6 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Zhang Chungiao and Yao Wenyuan:"To study some foreign language to avoid being cheated."Zhou's effort to "check the leftism"and to re- verse the political trend in the wake of Lin Biao incident failed.Then,the political situation took a turn for the worse.The 1973 New Year's edito- rial in the Central Committee's"two newspapers and one magazine" (Renmin Ribao [People's Daily],Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily],and Hongqi [Red Flag])emphasized the need to grasp the"ultra-right es- sence"of Lin Biao's"reactionary revisionist line."To criticize"the left" thus became a political taboo.4 Mao's Strategy of a Global "Horizontal Line"to Deal with the Soviet Union(February 1973) Early 1973 witnessed some progress in U.S.-China relations.In January, the Paris accord was signed,negotiating American withdrawal from Vietnam.This eliminated the foremost obstacle to a better U.S.-China relationship (Taiwan being the second issue).As Nixon promised to solve the Taiwan issue during his second term,he sent Kissinger to China in February 1973 to work out a concrete solution. At a meeting on 16 February,Zhou Enlai and Kissinger agreed that normalization of U.S.-China relations would be attained by a two-step process during Nixon's second term.First,each agreed to establish a liaison office at each other's capital.The second phase was to achieve normalization of U.S.-China relations at the opportune moment.By 1 May,the United States and China opened liaison offices in Beijing and Washington respectively,operating as de facto embassies.15 During his meeting with Kissinger on 17 February,Mao suggested that the United States and China should"work together to commonly deal with a bastard [the Soviet Union]."Mao also proposed his strategy of establishing"a horizontal line [yi tiao xian]-the U.S.-Japan-Paki- stan-Iran-Turkey and Europe"in order to jointly counter Soviet hege- mony.16 As Gong Li observes,"In fact,this is Mao's international strategic thinking on a united front(against the Soviet expansion and hegemony) from China,Japan to Pakistan,Iran,Turkey,Europe to the United States."7 14.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,391-92,394. 15.Gong Li,Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and the United States) (Beijing,2004),105-9. 16.William Burr,The Kissinger Transcripts:The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York,1998),88,94;Gong,Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo,104-9. 17.Gong Li,"Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe:1972-1978 nian Zhongguo due Mei zhengce de yanbian"(Tortuous road to the establishment of diplomatic rela- tions:The evolution of China's U.S.policy,1972-1978),"in Gong,Kirby,and Ross, Cong jiedong zouxiang jianjiao,125
6 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan: “To study some foreign language to avoid being cheated.” Zhou’s effort to “check the leftism” and to reverse the political trend in the wake of Lin Biao incident failed. Then, the political situation took a turn for the worse. The 1973 New Year’s editorial in the Central Committee’s “two newspapers and one magazine” (Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily], and Hongqi [Red Flag]) emphasized the need to grasp the “ultra-right essence” of Lin Biao’s “reactionary revisionist line.” To criticize “the left” thus became a political taboo.14 Mao’s Strategy of a Global “Horizontal Line” to Deal with the Soviet Union (February 1973) Early 1973 witnessed some progress in U.S.-China relations. In January, the Paris accord was signed, negotiating American withdrawal from Vietnam. This eliminated the foremost obstacle to a better U.S.-China relationship (Taiwan being the second issue). As Nixon promised to solve the Taiwan issue during his second term, he sent Kissinger to China in February 1973 to work out a concrete solution. At a meeting on 16 February, Zhou Enlai and Kissinger agreed that normalization of U.S.-China relations would be attained by a two-step process during Nixon’s second term. First, each agreed to establish a liaison office at each other’s capital. The second phase was to achieve normalization of U.S.-China relations at the opportune moment. By 1 May, the United States and China opened liaison offices in Beijing and Washington respectively, operating as de facto embassies.15 During his meeting with Kissinger on 17 February, Mao suggested that the United States and China should “work together to commonly deal with a bastard [the Soviet Union].” Mao also proposed his strategy of establishing “a horizontal line [yi tiao xian]—the U.S.—Japan—Pakistan—Iran—Turkey and Europe” in order to jointly counter Soviet hegemony. 16As Gong Li observes, “In fact, this is Mao’s international strategic thinking on a united front (against the Soviet expansion and hegemony) from China, Japan to Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Europe to the United States.”17 14. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 391–92, 394. 15. Gong Li, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and the United States) (Beijing, 2004), 105–9. 16. William Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, 1998), 88, 94; Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo, 104–9. 17. Gong Li, “Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe: 1972–1978 nian Zhongguo due Mei zhengce de yanbian” (Tortuous road to the establishment of diplomatic relations: The evolution of China’s U.S. policy, 1972–1978),” in Gong, Kirby, and Ross, Cong jiedong zouxiang jianjiao, 125
Myth or Reality？.7 The shift from rapprochement to "alliance with the U.S.to deter the Soviets"(lian Mei kang Su)is to some extent simply classical Maoist tactics.In 1940,during the War of Resistance against Japan,Mao explic- itly pointed out:"On the whole,we are anti-imperialism.But we also need to formulate different diplomatic tactics based on the extent of harm- fulness and whether it is presently harmful."That is,Mao drew a dis- tinction between "Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not do- ing so now.""The basic principles are 'to win over the many,to oppose the few,to utilize contradictions and crush our enemies one by one.'"1s On the one hand,in a New Year's Message of 1 January 1973,the Chi- nese government continued to loudly chant the tune of "opposing the hegemony of the two superpowers [the Soviet Union and the United States]and great power politics,"and"resolutely supporting the revolu- tionary struggle of the revolutionary people of all countries."On the other hand,it turned to adopt a policy of allying with the United States.9 The Chinese government felt obliged to offer a reasonable interpretation and explain the internal logic. On 25 February,the Central Committee transmitted a document pre- pared by the Foreign Ministry stating that the improvement in Sino- American relations would not change China's principled position but that China's foreign policy would continue to oppose the two super- powers.It would not be a paralleled opposition but one distinguish between primary and secondary targets.Currently,the target of the struggle was the Soviet revisionist.Thus,improvement in Sino-Ameri- can relations would be beneficial to the struggle against the Soviet revisionists.20 No.153 Issue of the New Information Incident(July-August 1973) The interpretation of the Foreign Ministry was in accordance with Mao thesis of "utilizing contradiction and defeating enemies one by one." However,not everyone appreciated Mao's decision.Alarge number of revolutionary parties and leftist groups,including Albania,which had been following China's position of countering imperialism and revi- sionism raised strongly worded doubts and harsh questions regarding the transformation of China's foreign policy.What irked Mao most was the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.An important precondition for a better U.S.-China relationship and "alliance with the U.S.to deter the 18.Mao Zedong,"On Policy"(25 Dec.1940),Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing, 1964),2:444. 19.Renmin Ribao (People's Daily),1 Jan.1973. 20.Gong,"Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe,"126
Myth or Reality? 7 The shift from rapprochement to “alliance with the U.S. to deter the Soviets” (lian Mei kang Su) is to some extent simply classical Maoist tactics. In 1940, during the War of Resistance against Japan, Mao explicitly pointed out: “On the whole, we are anti-imperialism. But we also need to formulate different diplomatic tactics based on the extent of harmfulness and whether it is presently harmful.” That is, Mao drew a distinction between “Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not doing so now.” “The basic principles are ‘to win over the many, to oppose the few, to utilize contradictions and crush our enemies one by one.’”18 On the one hand, in a New Year’s Message of 1 January 1973, the Chinese government continued to loudly chant the tune of “opposing the hegemony of the two superpowers [the Soviet Union and the United States] and great power politics,” and “resolutely supporting the revolutionary struggle of the revolutionary people of all countries.” On the other hand, it turned to adopt a policy of allying with the United States.19 The Chinese government felt obliged to offer a reasonable interpretation and explain the internal logic. On 25 February, the Central Committee transmitted a document prepared by the Foreign Ministry stating that the improvement in SinoAmerican relations would not change China’s principled position but that China’s foreign policy would continue to oppose the two superpowers. It would not be a paralleled opposition but one distinguish between primary and secondary targets. Currently, the target of the struggle was the Soviet revisionist. Thus, improvement in Sino-American relations would be beneficial to the struggle against the Soviet revisionists.20 No. 153 Issue of the New Information Incident (July–August 1973) The interpretation of the Foreign Ministry was in accordance with Mao thesis of “utilizing contradiction and defeating enemies one by one.” However, not everyone appreciated Mao’s decision. A large number of revolutionary parties and leftist groups, including Albania, which had been following China’s position of countering imperialism and revisionism raised strongly worded doubts and harsh questions regarding the transformation of China’s foreign policy. What irked Mao most was the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. An important precondition for a better U.S.-China relationship and “alliance with the U.S. to deter the 18. Mao Zedong, “On Policy” (25 Dec. 1940), Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing, 1964), 2:444. 19. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 1 Jan. 1973. 20. Gong, “Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe,” 126
8 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Soviets"was Mao's belief that contradictions in the U.S.-Soviet relation- ship were much greater than their ability to compromise or talent for collusion.However,Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972 and Brezhenev's return visit to the United States in June 1973 elevated U.S.- Soviet relations to a good standing.21 This put Mao in an awkward posi- tion and implied that his new policy toward the U.S.was indeed a blunder. After the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreements on preventing nuclear war and strategic arms limitation in June 1973,David Bruce,the director of American liaison office in China,requested an audience with Zhou Enlai to brief him on the event and deliver Nixon's letter to him.Mao was unsatisfied with the talking-points prepared by the Foreign Minis- try for Zhou and carped that the Foreign Ministry "constantly forgets struggle while allying with the capitalists."In his subsequent meeting with Bruce on 25 June,Zhou,following Mao's instruction,"adopted a scornful and critical attitude.He lashed out at U.S.-Soviet notion of pursuing hegemony and dominance around the world.2 New developments in U.S.-Soviet relations attracted the attention of Zhou Enlai and the Foreign Ministry.The Department of American and Oceanic Affairs of the Foreign Ministry put together a research article, entitled"A Preliminary Analysis on Nixon and Brezhenev Talk,"which was published on 28 June in No.153 issue of New Information.The article argued that the U.S.-Soviet summit talk was"more deceitful"and cre- ated "a stronger atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet domination around the world."2 This article stressed U.S.-Soviet collusion,which touched on Mao Zedong's tender spot.Mao was outraged and severely criticized the Foreign Ministry,implicating Zhou Enlai.Mao even used vulgar language:"What crap!"On 3 July,when Zhou learned about Mao's criticism from Wang Hairong,Mao's grandniece and assistant foreign minister,he immediately wrote to the related personnel in the Foreign Ministry,asking them to withdraw No.153 issue of New Information. "I'm mainly responsible for such a mistake,"stated Zhou."I hope that you also learn from this mistake,carrying on the positive attitude of studying and discussing intensively.Sometime,you should also ask me to chair brief meetings to exchange views.Don't worry that I may be too busy.[We should]discard small errands and give more attention to big issues.We should learn from the Chairman's work method."24 21.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,286 22.Ibid.,452. 23.Cited from Zong Daoyi,"1973 nian waijiaobu 153 xinqingkuang shijian'shimo" (The beginning and end of"No.153 issue of New Information Incident"in the Foreign Ministry in 1973),Dangshi yanjiu ziliao(Materials on party history research),no.5 (2001).Also see Gong,Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo,116-17 24.Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the found- ing of the PRC)(Beijing,1998),13:356-57n1.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,454
8 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations Soviets” was Mao’s belief that contradictions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship were much greater than their ability to compromise or talent for collusion. However, Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972 and Brezhenev’s return visit to the United States in June 1973 elevated U.S.- Soviet relations to a good standing.21 This put Mao in an awkward position and implied that his new policy toward the U.S. was indeed a blunder. After the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreements on preventing nuclear war and strategic arms limitation in June 1973, David Bruce, the director of American liaison office in China, requested an audience with Zhou Enlai to brief him on the event and deliver Nixon’s letter to him. Mao was unsatisfied with the talking-points prepared by the Foreign Ministry for Zhou and carped that the Foreign Ministry “constantly forgets struggle while allying with the capitalists.” In his subsequent meeting with Bruce on 25 June, Zhou, following Mao’s instruction, “adopted a scornful and critical attitude.” He lashed out at U.S.-Soviet notion of pursuing hegemony and dominance around the world.22 New developments in U.S.-Soviet relations attracted the attention of Zhou Enlai and the Foreign Ministry. The Department of American and Oceanic Affairs of the Foreign Ministry put together a research article, entitled “A Preliminary Analysis on Nixon and Brezhenev Talk,” which was published on 28 June in No. 153 issue of New Information. The article argued that the U.S.–Soviet summit talk was “more deceitful” and created “a stronger atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet domination around the world.”23 This article stressed U.S.-Soviet collusion, which touched on Mao Zedong’s tender spot. Mao was outraged and severely criticized the Foreign Ministry, implicating Zhou Enlai. Mao even used vulgar language: “What crap!” On 3 July, when Zhou learned about Mao’s criticism from Wang Hairong, Mao’s grandniece and assistant foreign minister, he immediately wrote to the related personnel in the Foreign Ministry, asking them to withdraw No. 153 issue of New Information. “I’m mainly responsible for such a mistake,” stated Zhou. “I hope that you also learn from this mistake, carrying on the positive attitude of studying and discussing intensively. Sometime, you should also ask me to chair brief meetings to exchange views. Don’t worry that I may be too busy. [We should] discard small errands and give more attention to big issues. We should learn from the Chairman’s work method.”24 21. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 286. 22. Ibid., 452. 23. Cited from Zong Daoyi, “1973 nian waijiaobu ‘153 xinqingkuang shijian' shimo” (The beginning and end of “No. 153 issue of New Information Incident” in the Foreign Ministry in 1973), Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Materials on party history research), no. 5 (2001). Also see Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo, 116–17. 24. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s manuscripts since the founding of the PRC) (Beijing, 1998), 13:356–57n1. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 454