Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies hegemonic population having politically relevant ex- and under our direct supervision.Our sample includes clusionary preferences toward low-status minorities 439 subjects,all of whom are Jewish Israelis.Since has obvious parallels in the other societies(Gidron and we are interested in the implications of exclusion,we Hall 2017).For example,the tendency for poor whites choose to focus on the hegemonic majority group be- in the United States to oppose the social integration of cause that is the group with the power to exclude.We African Americans has a long been noted (Key 1949). used quotas for gender and age to generate a balanced In some analyses below,we divide the sample into sample on these covariates.While the sample is broadly secular and ultra-Orthodox based on respondents'self- representative of the Jewish population of Israel,ultra- identification.By dividing the sample,we can see Orthodox Jews are intentionally overrepresented (see whether the exclusionary preferences of the low-status Table A.1 in the Online Appendix). ultra-Orthodox group are higher than those of other Respondents were selected to participate in our Jews.Additionally,we compare preferences for exclu- study using a random walk strategy,with a partici- sion and cooperative behaviors of Jews toward PCl pation rate of about 17%.Participation took around with preferences for exclusion and cooperative behav- 40 minutes and was conducted inside participants' iors toward ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews.This al- homes.Participants were told that this research deals lows us to compare the preferences and behaviors to- with "Israeli society"and worked independently on ward a Jewish outgroup to preferences and behaviors computers provided by our fieldworkers.Compensa- toward the PCI outgroup. tion for participation was determined by randomly se- lecting the outcome of one of the economic decision- DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN making games. Participants were first asked to play a public goods Our data was collected through lab-in-the-field experi- game with three rounds in a random order:against ments across twenty locations in Israel,with wide varia a PCI,Jewish secular,or ultra-Orthodox opposing tion in the local proportion PCI.Not only does using a player.The opposing players were all real people, 4r元 laboratory allow for careful measurement of play in the whose decisions in the public goods game,as we ex- economic games necessary for this design,but bringing plained to subjects,were recorded in advance.10 Par- the lab to the respondents-rather than the other way ticipants were shown a picture of the opposing play- & around-increases the external validity of the results in ers next to their name,age,and city of residence.The two primary ways.First,we are able to have a sample names provided a strong indicator whether the op- that is more representative of the Israeli Jewish popu- posing player was Jewish or PCI,and the distinctive lation than could be obtained when relying on univer- clothes of the ultra-Orthodox players clearly distin- sity students-a limitation that may be especially prob- guished them from Jewish secular players.Almost 95% lematic when needing variation in exclusionary inter- of our players were able to identify the ethnicity of the group attitudes.College students tend to have a distinct opposing player based on these cues. psychological profile(Sears 1986;Jones 2010),includ- The structure of our public goods game is drawn ing strong norms of equality and low levels of preju- from previous work on intergroup relations in eth- dice (Sidanius et al.2008)and their play in economic nically diverse societies (Habyarimana et al.2009). games varies substantially from the play of other pop- In each round,participants were given twenty Israeli ulations (Henrich et al.2006).Second,and of particu Shekels(NIS)and had to decide whether to cooperate lar importance for the focus of this research,stationary by sharing the full sum or defect by keeping the full sum to themselves.After announcing their decision. 8 laboratory experiments,in contrast to lab-in-the-field experiments,are limited in their ability "to inform the they were informed of the opposing player's decision. study of cooperation in social dilemmas"(Grossman which we recorded in advance.In line with the standard 2011).And as Baldassarri(2015)notes,lab-in-the-field procedure of the public goods game,payoffs were mul- experiments,especially-as in our case-when compli- tiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two par- mented by additional survey data,can overcome the ticipants.This means that if both sides cooperated,each limited ability of laboratory experiments to represent participant ended the game with 30 NIS.If one cooper- the contexts in which group identities and norms of co- ated and the other did not,the person who cooperated operation operate. received 15 NIS and the person who did not cooperate Fieldwork and data collection were conducted dur received 35 NIS.If both sides did not cooperate,both ing the summer of 2013 by a professional survey team remained with their initial sum of 20 NIS.Thus,as is the eys standard in the public goods game,cooperation is the Data was collected in the following cities:Ashdod,Kiryat Malachi. mutually beneficial strategy. Elad,Arad,Bet Shemesh,Kiryat Gat,Haifa,Bnei Brak,Tve- We measure cooperation as a binary variable mea- ria,Safed,Rehovot,Zichron Yaakov,Ofakim,Netivot,Modi'in Makabim-Reut,Tel Aviv.We also sampled four neighborhoods in sured by play in the game against the PCI player,coded Jerusalem:Neve Yaakov,Ramat Shlomo,City Center,and Kiryat one if the subject cooperated,zero otherwise.Over- Yovel.The share of non-Jewish (mostly PCI)population in these all,only 33%(N =147)of subjects cooperated with locations vary from 0 to 37%,according to Israel's Central Bureau the PCI player,while 61%cooperated with the secular of Statistics census data from 2008.In analysis to follow,we use non- Jewish population rather than percent PCI because Israeli Census /:sony does not include ethnicity of non-Jewish residents and some of the 10 Note that playing against pre-recorded moves of opposing players non-Jewish population may not be PCI.However,it is reasonable to has been used successfully in previous lab-in-the-field studies (Enos assume that the overwhelming share of this population is PCI. and Gidron 2016;Whitt and Wilson 2007). 747
Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies hegemonic population having politically relevant exclusionary preferences toward low-status minorities has obvious parallels in the other societies (Gidron and Hall 2017). For example, the tendency for poor whites in the United States to oppose the social integration of African Americans has a long been noted (Key 1949). In some analyses below, we divide the sample into secular and ultra-Orthodox based on respondents’ selfidentification. By dividing the sample, we can see whether the exclusionary preferences of the low-status ultra-Orthodox group are higher than those of other Jews. Additionally, we compare preferences for exclusion and cooperative behaviors of Jews toward PCI with preferences for exclusion and cooperative behaviors toward ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews. This allows us to compare the preferences and behaviors toward a Jewish outgroup to preferences and behaviors toward the PCI outgroup. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN Our data was collected through lab-in-the-field experiments across twenty locations in Israel, with wide variation in the local proportion PCI.9 Not only does using a laboratory allow for careful measurement of play in the economic games necessary for this design, but bringing the lab to the respondents—rather than the other way around—increases the external validity of the results in two primary ways. First, we are able to have a sample that is more representative of the Israeli Jewish population than could be obtained when relying on university students—a limitation that may be especially problematic when needing variation in exclusionary intergroup attitudes. College students tend to have a distinct psychological profile (Sears 1986; Jones 2010), including strong norms of equality and low levels of prejudice (Sidanius et al. 2008) and their play in economic games varies substantially from the play of other populations (Henrich et al. 2006). Second, and of particular importance for the focus of this research, stationary laboratory experiments, in contrast to lab-in-the-field experiments, are limited in their ability “to inform the study of cooperation in social dilemmas” (Grossman 2011). And as Baldassarri (2015) notes, lab-in-the-field experiments, especially—as in our case—when complimented by additional survey data, can overcome the limited ability of laboratory experiments to represent the contexts in which group identities and norms of cooperation operate. Fieldwork and data collection were conducted during the summer of 2013 by a professional survey team 9 Data was collected in the following cities: Ashdod, Kiryat Malachi, Elad, Arad, Bet Shemesh, Kiryat Gat, Haifa, Bnei Brak, Tveria, Safed, Rehovot, Zichron Yaakov, Ofakim, Netivot, Modi’inMakabim-Reut, Tel Aviv. We also sampled four neighborhoods in Jerusalem: Neve Yaakov, Ramat Shlomo, City Center, and Kiryat Yovel. The share of non-Jewish (mostly PCI) population in these locations vary from 0 to 37%, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics census data from 2008. In analysis to follow, we use nonJewish population rather than percent PCI because Israeli Census does not include ethnicity of non-Jewish residents and some of the non-Jewish population may not be PCI. However, it is reasonable to assume that the overwhelming share of this population is PCI. and under our direct supervision. Our sample includes 439 subjects, all of whom are Jewish Israelis. Since we are interested in the implications of exclusion, we choose to focus on the hegemonic majority group because that is the group with the power to exclude. We used quotas for gender and age to generate a balanced sample on these covariates.While the sample is broadly representative of the Jewish population of Israel, ultraOrthodox Jews are intentionally overrepresented (see Table A.1 in the Online Appendix). Respondents were selected to participate in our study using a random walk strategy, with a participation rate of about 17%. Participation took around 40 minutes and was conducted inside participants’ homes. Participants were told that this research deals with “Israeli society” and worked independently on computers provided by our fieldworkers. Compensation for participation was determined by randomly selecting the outcome of one of the economic decisionmaking games. Participants were first asked to play a public goods game with three rounds in a random order: against a PCI, Jewish secular, or ultra-Orthodox opposing player. The opposing players were all real people, whose decisions in the public goods game, as we explained to subjects, were recorded in advance.10 Participants were shown a picture of the opposing players next to their name, age, and city of residence. The names provided a strong indicator whether the opposing player was Jewish or PCI, and the distinctive clothes of the ultra-Orthodox players clearly distinguished them from Jewish secular players. Almost 95% of our players were able to identify the ethnicity of the opposing player based on these cues. The structure of our public goods game is drawn from previous work on intergroup relations in ethnically diverse societies (Habyarimana et al. 2009). In each round, participants were given twenty Israeli Shekels (NIS) and had to decide whether to cooperate by sharing the full sum or defect by keeping the full sum to themselves. After announcing their decision, they were informed of the opposing player’s decision, which we recorded in advance. In line with the standard procedure of the public goods game, payoffs were multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two participants.This means that if both sides cooperated, each participant ended the game with 30 NIS. If one cooperated and the other did not, the person who cooperated received 15 NIS and the person who did not cooperate received 35 NIS. If both sides did not cooperate, both remained with their initial sum of 20 NIS. Thus, as is the standard in the public goods game, cooperation is the mutually beneficial strategy. We measure cooperation as a binary variable measured by play in the game against the PCI player, coded one if the subject cooperated, zero otherwise. Overall, only 33% (N = 147) of subjects cooperated with the PCI player, while 61% cooperated with the secular 10 Note that playing against pre-recorded moves of opposing players has been used successfully in previous lab-in-the-field studies (Enos and Gidron 2016; Whitt and Wilson 2007). 747 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266
Ryan D.Enos and Noam Gidron FIGURE 1.Social Distance by Group ☐UO toward Secular Secular toward UO 吕 UO toward Arabs g Secular toward Arabs .0 ds 8 relative neighbor friend coworker citizen' visitor one elati coworker neighbo citiz visitor ne 4号 (a)ultra-Orthodox (UO) (b)Secular player(N=268)and 63%cooperated with the ultra- Because social distance is rarely used in political sci- & Orthodox player(N=277).11 ence literature,this will help us to interpret the mean- After completing the experimental games,respon- ing of the variable and its relationship with coopera- dents were asked a series of demographic survey tion. questions.They were then asked for their opinions In Figure 1,we show the distribution in our sam- about intergroup relations in Israel,including how ple of social distance attitudes among ultra-Orthodox they would position different outgroup members- Jews toward secular Jews and PCI,and secular Jews including PCI-along the social distance scale,using toward ultra-Orthodox Jews and PCI.12 The distribu- the following wording:"Below are some groups of peo- tion of Jews'preferred social distance from PCI is strik- ple in Israel.Look at each of them and say which is ing:only a minority of Israeli Jews,either secular or the closest relationship you would find acceptable for ultra-Orthodox,expresses a willingness to have even each group.For example,if you would accept some- minimal interpersonal relationships with PCI.The high one from a group living on your street,but not as a share of ultra-Orthodox Jews who would prefer PCI to close friend,then you would choose neighbors."Re- not be citizens of Israel is especially noteworthy:over spondents were asked to choose from relative,friend. 60%of ultra-Orthodox respondents would prefer not neighbor,coworker,citizen,visitor,and none.We also to admit PCI to Israel at all-not even as visitors.Less asked participants about the trustworthiness of differ- than 10%would event accept PCI as coworkers,and ent groups in Israel,including PCl,using the following levels of acceptance for closer relationships are vanish- wording:"Below are some groups of people in Israel. ingly small. For each,please mark how much you trust people from Notably,for both ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews, that group.”Possible responses were“none,”“little,” the distribution of exclusion toward a Jewish outgroup “some,”and“alot." is starkly different.Even though many secular Jews have marked hostility toward ultra-Orthodox (Enos RESULTS and Gidron 2016).secular Jews are far more accept- ing of this group than of the PCI outgroup,with a ma- Before exploring the relationship between exclusion- jority willing to accept ultra-Orthodox as neighbor or ary preferences,as measured by social distance and co closer but a majority not willing to accept PCI in any operation,as measured by the public goods game,we personal relationship,not even as a coworker.The dif- first examine the distribution of preferences for exclu- ferences between levels of exclusion toward the Jewish sion and how social distance should be characterized. 11 We also checked for ordering effects of when the subject encoun. 12 Note that we are subsetting the data here to only those respon- dents who self-identify as either secular or ultra-Orthodox.We ac- tered the PCI player on the probability of cooperation and see no ef- count for the full range of Jewish religious identities in Israel-ultra- fects.Percent cooperating with PCI in first round is 34,second round Orthodox.religious,traditional,and secular-in later analyses.While is 30,third round is 35.The T-statistic for a test of difference of means we also included a category for "anti-religious,"since only four re between rounds 1 and 2,T=0.75;rounds 1 and 3,T=-0.18;and spondents identified as such,we merged this category with "secular' rounds 2 and 3,T=-0.97 in the analyses below. 748
Ryan D. Enos and Noam Gidron FIGURE 1. Social Distance by Group Share of respondents UO toward Secular UO toward Arabs relative friend neighbor coworker citizen visitor none 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 (a) ultra-Orthodox (UO) Share of respondents Secular toward UO Secular toward Arabs relative friend neighbor coworker citizen visitor none 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 (b) Secular player (N = 268) and 63% cooperated with the ultraOrthodox player (N = 277).11 After completing the experimental games, respondents were asked a series of demographic survey questions. They were then asked for their opinions about intergroup relations in Israel, including how they would position different outgroup members— including PCI—along the social distance scale, using the following wording: “Below are some groups of people in Israel. Look at each of them and say which is the closest relationship you would find acceptable for each group. For example, if you would accept someone from a group living on your street, but not as a close friend, then you would choose neighbors.” Respondents were asked to choose from relative, friend, neighbor, coworker, citizen, visitor, and none. We also asked participants about the trustworthiness of different groups in Israel, including PCI, using the following wording: “Below are some groups of people in Israel. For each, please mark how much you trust people from that group.” Possible responses were “none,” “little,” “some,” and “a lot.” RESULTS Before exploring the relationship between exclusionary preferences, as measured by social distance and cooperation, as measured by the public goods game, we first examine the distribution of preferences for exclusion and how social distance should be characterized. 11 We also checked for ordering effects of when the subject encountered the PCI player on the probability of cooperation and see no effects. Percent cooperating with PCI in first round is 34, second round is 30, third round is 35. The T-statistic for a test of difference of means between rounds 1 and 2, T = 0.75; rounds 1 and 3, T = −0.18; and rounds 2 and 3, T = −0.97. Because social distance is rarely used in political science literature, this will help us to interpret the meaning of the variable and its relationship with cooperation. In Figure 1, we show the distribution in our sample of social distance attitudes among ultra-Orthodox Jews toward secular Jews and PCI, and secular Jews toward ultra-Orthodox Jews and PCI.12 The distribution of Jews’ preferred social distance from PCI is striking: only a minority of Israeli Jews, either secular or ultra-Orthodox, expresses a willingness to have even minimal interpersonal relationships with PCI. The high share of ultra-Orthodox Jews who would prefer PCI to not be citizens of Israel is especially noteworthy: over 60% of ultra-Orthodox respondents would prefer not to admit PCI to Israel at all—not even as visitors. Less than 10% would event accept PCI as coworkers, and levels of acceptance for closer relationships are vanishingly small. Notably, for both ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews, the distribution of exclusion toward a Jewish outgroup is starkly different. Even though many secular Jews have marked hostility toward ultra-Orthodox (Enos and Gidron 2016), secular Jews are far more accepting of this group than of the PCI outgroup, with a majority willing to accept ultra-Orthodox as neighbor or closer but a majority not willing to accept PCI in any personal relationship, not even as a coworker. The differences between levels of exclusion toward the Jewish 12 Note that we are subsetting the data here to only those respondents who self-identify as either secular or ultra-Orthodox. We account for the full range of Jewish religious identities in Israel—ultraOrthodox, religious, traditional, and secular—in later analyses.While we also included a category for “anti-religious,” since only four respondents identified as such, we merged this category with “secular” in the analyses below. 748 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266