上海交通大学：《政治的边界与逻辑》课程教学资源（课外阅读文献）challege of african state building

INTRODUCTION 7 the country as "Zaire"while it was ruled by former President Mobutu Sese Seko and as "Democratic Republic of the Congo(D.R.O.C.)"for the post-May 1997 era. This book has its origins in 1982 when I went to Nigeria to research my senior thesis as an undergraduate in Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School.I woke up in the morning when my plane was over West Africa,looked out the window and remarked to myself that there ap- peared to be very few people on the land.That observation has,to one degree or another,haunted me for the last fifteen years and is the original impetus for this book.As a student,I was fortunate to have as teachers Henry Bicnen,Michacl Doyle,and Robert Tignor,among others,who cultivated my growing interest in African politics. While teaching at Princeton,I have been thinking about this book's central argument for over a decade and writing it for the last two years. While writing,I have incurred many debts as I exposed numerous col- leagues to iterated versions of the manuscript.Robert Tignor continues to tutor me in African history and Michacl Doyle is still teaching me the intricacics of international relations theory.Sheri Berman and Gidcon Rose provided me with an especially searching and comprehensive cri- tique of the draft manuscript.I also received helpful comments from Robert Bates,Christopher Clapham,Kent Eaton,Antoinette Handley, John Harbeson,Tony Hopkins,Atul Kohli,Emmanucl Kreike,Donald Rothchild,Martin Stcin,Kathryn Stoner-Weiss,John Waterbury,Deb- orah Yashar,and Crawford Young.Research assistance for the book was ably provided by Elizabeth Bloodgood and Amanda Dickins. Research for this book was supported by Princeton University's Center of International Studies and the University Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. John Bruce of the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center was kind enough to give me permission to quote from the country profiles the LTC had produced for Africa. My greatest thanks goes,as always,to my wife Sharon,who manages the roles of partner,friend,and constructive critic with love and good cheer. Maps 3.1,3.2,and 3.3 are reprinted from Ieuan L.L.Griffiths,The Atlas of African Affairs,2nd ed.(London:Routledge Press,1994).1994 by Routledge Press.Used with permission of the publisher.Parts of chapter nine originally appeared in Jeffrey Herbst,"Responding to State Failure in Africa,"International Security 21(Winter 1996/7).Used with permis- sion of the president and fellows of Harvard College and the Massa- chusetts Institute of Technology

INTRODUCTION 7 the country as “Zaire” while it was ruled by former President Mobutu Sese Seko and as “Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.O.C.)” for the post-May 1997 era. This book has its origins in 1982 when I went to Nigeria to research my senior thesis as an undergraduate in Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. I woke up in the morning when my plane was over West Africa, looked out the window and remarked to myself that there ap￾peared to be very few people on the land. That observation has, to one degree or another, haunted me for the last fifteen years and is the original impetus for this book. As a student, I was fortunate to have as teachers Henry Bienen, Michael Doyle, and Robert Tignor, among others, who cultivated my growing interest in African politics. While teaching at Princeton, I have been thinking about this book’s central argument for over a decade and writing it for the last two years. While writing, I have incurred many debts as I exposed numerous col￾leagues to iterated versions of the manuscript. Robert Tignor continues to tutor me in African history and Michael Doyle is still teaching me the intricacies of international relations theory. Sheri Berman and Gideon Rose provided me with an especially searching and comprehensive cri￾tique of the draft manuscript. I also received helpful comments from Robert Bates, Christopher Clapham, Kent Eaton, Antoinette Handley, John Harbeson, Tony Hopkins, Atul Kohli, Emmanuel Kreike, Donald Rothchild, Martin Stein, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, John Waterbury, Deb￾orah Yashar, and Crawford Young. Research assistance for the book was ably provided by Elizabeth Bloodgood and Amanda Dickins. Research for this book was supported by Princeton University’s Center of International Studies and the University Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. John Bruce of the University of Wisconsin’s Land Tenure Center was kind enough to give me permission to quote from the country profiles the LTC had produced for Africa. My greatest thanks goes, as always, to my wife Sharon, who manages the roles of partner, friend, and constructive critic with love and good cheer. Maps 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are reprinted from Ieuan L. L. Griffiths, The Atlas of African Affairs, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge Press, 1994). q 1994 by Routledge Press. Used with permission of the publisher. Parts of chapter nine originally appeared in Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa,” International Security 21(Winter 1996/7). Used with permis￾sion of the president and fellows of Harvard College and the Massa￾chusetts Institute of Technology

Part One THE CHALLENGE OF STATE-BUILDING IN AFRICA

Part One THE CHALLENGE OF STATE-BUILDING IN AFRICA

One The Challenge of State-Building in Africa The history of every continent is written clearly in its geographical features,but of no continent is this more true than of Africa. Lord Hailey,An African Survey THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM facing state-builders in Africa-be they pre- colonial kings,colonial governors,or presidents in the independent era- has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people.Sub-Saharan Africa,with roughly 18 percent of the world's surface area,has always been sparsely settled.Af- rica had only 6 to 11 percent of the world's population in 1750,5 to 7 percent in 1900,and only 11 percent in 1997.'Rclatively low population densities in Africa have automatically meant that it always has been more expensive for states to exert control over a given number of people com- pared to Europe and other densely settled areas.As John Iliffe wrote,"In the West African savannah,underpopulation was the chief obstacle to state formation."2 In only a few places in Africa,including the Great Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands,are there ccologies that have supported relatively high densities of people.Not surprisingly,these areas,with the longest traditions of relatively centralized state structures,have been periodically able to exercise direct control over their peripheries.However,ccologi- cal conditions throughout most of the continent do not allow high densi- ties of people to be easily supported.More than 50 percent of Africa has Calculated from John D.Durand,"Historical Estimates of World Population:An Eval- uation,"Population and Development Review 3 (September 1977):p.259 and World Bank, World Development Report 1998,p 191. John Iliffe,Africans The History of a Continent(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,.1995),P.70. 3 While hampered by very poor data,Robert Bates found that,in the African polities he was able to code,"the higher the population density,the greater the level of political centralization."See his Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge:Cam- bridge University Press,1983),p.35.See also Robert F.Stevenson,Population and Politi- cal Systems in Tropical Africa (New York:Columbia University Press,1968)

One The Challenge of State-Building in Africa The history of every continent is written clearly in its geographical features, but of no continent is this more true than of Africa. Lord Hailey, An African Survey THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM facing state-builders in Africa—be they pre￾colonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era— has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people. Sub-Saharan Africa, with roughly 18 percent of the world’s surface area, has always been sparsely settled. Af￾rica had only 6 to 11 percent of the world’s population in 1750, 5 to 7 percent in 1900, and only 11 percent in 1997.1 Relatively low population densities in Africa have automatically meant that it always has been more expensive for states to exert control over a given number of people com￾pared to Europe and other densely settled areas. As John Iliffe wrote, “In the West African savannah, underpopulation was the chief obstacle to state formation.”2 In only a few places in Africa, including the Great Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands, are there ecologies that have supported relatively high densities of people. Not surprisingly, these areas, with the longest traditions of relatively centralized state structures, have been periodically able to exercise direct control over their peripheries.3 However, ecologi￾cal conditions throughout most of the continent do not allow high densi￾ties of people to be easily supported. More than 50 percent of Africa has 1 Calculated from John D. Durand, “Historical Estimates of World Population: An Eval￾uation,” Population and Development Review 3 (September 1977): p. 259 and World Bank, World Development Report 1998, p 191. 2 John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 70. 3 While hampered by very poor data, Robert Bates found that, in the African polities he was able to code, “the higher the population density, the greater the level of political centralization.” See his Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge: Cam￾bridge University Press, 1983), p. 35. See also Robert F. Stevenson, Population and Politi￾cal Systems in Tropical Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968)

12 CHAPTER ONE inadequate rainfall;indeed,contrary to the popular imagination,only 8 percent of the continent has a tropical climate.Approximately one-third of the world's arid land is in Africa. In Africa,two other factors have aggravated the cost of extending power in the face of low population densities.First,African countries have quite varied environmental conditions.Ecological differences across provinces of a country in West Africa,which can be coastal,forest,savan- nah,or near-desert,are greater than in any European country.s Therefore, the models of control an African state must develop for these highly differentiated zones are more varied,and thus more costly,than what a government in Europe or Asia must implement in order to rule over their more homogenous rural areas.Second,it is expensive to project power over distance in Africa because of the combination of a peculiar set of geographical features.As Ralph Austen notes, The geography of Africa also presents serious barriers to long-distance trans- port.Water travel is limited by the small amount of indented shoreline relative to the size of the interior surface of the continent,as well as the disrupted navigability of most rivers,due to rapids and seasonal shallows.The wheel was introduced into northern Africa for overland travel during ancient times but then abandoned because the terrain and distances to be covered could not feasibly be provided with the necessary roads." The daunting nature of Africa's geography is one of the reasons the re- gion was only colonized in the late 1800s despite its proximity to Eu- rope.The Europeans found it easier to colonize Latin America hundreds of years before despite the much greater distances involved. Why the particular pattern of population density occurred,given Af- rica's geography,is not within my competence to explain.?Rather,this book examines how successive sets of leaders in Africa responded to a political geography they were forced to take as a given.This is not an argument for the kind of gcographical determinism that has captivated scholars from Ibn Khaldun to Montesquicu to Jeffrey Sachs.3 A variety of paths were open to African leaders as they confronted their environ- W.Bediako Lamouse-Smith and Joseph School,Africa Interactive Maps,CD-ROM, (Odenton,Md.:Africa Interactive Maps,1998). s W.Arthur Lewis,Politics in West Africa (London:George Allen and Unwin,1965),p. 24. Ralph Austen,African Economic History (London:James Currey,1987),p.20. For a provocative thesis,see Jared Diamond,Guns Germs and Steel:The Fate of Hu- man Societies (New York:W.W.Norton,1997),chapter 19. See Ibn Khaldun,The Mugaddimab,trans.Franz Rosenthal (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1967),p.63;Montesquicu,The Spirit of the Laws,vol.I (Cincinnati:Robert Clarke,1873),p.255;and Jeffrey Sachs,"Nature,Nurture,and Growth,"The Economist, 14Junc1997,Pp.19-23

12 CHAPTER ONE inadequate rainfall; indeed, contrary to the popular imagination, only 8 percent of the continent has a tropical climate. Approximately one-third of the world’s arid land is in Africa.4 In Africa, two other factors have aggravated the cost of extending power in the face of low population densities. First, African countries have quite varied environmental conditions. Ecological differences across provinces of a country in West Africa, which can be coastal, forest, savan￾nah, or near-desert, are greater than in any European country. 5 Therefore, the models of control an African state must develop for these highly differentiated zones are more varied, and thus more costly, than what a government in Europe or Asia must implement in order to rule over their more homogenous rural areas. Second, it is expensive to project power over distance in Africa because of the combination of a peculiar set of geographical features. As Ralph Austen notes, The geography of Africa also presents serious barriers to long-distance trans￾port. Water travel is limited by the small amount of indented shoreline relative to the size of the interior surface of the continent, as well as the disrupted navigability of most rivers, due to rapids and seasonal shallows. The wheel was introduced into northern Africa for overland travel during ancient times but then abandoned because the terrain and distances to be covered could not feasibly be provided with the necessary roads.6 The daunting nature of Africa’s geography is one of the reasons the re￾gion was only colonized in the late 1800s despite its proximity to Eu￾rope. The Europeans found it easier to colonize Latin America hundreds of years before despite the much greater distances involved. Why the particular pattern of population density occurred, given Af￾rica’s geography, is not within my competence to explain.7 Rather, this book examines how successive sets of leaders in Africa responded to a political geography they were forced to take as a given. This is not an argument for the kind of geographical determinism that has captivated scholars from Ibn Khaldun to Montesquieu to Jef ˆ frey Sachs.8 A variety of paths were open to African leaders as they confronted their environ- 4 W. Bediako Lamouse-Smith and Joseph School, ´ Africa Interactive Maps, CD-ROM, (Odenton, Md.: Africa Interactive Maps, 1998). 5 W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), p. 24.6 Ralph Austen, African Economic History (London: James Currey, 1987), p. 20. 7 For a provocative thesis, see Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fate of Hu￾man Societies (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), chapter 19. 8 See Ibn Khaldun, ˆ The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 63; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, vol. 1 (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1873), p. 255; and Jeffrey Sachs, “Nature, Nurture, and Growth,” The Economist, 14 June 1997, pp. 19–23

THE CHALLENGE OF STATE-BUILDING 13 ments.However,the challenges posed by political geography,especially low population densities,could not be ignored by any leader.Such an approach offers a tremendous methodological advantage:by holding the physical environment "constant,"I can focus on the precise political cal- culations of different African leaders over time as they sought to design their states. In this book,I argue that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their states:the cost of expanding the domestic power infra- structure;the nature of national boundaries;and the design of state sys- tems.Understanding the decisions made regarding each is critical,and there are profound trade-offs inherent to different approaches.Africa's political geography helped structure the responses that leaders adopted to each set of issues just as European decisions were influenced by the struc- tural features of that region.The following two sections provide a com- parison of Europe and Africa's political geographies.I then develop the analytic tools that are central to this study. The European Experience of State Consolidation The African experience of politics amid large supplies of land and low popu- lation densities while confronting an inhospitable physical setting is in dra- matic contrast to the European experience of state-building.In Europe, through the fourteenth century,population densities were not high enough to put immediate pressure on land and compel territorial competition.As Mattingly notes,"In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,the continental space of Western Europe still impeded any degree of political organization efficient enough to create a system of continuous diplomatic pressures. However,starting in the fifteenth century in Italy and later elsewhere, population densitics increased.As a result,European nations began to compete for territory,a tendency that only makes sense if population densities are relatively high and vacant land is limited or nonexistent,so that the valuc of conquering land is higher than the price to be paid in wealth and men.In turn,there was significant pressure to strengthen states in order to fight wars.Charles Tilly notes that one of the central reasons for the creation of relatively centralized state apparatuses in Eu- rope was the "continuous aggressive competition for trade and territory among changing states of unequal size,which made war a driving force in European history.Wars of territorial conquest,as chapter four notes in much greater detail,have been central to the formation of particular Garrett Mattingly,Renaissance Diplomacy (London:Jonathan Cape,1955),p.60. Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capital,and European States,A.D.990-1992 (Cambridge, MA:Blackwell,1990),p.54

THE CHALLENGE OF ST A TE-BUILDING 13 ments. However, the challenges posed by political geography, especially low population densities, could not be ignored by any leader. Such an approach offers a tremendous methodological advantage: by holding the physical environment “constant,” I can focus on the precise political cal￾culations of different African leaders over time as they sought to design their states. In this book, I argue that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their states: the cost of expanding the domestic power infra￾structure; the nature of national boundaries; and the design of state sys￾tems. Understanding the decisions made regarding each is critical, and there are profound trade-offs inherent to different approaches. Africa’s political geography helped structure the responses that leaders adopted to each set of issues just as European decisions were influenced by the struc￾tural features of that region. The following two sections provide a com￾parison of Europe and Africa’s political geographies. I then develop the analytic tools that are central to this study. The European Experience of State Consolidation The African experience of politics amid large supplies of land and low popu￾lation densities while confronting an inhospitable physical setting is in dra￾matic contrast to the European experience of state-building. In Europe, through the fourteenth century, population densities were not high enough to put immediate pressure on land and compel territorial competition. As Mattingly notes, “In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the continental space of Western Europe still impeded any degree of political organization efficient enough to create a system of continuous diplomatic pressures.”9 However, starting in the fifteenth century in Italy and later elsewhere, population densities increased. As a result, European nations began to compete for territory, a tendency that only makes sense if population densities are relatively high and vacant land is limited or nonexistent, so that the value of conquering land is higher than the price to be paid in wealth and men. In turn, there was significant pressure to strengthen states in order to fight wars. Charles Tilly notes that one of the central reasons for the creation of relatively centralized state apparatuses in Eu￾rope was the “continuous aggressive competition for trade and territory among changing states of unequal size, which made war a driving force in European history.”10 Wars of territorial conquest, as chapter four notes in much greater detail, have been central to the formation of particular 9 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), p. 60. 10 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), p. 54