《社会保障概论》课程教学资源（课后阅读资料）APSR_Volume112. Issue 4.Nov 2018_Between_Presumption_and_Despair_Augustines_Hope_for_the_Commonwealth

American Political Science Review (2018)112.4,1036-1049 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000345 American Political Science Association 2018 Between Presumption and Despair:Augustine's Hope for the Commonwealth MICHAEL LAMB Wake Forest University any political theorists dismiss Augustine as a pessimist about politics,assuming his "other- worldly"account of love precludes hope for this-worldly politics.This article challenges this pessimism by applying recent research on Augustine's"order oflove"to reconstruct his implicit order of hope.Analyzing neglected sermons,letters,and treatises,I argue that Augustine encourages hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is rightly ordered and avoids the corresponding vices of presump- tion and despair.I then identify "civic peace"as a common object of hope that diverse citizens can share By recovering hope as a virtue and reframing civic peace as a positive form of civic friendship,I argue that Augustine commends a hope for the commonwealth that avoids both presumption and despair.I conclude by analyzing how Augustine's vision of the commonwealth can inform contemporary political theory and practice. hile hope has been a prominent theme in Center (2017b)affirms that Democrats and Republi- American politics over the last three decades. cans are more divided over"fundamental political val- it seems conspicuously absent from contem- ues"than they have been since Pew began surveying in porary political discourse.In the face of partisan polar- 1994.Another Pew poll shows that "the overall level of ization,economic inequality,and social division,many trust in government remains near historic lows."with citizens rightly feel tempted to despair,wondering if almost 80%saying they either never trust the govern- politics can offer any hope in our troubled times.A re- ment to do the right thing(11%)or only trust the gov- cent Washington Post-University of Maryland Democ- ernment some of the time(68%)(2017a).These trends racy Poll (2017),for example,suggests that Americans invite us to ask what citizens may hope for in politics have a "starkly pessimistic view of U.S.politics"(Wag- and whether,given current divisions,it is possible to ner and Clement 2017).Seventy-one percent of re- share any of these hopes in common. spondents agreed that current partisan divisions have This article seeks to recover resources for conceptu- "reached a dangerous low point,"which many see as alizing political hope by turning to an unlikely source, the "new normal"rather than a temporary aberration Augustine of Hippo.While Augustine is often regarded (Washington Post-University of Maryland 2017;Wag- as one of the most important thinkers in the history of ner and Clement 2017).A survey by the Pew Research Western political thought,his influence has emerged most recently in strands of political realism that em- Michael Lamb is an Assistant Professor of Politics,Ethics.and In- phasize the "corruption of self-interest"(Niebuhr 1986 terdisciplinary Humanities,Wake Forest University,P.O.Box 7225 129)and seek to "give injustice its due"(Shklar 1989). Winston-Salem,NC 27106,USA(lambkm@wfu.edu). As a result,Augustine is"usually numbered among the For helpful conversation and feedback on previous versions of pessimists"(Elshtain 1998,19).If Augustine offers any this paper,I am grateful to the editors,anonymous reviewers,and hope,most assume that it is a hope for heaven,not for a number of friends and colleagues,including Robert M.Adams. Matthew Anderson,Alexis Andres,Nancy Bedford,Nigel Biggar, politics.As Eric Gregory notes,many interpreters cast John Bowlin.Edward Brooks.Peter Busch.Paul Camacho,Andrew Augustine as"the patron saint of a dour and other- Chignell,Joseph Clair,Kody Cooper,Molly Farneth,Steven Firmin worldly pessimism which emphasizes the radical limits Allan Fitzgerald,Andrius Galisanka,Eric Gregory,Paul Griffiths. of politics and virtue as compared to a heavenly city" Davey Henreckson,Joshua Hordern,Kristen Deede Johnson,Bolek 2011.34). Kabala,Melissa Lane,Sean Larsen,Philip Lorish,Stephen Macedo, Charles Mathewes,Christina McRorie,Ashleen Mechaca-Bagnulo, Undoubtedly,Augustine provides evidence to sup- Samuel Newlands,Anne Norton,Joshua Nunziato,Matthew Puffer port such a view.In City of God,Augustine prosecutes Veronica Roberts,Cameron Silverglate,Sarah Stewart-Kroeker,Jef- a scathing polemic against imperial Rome,assailing the frey Stout,Daniel Strand,Adam Thomas,Melanie Webb,Brian Romans'lust for domination and comparing the Ro- Williams,and audiences at the Northeast Political Science Associa- tion (2011),the American Academy of Religion(2014),the Univer- man empire to a "band of robbers"(1998a,1.Preface, sity of Oxford Christian Ethics Graduate Research Seminar(2014) 5.19,14.28,4.4).Throughout City of God,Augustine a manuscript workshop at High Point University (2015).the Inter. laments the "miserable condition of this life,"bemoan- national Conference on Patristic Studies at the University of Ox. ing the“darkness'”and“undoubted evils'”that accom- ford(2015),LArca delle Virtu Conference at the University of Pavia pany political affairs(1998a,19.8,19.5).He even com- (2017),the Hope Optimism seminar at Cornell University(2017). and the Augustine and Politics Reading Group at the University piles a lengthy list of the "many and grave evils"that of Oxford(2018).For support of this research,I wish to thank the beset human life,going so far as to describe our condi- Princeton University Department of Politics and University Center tion as "a hell on earth"(1998a,22.22-22.23).If these for Human Values,Josephine de Karman Fellowship Trust,Temple- ton World Charity Foundation,Oxford Character Project,McDon ald Centre for Theology,Ethics,and Public Life at the University of Oxford,and Wake Forest University. Following accepted standards in Augustinian studies,all citations to Augustine's texts are to chapter,section,and/or paragraph numbers Received:July 21.2017:revised:February 1.2018:accepted:June 1. rather than page numbers.References to the original Latin are from 2018.First published online:August 7 2018. Augustine (1995). 1036

American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 1036–1049 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000345 © American Political Science Association 2018 Between Presumption and Despair: Augustine’s Hope for the Commonwealth MICHAEL LAMB Wake Forest University Many political theorists dismiss Augustine as a pessimist about politics, assuming his “other￾worldly” account of love precludes hope for this-worldly politics. This article challenges this pessimism by applying recent research on Augustine’s “order of love” to reconstruct his implicit order of hope. Analyzing neglected sermons, letters, and treatises, I argue that Augustine encourages hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is rightly ordered and avoids the corresponding vices of presump￾tion and despair. I then identify “civic peace” as a common object of hope that diverse citizens can share. By recovering hope as a virtue and reframing civic peace as a positive form of civic friendship, I argue that Augustine commends a hope for the commonwealth that avoids both presumption and despair. I conclude by analyzing how Augustine’s vision of the commonwealth can inform contemporary political theory and practice. While hope has been a prominent theme in American politics over the last three decades, it seems conspicuously absent from contem￾porary political discourse. In the face of partisan polar￾ization, economic inequality, and social division, many citizens rightly feel tempted to despair, wondering if politics can offer any hope in our troubled times. A re￾cent Washington Post–University of Maryland Democ￾racy Poll (2017), for example, suggests that Americans have a “starkly pessimistic view of U.S. politics” (Wag￾ner and Clement 2017). Seventy-one percent of re￾spondents agreed that current partisan divisions have “reached a dangerous low point,” which many see as the “new normal” rather than a temporary aberration (Washington Post–University of Maryland 2017; Wag￾ner and Clement 2017). A survey by the Pew Research Michael Lamb is an Assistant Professor of Politics, Ethics, and In￾terdisciplinary Humanities, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7225, Winston-Salem, NC 27106, USA (lambkm@wfu.edu). For helpful conversation and feedback on previous versions of this paper, I am grateful to the editors, anonymous reviewers, and a number of friends and colleagues, including Robert M. Adams, Matthew Anderson, Alexis Andres, Nancy Bedford, Nigel Biggar, John Bowlin, Edward Brooks, Peter Busch, Paul Camacho, Andrew Chignell, Joseph Clair, Kody Cooper, Molly Farneth, Steven Firmin, Allan Fitzgerald, Andrius Galisanka, Eric Gregory, Paul Griffiths, Davey Henreckson, Joshua Hordern, Kristen Deede Johnson, Bolek Kabala, Melissa Lane, Sean Larsen, Philip Lorish, Stephen Macedo, Charles Mathewes, Christina McRorie, Ashleen Mechaca-Bagnulo, Samuel Newlands, Anne Norton, Joshua Nunziato, Matthew Puffer, Veronica Roberts, Cameron Silverglate, Sarah Stewart-Kroeker, Jef￾frey Stout, Daniel Strand, Adam Thomas, Melanie Webb, Brian Williams, and audiences at the Northeast Political Science Associa￾tion (2011), the American Academy of Religion (2014), the Univer￾sity of Oxford Christian Ethics Graduate Research Seminar (2014), a manuscript workshop at High Point University (2015), the Inter￾national Conference on Patristic Studies at the University of Ox￾ford (2015), L’Arca delle Virtù Conference at the University of Pavia (2017), the Hope & Optimism seminar at Cornell University (2017), and the Augustine and Politics Reading Group at the University of Oxford (2018). For support of this research, I wish to thank the Princeton University Department of Politics and University Center for Human Values, Josephine de Karman Fellowship Trust, Temple￾ton World Charity Foundation, Oxford Character Project, McDon￾ald Centre for Theology, Ethics, and Public Life at the University of Oxford, and Wake Forest University. Received: July 21, 2017; revised: February 1, 2018; accepted: June 1, 2018. First published online: August 7, 2018. Center (2017b) affirms that Democrats and Republi￾cans are more divided over “fundamental political val￾ues” than they have been since Pew began surveying in 1994. Another Pew poll shows that “the overall level of trust in government remains near historic lows,” with almost 80% saying they either never trust the govern￾ment to do the right thing (11%) or only trust the gov￾ernment some of the time (68%) (2017a). These trends invite us to ask what citizens may hope for in politics and whether, given current divisions, it is possible to share any of these hopes in common. This article seeks to recover resources for conceptu￾alizing political hope by turning to an unlikely source, Augustine of Hippo.While Augustine is often regarded as one of the most important thinkers in the history of Western political thought, his influence has emerged most recently in strands of political realism that em￾phasize the “corruption of self-interest” (Niebuhr 1986, 129) and seek to “give injustice its due” (Shklar 1989). As a result, Augustine is “usually numbered among the pessimists” (Elshtain 1998, 19). If Augustine offers any hope, most assume that it is a hope for heaven, not for politics. As Eric Gregory notes, many interpreters cast Augustine as “the patron saint of a dour and other￾worldly pessimism which emphasizes the radical limits of politics and virtue as compared to a heavenly city” (2011, 34). Undoubtedly, Augustine provides evidence to sup￾port such a view. In City of God, Augustine prosecutes a scathing polemic against imperial Rome, assailing the Romans’ lust for domination and comparing the Ro￾man empire to a “band of robbers” (1998a, 1. Preface, 5.19, 14.28, 4.4).1 Throughout City of God, Augustine laments the “miserable condition of this life,” bemoan￾ing the “darkness” and “undoubted evils” that accom￾pany political affairs (1998a, 19.8, 19.5). He even com￾piles a lengthy list of the “many and grave evils” that beset human life, going so far as to describe our condi￾tion as “a hell on earth” (1998a, 22.22–22.23). If these 1 Following accepted standards in Augustinian studies, all citations to Augustine’s texts are to chapter, section, and/or paragraph numbers rather than page numbers. References to the original Latin are from Augustine (1995). 1036 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Between Presumption and Despair passages were not enough to justify a"picture of a implicit order of hope,an aspect of his thought that has man pessimistic about politics"(Wills 1999,129),inter- gone unnoticed by scholars of Augustine.Drawing on preters have added fuel(and sometimes brimstone)to sermons,letters,and treatises often overlooked by po- Augustine's fire. litical interpreters,I argue that Augustine allows hope Elsewhere,I analyze these passages and the method- for temporal goods as long as that hope is properly ological assumptions that underwrite overly pes- ordered and thus avoids corresponding forms of disor- simistic interpretations,focusing in particular on how der,namely,the vices of presumption and despair.The interpreters often abstract Augustine's texts from their fourth section considers whether distinctly political historical,rhetorical,and pedagogical contexts.Trained goods can be among hope's proper objects.Focusing in the art of Roman rhetoric,Augustine frequently uses on Augustine's account of the commonwealth,I argue op//s excessive rhetoric about the evils of this world to chas- that Augustine commends "civic peace"as a common ten the earthly desires of his readers and reorder their object of hope that can be shared by diverse citizens hopes to the heavenly city,even as he affirms the value with different ultimate beliefs and commitments. of temporal goods and the importance of earthly poli- Moreover,I contend this "civic peace"consists not tics(Lamb,forthcoming).While understanding Augus- merely in the absence of violence,as many interpreters tine's rhetorical and pedagogical purposes is critical to assume,but in a more positive form of civic friendship complicating influential views of his pessimism,this ar- among diverse citizens in the commonwealth. ticle challenges more substantive assumptions about I conclude by highlighting three ways in which Au- his "order of love,"which often fuels suspicions that gustine's hope for such a commonwealth can inform Augustine is a gloomy pessimist and otherworldly es- contemporary politics.First,Augustine's triad of pre- capist. sumption,hope,and despair provides a more nuanced Hannah Arendt,for example,complains that Augus- conceptual vocabulary for contemporary political dis- tine's otherworldly love makes a "desert out of this course that avoids the common binary between opti- world"and thereby diminishes political agency (1996, mism and pessimism.Second,his vision of the com 4r元 19;cf.93-7).Following Arendt,Martha Nussbaum ar- monwealth reflects a way for diverse citizens to share gues that the"insistent otherworldly direction"of Au- common hopes without requiring either strict neutral- gustine's love encourages passivity in politics and com- ity or totalizing adherence to the same tradition.Fi- & plicity in suffering (2001,551-6).Meanwhile,David nally,his view of civic peace as a form of civic friendship Billings cites Arendt to suggest that Augustine's oth- entails an expansive view of the political that directs erworldly love precludes hope for this-worldly pol- citizens'hopes to objects beyond elections or formal itics (2004,135-6)."Augustine cannot develop an institutions of government,which is especially impor- adequate view of politics,"Billings argues,"because tant at a time when ideological and electoral divisions loving the world for its own sake is idolatry and sec- might tempt despair. ular(worldly)events cannot attain true significance.In other words,while Augustine's eschatological ends do THE ORDER OF LOVE provide a kind of hope,they do not provide political hope-ie.,a hope that can sustain and enrich politi- In On Christian Teaching,Augustine analyzes the cal action"(2004.135-6).Because Augustine considers Christian commandment to love God and neighbor by love of the world to be"idolatry."these critics assume. developing his early and influential account of the "or- he cannot commend any hope for this-worldly politics. der of love: Augustine's hope is not“for the world”but“against'”it Billings 2004.136:cf.Arendt 1996.106). The person who lives a just and holy life is one...who has ordered his love,so that he does not love what it is wrong to This article draws on neglected texts to challenge love,or fail to love what should be loved,or love too much influential interpretations of Augustine's political what should be loved less (or love too little what should pessimism and show how Augustine's hope for the be loved more),or love two things equally if one of them commonwealth can inform contemporary politics.To should be loved either less or more than the other.or love situate the discussion,the first section sets forth Augus things either more of less if they should be loved equally tine's controversial account of the "order of love"(ordo (1997a.1.2728). amoris)and examines criticisms from three prominent political interpreters-Arendt,Nussbaum,and Rein- To determine which objects to love and how to love hold Niebuhr-who worry that Augustine's order of them,Augustine employs a famous distinction between eys love instrumentalizes the neighbor and evacuates the “use”(usus/huti)and“enjoyment'”(fruitio/frui):There world of its value.The second section challenges the as- are some things which are to be enjoyed,some which are to be used.and some whose function is both to en- sumptions underlying these criticisms by synthesizing and integrating recent scholarship in religious studies and use.Those which are to be enjoyed make us to engage political critics who dismiss Augustinian happy;those which are to be used assist us and give us hope because of anxieties about his "otherworldly' a boost,so to speak,as we press on towards our happi- ness,so that we may reach and hold fast to the things love.By highlighting how Augustine's order of love is focused as much on moral psychology as metaphysics,I which make us happy"(1997a,1.3.3).2 Augustine goes show how he allows love for temporal goods as long as that love is properly ordered.The third section builds 2 For an excellent analysis of Augustine's distinction between"use" and "enjoyment"in light of his pilgrimage motif,see Stewart- on this alternative account to reconstruct Augustine's Kroeker(2014;2017,204-4). 1037

Between Presumption and Despair passages were not enough to justify a “picture of a man pessimistic about politics” (Wills 1999, 129), inter￾preters have added fuel (and sometimes brimstone) to Augustine’s fire. Elsewhere, I analyze these passages and the method￾ological assumptions that underwrite overly pes￾simistic interpretations, focusing in particular on how interpreters often abstract Augustine’s texts from their historical, rhetorical, and pedagogical contexts.Trained in the art of Roman rhetoric,Augustine frequently uses excessive rhetoric about the evils of this world to chas￾ten the earthly desires of his readers and reorder their hopes to the heavenly city, even as he affirms the value of temporal goods and the importance of earthly poli￾tics (Lamb, forthcoming).While understanding Augus￾tine’s rhetorical and pedagogical purposes is critical to complicating influential views of his pessimism, this ar￾ticle challenges more substantive assumptions about his “order of love,” which often fuels suspicions that Augustine is a gloomy pessimist and otherworldly es￾capist. Hannah Arendt, for example, complains that Augus￾tine’s otherworldly love makes a “desert out of this world” and thereby diminishes political agency (1996, 19; cf. 93–7). Following Arendt, Martha Nussbaum ar￾gues that the “insistent otherworldly direction” of Au￾gustine’s love encourages passivity in politics and com￾plicity in suffering (2001, 551–6). Meanwhile, David Billings cites Arendt to suggest that Augustine’s oth￾erworldly love precludes hope for this-worldly pol￾itics (2004, 135–6). “Augustine cannot develop an adequate view of politics,” Billings argues, “because loving the world for its own sake is idolatry and sec￾ular (worldly) events cannot attain true significance. In other words, while Augustine’s eschatological ends do provide a kind of hope, they do not provide political hope—i.e., a hope that can sustain and enrich politi￾cal action” (2004, 135–6). Because Augustine considers love of the world to be “idolatry,” these critics assume, he cannot commend any hope for this-worldly politics. Augustine’s hope is not “for the world” but “against” it (Billings 2004, 136; cf. Arendt 1996, 106). This article draws on neglected texts to challenge influential interpretations of Augustine’s political pessimism and show how Augustine’s hope for the commonwealth can inform contemporary politics. To situate the discussion, the first section sets forth Augus￾tine’s controversial account of the “order of love” (ordo amoris) and examines criticisms from three prominent political interpreters—Arendt, Nussbaum, and Rein￾hold Niebuhr—who worry that Augustine’s order of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and evacuates the world of its value.The second section challenges the as￾sumptions underlying these criticisms by synthesizing and integrating recent scholarship in religious studies to engage political critics who dismiss Augustinian hope because of anxieties about his “otherworldly” love. By highlighting how Augustine’s order of love is focused as much on moral psychology as metaphysics, I show how he allows love for temporal goods as long as that love is properly ordered. The third section builds on this alternative account to reconstruct Augustine’s implicit order of hope, an aspect of his thought that has gone unnoticed by scholars of Augustine. Drawing on sermons, letters, and treatises often overlooked by po￾litical interpreters, I argue that Augustine allows hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is properly ordered and thus avoids corresponding forms of disor￾der, namely, the vices of presumption and despair. The fourth section considers whether distinctly political goods can be among hope’s proper objects. Focusing on Augustine’s account of the commonwealth, I argue that Augustine commends “civic peace” as a common object of hope that can be shared by diverse citizens with different ultimate beliefs and commitments. Moreover, I contend this “civic peace” consists not merely in the absence of violence, as many interpreters assume, but in a more positive form of civic friendship among diverse citizens in the commonwealth. I conclude by highlighting three ways in which Au￾gustine’s hope for such a commonwealth can inform contemporary politics. First, Augustine’s triad of pre￾sumption, hope, and despair provides a more nuanced conceptual vocabulary for contemporary political dis￾course that avoids the common binary between opti￾mism and pessimism. Second, his vision of the com￾monwealth reflects a way for diverse citizens to share common hopes without requiring either strict neutral￾ity or totalizing adherence to the same tradition. Fi￾nally, his view of civic peace as a form of civic friendship entails an expansive view of the political that directs citizens’ hopes to objects beyond elections or formal institutions of government, which is especially impor￾tant at a time when ideological and electoral divisions might tempt despair. THE ORDER OF LOVE In On Christian Teaching, Augustine analyzes the Christian commandment to love God and neighbor by developing his early and influential account of the “or￾der of love:” The person who lives a just and holy life is one . . . who has ordered his love, so that he does not love what it is wrong to love, or fail to love what should be loved, or love too much what should be loved less (or love too little what should be loved more), or love two things equally if one of them should be loved either less or more than the other, or love things either more of less if they should be loved equally (1997a, 1.27.28). To determine which objects to love and how to love them,Augustine employs a famous distinction between “use” (usus/uti) and “enjoyment” (fruitio/frui): “There are some things which are to be enjoyed, some which are to be used, and some whose function is both to en￾joy and use. Those which are to be enjoyed make us happy; those which are to be used assist us and give us a boost, so to speak, as we press on towards our happi￾ness, so that we may reach and hold fast to the things which make us happy” (1997a, 1.3.3).2 Augustine goes 2 For an excellent analysis of Augustine’s distinction between “use” and “enjoyment” in light of his pilgrimage motif, see Stewart￾Kroeker (2014; 2017, 204–4). 1037 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Michael Lamb on to clarify what use and enjoyment entail:"To en- (1996.9-44.106).Moreover,Arendt argues that Augus- joy something is to hold fast to it in love for its own tine's injunction to"use"other human beings to enjoy sake.To use something is to apply whatever it may be God instrumentalizes our neighbors,making them into to the purpose of obtaining what you love-if indeed it mere"means and tools"rather than ends in themselves is something that ought to be loved.(The improper use (1996.37-44).As a result.we no longer love our neigh- of something should be termed abuse.)"(1997a,1.4.4). bor qua neighbor or individual qua individual;rather, With this account in view,Augustine emphasizes we love what is "eternal"in her(1996,96).Loving our that the“supreme'”object to be“enjoyed”is God neighbor simply becomes an "occasion to love God" the "supremely excellent and immortal being":"it is (1996,96-7). only the eternal and unchangeable things which I men- Nussbaum presses similar charges.While she praises tioned that are to be enjoyed;other things are to be Augustine's efforts to restore "compassion,along with used so that we may attain the full enjoyment of those other emotions,to a place of centrality in the earthly things"(1997a,1.5.5-1.6.6,1.22.20).On this account,hu- life,"Nussbaum complains that Augustine's vision of man beings should love only God for God's own sake; Christian love remains too otherworldly and transcen- all other objects must be "used"to"enjoy"God (1997a, dent (2001,551,528-9,552-5).*Targeting his contrast 1.3.3-1.4.4,1.22.20-21). between“human or earthly love”and“Christian love, As Augustine recognizes and critics hasten to point whose core is the love of God,"Nussbaum argues that out,the priority of God in the order of love raises an Augustine"repudiates the one and urges us,disdaining "important question"(magna quaestio):"whether hu- it,to cultivate the other"(2001.528-9).Citing Arendt. mans should enjoy one another or use one another:" she suggests that Augustine's "otherworldly"account of love denies the value of this-worldly striving and We have been commanded to love one another [John 13: eclipses human individuality(2001,549-56).If Augus- 34;15:12,17],but the question is whether one person tine requires human beings to order all loves to God should be loved by another on his own account or for some "it is a little unclear what role is left...for loving real- 4号 other reason.If on his own account,we enjoy him;if for life individual people.For what one loves above all in some other reason,we use him.In my opinion,he should be loved for another reason.For if something is to be loved them is the presence of God and the hope of salvation" on its own account,it is made to constitute the happy life, (2001,549-50).Ultimately,Augustine's attempt to"di- & even if it is not as yet the reality but the hope of it which rect longing away from this-worldly virtue"encourages consoles us at this time (1997a.1.22.20). insensitivity to human suffering and earthly injustice (2001,552-4).Rather than "taking action as best we Thus,Augustine concludes,"a person who loves his can,"Nussbaum concludes,Augustine admonishes us neighbor properly should,in concert with him,aim to to "cover ourselves,mourn,and wait"(2001,556). love God with all his heart.all his soul.and all his Critics are not alone in raising suspicions about Au- mind.In this way,loving him as he would himself,he gustine's order of love.Even an Augustinian as influen- 是 relates his love of himself and his neighbor entirely to tial as Niebuhr shares these concerns.While Niebuhr the love of God.which allows not the slightest trickle praises Augustine as"the first great'realist'in Western to flow away from it and thereby diminish it"(1997a, history,"he identifies "several grave errors in Augus- 1.22.21).For Augustine,the love of neighbor and other tine's account of love"(1986,124,130).In particular, temporal goods must always be"related"or"referred" Niebuhr argues that Augustine's account of love instru- to God(1997a,1.23.22:1998b,4.12.18).Or,as he says mentalizes the neighbor:"The love of the neighbor is in later formulations,human beings must love their for him not part of a double love commandment,but neighbor and the world "in God"(1998b,4.12.18;see merely the instrument of a single love commandment Gregory 2008,42). which bids us flee all mortality,including the neighbor, in favor of the immutable good"(1986,136).Niebuhr blames this Augustinian flight on a lingering Neopla- Political Critics of an Otherworldly tonic focus on the nature of love's objects:"the empha- Augustine sis lies always upon the worthiness or unworthiness of To contemporary readers,especially those with Kan- the object of our love:the insistence is that only God tian sensibilities,Augustine's discussion of"use"and and not some mutable 'good'or person is worthy of "enjoyment"can seem like a blatant violation of the our love"(1986,137).While Niebuhr concedes that this categorical imperative,encouraging citizens to exploit formula is"a safeguard against all forms of idolatry," the world and treat their fellow human beings as mere he nevertheless suggests that"using"the neighbor and means to their ends.Arendt,for example,argues that earthly goods to enjoy God denies human individual- Augustine tends "to strip the world and all tempo- ity and trivializes the value of temporal goods (1986, ral things of their value and to make them relative' (1996,14).3 As a result,Augustine's account of love drains this-worldly life of significance,requiring that According to Nussbaum,the Augustinian "ascent of love and desire L we "stand against the world,not simply without it" from the earthly to the heavenly...strips away and leaves behind the merely human in love"(2001,529). 5 Nussbaum adds a qualifying footnote:"Not all Christian love is love of God:there may be human loves that are distinctively Chris- 3 For an insightful discussion of Arendt's interpretation of Augus- tian.But these other loves are suffused by the love of God,and,as tine,see Gregory (2008,197-240). we shall see,their real object always is,in a way,God"(2001,528n1). 1038

Michael Lamb on to clarify what use and enjoyment entail: “To en￾joy something is to hold fast to it in love for its own sake. To use something is to apply whatever it may be to the purpose of obtaining what you love—if indeed it is something that ought to be loved. (The improper use of something should be termed abuse.)” (1997a, 1.4.4). With this account in view, Augustine emphasizes that the “supreme” object to be “enjoyed” is God, the “supremely excellent and immortal being”: “it is only the eternal and unchangeable things which I men￾tioned that are to be enjoyed; other things are to be used so that we may attain the full enjoyment of those things” (1997a, 1.5.5–1.6.6, 1.22.20).On this account, hu￾man beings should love only God for God’s own sake; all other objects must be “used” to “enjoy”God (1997a, 1.3.3–1.4.4, 1.22.20–21). As Augustine recognizes and critics hasten to point out, the priority of God in the order of love raises an “important question” (magna quaestio): “whether hu￾mans should enjoy one another or use one another:” We have been commanded to love one another [John 13: 34; 15: 12, 17], but the question is whether one person should be loved by another on his own account or for some other reason. If on his own account, we enjoy him; if for some other reason, we use him. In my opinion, he should be loved for another reason. For if something is to be loved on its own account, it is made to constitute the happy life, even if it is not as yet the reality but the hope of it which consoles us at this time (1997a, 1.22.20). Thus, Augustine concludes, “a person who loves his neighbor properly should, in concert with him, aim to love God with all his heart, all his soul, and all his mind. In this way, loving him as he would himself, he relates his love of himself and his neighbor entirely to the love of God, which allows not the slightest trickle to flow away from it and thereby diminish it” (1997a, 1.22.21). For Augustine, the love of neighbor and other temporal goods must always be “related” or “referred” to God (1997a, 1.23.22; 1998b, 4.12.18). Or, as he says in later formulations, human beings must love their neighbor and the world “in God” (1998b, 4.12.18; see Gregory 2008, 42). Political Critics of an Otherworldly Augustine To contemporary readers, especially those with Kan￾tian sensibilities, Augustine’s discussion of “use” and “enjoyment” can seem like a blatant violation of the categorical imperative, encouraging citizens to exploit the world and treat their fellow human beings as mere means to their ends. Arendt, for example, argues that Augustine tends “to strip the world and all tempo￾ral things of their value and to make them relative” (1996, 14).3 As a result, Augustine’s account of love drains this-worldly life of significance, requiring that we “stand against the world, not simply without it” 3 For an insightful discussion of Arendt’s interpretation of Augus￾tine, see Gregory (2008, 197–240). (1996, 9–44, 106).Moreover,Arendt argues that Augus￾tine’s injunction to “use” other human beings to enjoy God instrumentalizes our neighbors, making them into mere “means and tools” rather than ends in themselves (1996, 37–44). As a result, we no longer love our neigh￾bor qua neighbor or individual qua individual; rather, we love what is “eternal” in her (1996, 96). Loving our neighbor simply becomes an “occasion to love God” (1996, 96–7). Nussbaum presses similar charges. While she praises Augustine’s efforts to restore “compassion, along with other emotions, to a place of centrality in the earthly life,” Nussbaum complains that Augustine’s vision of Christian love remains too otherworldly and transcen￾dent (2001, 551, 528–9, 552–5).4 Targeting his contrast between “human or earthly love” and “Christian love, whose core is the love of God,” Nussbaum argues that Augustine “repudiates the one and urges us, disdaining it, to cultivate the other” (2001, 528–9).5 Citing Arendt, she suggests that Augustine’s “otherworldly” account of love denies the value of this-worldly striving and eclipses human individuality (2001, 549–56). If Augus￾tine requires human beings to order all loves to God, “it is a little unclear what role is left … for loving real￾life individual people. For what one loves above all in them is the presence of God and the hope of salvation” (2001, 549–50). Ultimately, Augustine’s attempt to “di￾rect longing away from this-worldly virtue” encourages insensitivity to human suffering and earthly injustice (2001, 552–4). Rather than “taking action as best we can,” Nussbaum concludes, Augustine admonishes us to “cover ourselves, mourn, and wait” (2001, 556). Critics are not alone in raising suspicions about Au￾gustine’s order of love. Even an Augustinian as influen￾tial as Niebuhr shares these concerns. While Niebuhr praises Augustine as “the first great ‘realist’ in Western history,” he identifies “several grave errors in Augus￾tine’s account of love” (1986, 124, 130). In particular, Niebuhr argues that Augustine’s account of love instru￾mentalizes the neighbor: “The love of the neighbor is for him not part of a double love commandment, but merely the instrument of a single love commandment which bids us flee all mortality, including the neighbor, in favor of the immutable good” (1986, 136). Niebuhr blames this Augustinian flight on a lingering Neopla￾tonic focus on the nature of love’s objects: “the empha￾sis lies always upon the worthiness or unworthiness of the object of our love; the insistence is that only God and not some mutable ‘good’ or person is worthy of our love” (1986, 137).While Niebuhr concedes that this formula is “a safeguard against all forms of idolatry,” he nevertheless suggests that “using” the neighbor and earthly goods to enjoy God denies human individual￾ity and trivializes the value of temporal goods (1986, 4 According to Nussbaum, the Augustinian “ascent of love and desire from the earthly to the heavenly . . . strips away and leaves behind the merely human in love” (2001, 529). 5 Nussbaum adds a qualifying footnote: “Not all Christian love is love of God: there may be human loves that are distinctively Chris￾tian. But these other loves are suffused by the love of God, and, as we shall see, their real object always is, in a way, God” (2001, 528n1). 1038 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Between Presumption and Despair 137-8).While Augustine is"too much the Christian to "enjoyment."Most interpreters tend to view this rela- engage in a consistent mystic depreciation of the re- tion as a means-end relation and then read it through sponsibilities and joys of this earthly life,"he nonethe- a distinctly Kantian lens,assuming that Augustine less insists on "performing these tasks for the ulti- requires that we "use"temporal goods and human mate,rather than the immediate end"(1986.137).Like neighbors instrumentally as mere "means and tools" Arendt and Nussbaum,Niebuhr concludes that Augus- to "enjoy"eternal ends (Arendt 1996,32-4,37 40:cf. tinian love,taken on its own,furnishes a world-denying Chadwick 1986.64:Marrou 1957.79).Critics then indict pessimism Augustine for denying that the neighbor and the world These objections threaten to undermine any plausi- have any intrinsic value.When this use/enjoyment ble Augustinian hope for politics.If Augustine's order distinction is interpreted through a Kantian lens,it gen- of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and deserts the erates charges of ethical instrumentalism and political world,it is difficult to see how Augustine can coun- pessimism. tenance any hope for this-worldly politics.While Au- Recently,scholars in religious studies,including Eric gustine's rhetoric occasionally gives support for such Gregory (2008,197-240),Charles Mathewes(2007,74- readings,influential scholars in religious studies have 94),Sarah Stewart-Kroeker (2014;2017,204-44),and recently challenged this interpretation,offering more Rowan Williams (1989).among others,have challenged subtle accounts of Augustine's order of love that rec- these assumptions by denying the implicit metaphysi- ommend an expansive love for temporal goods,includ- cal and eschatological dualism they impute to Augus- ing the goods of politics.Unfortunately,this scholar- tine.Augustine's God is not located simply in some ship has yet to penetrate political theory.By lifting this "absolute future"or "transcendent region,"as Arendt alternative account into the discipline and showing its and Nussbaum assume (Arendt 1996,48-50.cf.36- wide acceptance among respected scholars in religious 44:cf.Nussbaum2001.549-56:2009.18-22).6 Rather. studies,I hope to challenge prevailing interpretations God is“Being itself,”the“author and creator of every- of Augustine's otherworldliness and open new vistas on thing”(1998b,9.4.11;cf71723;1997a,1.10.10;cf1998a 4号 his political thought. 8.6,12.2).If God is the "true ground"of all Being, then God is not completely separate from the world (1998a,14.13).Rather,everything that exists has its be- THE ORDER OF LOVE RECONSIDERED ing because it participates in God's being(1998a,11.28, 12.5).7 Moreover,if God is supremely good,then every- Three assumptions tend to underwrite otherworldly thing that exists also participates in God's goodness.It interpretations of Augustine's order of love.The first follows that,for Augustine,"Everything that exists is is that the metaphysical status of love's object-its good”(1998b,712.18:cf1953,11.21.18.35:1990.21.3: "worthiness or unworthiness,"to quote Niebuhr- 1997a,1.32.35;1998a,11.21,12.1,12.5) solely determines love's moral quality (Niebuhr 1986 This participationist ontology has radical implica- 137;cf.Arendt1996,30-4;Nussbaum2001,542-3; tions for understanding Augustine's order of love.First, for analysis,see Gregory 2008,40-7,197-240,337n28) it challenges critics'first assumption that the meta- Because an infinite,eternal,and unchanging God is physical status of love's objects determines their moral the most perfect being,the assumption goes,God is quality (Gregory 2008,40-1,221,337n28;Stewart- the highest object of love,and since temporal goods are Kroeker,2014,211;2017,227).Rather than quarantin- subject to fortune and finitude,they cannot provide the ing God to some transcendent realm and denying the security that eternal goods can.To realize our ultimate goods of the world,Augustine suggests a more fun- good,then,human beings should turn away from fleet- damental continuity between heaven and earth,time ing goods and toward the eternal good of God.Any and eternity.If everything that exists is,in some way, love of the world "for its own sake"is,as Billings sug- good,then even finite,temporal goods partake in God's gests,.“idolatry'”(2004,135-6). goodness.Temporal goods are still goods.As Augus- This concern about idolatry licenses a second as- tine writes."Whatever God has made is good.Some sumption,namely,that love of eternal and temporal are great goods,some are small goods,but all are good. goods is mutually exclusive or competitive.Human be- Some are celestial good things,some are earthly good ings must enjoy either God or neighbor;they cannot things;some are spiritual goods,some are bodily goods; love both fully for their own sakes(Niebuhr 1986,136- some are eternal goods,some are temporal goods.But 7;Arendt 1996,30;Nussbaum 2001,528-9;see Gregory 四 2008,3-5,35-47 221,319-50).This assumption is evi dent not only in Billings's concerns about idolatry,but 6 Standard accounts of Augustine in political theory share this em- in Nussbaum's suggestion that Augustine"repudiates' phasis on transcendence.Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe suggests that,for human or earthly love"and "urges us,disdaining it Augustine,"the truly important community is not this-worldly,but to cultivate [love of God]"(2001,528-9).As Eric Gre- transcendent"and argues that Augustine's primary critique against classical philosophers targeted their "inappropriately earthly focus" gory observes,the assumption behind such complaints 2011,150-1) is that Augustine endorses a "competitive tournament For discussion,see Gregory (2008,41-4):Mathewes(2007.74-94): of loves between God and the world"(2008.330:cf.36. Jenson(2006,8-15):and Coles(1992,17-8). 221,260,323) As Augustine writes(1998a,12.4),"For,though earthly things were This either-or account of love fuels a third assump- not intended to be coequal with heavenly things,it would still not be fitting for the universe to lack these things altogether,even though tion about Augustine's distinction between "use"and heavenly things are better." 1039

Between Presumption and Despair 137–8). While Augustine is “too much the Christian to engage in a consistent mystic depreciation of the re￾sponsibilities and joys of this earthly life,” he nonethe￾less insists on “performing these tasks for the ulti￾mate, rather than the immediate end” (1986, 137). Like Arendt and Nussbaum, Niebuhr concludes that Augus￾tinian love, taken on its own, furnishes a world-denying pessimism. These objections threaten to undermine any plausi￾ble Augustinian hope for politics. If Augustine’s order of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and deserts the world, it is difficult to see how Augustine can coun￾tenance any hope for this-worldly politics. While Au￾gustine’s rhetoric occasionally gives support for such readings, influential scholars in religious studies have recently challenged this interpretation, offering more subtle accounts of Augustine’s order of love that rec￾ommend an expansive love for temporal goods, includ￾ing the goods of politics. Unfortunately, this scholar￾ship has yet to penetrate political theory. By lifting this alternative account into the discipline and showing its wide acceptance among respected scholars in religious studies, I hope to challenge prevailing interpretations of Augustine’s otherworldliness and open new vistas on his political thought. THE ORDER OF LOVE RECONSIDERED Three assumptions tend to underwrite otherworldly interpretations of Augustine’s order of love. The first is that the metaphysical status of love’s object—its “worthiness or unworthiness,” to quote Niebuhr— solely determines love’s moral quality (Niebuhr 1986, 137; cf. Arendt 1996, 30–4; Nussbaum 2001, 542–3; for analysis, see Gregory 2008, 40–7, 197–240, 337n28). Because an infinite, eternal, and unchanging God is the most perfect being, the assumption goes, God is the highest object of love, and since temporal goods are subject to fortune and finitude, they cannot provide the security that eternal goods can. To realize our ultimate good, then, human beings should turn away from fleet￾ing goods and toward the eternal good of God. Any love of the world “for its own sake” is, as Billings sug￾gests, “idolatry” (2004, 135–6). This concern about idolatry licenses a second as￾sumption, namely, that love of eternal and temporal goods is mutually exclusive or competitive. Human be￾ings must enjoy either God or neighbor; they cannot love both fully for their own sakes (Niebuhr 1986, 136– 7; Arendt 1996, 30; Nussbaum 2001, 528–9; see Gregory 2008, 3–5, 35–47, 221, 319–50). This assumption is evi￾dent not only in Billings’s concerns about idolatry, but in Nussbaum’s suggestion that Augustine “repudiates” “human or earthly love” and “urges us, disdaining it, to cultivate [love of God]” (2001, 528–9). As Eric Gre￾gory observes, the assumption behind such complaints is that Augustine endorses a “competitive tournament of loves between God and the world” (2008, 330; cf. 36, 221, 260, 323). This either-or account of love fuels a third assump￾tion about Augustine’s distinction between “use” and “enjoyment.” Most interpreters tend to view this rela￾tion as a means-end relation and then read it through a distinctly Kantian lens, assuming that Augustine requires that we “use” temporal goods and human neighbors instrumentally as mere “means and tools” to “enjoy” eternal ends (Arendt 1996, 32–4, 37, 40; cf. Chadwick 1986, 64;Marrou 1957, 79). Critics then indict Augustine for denying that the neighbor and the world have any intrinsic value. When this use/enjoyment distinction is interpreted through a Kantian lens,it gen￾erates charges of ethical instrumentalism and political pessimism. Recently, scholars in religious studies, including Eric Gregory (2008, 197–240), Charles Mathewes (2007, 74– 94), Sarah Stewart-Kroeker (2014; 2017, 204–44), and Rowan Williams (1989), among others, have challenged these assumptions by denying the implicit metaphysi￾cal and eschatological dualism they impute to Augus￾tine. Augustine’s God is not located simply in some “absolute future” or “transcendent region,” as Arendt and Nussbaum assume (Arendt 1996, 48–50, cf. 36– 44; cf. Nussbaum 2001, 549–56; 2009, 18–22).6 Rather, God is “Being itself,” the “author and creator of every￾thing” (1998b, 9.4.11; cf. 7.17.23; 1997a, 1.10.10; cf. 1998a, 8.6, 12.2). If God is the “true ground” of all Being, then God is not completely separate from the world (1998a, 14.13). Rather, everything that exists has its be￾ing because it participates in God’s being (1998a, 11.28, 12.5).7 Moreover,if God is supremely good, then every￾thing that exists also participates in God’s goodness. It follows that, for Augustine, “Everything that exists is good” (1998b, 7.12.18; cf. 1953, 11.21, 18.35; 1990, 21.3; 1997a, 1.32.35; 1998a, 11.21, 12.1, 12.5). This participationist ontology has radical implica￾tions for understanding Augustine’s order of love. First, it challenges critics’ first assumption that the meta￾physical status of love’s objects determines their moral quality (Gregory 2008, 40–1, 221, 337n28; Stewart￾Kroeker, 2014, 211; 2017, 227). Rather than quarantin￾ing God to some transcendent realm and denying the goods of the world, Augustine suggests a more fun￾damental continuity between heaven and earth, time and eternity. If everything that exists is, in some way, good, then even finite, temporal goods partake in God’s goodness. Temporal goods are still goods. 8 As Augus￾tine writes, “Whatever God has made is good. Some are great goods, some are small goods, but all are good. Some are celestial good things, some are earthly good things; some are spiritual goods, some are bodily goods; some are eternal goods, some are temporal goods. But 6 Standard accounts of Augustine in political theory share this em￾phasis on transcendence. Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe suggests that, for Augustine, “the truly important community is not this-worldly, but transcendent” and argues that Augustine’s primary critique against classical philosophers targeted their “inappropriately earthly focus” (2011, 150–1). 7 For discussion, see Gregory (2008, 41–4); Mathewes (2007, 74–94); Jenson (2006, 8–15); and Coles (1992, 17–8). 8 As Augustine writes (1998a, 12.4), “For, though earthly things were not intended to be coequal with heavenly things, it would still not be fitting for the universe to lack these things altogether, even though heavenly things are better.” 1039 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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Michael Lamb they are all good,because the one who is good made is all-good,then everything that God creates,includ- them good"(1990,21.3).In City ofGod,Augustine even ing the material world,must be good,for God could rejects the claim that "the goods which [the earthly] not be responsible for creating anything evil (1998b. -00081v0000/L0LoL city desires are not goods:for,in its own human fash- 712.18-716.22:1998a,11.22,12.5-9).Even the nature ion,even that city is better when it possesses them than of the devil is,in one sense,good (1998a,19.13;1953 when it does not....These goods are goods,and they are 13.26).For Augustine,then,evil is not an independent without doubt gifts of God"(1998a,15.4). force that competes with goodness,but a deficiency or If Augustine's participationist ontology undermines negation of goodness,either a turning away from what critics'first assumption about the metaphysical and is good (privation)or the wrongful use of a good for thus moral status of temporal goods,it also challenges improper ends(perversion)(1998a.11.9.11.22.12.7-9 their second assumption about Augustine's either-or 19.13:Elshtain1998.76-85:athewes2001.75-81:Jen- account of love.If human beings participate in God's son 2006,15-32).The ontological and moral priority being and goodness,then loving God does not neces- of goodness over evil thus furnishes what Gregory de- sarily crowd out,or compete with,love of neighbor or scribes as a psychological"dialectic"between love and the world.In loving temporal goods properly,human sin.virtue and vice(2008.14-5.20-2.35-6).Since sin re beings also love God:the two loves are not mutually ex- flects the privation or perversion of love,love has onto- clusive (see Gregory 2008.44-5.221-2.322-50:Math- logical,moral,and psychological priority over sin:with- ewes2007,82-4,91-2;Jenson2006,28;Smith2005, out a movement of love for some good,there would be 201).In one sermon,Augustine even suggests that it is no sin.Yet,because love can become disordered,love is impossible to love the invisible God without loving the always threatened by sin,the human tendency to love visible neighbor:"if you do not love the brother whom a good insufficiently or perversely (Augustine 1998a, you see,how can you love God,whom you do not see?" 14.6-7:1997b,352A.6;Gregory2008.14-5,20-2,35-36: (2008,9.10).10 Indeed,for Augustine,properly loving Mathewes 2007,82-5).In this life,love risks becoming the neighbor simply is loving God:"Does he who loves deficient or excessive,and virtue remains threatened his brother also love God?It must be that he loves God: by temptations toward privation or perversion(1998a, it must be that he loves love itself....By loving love he 19.4;1953,19.37).As a result,one function of a virtue is loves God....If God is love,whoever loves love loves to help human beings resist these temptations toward God”(2008.9.10:cf.1990,21.2-3:1998a.11:28).In this vice(1998a,19.4). context,love of neighbor does not compete with love Augustine is especially concerned about the vice of of God but partly constitutes it.An either-or account pride,or perverse self-love,which breeds a lust for of love that neglects this continuity fails to register Au- domination that drives human beings to grasp tem- gustine's participationist ontology. poral goods for their own purposes (1998a,1.Preface On Augustine's account,the primary problem is not 1.30-31,12.6,12.8,14.13-14,15.5,19.12,19.15).Under with the metaphysical status of temporal goods or hu- the sway of pride,human beings assume they are self- man neighbors,but with human beings who tend to sufficient and self-sustaining sources of their own be- love them in an inordinate or disordered way(Gregory ing and goodness,putting themselves in the place of 2008,39,221,256-63:Mathewes2007,78.83:Bowlin God and seeking to place others under their power 2010,297).As Augustine says of the "miser"who loves (1998a,1.Preface,12.1,14.13-14;19.12:cf.Elshtain1998, S5.501g money,the "fault...lies not with the gold,but with the 16-8,49-51;Jenson 2006,25-8).Augustine attributes man;and this is true of every created thing:though it is the Fall to this prideful assumption of self-sufficiency, good,it can be loved well or ill;well when the proper which denies the ways in which human beings partic- order is observed,and ill when that order is disturbed" ipate in God's being and goodness (1998a,14.13-14) (1998a,15.22:cf12.8:1990,21.3)Thus,Augustine con- For Augustine,pride causes human beings to strive af- cludes,"a brief and true definition of virtue is'rightly ter more for themselves,to grasp at temporal goods ordered love'"(1998a,15.22).11 and dominate their neighbors for their own private pur- If virtue is "rightly ordered love,"it follows that vice poses rather than participate in a good that everyone is disordered love,a privation or perversion of good- can share in common (see 1998a,1.Preface,1.30-31, ness(1998a,12.34,12.6-9,14.6-719.13).12 Challeng- 12.1,15.5,19.12:Jenson2006,25-32:Gregory2008,42- ing the Manichean view of good and evil as compet- 4,329-31.343-7:C1air2016,60-1n48) ing forces in the world,Augustine argues that if God In light of Augustine's participationist ontology and concerns about pride and domination,Gregory argues 9"But"he adds,"if the higher goods are neglected..and those that the function of Augustine's"order of love"is moral other goods desired so much that they are thought to be the only as much as metaphysical:"His philosophical and theo- goods,or loved more than the goods which are believed to be higher logical energies are devoted more to how one is to love then misery will of necessity follow,and present misery be increased by it"(1998a,15.4).I address this point below. in an actively ordering way rather than to an abstract 10 For discussion,see Gregory(2008,44-5):cf.Mathewes(2007,81- metaphysical speculation on what one is to consider as 7) appropriate objects of love"(2008,221,cf.40-2).Math- ifFor Augustine,virtue and vice reflect the"quality"of a person's ewes agrees:the order of love "is more dispositional will:"For if the will is perverse,the emotions will be perverse:but than metaphysical:Augustine does not want us not to if it is righteous,the emotions will not only be blameless,but praise. love the world,but rather to change how we love it,as 2orniuiscussion se Mathewes (001 59-103 e64 a whole and in its component parts"(2007,89-90;see 5.75-81) also Williams 1989;Bowlin 2010,297-9).Rather than 1040

Michael Lamb they are all good, because the one who is good made them good” (1990, 21.3). In City of God,Augustine even rejects the claim that “the goods which [the earthly] city desires are not goods; for, in its own human fash￾ion, even that city is better when it possesses them than when it does not….These goods are goods, and they are without doubt gifts of God” (1998a, 15.4).9 If Augustine’s participationist ontology undermines critics’ first assumption about the metaphysical and thus moral status of temporal goods, it also challenges their second assumption about Augustine’s either-or account of love. If human beings participate in God’s being and goodness, then loving God does not neces￾sarily crowd out, or compete with, love of neighbor or the world. In loving temporal goods properly, human beings also love God; the two loves are not mutually ex￾clusive (see Gregory 2008, 44–5, 221–2, 322–50; Math￾ewes 2007, 82–4, 91–2; Jenson 2006, 28; Smith 2005, 201). In one sermon, Augustine even suggests that it is impossible to love the invisible God without loving the visible neighbor: “if you do not love the brother whom you see, how can you love God, whom you do not see?” (2008, 9.10).10 Indeed, for Augustine, properly loving the neighbor simply is loving God: “Does he who loves his brother also love God? It must be that he loves God; it must be that he loves love itself…. By loving love he loves God…. If God is love, whoever loves love loves God” (2008, 9.10; cf. 1990, 21.2–3; 1998a, 11:28). In this context, love of neighbor does not compete with love of God but partly constitutes it. An either-or account of love that neglects this continuity fails to register Au￾gustine’s participationist ontology. On Augustine’s account, the primary problem is not with the metaphysical status of temporal goods or hu￾man neighbors, but with human beings who tend to love them in an inordinate or disordered way (Gregory 2008, 39, 221, 256–63; Mathewes 2007, 78, 83; Bowlin 2010, 297). As Augustine says of the “miser” who loves money, the “fault … lies not with the gold, but with the man; and this is true of every created thing: though it is good, it can be loved well or ill; well when the proper order is observed, and ill when that order is disturbed” (1998a, 15.22; cf. 12.8; 1990, 21.3) Thus, Augustine con￾cludes, “a brief and true definition of virtue is ‘rightly ordered love’” (1998a, 15.22).11 If virtue is “rightly ordered love,” it follows that vice is disordered love, a privation or perversion of good￾ness (1998a, 12.3–4, 12.6–9, 14.6–7, 19.13).12 Challeng￾ing the Manichean view of good and evil as compet￾ing forces in the world, Augustine argues that if God 9 “But,” he adds, “if the higher goods are neglected … and those other goods desired so much that they are thought to be the only goods, or loved more than the goods which are believed to be higher, then misery will of necessity follow, and present misery be increased by it” (1998a, 15.4). I address this point below. 10 For discussion, see Gregory (2008, 44–5); cf. Mathewes (2007, 81– 7). 11 For Augustine, virtue and vice reflect the “quality” of a person’s will: “For if the will is perverse, the emotions will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the emotions will not only be blameless, but praise￾worthy” (1998a, 14.6). 12 For an insightful discussion, see Mathewes (2001, 59–103, esp. 64– 5, 75–81). is all-good, then everything that God creates, includ￾ing the material world, must be good, for God could not be responsible for creating anything evil (1998b, 7.12.18–7.16.22; 1998a, 11.22, 12.5–9). Even the nature of the devil is, in one sense, good (1998a, 19.13; 1953, 13.26). For Augustine, then, evil is not an independent force that competes with goodness, but a deficiency or negation of goodness, either a turning away from what is good (privation) or the wrongful use of a good for improper ends (perversion) (1998a, 11.9, 11.22, 12.7–9, 19.13; Elshtain 1998, 76–85;Mathewes 2001, 75–81; Jen￾son 2006, 15–32). The ontological and moral priority of goodness over evil thus furnishes what Gregory de￾scribes as a psychological “dialectic” between love and sin, virtue and vice (2008, 14–5, 20–2, 35–6). Since sin re￾flects the privation or perversion of love, love has onto￾logical,moral, and psychological priority over sin: with￾out a movement of love for some good, there would be no sin.Yet, because love can become disordered,love is always threatened by sin, the human tendency to love a good insufficiently or perversely (Augustine 1998a, 14. 6–7; 1997b, 352A.6; Gregory 2008, 14–5, 20–2, 35–36; Mathewes 2007, 82–5). In this life, love risks becoming deficient or excessive, and virtue remains threatened by temptations toward privation or perversion (1998a, 19.4; 1953, 19.37). As a result, one function of a virtue is to help human beings resist these temptations toward vice (1998a, 19.4). Augustine is especially concerned about the vice of pride, or perverse self-love, which breeds a lust for domination that drives human beings to grasp tem￾poral goods for their own purposes (1998a, 1.Preface, 1.30–31, 12.6, 12.8, 14.13–14, 15.5, 19.12, 19.15). Under the sway of pride, human beings assume they are self￾sufficient and self-sustaining sources of their own be￾ing and goodness, putting themselves in the place of God and seeking to place others under their power (1998a, 1.Preface, 12.1, 14.13–14; 19.12; cf. Elshtain 1998, 16–8, 49–51; Jenson 2006, 25–8). Augustine attributes the Fall to this prideful assumption of self-sufficiency, which denies the ways in which human beings partic￾ipate in God’s being and goodness (1998a, 14.13–14). For Augustine, pride causes human beings to strive af￾ter more for themselves, to grasp at temporal goods and dominate their neighbors for their own private pur￾poses rather than participate in a good that everyone can share in common (see 1998a, 1. Preface, 1.30–31, 12.1, 15.5, 19.12; Jenson 2006, 25–32; Gregory 2008, 42– 4, 329–31, 343–7; Clair 2016, 60–1n48). In light of Augustine’s participationist ontology and concerns about pride and domination, Gregory argues that the function of Augustine’s “order of love”is moral as much as metaphysical: “His philosophical and theo￾logical energies are devoted more to how one is to love in an actively ordering way rather than to an abstract metaphysical speculation on what one is to consider as appropriate objects of love” (2008, 221, cf. 40–2).Math￾ewes agrees: the order of love “is more dispositional than metaphysical: Augustine does not want us not to love the world, but rather to change how we love it, as a whole and in its component parts” (2007, 89–90; see also Williams 1989; Bowlin 2010, 297–9). Rather than 1040 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345