stated desire to exclude may trans￾late into political behavior, such as voting (see, for ex￾ample, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013)). The scale, developed by Bogardus, measures the de￾gree to which respondents prefer to exclude outgroup members by asking whether they would accept a mem￾ber of the group at increasing levels of closeness. The scale ranges from family relative (minimal distance) to friend, neighbor, coworker, citizen, visitor, and none (maximal distance). Agreement with any one of the items implies agreement with the previous items. For instance,it is assumed that if someone will accept a per￾son as a family member, they will also accept them as visitor and everything in between. This scale has attractive properties that may improve over other common measures of intergroup attitudes. Political scientists often measure intergroup attitudes through culturally specific stereotypes (e.g., asking if a group is “intelligent” (Kinder and Kam 2009)) through questions specific to one group, such as African Amer￾icans (e.g., Tarman and Sears (2005)); or through ques￾tions about specific policy measures, such as immigra￾tion (e.g., Enos (2014)). While these measures can all certainly be useful, group-specific measures make it difficult to compare attitudes across different groups (e.g., African Americans and Muslims) and individu￾als may also hold negative feelings about a group with￾out endorsing specific stereotypes (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007). Furthermore, attitudes about specific poli￾cies are problematic for capturing the attitudes of the large majority of most mass publics that have low en￾gagement in politics and hold unstable attitudes (Zaller 1992). The social distance scale, in contrast, was intended as a general measure to be used across multiple groups (Bogardus 1926). It captures basic affective attitudes: a person does not have to endorse specific stereotypes to know that they do not want to have a person from an outgroup as a spouse or coworker.4 This allows comparisons across groups, so that, for example, in the American context, attitudes about African Americans can be compared to attitudes about Latino immigrants. Thus, in Israel, we can usefully compare exclusion to￾ward PCI to exclusion of other social groups, for in￾stance, as we do in this study, different groups of Jews. Other measures commonly found in political science, such as feeling thermometers, have similar properties 3 See also Marger (2003) and Simpson and Yinger (2013). 4 For example, Binder et al. (2009, 848) argues that social distance “generalizes to the outgroup as a whole without any reference to a specific context or interaction.” 744 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266

Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies but responses to these questions tend to have little vari- ditions under which groups can overcome individual ation,calling into question their ability to usefully dis incentives to defect"(Grossman and Baldassarri 2012 criminate between attitudes (Krosnick 1991).Finally, 965).As Baldassarri(2015.367)notes,"designed to in- the widespread use and cross-cultural applicability of duce a social dilemma,[public goods games]capture this scale allows it to be compared to measurements how players balance self-interest and the well-being taken in other contexts,both in existing and future of the group."Habyarimana et al.(2009)argue that studies.5 the public goods game"captures the challenge of pub- A crucial question for predicting the relationship lic goods provision directly"and use results from such between exclusionary attitudes and cooperation games to argue that the failure to cooperate across eth- whether these preferences are symbolic attitudes.In nic groups in social situations analogous to the public the intergroup context,symbolic attitudes are attitudes goods game is the primary reason that diverse societies developed around affective responses to a particular fail to allocate desirable public goods. group that are socialized early in life,are stable over a Habyarimana et al.(2009)attribute this lack of coop- lifespan,and tend to dominate other attitudes(Tarman eration across ethnic groups to a lack of norms of coop- and Sears 2005).The canonical example of symbolic at eration.In other social science work,variation in play titudes is attitudes toward blacks and other racial and in the public goods game is ascribed to differences inin- ethnic groups in the United States(Sears and Henry stitutions(Alexander and Christia 2011).culture (Hen- 2003).Recent empirical work in American politics sug- rich et al.2006),geographic context(Enos 2017),or gests that attitudes toward immigrants are also sym- statistically based stereotypes (Fershtman and Gneezy bolic attitudes(Hopkins,Sides,and Citrin 2016). 2001).The focus in political science and economics Whether social distance should be understood as a on norms and institutions as determinants of cooper- symbolic attitude is important because it speaks to its vc士 ative behavior is understandable given the intellectual likelihood of dominating other attitudes and also of foundation of both disciplines.Yet this focus may ne- changing in the face of shifting demographics.If ex- glect important sources of variation.Cooperation is 4r元 clusionary preferences are symbolic attitudes,they are also likely structured by individual-level differences,in- likely to dominate other attitudes,meaning other atti- cluding psychological traits such as the attitudes asso- tudes will be shaped by the symbolic attitudes-not the ciated with exclusionary preferences.Robust findings other way around.This means that symbolic attitudes from psychology point to this connection:The cogni- are predicted to strongly affect opinion when brought tive biases associated with ingroup favoritism cause to bear on political questions.For example,turning to individuals to seek maximum distinctiveness between the American context.classic literature demonstrates groups,even when it is costly to their own group(Tajfel how whites'attitudes toward blacks dominates other et al.1971;Tajfel and Turner 1979;Turner and Oakes considerations in policy questions from school busing 1986).In other words,when choosing how to allocate (Kinder and Sears 1981)to health care (Tesler 2012). money,anti-outgroup or pro-ingroup biases (Brewer and Miller 1984)cause people to forgo allocations that COOPERATION are beneficial to their own group or mutually benefi- cial to both groups,to select allocations that maximize We connect preference for exclusion with cooperative the difference in monetary payout between groups.A behaviors.Cooperation is necessary to maintain public bias for maximizing differences would predict defec- goods provision,from roads to schools(Habyarimana tion in a public goods game,rather than mutually bene- ficial cooperation.Furthermore,evolutionary psychol- 8 et al.2009),and for the operation of democratic insti- tutions,such as legislatures (Axelrod 2006)-but the ogists have hypothesized that the evolution of the cog- logic of collective action means that cooperation is of- nitive adaptations for social exclusion are a result of ten difficult to achieve (Olson 1971).Given the central selective pressures for efficient within-group cooper- importance of cooperation,social scientists have de- ation and between-group competition (Kurzban and veloped a toolkit for measuring it,including the pris- Leary 2001).5 Also drawing on evolutionary reasoning, oner's dilemma or public goods game.This game re- Sidanius and Pratto(2001)argue that the competition wards participants for mutual cooperation,but rewards between groups to maintain group-based status hier- them more for defecting and allowing the other player archies and to exclude low-status groups from power to carry the cost.This tends to lead to mutual defection causes a range of discriminatory and non-cooperative where neither player cooperates. behavior. 四 The public goods game has been argued to mimic Despite the reasons to believe that exclusion and the dynamics underlying the challenges to societies in cooperation are related,as noted above,the relation- allocating public goods and the tendency for diverse ship between discriminatory attitudes and discrimina- societies in particular to fail at doing so.It "is the con- tory behaviors is heavily contested in the literature, ventional behavioral experiment used to study the con- and other scholarship may point to reasons to believe these attitudes and behaviors should be unrelated.In However,it should be noted that the meaning of levels of closeness in the social distance scale may vary across groups,so that "family rel- Quoting Kurzban and Leary (2001,195):"Indeed,if adaptations ative"may imply a different level of closeness in different cultures.It for within-group cooperation are designed for between-group com does,nevertheless,seem reasonable to assume that the ordinal rank- petition,then the psychology of inclusion and cooperation requires ings of the levels will be consistent across most cultures. a concurrent psychology of social exclusion and discrimination." 745

Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies but responses to these questions tend to have little vari￾ation, calling into question their ability to usefully dis￾criminate between attitudes (Krosnick 1991). Finally, the widespread use and cross-cultural applicability of this scale allows it to be compared to measurements taken in other contexts, both in existing and future studies.5 A crucial question for predicting the relationship between exclusionary attitudes and cooperation is whether these preferences are symbolic attitudes. In the intergroup context, symbolic attitudes are attitudes developed around affective responses to a particular group that are socialized early in life, are stable over a lifespan, and tend to dominate other attitudes (Tarman and Sears 2005).The canonical example of symbolic at￾titudes is attitudes toward blacks and other racial and ethnic groups in the United States (Sears and Henry 2003). Recent empirical work in American politics sug￾gests that attitudes toward immigrants are also sym￾bolic attitudes (Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin 2016). Whether social distance should be understood as a symbolic attitude is important because it speaks to its likelihood of dominating other attitudes and also of changing in the face of shifting demographics. If ex￾clusionary preferences are symbolic attitudes, they are likely to dominate other attitudes, meaning other atti￾tudes will be shaped by the symbolic attitudes—not the other way around. This means that symbolic attitudes are predicted to strongly affect opinion when brought to bear on political questions. For example, turning to the American context, classic literature demonstrates how whites’ attitudes toward blacks dominates other considerations in policy questions from school busing (Kinder and Sears 1981) to health care (Tesler 2012). COOPERATION We connect preference for exclusion with cooperative behaviors. Cooperation is necessary to maintain public goods provision, from roads to schools (Habyarimana et al. 2009), and for the operation of democratic insti￾tutions, such as legislatures (Axelrod 2006)—but the logic of collective action means that cooperation is of￾ten difficult to achieve (Olson 1971). Given the central importance of cooperation, social scientists have de￾veloped a toolkit for measuring it, including the pris￾oner’s dilemma or public goods game. This game re￾wards participants for mutual cooperation, but rewards them more for defecting and allowing the other player to carry the cost.This tends to lead to mutual defection, where neither player cooperates. The public goods game has been argued to mimic the dynamics underlying the challenges to societies in allocating public goods and the tendency for diverse societies in particular to fail at doing so. It “is the con￾ventional behavioral experiment used to study the con- 5 However, it should be noted that the meaning of levels of closeness in the social distance scale may vary across groups, so that “family rel￾ative” may imply a different level of closeness in different cultures. It does, nevertheless, seem reasonable to assume that the ordinal rank￾ings of the levels will be consistent across most cultures. ditions under which groups can overcome individual incentives to defect” (Grossman and Baldassarri 2012, 965). As Baldassarri (2015, 367) notes, “designed to in￾duce a social dilemma, [public goods games] capture how players balance self-interest and the well-being of the group.” Habyarimana et al. (2009) argue that the public goods game “captures the challenge of pub￾lic goods provision directly” and use results from such games to argue that the failure to cooperate across eth￾nic groups in social situations analogous to the public goods game is the primary reason that diverse societies fail to allocate desirable public goods. Habyarimana et al. (2009) attribute this lack of coop￾eration across ethnic groups to a lack of norms of coop￾eration. In other social science work, variation in play in the public goods game is ascribed to differences in in￾stitutions (Alexander and Christia 2011), culture (Hen￾rich et al. 2006), geographic context (Enos 2017), or statistically based stereotypes (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001). The focus in political science and economics on norms and institutions as determinants of cooper￾ative behavior is understandable given the intellectual foundation of both disciplines. Yet this focus may ne￾glect important sources of variation. Cooperation is also likely structured by individual-level differences,in￾cluding psychological traits such as the attitudes asso￾ciated with exclusionary preferences. Robust findings from psychology point to this connection: The cogni￾tive biases associated with ingroup favoritism cause individuals to seek maximum distinctiveness between groups, even when it is costly to their own group (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Oakes 1986). In other words, when choosing how to allocate money, anti-outgroup or pro-ingroup biases (Brewer and Miller 1984) cause people to forgo allocations that are beneficial to their own group or mutually benefi￾cial to both groups, to select allocations that maximize the difference in monetary payout between groups. A bias for maximizing differences would predict defec￾tion in a public goods game, rather than mutually bene￾ficial cooperation. Furthermore, evolutionary psychol￾ogists have hypothesized that the evolution of the cog￾nitive adaptations for social exclusion are a result of selective pressures for efficient within-group cooper￾ation and between-group competition (Kurzban and Leary 2001).6 Also drawing on evolutionary reasoning, Sidanius and Pratto (2001) argue that the competition between groups to maintain group-based status hier￾archies and to exclude low-status groups from power causes a range of discriminatory and non-cooperative behavior. Despite the reasons to believe that exclusion and cooperation are related, as noted above, the relation￾ship between discriminatory attitudes and discrimina￾tory behaviors is heavily contested in the literature, and other scholarship may point to reasons to believe these attitudes and behaviors should be unrelated. In 6 Quoting Kurzban and Leary (2001, 195): “Indeed, if adaptations for within-group cooperation are designed for between-group com￾petition, then the psychology of inclusion and cooperation requires a concurrent psychology of social exclusion and discrimination.” 745 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266

Ryan D.Enos and Noam Gidron particular,strategic behavior in situations like the tion and are subject to discrimination by state institu- public goods game may not reflect prejudicial atti- tions (Okun and Friedlander 2005). tudes like preferences for exclusion-after all,a central There is long-standing research on Israeli public premise of both cognitive psychology and behavioral opinion about both domestic and international Jewish- economics is that the mind is characterized by two sys- Arab tensions(Smooha 1987,1992,2002,2004:Gubler tems (Kahneman 2003),one of which makes the fast, and Kalmoe 2015;Gubler,Halperin,and Hirschberger heuristic decisions associated with affective associa- 2015:Zeitzoff 2014.2016).with clear evidence for tions,like exclusionary preferences,and another which widespread prejudice toward PCI.Pedahzur and Yishai makes the slower,more deliberate decisions that char- (1999)document"deep resentment toward the Arabs," acterize strategic choice.The latter system is known to with 56.5%of Jewish respondents in their sample op- overrule the former when the stakes are high.Labora- posed to granting Arab and Jewish citizens equal so- tory cooperation games are intentionally made to be cial rights.Bar and Zussman (2017)show that around costly and invoke this sort of strategic behavior. 40%of Jewish Israelis would be willing to pay more to Indeed,there are real-world examples of the separa- receive services from Jewish workers rather than from tion of strongly held prejudices and cooperative behav- Arab workers and Zussman(2013)reports that more ior in costly situations.For example.Axelrod (2006). than half of the respondents in his sample would prefer drawing on the logic of the public goods game.de- not to have an Arab neighbor. scribes the system by which opposing forces in World The PCI are not only a national-religious minority War I,despite the presumably strong feelings involved, within a state defined by Jewish nationality;they are 元 developed cooperative systems of"live and let live"to also often perceived as a security threat or a "fifth col- avoid the devastating costs of trench warfare umn"in the context of Israel's armed conflicts with In the face of these contrasting theoretical intuitions its surrounding Arab neighbors(Canetti-Nisim,Ariely, and empirical findings,our analyses take the first step and Halperin 2008).Smooha(2004)shows that a sub- toward showing that exclusion and cooperation are stantial share of Jewish Israelis believe that PCI sup- strongly related and,as such,further shed light on the port terrorism and may rebel against Israel in the fu- challenges that diversifying societies face in overcom- ture.This makes the case of exclusion of PCI poten- ing barriers for cooperation.Because we cannot ran- tially informative for thinking about minority groups domly assign a preference for exclusion,we cannot,of elsewhere:perceptions of security threats affect atti- course,speak directly to the causal effect of exclusion- tudes toward Muslim immigrants to Western countries ary attitudes on cooperation.However,even though (Hellwig and Sinno 2016)and stereotypes of orga- demonstrating so is not our focus,we do show that ex- nized,even transnational,criminality are often asso- clusionary attitudes can be characterized by associa- ciated with Latin American immigrants to the United tions that suggest they are developed early in life and States.Furthermore,the situation of a minority group are,therefore,causally prior to cooperative behavior. having cultural and familial ties to neighboring states 是 can also be found elsewhere,again such as with Latino INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN ISRAEL immigrants to the United States. We focus on the general issue of exclusion by Jewish With its high levels of diversity along multiple dimen- Israelis toward PCI,but also on the particular ques- 5.501g sions,Israel provides a fertile case for the study of in- tion of the attitudes of ultra-Orthodox Jews.Ultra- tergroup relations.While there are,of course,unique Orthodox Jews are distinctive among the Jewish ma- features of Israeli society,it is a case that is useful in jority because of their religious and social traditions understanding social dynamics in other societies that including low formal education and widespread non- are becoming increasingly heterogeneous.As Canetti- participation in the workforce,resulting in a popula- Nisim,Ariely,and Halperin (2008,92)write,"Israel's tion that is substantially poorer than the general Jew- ethno-national character as a Jewish state,the ongoing ish population.Furthermore,there are also barriers Arab-Israeli conflict,and the complex relations be- for cooperation between the ultra-Orthodox and the tween Jews and Arabs in Israel [...have turned Israel rest of the Israeli Jewish population(Enos and Gidron into a laboratory conducive to the study of the devel- 2016).The ultra-Orthodox thus present an informative opment of negative political attitudes toward various point of reference in their relations with the PCI be- minority groups.' cause they are,arguably,close to PCI on a social hi- We focus on intergroup relations between Jewish erarchy.According to prominent social-psychological and PCI,a highly salient social-political cleavage de- theories,they may therefore hold more exclusionary fined on religious and nationalistic lines.PCI con- attitudes due to greater perceived threat to their rel- stitute around 20%of the Israeli population.As a ative status (Blumer 1958;Bobo and Hutchings 1996; marginalized minority.the PCI are characterized by a Sidanius and Pratto 2001).Competition over resources low socioeconomic status and labor market participa- is often most relevant to the low-income portion of a majority group that shares social welfare institutions L with low-status minority groups (Bobo and Hutch- 7 Note that we examine Israeli-Jews'attitudes and behaviors toward ings 1996).3 Of course,less well-off subgroups of the PCI,as opposed to non-citizen Palestinians or citizens of neighboring Arab countries,the West Bank and Gaza.For research on Israeli- Jews'attitudes toward non-citizen Arabs,see Inbar and Yuchtman- 8 Although,notably,in the Israeli context,ultra-Orthodox and PCI Yaar(1986).The 20%figure does not include the West Bank or Gaza are largely institutionally separated,so competition over institutions populations. such as schools is not present. 746

Ryan D. Enos and Noam Gidron particular, strategic behavior in situations like the public goods game may not reflect prejudicial atti￾tudes like preferences for exclusion—after all, a central premise of both cognitive psychology and behavioral economics is that the mind is characterized by two sys￾tems (Kahneman 2003), one of which makes the fast, heuristic decisions associated with affective associa￾tions, like exclusionary preferences, and another which makes the slower, more deliberate decisions that char￾acterize strategic choice. The latter system is known to overrule the former when the stakes are high. Labora￾tory cooperation games are intentionally made to be costly and invoke this sort of strategic behavior. Indeed, there are real-world examples of the separa￾tion of strongly held prejudices and cooperative behav￾ior in costly situations. For example, Axelrod (2006), drawing on the logic of the public goods game, de￾scribes the system by which opposing forces in World War I, despite the presumably strong feelings involved, developed cooperative systems of “live and let live” to avoid the devastating costs of trench warfare. In the face of these contrasting theoretical intuitions and empirical findings, our analyses take the first step toward showing that exclusion and cooperation are strongly related and, as such, further shed light on the challenges that diversifying societies face in overcom￾ing barriers for cooperation. Because we cannot ran￾domly assign a preference for exclusion, we cannot, of course, speak directly to the causal effect of exclusion￾ary attitudes on cooperation. However, even though demonstrating so is not our focus, we do show that ex￾clusionary attitudes can be characterized by associa￾tions that suggest they are developed early in life and are, therefore, causally prior to cooperative behavior. INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN ISRAEL With its high levels of diversity along multiple dimen￾sions, Israel provides a fertile case for the study of in￾tergroup relations. While there are, of course, unique features of Israeli society, it is a case that is useful in understanding social dynamics in other societies that are becoming increasingly heterogeneous. As Canetti￾Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin (2008, 92) write, “Israel’s ethno-national character as a Jewish state, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, [and] the complex relations be￾tween Jews and Arabs in Israel [...] have turned Israel into a laboratory conducive to the study of the devel￾opment of negative political attitudes toward various minority groups.” We focus on intergroup relations between Jewish and PCI, a highly salient social-political cleavage de￾fined on religious and nationalistic lines. PCI con￾stitute around 20% of the Israeli population.7 As a marginalized minority, the PCI are characterized by a low socioeconomic status and labor market participa- 7 Note that we examine Israeli-Jews’ attitudes and behaviors toward PCI, as opposed to non-citizen Palestinians or citizens of neighboring Arab countries, the West Bank and Gaza. For research on Israeli￾Jews’ attitudes toward non-citizen Arabs, see Inbar and Yuchtman￾Yaar (1986). The 20% figure does not include the West Bank or Gaza populations. tion and are subject to discrimination by state institu￾tions (Okun and Friedlander 2005). There is long-standing research on Israeli public opinion about both domestic and international Jewish￾Arab tensions (Smooha 1987, 1992, 2002, 2004; Gubler and Kalmoe 2015; Gubler, Halperin, and Hirschberger 2015; Zeitzoff 2014, 2016), with clear evidence for widespread prejudice toward PCI. Pedahzur and Yishai (1999) document “deep resentment toward the Arabs,” with 56.5% of Jewish respondents in their sample op￾posed to granting Arab and Jewish citizens equal so￾cial rights. Bar and Zussman (2017) show that around 40% of Jewish Israelis would be willing to pay more to receive services from Jewish workers rather than from Arab workers and Zussman (2013) reports that more than half of the respondents in his sample would prefer not to have an Arab neighbor. The PCI are not only a national-religious minority within a state defined by Jewish nationality; they are also often perceived as a security threat or a “fifth col￾umn” in the context of Israel’s armed conflicts with its surrounding Arab neighbors (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin 2008). Smooha (2004) shows that a sub￾stantial share of Jewish Israelis believe that PCI sup￾port terrorism and may rebel against Israel in the fu￾ture. This makes the case of exclusion of PCI poten￾tially informative for thinking about minority groups elsewhere: perceptions of security threats affect atti￾tudes toward Muslim immigrants to Western countries (Hellwig and Sinno 2016) and stereotypes of orga￾nized, even transnational, criminality are often asso￾ciated with Latin American immigrants to the United States. Furthermore, the situation of a minority group having cultural and familial ties to neighboring states can also be found elsewhere, again such as with Latino immigrants to the United States. We focus on the general issue of exclusion by Jewish Israelis toward PCI, but also on the particular ques￾tion of the attitudes of ultra-Orthodox Jews. Ultra￾Orthodox Jews are distinctive among the Jewish ma￾jority because of their religious and social traditions, including low formal education and widespread non￾participation in the workforce, resulting in a popula￾tion that is substantially poorer than the general Jew￾ish population. Furthermore, there are also barriers for cooperation between the ultra-Orthodox and the rest of the Israeli Jewish population (Enos and Gidron 2016). The ultra-Orthodox thus present an informative point of reference in their relations with the PCI be￾cause they are, arguably, close to PCI on a social hi￾erarchy. According to prominent social-psychological theories, they may therefore hold more exclusionary attitudes due to greater perceived threat to their rel￾ative status (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Sidanius and Pratto 2001). Competition over resources is often most relevant to the low-income portion of a majority group that shares social welfare institutions with low-status minority groups (Bobo and Hutch￾ings 1996).8 Of course, less well-off subgroups of the 8 Although, notably, in the Israeli context, ultra-Orthodox and PCI are largely institutionally separated, so competition over institutions such as schools is not present. 746 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266