Origins of the EU 57 States demanded the rapid revival of a West German state and economy as bulwark and ally against the Soviets.Pressure increased with the Marshall Plan in June 1947, offering the French badly needed economic aid on the condition that they coordinate their recovery with Germany and other countries.33 These huge changes opened what Gerald Berk calls an "epochal moment"in French policymaking.34 Rapid change can destabilize how actors understand their interests.Innovative actors may assemble new ideational "frames"out of the "tool kit"of ideas present in their culture.35 Such innovations do not necessarily respond functionally to the new situation:adaptation of older framing ideas,or other new ideas,may suggest competing analyses.The result is a "battle of ideas"in which groups debate several viable strategies.This is what developed in France in the late 1940s.Major change in objective conditions brought new ideas to the fore but did not dictate their success.The rise of the super powers,the destruction of national economies,and domestic delegitimation of the nationalist far Right turned"Euro- peanist"projects-utopian musings before the war-into active options.36 But older ideas survived these objective shifts as well.The battle over postwar Europe remained to be fought. Some French elites held to traditional strategies.They retained a familiar realist analysis,with legitimacy and security located in the independent nation-state.If the attempt to block Germany's recovery had been frustrated,traditional options remained.Some direct controls on Germany could still be salvaged;military and economic alliances with other powers could still be sought;if necessary,bilateral deals could even be struck with the Germans themselves.All would uphold the balance of European power,protecting French interests better than uncontrollable international organizations.This was also more worthy of "great power"France, whose independence was sacrosanct,and whose peers were the United States,the United Kingdom,and the USSR-not the other Europeans. Another group favored "confederal"strategies.They based their analysis on liberal thinking:The nation-state remained the source of legitimacy and security, but like-minded states should cooperate closely,given their interdependence. France's natural partner was its liberal counterpart,Britain;together they would preside over pragmatic cooperation in broad European forums,while supervising the illiberal,atavistic Germans.Only combined Franco-British leadership would prevent the Germans from dominating Europe-ruling out narrower Franco-German projects.Broad but weak organizations could provide a platform for a European "third way"between the super powers,and for economic cooperation,without requiring direct losses of French sovereignty. 33.See Milward 1984:and Lundestad 1998. 34.Berk 1994.Similar notions are Ann Swidler's"unsettled periods,"Neil Fligstein's"institution- building moments,"Robert Unger's"context making"eras,and Robert Dahl's"historic commitments." See Swidler 1986:Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996:Unger 1987;Ackerman 1991;and Dahl 1986. 35.See Schon and Rein 1994:Snow et al.1986:and Kingdon 1984. 36.On interwar Europeanism,see Brugmans 1965
States demanded the rapid revival of a West German state and economy as bulwark and ally against the Soviets. Pressure increased with the Marshall Plan in June 1947, offering the French badly needed economic aid on the condition that they coordinate their recovery with Germany and other countries.33 These huge changes opened what Gerald Berk calls an “epochal moment” in French policymaking.34 Rapid change can destabilize how actors understand their interests. Innovative actors may assemble new ideational “frames” out of the “tool kit” of ideas present in their culture.35 Such innovations do not necessarily respond functionally to the new situation; adaptation of older framing ideas, or other new ideas, may suggest competing analyses. The result is a “battle of ideas” in which groups debate several viable strategies. This is what developed in France in the late 1940s. Major change in objective conditions brought new ideas to the fore but did not dictate their success. The rise of the super powers, the destruction of national economies, and domestic delegitimation of the nationalist far Right turned “Europeanist” projects—utopian musings before the war—into active options.36 But older ideas survived these objective shifts as well. The battle over postwar Europe remained to be fought. Some French elites held to traditional strategies. They retained a familiar realist analysis, with legitimacy and security located in the independent nation-state. If the attempt to block Germany’s recovery had been frustrated, traditional options remained. Some direct controls on Germany could still be salvaged; military and economic alliances with other powers could still be sought; if necessary, bilateral deals could even be struck with the Germans themselves. All would uphold the balance of European power, protecting French interests better than uncontrollable international organizations. This was also more worthy of “great power” France, whose independence was sacrosanct, and whose peers were the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR—not the other Europeans. Another group favored “confederal” strategies. They based their analysis on liberal thinking: The nation-state remained the source of legitimacy and security, but like-minded states should cooperate closely, given their interdependence. France’s natural partner was its liberal counterpart, Britain; together they would preside over pragmatic cooperation in broad European forums, while supervising the illiberal, atavistic Germans. Only combined Franco-British leadership would prevent the Germans from dominating Europe—ruling out narrower Franco-German projects. Broad but weak organizations could provide a platform for a European “third way” between the super powers, and for economic cooperation, without requiring direct losses of French sovereignty. 33. See Milward 1984; and Lundestad 1998. 34. Berk 1994. Similar notions are Ann Swidler’s “unsettled periods,” Neil Fligstein’s “institutionbuilding moments,” Robert Unger’s “context making” eras, and Robert Dahl’s “historic commitments.” See Swidler 1986; Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Unger 1987; Ackerman 1991; and Dahl 1986. 35. See Scho¨n and Rein 1994; Snow et al. 1986; and Kingdon 1984. 36. On interwar Europeanism, see Brugmans 1965. Origins of the EU 57
58 International Organization A third group called for a more radical departure from standard diplomacy,in "community"strategies.In their functionalist analysis-where legitimate policies were those that best provided welfare-two world wars and the rise of the super powers showed that Europe needed more than the nation-state.Only a new sort of "supranational"institution,partly independent of governments,could lead fractious Europe to peace and prosperity.In particular,weak intergovernmental accords could not hold the Germans down.In order to make such control acceptable to the Germans,however,France would have to submit to it as well.This might entail a break with the British,who abhorred supranationality.Thus a supranational solution meant forsaking the security of Franco-British balancing against Germany.But the result could be real“integration,”leading to a“United States of Europe'”as powerful and rich as the United States of America. If these models divided most clearly on the "German problem,"their key difference was not pro-or anti-Germanism.Some traditionalists soon proved quite willing to deal bilaterally with Germany.Others arrived at confederal or community strategies out of visceral fear of Germany unfettered.Instead,the fundamental distinctions concerned the "master frame"linking France itself and its European environment.In the slightly different vocabulary of John Searle,they suggested different"constitutive rules"about France as a player in a European game. 37 Each packaged a set of normative and causal claims that defined France's position vis-a-vis its neighbors. Crucially,these different views of Europe had no direct connection to the Right-Left cleavage that dominated French politics.Each model's constitutive rules were general enough to link to various lower-level "regulative rules";arguments soon arose that pictured a"community"Europe (and its competitors)as either advancing or impeding goals across Left and Right(except for the Communists).38 For the Left,a supranational community could undo conservative legacies at the national level-or mean capitulation to the German Konzerns.For the Right. supranational integration could open France to broader markets-or emasculate national strength and identity.Since Right,Left,and Center had their realists, pragmatists,idealists,Anglophiles,and even Germanophiles,domestic allies grav- itated to different European strategies.After several years of confusion,their positions crystallized around the ECSC proposal.Some elites sought to mobilize coalitions in favor of community projects;others in the same parties and bureau- cracies called for confederal or traditional alternatives. The Parting of the Ways:The ECSC The community model first entered French debates seriously with Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's proposal for a "European Coal and Steel Community"in May 37.See Searle 1995:and Ruggie 1998. 38.On ideas at different levels of generality.see Campbell 1998;and Goldstein and Keohane 1993
A third group called for a more radical departure from standard diplomacy, in “community” strategies. In their functionalist analysis—where legitimate policies were those that best provided welfare—two world wars and the rise of the super powers showed that Europe needed more than the nation-state. Only a new sort of “supranational” institution, partly independent of governments, could lead fractious Europe to peace and prosperity. In particular, weak intergovernmental accords could not hold the Germans down. In order to make such control acceptable to the Germans, however, France would have to submit to it as well. This might entail a break with the British, who abhorred supranationality. Thus a supranational solution meant forsaking the security of Franco-British balancing against Germany. But the result could be real “integration,” leading to a “United States of Europe” as powerful and rich as the United States of America. If these models divided most clearly on the “German problem,” their key difference was not pro- or anti-Germanism. Some traditionalists soon proved quite willing to deal bilaterally with Germany. Others arrived at confederal or community strategies out of visceral fear of Germany unfettered. Instead, the fundamental distinctions concerned the “master frame” linking France itself and its European environment. In the slightly different vocabulary of John Searle, they suggested different “constitutive rules” about France as a player in a European game.37 Each packaged a set of normative and causal claims that defined France’s position vis-a`-vis its neighbors. Crucially, these different views of Europe had no direct connection to the Right–Left cleavage that dominated French politics. Each model’s constitutive rules were general enough to link to various lower-level “regulative rules”; arguments soon arose that pictured a “community” Europe (and its competitors) as either advancing or impeding goals across Left and Right (except for the Communists).38 For the Left, a supranational community could undo conservative legacies at the national level—or mean capitulation to the German Konzerns. For the Right, supranational integration could open France to broader markets—or emasculate national strength and identity. Since Right, Left, and Center had their realists, pragmatists, idealists, Anglophiles, and even Germanophiles, domestic allies gravitated to different European strategies. After several years of confusion, their positions crystallized around the ECSC proposal. Some elites sought to mobilize coalitions in favor of community projects; others in the same parties and bureaucracies called for confederal or traditional alternatives. The Parting of the Ways: The ECSC The community model first entered French debates seriously with Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s proposal for a “European Coal and Steel Community” in May 37. See Searle 1995; and Ruggie 1998. 38. On ideas at different levels of generality, see Campbell 1998; and Goldstein and Keohane 1993. 58 International Organization
Origins of the EU 59 1950.France,West Germany,and other countries would pool their coal and steel industries under independent "supranational"institutions.Structural accounts present the Schuman Plan as responding directly to clear imperatives.Geopoliti- cally,it initiated Franco-German reconciliation while giving France oversight of West Germany's nascent foreign policy,and it responded to U.S.pressure for European collaboration.Economically,it secured long-term access to German coal and supervision of German heavy industry.These benefits dictated that the ECSC was the"rational"French strategy.3 Yet structuralists overlook actual French reactions to ECSC.Rather than reflect- ing clear preferences in parties,interest groups,or bureaucracies,Schuman's self-described"leap in the dark"provoked a deeply divided response.Early support was weakly scattered across Schuman's diverse "Third Force"coalition,which allied the full range of pro-parliamentary parties-from the conservative Indepen- dents,to Schuman's Christian Democrats (Movement republicain populaire,MRP), to the centrist Radicals and the Union democratique et socialiste de la resistance (UDSR),to the Socialists(Section francaise de I'internationale ouvriere,SFIO) against the Communists and Gaullists.4 Only about a third of the majority saluted the plan,including major figures in each party:a third of the 67 Independents, around Paul Reynaud and Antoine Pinay:perhaps 50 of the 166 MRP,behind Frangois de Menthon and Pierre Pflimlin;a score of the 52 centrists,such as Rene Mayer and Rene Pleven;and another 20 of the 128 Socialists,around Andre Philip and Gerard Jacquet.Schuman also drew support from some prominent bureaucrats, like diplomat Herve Alphand and Planning head Jean Monnet (author of the Schuman Plan). But the other two-thirds of the majority,the opposition,most high officials,and all interest groups criticized Schuman's proposal.About one-third of the coalition voiced confederal concerns,supporting coal and steel cooperation but fearing supranationality and partnership with Germany.They favored plans within two weak organizations under Franco-British direction:the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)or the Council of Europe.4 They counted close to half of Schuman's own MRP,including Prime Minister Georges Bidault,party head Maurice Schuman,and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Robert Buron;at least a third of the Independents,most notably Finance Minister Maurice Petsche; a similar portion of centrists like Pierre Mendes France (Radical)and Edouard 39.See Milward 1984,380;and Hitchcock 1998,10. 40.For different reasons,the Gaullists and Communists wanted to alter the Fourth Republic's parliamentary institutions. 41.The OEEC,created in 1948 to allocate Marshall Plan aid,had sixteen members.Organizationally. it was limited to a secretariat without decision-making powers.An executive committee dominated by France and Britain set its agenda.The Council of Europe,created in 1949 to discuss integrative projects and to readmit Germany into Europe,had ten original members and quickly expanded.It had a standard council of government ministers and a consultative assembly.See Griffiths 1997;and Bitsch 1986
1950. France, West Germany, and other countries would pool their coal and steel industries under independent “supranational” institutions. Structural accounts present the Schuman Plan as responding directly to clear imperatives. Geopolitically, it initiated Franco-German reconciliation while giving France oversight of West Germany’s nascent foreign policy, and it responded to U.S. pressure for European collaboration. Economically, it secured long-term access to German coal and supervision of German heavy industry. These benefits dictated that the ECSC was the “rational” French strategy.39 Yet structuralists overlook actual French reactions to ECSC. Rather than reflecting clear preferences in parties, interest groups, or bureaucracies, Schuman’s self-described “leap in the dark” provoked a deeply divided response. Early support was weakly scattered across Schuman’s diverse “Third Force” coalition, which allied the full range of pro-parliamentary parties—from the conservative Independents, to Schuman’s Christian Democrats (Movement re´publicain populaire, MRP), to the centrist Radicals and the Union de´mocratique et socialiste de la re´sistance (UDSR), to the Socialists (Section franc¸aise de l’internationale ouvrie`re, SFIO)— against the Communists and Gaullists.40 Only about a third of the majority saluted the plan, including major figures in each party: a third of the 67 Independents, around Paul Reynaud and Antoine Pinay; perhaps 50 of the 166 MRP, behind Franc¸ois de Menthon and Pierre Pflimlin; a score of the 52 centrists, such as Rene´ Mayer and Rene´ Pleven; and another 20 of the 128 Socialists, around Andre´ Philip and Ge´rard Jacquet. Schuman also drew support from some prominent bureaucrats, like diplomat Herve´ Alphand and Planning head Jean Monnet (author of the Schuman Plan). But the other two-thirds of the majority, the opposition, most high officials, and all interest groups criticized Schuman’s proposal. About one-third of the coalition voiced confederal concerns, supporting coal and steel cooperation but fearing supranationality and partnership with Germany. They favored plans within two weak organizations under Franco-British direction: the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) or the Council of Europe.41 They counted close to half of Schuman’s own MRP, including Prime Minister Georges Bidault, party head Maurice Schuman, and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Robert Buron; at least a third of the Independents, most notably Finance Minister Maurice Petsche; a similar portion of centrists like Pierre Mende`s France (Radical) and E´ douard 39. See Milward 1984, 380; and Hitchcock 1998, 10. 40. For different reasons, the Gaullists and Communists wanted to alter the Fourth Republic’s parliamentary institutions. 41. The OEEC, created in 1948 to allocate Marshall Plan aid, had sixteen members. Organizationally, it was limited to a secretariat without decision-making powers. An executive committee dominated by France and Britain set its agenda. The Council of Europe, created in 1949 to discuss integrative projects and to readmit Germany into Europe, had ten original members and quickly expanded. It had a standard council of government ministers and a consultative assembly. See Griffiths 1997; and Bitsch 1986. Origins of the EU 59