American Political Science Review (2018)112.4,775-791 doi:10.1017/S000305541800028X American Political Science Association 2018 How Clients Select Brokers:Competition and Choice in India's Slums ADAM MICHAEL AUERBACH American University TARIO THACHIL Vanderbilt University onventional models of clientelism often assume poor voters have little or no choice over which lo- cal broker to turn to for help.Yet communities in many clientelistic settings are marked by multiple brokers who compete for a following.Such competition makes client choices,and the preferences guiding such choices,pivotal in fueling broker support.We examine client preferences for a pervasive broker-slum leaders-in the context of urban India.To identify resident preferences for slum leaders. we conducted an ethnographically informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 residents across 110 slums in two Indian cities.Contra standard emphases on shared ethnicity,we find residents place heaviest weight on a broker's capability to make claims on the state.A survey of 629 slum leaders finds client- preferred traits distinguish brokers from residents.In highlighting processes of broker selection,and the client preferences that undergird them,we underscore the centrality of clients in shaping local brokerage environments. INTRODUCTION ers,who vie to expand their personal following-their source of rents,patronage,and political sway. avan's home is set deep within the serpentine A burgeoning literature in comparative politics es- alleyways of Ganpati,one of the largest slums tablishes the pervasiveness of political brokers like in the north Indian city of Jaipur.With exposed Pavan,who facilitate the exchange of electoral sup- brick walls,chipping paint,and a corrugated steel roof port for access to goods,services,and protection in held by stones,the shanty is almost indistinguishable clientelistic settings (Nichter 2008;Stokes et al.2013; from others in the settlement.What differentiates it is Camp 2015;Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015;Szwar- the inscription on Pavan's front door.The sign displays cberg 2015;Larreguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016). his name,his position as adyaksh(president),and a lo- While these studies advance our understanding of tus flower-the symbol of the Bharatiya Janata Party clientelism,they tend to view machine politics-and (BJP).Pavan is an informal slum leader.He helps res- the hierarchies of brokers who enable it-from a top- idents secure government IDs and demand public ser- vices from the state.In a handful of folders,Pavan keeps down,party-centered perspective.Consequently,they predominantly conceptualize poor voters as passive copies of petitions,official correspondence,and notes recipients of election-time handouts,targeted by in- from party meetings,detailing his efforts to improve termediaries operating in their neighborhoods.The the slum.He has built a large following through these agency of poor voters in selecting the local brokers activities and is expected to translate his support into they support and turn to for help has largely been votes for the BJP.Pavan,however,cannot rest on his overlooked. laurels.He must maintain his clients'approval or risk In this paper,we argue that clients play a meaning- losing them to one of Ganpati's many other slum lead- ful role in selecting the brokers that staff electoral ma- chines.The neglect of client agency in broker selection stems from a lack of recognition of the intense competi- Adam Michael Auerbach is an Assistant Professor,School of Inter- tion among brokers for client support in many parts of national Service,American University,4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW,Washington,DC 20016(aauerba@american.edu) the world.Such competition enables clients to choose Tarig Thachil is an Associate Professor,Department of Political which broker to seek help from and follow.Recognition Science,Vanderbilt University,230 Appleton Place,Nashville,TN of such choice compels analyzing the underlying pref- 37203 (tariq.thachil@vanderbilt.edu) erences that inform broker selection by clients,which This study was preregistered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (20150619AA)and received IRB approval from Ameri- have not been systematically theorized or tested. can University (15098)and Yale University (1504015671).The au- We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing thors thank Ameya Balsekar,Leticia Bode,Natalia Bueno,Aditya client preferences for brokers,distinguishing two con- Dasgupta,Agustina Giraudy,Anirudh Krishna,Gareth Nellis,Irfan cerns that jointly structure such support.The first is Nooruddin,David Ohls,Kelly Rader,Mark Schneider,Susan Stokes, efficacy oriented:How likely is a broker to be able Yuhki Tajima,Emmanuel Teitelbaum.Milan Vaishnav,Michael Walton,Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro,Ashutosh Varshney,Erik Wibbels. to successfully demand and secure public goods and Adam Ziegfeld,and seminar participants at American University: services from the state?We argue evaluations of ef- the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi;Duke University;George- ficacy hinge on client perceptions of a broker's capa- town University;Harvard University;MIT;the New School;the Uni bility in making claims,their bureaucratic connected- versity of Pennsylvania:the University of Wisconsin-Madison;and ness to local municipal officials,and their partisan con- Yale University.Ved Prakash Sharma and the MORSELsurvey team provided excellent research assistance.This research was funded by nectedness to the incumbent political party.The second American University,Vanderbilt University,and Yale University Replication files are available on the American Political Science Re. view Dataverse:https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RUQ2KP Interview with Pavan,January 29,2011.Unless noted otherwise,all Received:August 11,2016;revised:April 21,2017;accepted:May 15. settlement and individual names have been changed to protect the 2018.First published online:July 11,2018. confidentiality of our informants. 775
American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 775–791 doi:10.1017/S000305541800028X © American Political Science Association 2018 How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India’s Slums ADAM MICHAEL AUERBACH American University TARIQ THACHIL Vanderbilt University Conventional models of clientelism often assume poor voters have little or no choice over which local broker to turn to for help. Yet communities in many clientelistic settings are marked by multiple brokers who compete for a following. Such competition makes client choices, and the preferences guiding such choices, pivotal in fueling broker support. We examine client preferences for a pervasive broker—slum leaders—in the context of urban India. To identify resident preferences for slum leaders, we conducted an ethnographically informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 residents across 110 slums in two Indian cities. Contra standard emphases on shared ethnicity, we find residents place heaviest weight on a broker’s capability to make claims on the state. A survey of 629 slum leaders finds clientpreferred traits distinguish brokers from residents. In highlighting processes of broker selection, and the client preferences that undergird them, we underscore the centrality of clients in shaping local brokerage environments. INTRODUCTION Pavan’s home is set deep within the serpentine alleyways of Ganpati, one of the largest slums in the north Indian city of Jaipur. With exposed brick walls, chipping paint, and a corrugated steel roof held by stones, the shanty is almost indistinguishable from others in the settlement. What differentiates it is the inscription on Pavan’s front door. The sign displays his name, his position as adyaksh (president), and a lotus flower—the symbol of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Pavan is an informal slum leader. He helps residents secure government IDs and demand public services from the state. In a handful of folders,Pavan keeps copies of petitions, official correspondence, and notes from party meetings, detailing his efforts to improve the slum. He has built a large following through these activities and is expected to translate his support into votes for the BJP. Pavan, however, cannot rest on his laurels. He must maintain his clients’ approval or risk losing them to one of Ganpati’s many other slum leadAdam Michael Auerbach is an Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20016 (aauerba@american.edu) Tariq Thachil is an Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203 (tariq.thachil@vanderbilt.edu) This study was preregistered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (20150619AA) and received IRB approval from American University (15098) and Yale University (1504015671). The authors thank Ameya Balsekar, Leticia Bode, Natalia Bueno, Aditya Dasgupta, Agustina Giraudy, Anirudh Krishna, Gareth Nellis, Irfan Nooruddin, David Ohls, Kelly Rader, Mark Schneider, Susan Stokes, Yuhki Tajima, Emmanuel Teitelbaum, Milan Vaishnav, Michael Walton, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Ashutosh Varshney, Erik Wibbels, Adam Ziegfeld, and seminar participants at American University; the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi; Duke University; Georgetown University; Harvard University;MIT; the New School; the University of Pennsylvania; the University of Wisconsin-Madison; and Yale University.Ved Prakash Sharma and the MORSEL survey team provided excellent research assistance. This research was funded by American University, Vanderbilt University, and Yale University. Replication files are available on the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RUQ2KP. Received: August 11, 2016; revised: April 21, 2017; accepted: May 15, 2018. First published online: July 11, 2018. ers, who vie to expand their personal following—their source of rents, patronage, and political sway.1 A burgeoning literature in comparative politics establishes the pervasiveness of political brokers like Pavan, who facilitate the exchange of electoral support for access to goods, services, and protection in clientelistic settings (Nichter 2008; Stokes et al. 2013; Camp 2015; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Szwarcberg 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). While these studies advance our understanding of clientelism, they tend to view machine politics—and the hierarchies of brokers who enable it—from a topdown, party-centered perspective. Consequently, they predominantly conceptualize poor voters as passive recipients of election-time handouts, targeted by intermediaries operating in their neighborhoods. The agency of poor voters in selecting the local brokers they support and turn to for help has largely been overlooked. In this paper, we argue that clients play a meaningful role in selecting the brokers that staff electoral machines. The neglect of client agency in broker selection stems from a lack of recognition of the intense competition among brokers for client support in many parts of the world. Such competition enables clients to choose which broker to seek help from and follow.Recognition of such choice compels analyzing the underlying preferences that inform broker selection by clients, which have not been systematically theorized or tested. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing client preferences for brokers, distinguishing two concerns that jointly structure such support. The first is efficacy oriented: How likely is a broker to be able to successfully demand and secure public goods and services from the state? We argue evaluations of efficacy hinge on client perceptions of a broker’s capability in making claims, their bureaucratic connectedness to local municipal officials, and their partisan connectedness to the incumbent political party.The second 1 Interview with Pavan, January 29, 2011. Unless noted otherwise, all settlement and individual names have been changed to protect the confidentiality of our informants. 775 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800028X
Adam Michael Auerbach and Tarig Thachil concern is distributive:how likely is a broker to chan- theoretical framework for understanding those pref- nel secured benefits to a client's household?We fo- erences centered on the distributive and efficacy con- cus on shared partisan or ethnic identities between the cerns of clients. broker and client as determinants of these distributive Our results,interpreted through this distinction be- expectations. tween efficacy and distributive concerns,are also the- Empirically,we examine client preferences for bro- oretically significant.First,our findings challenge con- kers through a study of a substantively important ventional wisdom on Asian and African politics that class of intermediaries:informal slum leaders.Poor anticipates distributive expectations based on coeth- urban neighborhoods are iconic settings for theories nicity will overwhelmingly shape political preferences of clientelism,making them especially important are- (Chandra 2004:Posner 2005).While clients do prefer nas to examine (Stokes 1995,Auyero 2000).Slums coethnics,we find they value certain nonethnic indica- are estimated to house approximately 850 million peo- tors of a slum leader's efficacy,particularly their educa- ple worldwide,making their leaders central figures in tion,even more highly.We also find,contra some prior the distributive politics of developing cities.?For res- studies,that the benefits for good performance do not idents,slum leaders are focal points for fighting evic- exclusively accrue to coethnics(Adida et al.2017;Carl- tion and demanding development.For politicians,they son 2015).Indeed,we find capability and connectivity are uniquely positioned to influence residents,encour- can even compensate for a lack of coethnicity.This lat- age turnout,and organize rallies.Through a combined ter finding is especially important,given that our bro- three years of qualitative fieldwork in Indian slums,we ker survey reveals the supply of coethnic brokers in di- found settlement leadership to be contested,multifo- verse slum settlements is more constrained than that of cal,and rapidly constructed to push back against evic- capable brokers. tion and claim public services.In such competitive bro- Second.our findings on education suggest varia- 上二 kerage environments,Indian slum residents wield sig- tion in broker efficacy for their clients should receive nificant agency and choice in selecting whom they ap- greater attention in models of clientelism.Extant stud- proach for problem-solving. ies have focused on conceptualizing broker efficacy To assess the relative salience of efficacy and dis- from the perspective of parties(Camp 2015;Larreguy, tributive concerns in shaping slum resident prefer- Marshall,and Querubin 2016).Variation in client- ences for brokers,we conducted an ethnographically facing efficacy is further obscured by a preoccupation informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 indi- with top-down,episodic forms of distributive politics viduals across 110 slums in two north Indian cities such as vote buying.Such activities mute the impor- Survey respondents were asked to choose between tance of individual skills in advancing client claims,a two hypothetical candidates running for the informal primary role brokers play between elections.Our find- position of slum president (adyaksh).We use ethno- ings support recent calls for paying greater attention to graphic insights to operationalize contextual indicators such everyday lobbying roles,and not simply a brokers' of each candidate's ethnicity and partisanship,their episodic roles as dispensers of election-time handouts claim-making capability,and their connectivity to both (Berenschot 2010:Nichter 2014:Bussell 2018:Kruks- local bureaucrats and the incumbent party.A paral- Wisner 2018). lel experiment asked respondents to choose between Empirically,our study provides the first systematic S5.501g two hypothetical residents as potential neighbors,al- analysis,to our knowledge,of client preferences for lowing us to distinguish political preferences for lead- brokers.We hope to spark a research agenda on the ers from social preferences for neighbors.Finally,we determinants of client preferences for informal lead- subject our experimental findings to further scrutiny ers across varied national and local contexts.We also using data from a survey of 629 slum leaders,whom seek to contribute to our empirical understanding of we surveyed across our 110 settlements.Specifically,we distributive politics within urban slums and migrant assess whether client-preferred traits distinguish actual communities,an understudied electorate that is prolif- slum leaders from ordinary residents erating across much of the developing world(Thachil This paper advances the study of distributive,eth- 2017).3 In this arena,we present evidence from the first nic,and urban politics.Theoretically,we draw atten- large and representative survey of slum leaders ever tion to the neglected phenomenon of broker selection conducted by clients.We build on important work showing that clients often have nontrivial agency (Auyero 2000) ranging from initiating requests for services (Nichter CLIENT PREFERENCES MATTER and Peress 2017)to defecting from nonresponsive ma- Conventional models of clientelism afford little agency chines (Taylor-Robinson 2010).We extend this schol- to poor voters in selecting the brokers they seek help arship by arguing clients can also shape who staffs from and follow.Influential studies assume the pres- the local machine,especially in competitive brokerage ence of brokers without probing the nature of their conditions.When clients can exercise choice in broker support(Stokes 2005;Nichter 2008),or analyze how selection,we argue it is important to analyze their pref- parties select brokers to include within their orga- erences for specific broker attributes.We provide a nizational networks (Camp 2015;Szwarcberg 2015; United Nations (2015,2).Officially,65 million people in India re- See Post(2018)for a larger discussion on urban politics in the de- side in urban slums(2011 Census of India). veloping world. 776
Adam Michael Auerbach and Tariq Thachil concern is distributive: how likely is a broker to channel secured benefits to a client’s household? We focus on shared partisan or ethnic identities between the broker and client as determinants of these distributive expectations. Empirically, we examine client preferences for brokers through a study of a substantively important class of intermediaries: informal slum leaders. Poor urban neighborhoods are iconic settings for theories of clientelism, making them especially important arenas to examine (Stokes 1995, Auyero 2000). Slums are estimated to house approximately 850 million people worldwide, making their leaders central figures in the distributive politics of developing cities.2 For residents, slum leaders are focal points for fighting eviction and demanding development. For politicians, they are uniquely positioned to influence residents, encourage turnout, and organize rallies. Through a combined three years of qualitative fieldwork in Indian slums, we found settlement leadership to be contested, multifocal, and rapidly constructed to push back against eviction and claim public services. In such competitive brokerage environments, Indian slum residents wield significant agency and choice in selecting whom they approach for problem-solving. To assess the relative salience of efficacy and distributive concerns in shaping slum resident preferences for brokers, we conducted an ethnographically informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 individuals across 110 slums in two north Indian cities. Survey respondents were asked to choose between two hypothetical candidates running for the informal position of slum president (adyaksh). We use ethnographic insights to operationalize contextual indicators of each candidate’s ethnicity and partisanship, their claim-making capability, and their connectivity to both local bureaucrats and the incumbent party. A parallel experiment asked respondents to choose between two hypothetical residents as potential neighbors, allowing us to distinguish political preferences for leaders from social preferences for neighbors. Finally, we subject our experimental findings to further scrutiny using data from a survey of 629 slum leaders, whom we surveyed across our 110 settlements. Specifically, we assess whether client-preferred traits distinguish actual slum leaders from ordinary residents. This paper advances the study of distributive, ethnic, and urban politics. Theoretically, we draw attention to the neglected phenomenon of broker selection by clients. We build on important work showing that clients often have nontrivial agency (Auyero 2000), ranging from initiating requests for services (Nichter and Peress 2017) to defecting from nonresponsive machines (Taylor-Robinson 2010). We extend this scholarship by arguing clients can also shape who staffs the local machine, especially in competitive brokerage conditions. When clients can exercise choice in broker selection, we argue it is important to analyze their preferences for specific broker attributes. We provide a 2 United Nations (2015, 2). Officially, 65 million people in India reside in urban slums (2011 Census of India). theoretical framework for understanding those preferences centered on the distributive and efficacy concerns of clients. Our results, interpreted through this distinction between efficacy and distributive concerns, are also theoretically significant. First, our findings challenge conventional wisdom on Asian and African politics that anticipates distributive expectations based on coethnicity will overwhelmingly shape political preferences (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). While clients do prefer coethnics, we find they value certain nonethnic indicators of a slum leader’s efficacy, particularly their education, even more highly. We also find, contra some prior studies, that the benefits for good performance do not exclusively accrue to coethnics (Adida et al. 2017; Carlson 2015). Indeed, we find capability and connectivity can even compensate for a lack of coethnicity. This latter finding is especially important, given that our broker survey reveals the supply of coethnic brokers in diverse slum settlements is more constrained than that of capable brokers. Second, our findings on education suggest variation in broker efficacy for their clients should receive greater attention in models of clientelism. Extant studies have focused on conceptualizing broker efficacy from the perspective of parties (Camp 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). Variation in clientfacing efficacy is further obscured by a preoccupation with top-down, episodic forms of distributive politics such as vote buying. Such activities mute the importance of individual skills in advancing client claims, a primary role brokers play between elections. Our findings support recent calls for paying greater attention to such everyday lobbying roles, and not simply a brokers’ episodic roles as dispensers of election-time handouts (Berenschot 2010; Nichter 2014; Bussell 2018; KruksWisner 2018). Empirically, our study provides the first systematic analysis, to our knowledge, of client preferences for brokers. We hope to spark a research agenda on the determinants of client preferences for informal leaders across varied national and local contexts. We also seek to contribute to our empirical understanding of distributive politics within urban slums and migrant communities, an understudied electorate that is proliferating across much of the developing world (Thachil 2017).3 In this arena, we present evidence from the first large and representative survey of slum leaders ever conducted. CLIENT PREFERENCES MATTER Conventional models of clientelism afford little agency to poor voters in selecting the brokers they seek help from and follow. Influential studies assume the presence of brokers without probing the nature of their support (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008), or analyze how parties select brokers to include within their organizational networks (Camp 2015; Szwarcberg 2015; 3 See Post (2018) for a larger discussion on urban politics in the developing world. 776 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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How Clients Select Brokers Larreguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016).In sharp In neglecting this reality of client choice in select- contrast,there have been no efforts to systemati- ing brokers,party-centric studies have overlooked the cally theorize and examine client preferences for bro- client preferences empowered by such choice.At most, kers.Auyero's(2000,153)assertion,made nearly two these studies anticipate clients will prefer a broker decades ago,that studies of clientelism rarely take the with connections to party organizations.Such connec- agency of clients seriously still rings true today. tions unlock the top-down flow of party handouts dur This neglect of client preferences stems from in- ing elections that are seen to motivate resident sup- sufficient recognition of competition among brokers port.Client approval of a broker should therefore for clients,which enables a degree of choice in who hinge upon a party's prior approval,especially from clients can turn to for help(Scott 1977).Many influen- the resource-rich incumbent at the center of most top- tial studies of clientelism model interactions between down models. voters and a single dominant machine (Stokes 2005; By contrast,in competitive brokerage environments, Nichter 2008:Stokes et al.2013:Gans-Morse.Maz- client approval does not simply flow axiomatically from zuca,and Nichter 2014).In such settings,client choice prior party approval.Slum leaders,for example,must can only occur via intra-party competition among bro- attract a following through entrepreneurial sweat,by kers,which is rarely examined.Other frameworks advancing everyday resident demands through local specify a single broker (Gingerich and Medina 2013: lobbying and competing with others in the settlement Rueda 2015)or multiple brokers who each hold spa- who seek to engage in netagiri,or politicking.Indeed. tially distinct monopolies over clients (Gans-Morse, party leaders frequently consider a slum leader's local Mazzuca,and Nichter 2014;Camp 2015).Across all of popularity with clients in their own organizational deci- these models,clients are bereft of options,rendering sions.Party leaders in our study cities noted they could their preferences-and efforts to investigate them- not manufacture client support for any individual sim- redundant. ply by granting them a position within their local or- However,assumptions of single-party or single ganization.Instead they noted the need for brokers to 4号元 broker dominance do not align with the political re- be from the slum itself,and the importance of resident alities of many countries and communities.An ex- approval in shaping their own evaluations: pert survey (Kitschelt 2011)documents competitive "bilateral or multilateral"clientelistic party systems Party Elite 1:See,there would always be some leadership as more common than "unilateral clientelism.4 Fur- in the bastis;some people who were active and working ther,even within "unilateral machines,"ethnographic for people.Our party needed someone like this in the set- studies find evidence of microlevel competition among tlement.It was through such people that we strengthened brokers (Auyero 2000;Zarazaga 2014).In our study our position in the bastis...These are the people we would setting,we found slum dwellers reside in highly com- select for a party position. petitive brokerage environments.Our survey respon- 是 dents provided nearly 1,000 slum leader names,or Party Elite 2:Someone from the community emerges as a roughly 9 per settlement,and most slums had leaders strong leader,has a public following,and has strong influ- with formal affiliations to each of the city's major po- ence.In that case,we must approach him and offer him a litical parties. position. Competition grants clients a degree of choice in Author:You mean when there is someone the local peo- choosing whom they seek assistance from.In inter- ple already support,you then approach him and bring him views,Indian slum residents repeatedly noted they ac- into the party? tively selected their leaders: Party Elite 2:Yes,somehow we have to make him part of the party. Resident 1:Slum leaders help us because the residents of the basti [slum have chosen them as their leader. Party Elite 3:We [the party]can't make someone a neta [leader]just by giving him neta clothes and making him stand on the road.In that case he would just be a statue. Resident 2:We chose them so that they can help us when They must first have the support of residents to be a there is a problem. leader.10 Evidence from our survey of 629 slum leaders(de- Resident 3:Leaders help poor people who have no one in the government to go to...We have chosen them for a tailed below)provides further corroboration of the im- reason. portance of client support in solidifying a broker's ap- peal to political parties.We asked slum leaders what the biggest reason was for securing a position (pad) within a party.56.8%said popularity within the slum 4"Clientelistic effort proceeds within a bilateral or multilateral competitive framework"in contexts across Europe (Italy,Austria. the next most frequent item accounted for 10.11%of L Bulgaria,Ukraine),Asia (Indonesia,India,and Taiwan),Africa (Ghana and Nigeria),and even Latin America (Brazil and Colom- bia)(Kitschelt 2011,9) Interview with Congress ex-MLA,Bhopal,January 25,2017 Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 7 August 2017 Interview with BJP municipal councilor,Jaipur,February 13,2017 6 Interview with Naya Colony Resident 3,August 2017 10 Interview with Congress municipal councilor,Bhopal,January 23. Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 9,August 2017 2017 777
How Clients Select Brokers Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). In sharp contrast, there have been no efforts to systematically theorize and examine client preferences for brokers. Auyero’s (2000, 153) assertion, made nearly two decades ago, that studies of clientelism rarely take the agency of clients seriously still rings true today. This neglect of client preferences stems from insufficient recognition of competition among brokers for clients, which enables a degree of choice in who clients can turn to for help (Scott 1977). Many influential studies of clientelism model interactions between voters and a single dominant machine (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; Stokes et al. 2013; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014). In such settings, client choice can only occur via intra-party competition among brokers, which is rarely examined. Other frameworks specify a single broker (Gingerich and Medina 2013; Rueda 2015) or multiple brokers who each hold spatially distinct monopolies over clients (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014; Camp 2015). Across all of these models, clients are bereft of options, rendering their preferences—and efforts to investigate them— redundant. However, assumptions of single-party or singlebroker dominance do not align with the political realities of many countries and communities. An expert survey (Kitschelt 2011) documents competitive “bilateral or multilateral” clientelistic party systems as more common than “unilateral clientelism.”4 Further, even within “unilateral machines,” ethnographic studies find evidence of microlevel competition among brokers (Auyero 2000; Zarazaga 2014). In our study setting, we found slum dwellers reside in highly competitive brokerage environments. Our survey respondents provided nearly 1,000 slum leader names, or roughly 9 per settlement, and most slums had leaders with formal affiliations to each of the city’s major political parties. Competition grants clients a degree of choice in choosing whom they seek assistance from. In interviews, Indian slum residents repeatedly noted they actively selected their leaders: Resident 1: Slum leaders help us because the residents of the basti [slum] have chosen them as their leader.5 * Resident 2: We chose them so that they can help us when there is a problem.6 * Resident 3: Leaders help poor people who have no one in the government to go to…We have chosen them for a reason.7 4 “Clientelistic effort proceeds within a bilateral or multilateral competitive framework” in contexts across Europe (Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Ukraine), Asia (Indonesia, India, and Taiwan), Africa (Ghana and Nigeria), and even Latin America (Brazil and Colombia) (Kitschelt 2011, 9). 5 Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 7, August 2017. 6 Interview with Naya Colony Resident 3, August 2017. 7 Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 9, August 2017. In neglecting this reality of client choice in selecting brokers, party-centric studies have overlooked the client preferences empowered by such choice. At most, these studies anticipate clients will prefer a broker with connections to party organizations. Such connections unlock the top-down flow of party handouts during elections that are seen to motivate resident support. Client approval of a broker should therefore hinge upon a party’s prior approval, especially from the resource-rich incumbent at the center of most topdown models. By contrast, in competitive brokerage environments, client approval does not simply flow axiomatically from prior party approval. Slum leaders, for example, must attract a following through entrepreneurial sweat, by advancing everyday resident demands through local lobbying and competing with others in the settlement who seek to engage in netagiri, or politicking. Indeed, party leaders frequently consider a slum leader’s local popularity with clients in their own organizational decisions. Party leaders in our study cities noted they could not manufacture client support for any individual simply by granting them a position within their local organization. Instead they noted the need for brokers to be from the slum itself, and the importance of resident approval in shaping their own evaluations: Party Elite 1: See, there would always be some leadership in the bastis; some people who were active and working for people. Our party needed someone like this in the settlement. It was through such people that we strengthened our position in the bastis...These are the people we would select for a party position.8 * Party Elite 2: Someone from the community emerges as a strong leader, has a public following, and has strong influence. In that case, we must approach him and offer him a position. Author: You mean when there is someone the local people already support, you then approach him and bring him into the party? Party Elite 2: Yes, somehow we have to make him part of the party.9 * Party Elite 3: We [the party] can’t make someone a neta [leader] just by giving him neta clothes and making him stand on the road. In that case he would just be a statue. They must first have the support of residents to be a leader.10 Evidence from our survey of 629 slum leaders (detailed below) provides further corroboration of the importance of client support in solidifying a broker’s appeal to political parties. We asked slum leaders what the biggest reason was for securing a position (pad) within a party. 56.8% said popularity within the slum (the next most frequent item accounted for 10.11% of 8 Interview with Congress ex-MLA, Bhopal, January 25, 2017. 9 Interview with BJP municipal councilor, Jaipur, February 13, 2017. 10 Interview with Congress municipal councilor, Bhopal, January 23, 2017. 777 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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Adam Michael Auerbach and Tarig Thachil responses).Only 9.56%said top-down,preexisting ties ties hold in their top-down evaluations of brokers.The to party leaders. first is a distribution-based concern:How likely am I These observations also align with an earlier wave (the client)to be included within a broker's distribu- of scholarship on urban politics in Latin America. tive network?The second is an efficacy-based concern: which described slums as competitive brokerage en- How likely is this broker to acquire material benefits vironments in which leaders were local residents to distribute?While these concerns can be complemen- who had to work to gain client approval(Ray 1969; tary,each highlights distinct attributes clients will value Cornelius 1975:Gay 1994).These studies,however. in their local broker stop short of theorizing and testing the implications of competitive brokerage for processes of client selec- tion and the nature of client preferences.Our argument Distributive Concerns also aligns with recent studies underscoring that clients Studies of how parties evaluate brokers have empha- have nontrivial agency,ranging from initiating requests sized the importance of a broker's efficiency in convert- for services(Nichter and Peress 2017)to defecting from ing party resources into votes (Stokes et al.2013;Lar- machines that do not reward them (Taylor-Robinson reguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016).Given it is neither 2010)and other mechanisms of constrained account- feasible nor efficient for parties to provide benefits to ability (Hilgers 2012).However,these studies have fo- all voters,brokers can help ensure benefits reach those cused on how such agency affects the downward re- the party wishes to cultivate as clients.Accordingly,par- sponsiveness of party machines toward clients.None ties are said to prefer brokers with pre-poll information have theoretically linked competition between brokers about client partisan preferences(Nichter 2008;Stokes with client agency in selecting local leaders,or empir- et al.2013),post-poll information about electoral com- ically examined the preferences guiding such bottom- pliance(Stokes 2005),and probity in passing on party up selection decisions. resources to voters (Rueda 2015;Larreguy,Marshall, In sum,brokers in competitive environments must and Querubin 2016). often vie for the client support that underpins their lo- Switching to a client's perspective,excludable target- cal authority.In generating choice,competition affords ing raises a distributive concern:which broker's net- clients an opportunity to select brokers they most pre- work am I most likely to be included within?Under fer,rather than accept a broker anointed by political competitive conditions,such expectations can shape elites.How,then,is client choice exercised? the preferences clients draw on to choose which bro- We found two primary alternatives within our study ker to support.What indicators might clients draw on setting.The first are discrete moments of selection. in formulating these distributive expectations? principally informal elections and community meet- Past literature suggests commitment problems in ings.Seventy-seven percent of the 1,925 respondents to quid pro quo protocols are ameliorated when bro- a 2012 author survey of slum residents across our two kers and voters are embedded within the same so- study cities(Auerbach 2016)acknowledged informal cial or organizational network.Consequently,schol- leadership in their settlement.Over half of this sub- ars anticipate shared partisan affiliations as central to set reported selecting their leaders through informal structuring clientelist transactions.Risk-averse parties elections or community meetings.This figure matches (Cox and McCubbins 1986)and brokers(Dunning and S5.501g our slum leader survey,where 38%of respondents Nilekani 2013;Stokes et al.2013)are argued to fa- claimed they were selected through informal elections vor copartisan clients most likely to reciprocate at or community meetings.Research on slums in India the polls.From the client's perspective,citizens who and Latin America has described similar selection pro- share partisan affiliations with their broker will there- cesses (Ray 1969;Gay 1994;Burgwal 1995;Jha,Rao, fore hold higher expectations of getting benefits than and Woolcock 2007).The second pathway of broker those who do not (Calvo and Murillo 2013).Thus,we selection is through iterative,everyday choices made expect residents to prefer slum leaders of the same par- by clients in whom to seek help from.These individ- tisan affiliation.11 ual choices aggregate into a distribution of support for Studies of clientelism in South Asia and Africa sim- slum leaders. ilarly emphasize the utility of shared ethnic networks. Irrespective of whether brokers are selected through The stickiness and visibility of ethnic markers be- informal elections,community meetings,or decentral- stow an informational advantage over nonethnic cat- ized day-to-day resident decisions,their success in com egories such as class.Such advantages are argued to petitive settings hinges on client preferences.We now solve commitment problems within clientelist pacts turn to providing a theoretical framework for analyzing (Chandra 2004:Posner 2005:Carlson 2015).Addition- such preferences. ally.coethnics are often embedded within dense so- cial networks,enabling them to build trust(Fershtman and Gneezy 2001).These and related arguments have WHICH BROKERS WILL THE URBAN POOR primarily been made with regard to shared ethnicity PREFER? between voters and political candidates (Chauchard 2016).However,their logic suggests slum residents will We pinpoint two key concerns that shape client pref- erences for brokers.Each provides a client-centered corollary to previously articulated concerns that par- 11 86.49%of our 629 surveyed slum leaders had partisan affiliations. 778
Adam Michael Auerbach and Tariq Thachil responses). Only 9.56% said top-down, preexisting ties to party leaders. These observations also align with an earlier wave of scholarship on urban politics in Latin America, which described slums as competitive brokerage environments in which leaders were local residents who had to work to gain client approval (Ray 1969; Cornelius 1975; Gay 1994). These studies, however, stop short of theorizing and testing the implications of competitive brokerage for processes of client selection and the nature of client preferences.Our argument also aligns with recent studies underscoring that clients have nontrivial agency, ranging from initiating requests for services (Nichter and Peress 2017) to defecting from machines that do not reward them (Taylor-Robinson 2010) and other mechanisms of constrained accountability (Hilgers 2012). However, these studies have focused on how such agency affects the downward responsiveness of party machines toward clients. None have theoretically linked competition between brokers with client agency in selecting local leaders, or empirically examined the preferences guiding such bottomup selection decisions. In sum, brokers in competitive environments must often vie for the client support that underpins their local authority. In generating choice, competition affords clients an opportunity to select brokers they most prefer, rather than accept a broker anointed by political elites. How, then, is client choice exercised? We found two primary alternatives within our study setting. The first are discrete moments of selection, principally informal elections and community meetings. Seventy-seven percent of the 1,925 respondents to a 2012 author survey of slum residents across our two study cities (Auerbach 2016) acknowledged informal leadership in their settlement. Over half of this subset reported selecting their leaders through informal elections or community meetings. This figure matches our slum leader survey, where 38% of respondents claimed they were selected through informal elections or community meetings. Research on slums in India and Latin America has described similar selection processes (Ray 1969; Gay 1994; Burgwal 1995; Jha, Rao, and Woolcock 2007). The second pathway of broker selection is through iterative, everyday choices made by clients in whom to seek help from. These individual choices aggregate into a distribution of support for slum leaders. Irrespective of whether brokers are selected through informal elections, community meetings, or decentralized day-to-day resident decisions, their success in competitive settings hinges on client preferences. We now turn to providing a theoretical framework for analyzing such preferences. WHICH BROKERS WILL THE URBAN POOR PREFER? We pinpoint two key concerns that shape client preferences for brokers. Each provides a client-centered corollary to previously articulated concerns that parties hold in their top-down evaluations of brokers. The first is a distribution-based concern: How likely am I (the client) to be included within a broker’s distributive network? The second is an efficacy-based concern: How likely is this broker to acquire material benefits to distribute? While these concerns can be complementary, each highlights distinct attributes clients will value in their local broker. Distributive Concerns Studies of how parties evaluate brokers have emphasized the importance of a broker’s efficiency in converting party resources into votes (Stokes et al. 2013; Larreguy,Marshall, and Querubin 2016).Given it is neither feasible nor efficient for parties to provide benefits to all voters, brokers can help ensure benefits reach those the party wishes to cultivate as clients.Accordingly, parties are said to prefer brokers with pre-poll information about client partisan preferences (Nichter 2008; Stokes et al. 2013), post-poll information about electoral compliance (Stokes 2005), and probity in passing on party resources to voters (Rueda 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). Switching to a client’s perspective, excludable targeting raises a distributive concern: which broker’s network am I most likely to be included within? Under competitive conditions, such expectations can shape the preferences clients draw on to choose which broker to support. What indicators might clients draw on in formulating these distributive expectations? Past literature suggests commitment problems in quid pro quo protocols are ameliorated when brokers and voters are embedded within the same social or organizational network. Consequently, scholars anticipate shared partisan affiliations as central to structuring clientelist transactions. Risk-averse parties (Cox and McCubbins 1986) and brokers (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Stokes et al. 2013) are argued to favor copartisan clients most likely to reciprocate at the polls. From the client’s perspective, citizens who share partisan affiliations with their broker will therefore hold higher expectations of getting benefits than those who do not (Calvo and Murillo 2013). Thus, we expect residents to prefer slum leaders of the same partisan affiliation.11 Studies of clientelism in South Asia and Africa similarly emphasize the utility of shared ethnic networks. The stickiness and visibility of ethnic markers bestow an informational advantage over nonethnic categories such as class. Such advantages are argued to solve commitment problems within clientelist pacts (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Carlson 2015). Additionally, coethnics are often embedded within dense social networks, enabling them to build trust (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001). These and related arguments have primarily been made with regard to shared ethnicity between voters and political candidates (Chauchard 2016). However, their logic suggests slum residents will 11 86.49% of our 629 surveyed slum leaders had partisan affiliations. 778 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800028X
How Clients Select Brokers also prefer coethnic local leaders,whom they expect to to secure resources(Zarazaga 2014;Camp 2015;Szwar- favor them in the distribution of resources. cberg 2015).But even this recognition has not yielded insights into how clients assess broker efficacy and the degree to which such evaluations guide broker selec- Efficacy Concerns tion by clients Scholars theorizing how parties evaluate brokers also Instead,prior scholarship has primarily assumed discuss the importance of a broker's efficacy,typically clients can rely on a broker's past performance in de- conceived in terms of their ability to mobilize vot- termining their future efficacy (Stokes et al.2013). ers during elections and rallies(Szwarcberg 2015),and Established slum leaders can and do rely on prior suc- monitor their compliance at the ballot box (Stokes cesses to recruit supporters.However,if clients exclu- et al.2013).This focus on a broker's electoral efficacy sively privilege past accomplishments,aspiring brokers is enabled by a preoccupation with vote buying,a top- with no record stand little chance of poaching sup- down strategy in which parties deliver handouts to bro- port from even minimally competent existing leaders. kers.and brokers distribute them to clients This model predicts a convergence to a low-turnover This"handout model"of clientelism paints brokers brokerage environment.We observe the opposite in as election-time distributive nodes with little individ our field sites,where new leaders constantly surface ual lobbying power (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.2012; to compete against-and often displace-existing lead- Larreguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016).The bene- ers.Our survey of slum leaders found evidence of new fits involved-petty cash,sacks of grain,liquor-are cohorts of leaders and consistent competition among modest.Further,their allocation is often managed by leaders.13 campaign operatives,who distribute them to brokers This data aligns with the phenomenon of a bulging as either a fixed allotment or variable handouts deter- class of ambitious yet unemployed Indian youth who mined by client demographics(Gans-Morse,Mazzuca, often turn to politics to generate income and connec- and Nichter 2014).A broker's individual skill thus plays tions (Jeffrey 2010).These rising leaders can break into 4号元 little role in determining the benefits they have to dis the current structure of leadership if they can signal the tribute.Recent models of vote-buying even explicitly potential to get things done better than current alterna- assume all brokers to be equally capable,and explain tives.Take Hari Singh,who rose to power by snatching variation in their efficacy (again conceptualized from supporters from a preexisting slum leader: the party's perspective)as dependent on the extent to which party superiors can monitor and punish them [There is]one leader who people stopped following after I (Larreguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016,165). came to the slum because I knew more than him...I know A client-centered perspective widens the aperture of everything about the system,whether you go to the Mu- observation to broker activities between the votes.This nicipal Corporation,Electricity Board,Development Au- focus reveals the importance of their individual capa- thority,or Collectorate.I know how to solve problems re- 是 lated to these departments.Hence,that leader became less bilities in everyday acts of problem-solving in response popular.14 to resident demands.These demands reverse the flow of activity upward,revealing the importance of a bro- The fluid and competitive nature of slum leadership ker's efficacy in bringing requests to the notice of polit- thus affords residents ongoing choices in which slum ical elites.Such skill is central to securing resources for leader they view as most efficacious.15 clients,and thereby popularity among them.Popularity What characteristics do residents use to form com- is the basis upon which brokers attract party patronage, parisons of the relative efficacy of the array of promotions within party organizations,and day-to-day leaders-both established and aspiring-who jostle for rents from residents seeking help(Auerbach 2016).12 power in their localities?We argue that clients eval- We are hardly the first to acknowledge the signifi- uate efficacy potential via attributes that indicate a cance of routine problem-solving in the repertoire of broker's connectivity to actors controlling government broker activities (Auyero 2000;Krishna 2002),as well benefits,and capability for effectively making claims. as the importance of broker efficacy in generating a fol- lowing(Ray 1969;Cornelius 1975).Yet most prior stud- ies simply describe such activities as essential,without 13 Respondents had varying tenure lengths as slum leaders,attest- theorizing the implications of variable client-facing ef- ing to the openness of the brokerage environment.The mean tenure length was 20 years,with a standard deviation of just over 10 years. ficacy.More recent studies of Argentine brokers note We asked respondents how many slum leaders were in operation 四 that broker popularity is a function of variable abilities when they began slum leadership.Responses indicated a stably com- petitive environment,with an average of 10.18 competitors for lead- ers who began more than 25 years ago,and 9.5 competitors for those 12 In terms of election-time rents,one slum leader told us that influ- o began within the past five ye Interview with Hari Singh.June 7 2016. ential brokers in his settlement received roughly Rs.20,000($300) 15 This assertion also holds for those settlements that emerge from parties in a recent municipal election-four months of income through large-scale,preplanned land invasions in which informa for many of their neighbors(interview with Gurjar,Jaipur,June leadership is initially present-a type of settlement formation most 28,2011).Another benefit,promotions within party organizations, frequently documented in Latin America (Collier 1976;Gilbert comes with increased access to patronage and government contacts 1998).Scholars describe these settlements as competitive brokerage 士 Our surveyed slum leaders did receive such promotions:278 of 629 environments,where new challengers emerge to compete with estab- of them had held multiple formal party positions,which tended to lished slum leaders,affording residents ongoing choice over leader follow an upward trajectory. selection (Ray 1969:Gay 1994;Burgwal 1995). 779
How Clients Select Brokers also prefer coethnic local leaders, whom they expect to favor them in the distribution of resources. Efficacy Concerns Scholars theorizing how parties evaluate brokers also discuss the importance of a broker’s efficacy, typically conceived in terms of their ability to mobilize voters during elections and rallies (Szwarcberg 2015), and monitor their compliance at the ballot box (Stokes et al. 2013). This focus on a broker’s electoral efficacy is enabled by a preoccupation with vote buying, a topdown strategy in which parties deliver handouts to brokers, and brokers distribute them to clients. This “handout model” of clientelism paints brokers as election-time distributive nodes with little individual lobbying power (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). The benefits involved—petty cash, sacks of grain, liquor—are modest. Further, their allocation is often managed by campaign operatives, who distribute them to brokers as either a fixed allotment or variable handouts determined by client demographics (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014).A broker’s individual skill thus plays little role in determining the benefits they have to distribute. Recent models of vote-buying even explicitly assume all brokers to be equally capable, and explain variation in their efficacy (again conceptualized from the party’s perspective) as dependent on the extent to which party superiors can monitor and punish them (Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016, 165). A client-centered perspective widens the aperture of observation to broker activities between the votes. This focus reveals the importance of their individual capabilities in everyday acts of problem-solving in response to resident demands. These demands reverse the flow of activity upward, revealing the importance of a broker’s efficacy in bringing requests to the notice of political elites. Such skill is central to securing resources for clients, and thereby popularity among them. Popularity is the basis upon which brokers attract party patronage, promotions within party organizations, and day-to-day rents from residents seeking help (Auerbach 2016).12 We are hardly the first to acknowledge the significance of routine problem-solving in the repertoire of broker activities (Auyero 2000; Krishna 2002), as well as the importance of broker efficacy in generating a following (Ray 1969; Cornelius 1975).Yet most prior studies simply describe such activities as essential, without theorizing the implications of variable client-facing efficacy. More recent studies of Argentine brokers note that broker popularity is a function of variable abilities 12 In terms of election-time rents, one slum leader told us that influential brokers in his settlement received roughly Rs. 20,000 ($300) from parties in a recent municipal election—four months of income for many of their neighbors (interview with Gurjar, Jaipur, June 28, 2011). Another benefit, promotions within party organizations, comes with increased access to patronage and government contacts. Our surveyed slum leaders did receive such promotions: 278 of 629 of them had held multiple formal party positions, which tended to follow an upward trajectory. to secure resources (Zarazaga 2014; Camp 2015; Szwarcberg 2015). But even this recognition has not yielded insights into how clients assess broker efficacy and the degree to which such evaluations guide broker selection by clients. Instead, prior scholarship has primarily assumed clients can rely on a broker’s past performance in determining their future efficacy (Stokes et al. 2013). Established slum leaders can and do rely on prior successes to recruit supporters. However, if clients exclusively privilege past accomplishments, aspiring brokers with no record stand little chance of poaching support from even minimally competent existing leaders. This model predicts a convergence to a low-turnover brokerage environment. We observe the opposite in our field sites, where new leaders constantly surface to compete against—and often displace—existing leaders. Our survey of slum leaders found evidence of new cohorts of leaders and consistent competition among leaders.13 This data aligns with the phenomenon of a bulging class of ambitious yet unemployed Indian youth who often turn to politics to generate income and connections (Jeffrey 2010). These rising leaders can break into the current structure of leadership if they can signal the potential to get things done better than current alternatives. Take Hari Singh, who rose to power by snatching supporters from a preexisting slum leader: [There is] one leader who people stopped following after I came to the slum because I knew more than him…I know everything about the system, whether you go to the Municipal Corporation, Electricity Board, Development Authority, or Collectorate. I know how to solve problems related to these departments. Hence, that leader became less popular.14 The fluid and competitive nature of slum leadership thus affords residents ongoing choices in which slum leader they view as most efficacious.15 What characteristics do residents use to form comparisons of the relative efficacy of the array of leaders—both established and aspiring—who jostle for power in their localities? We argue that clients evaluate efficacy potential via attributes that indicate a broker’s connectivity to actors controlling government benefits, and capability for effectively making claims. 13 Respondents had varying tenure lengths as slum leaders, attesting to the openness of the brokerage environment. The mean tenure length was 20 years, with a standard deviation of just over 10 years. We asked respondents how many slum leaders were in operation when they began slum leadership. Responses indicated a stably competitive environment, with an average of 10.18 competitors for leaders who began more than 25 years ago, and 9.5 competitors for those who began within the past five years. 14 Interview with Hari Singh, June 7, 2016. 15 This assertion also holds for those settlements that emerge through large-scale, preplanned land invasions in which informal leadership is initially present—a type of settlement formation most frequently documented in Latin America (Collier 1976; Gilbert 1998). Scholars describe these settlements as competitive brokerage environments, where new challengers emerge to compete with established slum leaders, affording residents ongoing choice over leader selection (Ray 1969; Gay 1994; Burgwal 1995). 779 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800028X