1986 Liberalism and World Politics veto thus preserves the liberties of the either case,we want more for ourselves state (Machiavelli,1950,bk.1,chap.5,p. and our states than just material welfare 122).However,since the people and the (materialistic monism).Because other rulers have different social characters,the states with similar aims thereby threaten people need to be "managed"by the few us,we prepare ourselves for expansion to avoid having their recklessness over- Because our fellow citizens threaten us if turn or their fecklessness undermine we do not allow them either to satisfy the ability of the state to expand their ambition or to release their political (Machiavelli,1950,bk.1,chap.53,pp. energies through imperial expansion,we 249-50).Thus the senate and the consuls expand. plan expansion,consult oracles,and There is considerable historical employ religion to manage the resources evidence for liberal imperialism. that the energy of the people supplies. Machiavelli's (Polybius's)Rome and Strength,and then imperial expansion, Thucydides'Athens both were imperial results from the way liberty encourages republics in the Machiavellian sense increased population and property,which (Thucydides,1954,bk.6).The historical grow when the citizens know their lives record of numerous U.S.interventions in and goods are secure from arbitrary the postwar period supports Machiavelli's seizure.Free citizens equip large armies argument (Aron,1973,chaps.3-4; and provide soldiers who fight for public Barnet,1968,chap.11),but the current glory and the common good because these record of liberal pacifism,weak as it is, are,in fact,their own(Machiavelli,1950, calls some of his insights into question.To bk.2,chap.2,pp.287-90).If you seek the extent that the modern populace ac- the honor of having your state expand, tually controls(and thus unbalances)the Machiavelli advises,you should organize mixed republic,its diffidence may out- it as a free and popular republic like weigh elite("senatorial")aggressiveness. Rome,rather than as an aristocratic We can conclude either that(1)liberal republic like Sparta or Venice.Expansion pacifism has at least taken over with the thus calls for a free republic. further development of capitalist "Necessity"-political survival-calls democracy,as Schumpeter predicted it for expansion.If a stable aristocratic would or that (2)the mixed record of republic is forced by foreign conflict "to liberalism-pacifism and imperialism- extend her territory,in such a case we indicates that some liberal states are shall see her foundations give way and Schumpeterian democracies while others herself quickly brought to ruin";if,on the are Machiavellian republics.Before we other hand,domestic security prevails, accept either conclusion,however,we "the continued tranquility would enervate must consider a third apparent regularity her,or provoke internal disensions, of modern world politics. which together,or either of them seperately,will apt to prove her ruin" (Machiavelli,1950,bk.1,chap.6,p. Liberal Internationalism 129).Machiavelli therefore believes it is necessary to take the constitution of Modern liberalism carries with it two Rome,rather than that of Sparta or legacies.They do not affect liberal states Venice,as our model. separately,according to whether they are Hence,this belief leads to liberal im- pacifistic or imperialistic,but simul- perialism.We are lovers of glory, taneously. Machiavelli announces.We seek to rule The first of these legacies is the pacifica- or,at least,to avoid being oppressed.In tion of foreign relations among liberal 1155
1986 Liberalism and World Politics veto thus preserves the liberties of the state (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. 122). However, since the people and the rulers have different social characters, the people need to be "managed by the few to avoid having their recklessness overturn or their fecklessness undermine the ability of the state to expand (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. 249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls plan expansion, consult oracles, and employ religion to manage the resources that the energy of the people supplies. Strength, and then imperial expansion, results from the way liberty encourages increased population and property, which grow when the citizens know their lives and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure. Free citizens equip large armies and provide soldiers who fight for public glory and the common good because these are, in fact, their own (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287-90). If you seek the honor of having your state expand, Machiavelli advises, you should organize it as a free and popular republic like Rome, rather than as an aristocratic republic like Sparta or Venice. Expansion thus calls for a free republic. "Necessityu-political survival-calls for expansion. If a stable aristocratic republic is forced by foreign conflict "to extend her territory, in such a case we shall see her foundations give way and herself quickly brought to ruin"; if, on the other hand, domestic security prevails, "the continued tranquility would enervate her, or provoke internal disensions, which together, or either of them seperately, will apt to prove her ruin" (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. 129). Machiavelli therefore believes it is necessary to take the constitution of Rome, rather than that of Sparta or Venice, as our model. Hence, this belief leads to liberal imperialism. We are lovers of glory, Machiavelli announces. We seek to rule or, at least, to avoid being oppressed. In either case, we want more for ourselves and our states than just material welfare (materialistic monism). Because other states with similar aims thereby threaten us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. Because our fellow citizens threaten us if we do not allow them either to satisfy their ambition or to release their political energies through imperial expansion, we expand. There is considerable historical evidence for liberal imperialism. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and Thucydides' Athens both were imperial republics in the Machiavellian sense (Thucydides, 1954, bk. 6). The historical record of numerous U.S. interventions in the postwar period supports Machiavelli's argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3-4; Barnet, 1968, chap. ll), but the current record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is, calls some of his insights into question. To the extent that the modern populace actually controls (and thus unbalances) the mixed republic, its diffidence may outweigh elite ("senatorial") aggressiveness. We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism-pacifism and imperialismindicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics. Before we accept either conclusion, however, we must consider a third apparent regularity of modern world politics. Liberal Internationalism Modern liberalism carries with it two legacies. They do not affect liberal states separately, according to whether they are pacifistic or imperialistic, but simultaneously. The first of these legacies is the pacification of foreign relations among liberal
American Political Science Review Vol.80 states.2 During the nineteenth century,the to the quarrels with our allies that be- United States and Great Britain engaged deviled the Carter and Reagan adminis- in nearly continual strife;however,after trations.It also offers the promise of a the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual continuing peace among liberal states, representation as the formal source of the and as the number of liberal states in- sovereignty of the British parliament, creases,it announces the possibility of Britain and the United States negotiated global peace this side of the grave or their disputes.They negotiated despite, world conquest. for example,British grievances during the Of course,the probability of the out- Civil War against the North's blockade of break of war in any given year between the South,with which Britain had close any two given states is low.The occur- economic ties.Despite severe Anglo- rence of a war between any two adjacent French colonial rivalry,liberal France and states,considered over a long period of liberal Britain formed an entente against time,would be more probable.The ap- illiberal Germany before World War I. parent absence of war between liberal And from 1914 to 1915,Italy,the liberal states,whether adjacent or not,for member of the Triple Alliance with Ger- almost 200 years thus may have sig- many and Austria,chose not to fulfill its nificance.Similar claims cannot be made obligations under that treaty to support for feudal,fascist,communist,au- its allies.Instead,Italy joined in an alli- thoritarian,or totalitarian forms of rule ance with Britain and France,which pre- (Doyle,1983a,pp.222),nor for plural- vented it from having to fight other liberal istic or merely similar societies.More states and then declared war on Germany significant perhaps is that when states are and Austria.Despite generations of forced to decide on which side of an im- Anglo-American tension and Britain's pending world war they will fight,liberal wartime restrictions on American trade states all wind up on the same side de- with Germany,the United States leaned spite the complexity of the paths that take toward Britain and France from 1914 to them there.These characteristics do not 1917 before entering World War I on their prove that the peace among liberals is side. statistically significant nor that liberalism Beginning in the eighteenth century and is the sole valid explanation for the slowly growing since then,a zone of peace.3 They do suggest that we consider peace,which Kant called the "pacific the possibility that liberals have indeed federation"or"pacific union,"has begun established a separate peace-but only to be established among liberal societies. among themselves. More than 40 liberal states currently make Liberalism also carries with it a 'second up the union.Most are in Europe and legacy:international "imprudence" North America,but they can be found on (Hume,1963,pp.346-47).Peaceful every continent,as Appendix 1 indicates. restraint only seems to work in liberals Here the predictions of liberal pacifists relations with other liberals.Liberal states (and President Reagan)are borne out: have fought numerous wars with non- liberal states do exercise peaceful liberal states.(For a list of international restraint,and a separate peace exists wars since 1816 see Appendix 2.) among them.This separate peace pro- Many of these wars have been defen- vides a solid foundation for the United sive and thus prudent by necessity. States'crucial alliances with the liberal Liberal states have been attacked and powers,e.g.,the North Atlantic Treaty threatened by nonliberal states that do Organization and our Japanese alliance. not exercise any special restraint in their This foundation appears to be impervious dealings with the liberal states. 1156
American Political Science Review Vol. 80 state^.^ During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife; however, after the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes. They negotiated despite, for example, British grievances during the Civil War against the North's blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe AngloFrench colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I. And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its obligations under that treaty to support its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alliance with Britain and France, which prevented it from having to fight other liberal states and then declared war on Germany and Austria. Despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain's wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917 before entering World War I on their side. Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the "pacific federation" or "pacific union," has begun to be established among liberal societies. More than 40 liberal states currently make up the union. Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent, as Appendix 1indicates. Here the predictions of liberal pacifists (and President Reagan) are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our Japanese alliance. This foundation appears to be impervious to the quarrels with our allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states, and as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest. Of course, the probability of the outbreak of war in any given year between any two given states is low. The occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, would be more probable. The apparent absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have significance. Similar claims cannot be made for feudal, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or totalitarian forms of rule (Doyle, 1983a, pp. 222), nor for pluralistic or merely similar societies. More significant perhaps is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states all wind up on the same side despite the complexity of the paths that take them there. These characteristics do not prove that the peace among liberals is statistically significant nor that liberalism is the sole valid explanation for the peace.3 They do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace-but only among themselves. Liberalism also carries with it a second legacy: international "imprudence" (Hume, 1963, pp. 346-47). Peaceful restraint only seems to work in liberals' relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states. (For a list of international wars since 1816 see Appendix 2.) Many of these wars have been defensive and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states that do not exercise any special restraint in their dealings with the liberal states
1986 Liberalism and World Politics Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and of peaceful rivalry among capitalists,but respond to an international political en- only liberal capitalists maintain peace. vironment in which conflicts of prestige, Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be interest,and pure fear of what other states aggressive toward nonliberal states,but might do all lead states toward war.War they also (and especially)expect them to and conquest have thus characterized the be imperialistic toward fellow liberal careers of many authoritarian rulers and capitalists. ruling parties,from Louis XIV and Kant's theory of liberal interna- Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists,Hitler's tionalism helps us understand these two Nazis,and Stalin's communists. legacies.The importance of Immanuel Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on Kant as a theorist of international ethics the authoritarians or totalitarians,as has been well appreciated (Armstrong, many of our more enthusiastic politicians 1931;Friedrich,1948;Gallie,1978,chap. would have us do.+Most wars arise out of 1;Galston,1975;Hassner,1972;Hinsley, calculations and miscalculations of in- 1967,chap.4;Hoffmann,1965;Waltz, terest,misunderstandings,and mutual 1962;Williams,1983),but Kant also has suspicions,such as those that char- an important analytical theory of interna- acterized the origins of World War I. tional politics.Perpetual Peace,written in However,aggression by the liberal state 1795(Kant,1970,pp.93-130),helps us has also characterized a large number of understand the interactive nature of inter- wars.Both France and Britain fought ex- national relations.Kant tries to teach us pansionist colonial wars throughout the methodologically that we can study nineteenth century.The United States neither the systemic relations of states nor fought a similar war with Mexico from the varieties of state behavior in isolation 1846 to 1848,waged a war of annihilation from each other.Substantively,he antic- against the American Indians,and in- ipates for us the ever-widening pacifica- tervened militarily against sovereign tion of a liberal pacific union,explains states many times before and after World this pacification,and at the same time War II.Liberal states invade weak suggests why liberal states are not pacific nonliberal states and display striking in their relations with nonliberal states. distrust in dealings with powerful Kant argues that perpetual peace will be nonliberal states (Doyle,1983b). guaranteed by the ever-widening accept- Neither realist (statist)nor Marxist ance of three"definitive articles"of peace. theory accounts well for these two When all nations have accepted the legacies.While they can account for definitive articles in a metaphorical aspects of certain periods of international "treaty"of perpetual peace he asks them stability (Aron,1968,pp.151-54; to sign,perpetual peace will have been Russett,1985),neither the logic of the established. balance of power nor the logic of interna- The First Definitive Article requires the tional hegemony explains the separate civil constitution of the state to be peace maintained for more than 150 years republican.By republican Kant means a among states sharing one particular form political society that has solved the prob- of governance-liberal principles and in- lem of combining moral autonomy,in- stitutions.Balance-of-power theory ex- dividualism,and social order.A private pects-indeed is premised upon-flexible property and market-oriented economy arrangements of geostrategic rivalry that partially addressed that dilemma in the include preventive war.Hegemonies wax private sphere.The public,or political, and wane,but the liberal peace holds. sphere was more troubling.His answer Marxist"ultra-imperialists"expect a form was a republic that preserved juridical 1157
1986 Liberalism and World Politics Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, interest, and pure fear of what other states might do all lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists, Hitler's Nazis, and Stalin's communists. Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us Most wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I. However, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. Both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War 11. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states (Doyle, 1983b). Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist theory accounts well for these two legacies. While they can account for aspects of certain periods of international stability (Aron, 1968, pp. 151-54; Russett, 1985), neither the logic of the balance of power nor the logic of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance-liberal principles and institutions. Balance-of-power theory expects-indeed is premised upon-flexible arrangements of geostrategic rivalry that include preventive war. Hegemonies wax and wane, but the liberal peace holds. Marxist "ultra-imperialists" expect a form of peaceful rivalry among capitalists, but only liberal capitalists maintain peace. Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be aggressive toward nonliberal states, but they also (and especially) expect them to be imperialistic toward fellow liberal capitalists. Kant's theory of liberal internationalism helps us understand these two legacies. The importance of Immanuel Kant as a theorist of international ethics has been well appreciated (Armstrong, 1931; Friedrich, 1948; Gallie, 1978, chap. 1;Galston, 1975; Hassner, 1972; Hinsley, 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann, -1965; Waltz, 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has an important analytical theory of intemational politics. Perpetual Peace, written in 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93-130), helps us understand the interactive nature of international relations. Kant tries to teach us methodologically that we can study neither the systemic relations of states nor the varieties of state behavior in isolation from each other. Substantively, he anticipates for us the ever-widening pacification of a liberal pacific union, explains this pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three "definitive articles" of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical "treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established. The First Definitive Article requires the civil constitution of the state to be republican. By republican Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A private property and market-oriented economy partially addressed that dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic that preserved juridical