《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源：The Economic Consequences of Partnership Dissolution— A Comparative Analysis of Panel Studies from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden

European Sociological Review VOLUME 22 NUMBER 5 DECEMBER 2006 533-560 533 DOI:10.1093/esr/jclo12,available online at www.esr.oxfordjournals.org Online publication 22 August 2006 The Economic Consequences of Partnership Dissolution- A Comparative Analysis of Panel Studies from Belgium,Germany, Great Britain,Italy,and Sweden Hans-Jurgen Andref,Barbara Borgloh,Miriam Brockel, Marco Giesselmann,and Dina Hummelsheim The paper analyses the economic consequences of partnership dissolution in different institutional settings.Belgium,Germany,Great Britain,Italy,and Sweden are selected as representatives of four prototypical models of family support(market model,extended family model,male breadwinner model,dual earner model).It is assumed that these four types of family support create specific dependencies within the family,which in case of separation or divorce may have negative economic consequences for the weaker partner. The central question is how much economic autonomy is granted to the weaker family members within each of the four models.Following a thorough discussion of the institu- tional setting in each of the selected countries,it is assumed that economic autonomy is highest in Sweden and lowest in Italy with Belgium,Germany,and Great Britain ranging in between.Using a cross-national data set of separations developed by the authors from national household panels in these five countries,a large number of partnership dissolu- tions are studied over time.The observation period is long enough to distinguish short- from long-term consequences of partnership dissolution and in doing so to add to previous comparative research.Using multivariate panel data models it is shown that(i)adjusted household income is affected for both genders;however more negatively for women than for men,(ii)the income decline is highest in Italy and lowest in Sweden,and(iii)British and German women recover rather quickly from the negative economic effects of separation. Sweden stands out as the country with the highest gender equalities with respect to post-separation incomes.However,the model does not convince without having a blemish: in the long run both Swedish men and women have to deal with long-lasting financial consequences after separation,which do not appear to the same extent in any of the other countries. The Author 2006.Published by Oxford University Press.All rights reserved. For permissions,please e-mail:journals.permissionsoxfordjournals.org

European Sociological Review VOLUME 22 NUMBER 5 DECEMBER 2006 533–560 533 DOI:10.1093/esr/jcl012, available online at www.esr.oxfordjournals.org Online publication 22 August 2006 © The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org The Economic Consequences of Partnership Dissolution— A Comparative Analysis of Panel Studies from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden Hans-Jürgen Andreß, Barbara Borgloh, Miriam Bröckel, Marco Giesselmann, and Dina Hummelsheim The paper analyses the economic consequences of partnership dissolution in different institutional settings. Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden are selected as representatives of four prototypical models of family support (market model, extended family model, male breadwinner model, dual earner model). It is assumed that these four types of family support create specific dependencies within the family, which in case of separation or divorce may have negative economic consequences for the weaker partner. The central question is how much economic autonomy is granted to the weaker family members within each of the four models. Following a thorough discussion of the institu￾tional setting in each of the selected countries, it is assumed that economic autonomy is highest in Sweden and lowest in Italy with Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain ranging in between. Using a cross-national data set of separations developed by the authors from national household panels in these five countries, a large number of partnership dissolu￾tions are studied over time. The observation period is long enough to distinguish short￾from long-term consequences of partnership dissolution and in doing so to add to previous comparative research. Using multivariate panel data models it is shown that (i) adjusted household income is affected for both genders; however more negatively for women than for men, (ii) the income decline is highest in Italy and lowest in Sweden, and (iii) British and German women recover rather quickly from the negative economic effects of separation. Sweden stands out as the country with the highest gender equalities with respect to post-separation incomes. However, the model does not convince without having a blemish: in the long run both Swedish men and women have to deal with long-lasting financial consequences after separation, which do not appear to the same extent in any of the other countries

534 ANDREB,BORGLOH,BROCKEL,GIESSELMANN,AND HUMMELSHEIM Introduction negatively affected than men's.For example,the study by DiPrete and McManus (2000),which shows the most Research on the economic consequences of partnership negative results for men(Germany:-23 per cent,United dissolution has shown that income losses outweigh States:-15 per cent),demonstrates that women's income income gains in terms of both family and per capita decline is still about 10 percentage points larger. income,but these losses are not absorbed equally by both Despite these overall regularities,the variance of find- partners.Women and their (dependent)children are ings across countries is striking.For a comparatist,these most often the losers,while men experience only moder- differences come as no surprise.Besides many individual ate income losses or even improve their economic status. factors,it can be expected that the institutional context Table I summarizes the results for some selected coun- determines the economic consequences of separation and tries.According to these data women's income changes divorce.It makes a difference,e.g.whether the institutional range between minus 80 per cent in one study for Germany setting encourages women's labour force participation, and plus 7 per cent in another study for Belgium.Men's whether the labour market provides enough opportuni- income changes,on the other hand,show less variability. ties for gainful employment of both genders,whether They range between minus 23 per cent in one study for state and legal system offer rights and financial support Germany and plus 6 per cent in the only study for Canada. for dependent family members and how the kinship Furthermore,all studies analyzing both men and women network operates in case of partnership failure.More clearly demonstrate that women's income is much more generally speaking,it is the national configuration of Table 1 Percentage change of adjusted household income due to separation and divorce in selected countries Percentage changea Country Author(s) Typeb Period Total n Women Men Belgium Dewilde (2003) 2a 1994-1996 NA 7 NA Uunk(2004) 2d 1994-2000 63 -20 NA Germany Burkhauser et al.(1990,1991) 2b 1983-1986 101 -44 -7 Sorensen (1994) 1 1984 NA -80 NA AndreB et al.(2003) 3 1984-1999 808 -27 DiPrete and McManus(2000) 2c 1984-1996 NA -33 -23 Dewilde(2003) 2a 1994-1996 NA NA Uunk(2004) 2d 1994-2000 157 -25 NA Denmark Dewilde (2003) 2a 1994-1996 NA -24 Uunk(2004) 2d 1994-2000 41 The Netherlands Poortman(2001) 3 1984-1995 349 -31 Uunk(2004) 2d 1994-2000 69 -19 A Italy Dewilde(2003) 2a 1994-1996 NA 3 Uunk(2004) 2d 1994-2000 69 Sweden Sorensen (1994) 1 1981 NA A Gahler (1998) 3 1980-1990 137 +9 +3 Fritzell(1990) 3 1973-1980 NA +36 United Kingdom Jarvis and Jenkins(1999) 3 1991-1994 253 -18 2 Dewilde(2003) 2 1994-1996 NA -27 Uunk(2004) 2d 1994-2000 145 -36 NA United States Burkhauser et al.(1990,1991) 1981-1985 540 -24 -6 Sorensen (1994) 1 1986 NA -71 NA DiPrete and McManus(2000) 2c 1981-1993 NA -26 -15 Canada Finnie(1993) 3 1982-1986 5,875 -40 6 NA,no information or not analysed. "The values of these columns can-strictly spoken-only be compared within one and the same study,because the studies use different statistical measures (medians,means,regression based estimates)and different operationalizations of income change. 1.comparison of countries based on cross-sectional data;2x,comparison of countries based on longitudinal data;3,national longitudinal data Number of cases for women only

534 ANDREß, BORGLOH, BRÖCKEL, GIESSELMANN, AND HUMMELSHEIM Introduction Research on the economic consequences of partnership dissolution has shown that income losses outweigh income gains in terms of both family and per capita income, but these losses are not absorbed equally by both partners. Women and their (dependent) children are most often the losers, while men experience only moder￾ate income losses or even improve their economic status. Table 1 summarizes the results for some selected coun￾tries.1 According to these data women’s income changes range between minus 80 per cent in one study for Germany and plus 7 per cent in another study for Belgium. Men’s income changes, on the other hand, show less variability. They range between minus 23 per cent in one study for Germany and plus 6 per cent in the only study for Canada. Furthermore, all studies analyzing both men and women clearly demonstrate that women’s income is much more negatively affected than men’s. For example, the study by DiPrete and McManus (2000), which shows the most negative results for men (Germany: –23 per cent, United States: –15 per cent), demonstrates that women’s income decline is still about 10 percentage points larger. Despite these overall regularities, the variance of find￾ings across countries is striking. For a comparatist, these differences come as no surprise. Besides many individual factors, it can be expected that the institutional context determines the economic consequences of separation and divorce. It makes a difference, e.g., whether the institutional setting encourages women’s labour force participation, whether the labour market provides enough opportuni￾ties for gainful employment of both genders, whether state and legal system offer rights and financial support for dependent family members and how the kinship network operates in case of partnership failure. More generally speaking, it is the national configuration of Table 1 Percentage change of adjusted household income due to separation and divorce in selected countries NA, no information or not analysed. a The values of these columns can—strictly spoken—only be compared within one and the same study, because the studies use different statistical measures (medians, means, regression based estimates) and different operationalizations of income change. b 1, comparison of countries based on cross-sectional data; 2x, comparison of countries based on longitudinal data; 3, national longitudinal data. c Number of cases for women only. Percentage changea Country Author(s) Typeb Period Total n Women Men Belgium Dewilde (2003) 2a 1994–1996 NA 7 NA Uunk (2004) 2d 1994–2000 63c –20 NA Germany Burkhauser et al. (1990, 1991) 2b 1983–1986 101 –44 –7 Sørensen (1994) 1 1984 NA –80 NA Andreß et al. (2003) 3 1984–1999 808 –27 –4 DiPrete and McManus (2000) 2c 1984–1996 NA –33 –23 Dewilde (2003) 2a 1994–1996 NA –6 NA Uunk (2004) 2d 1994–2000 157c –25 NA Denmark Dewilde (2003) 2a 1994–1996 NA –24 NA Uunk (2004) 2d 1994–2000 41c –13 NA The Netherlands Poortman (2001) 3 1984–1995 349 –31 4 Uunk (2004) 2d 1994–2000 69c –19 NA Italy Dewilde (2003) 2a 1994–1996 NA –13 NA Uunk (2004) 2d 1994–2000 69c –3 NA Sweden Sørensen (1994) 1 1981 NA –63 NA Gähler (1998) 3 1980–1990 137 +9 +33 Fritzell (1990) 3 1973–1980 NA +36 +52 United Kingdom Jarvis and Jenkins (1999) 3 1991–1994 253 –18 2 Dewilde (2003) 2a 1994–1996 NA –27 NA Uunk (2004) 2d 1994–2000 145c –36 NA United States Burkhauser et al. (1990, 1991) 2b 1981–1985 540 –24 –6 Sørensen (1994) 1 1986 NA –71 NA DiPrete and McManus (2000) 2c 1981–1993 NA –26 –15 Canada Finnie (1993) 3 1982–1986 5,875 –40 6

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 535 family,market,and state institutions that moderates the consequences.It is an important question,from both a economic effects of partnership dissolution. practical and a theoretical point of view,whether Although such institutional explanations are both income losses can be compensated in the years following plausible and popular,they have not been tested very often separation and what factors help to do so.Finally,unlike with comparative studies applying the same methodology other studies we not only concentrate on the economic on equivalent longitudinal data in each country.Most consequences for women,but have a look at both genders. previous studies were conducted on a national level and The article is organized as follows.In A Typology of Fam- sometimes even use only cross-sectional data(Table 1). ily Support we develop a typology that distinguishes four So far there exist only two longitudinal country different configurations of family,market,and state institu- comparisons including more than three countries tions.Compared to general typologies of welfare regimes (Dewilde,2003;Uunk,2004).Besides that,research on like,e.g.,Esping-Andersen's(1990)three worlds of welfare the consequences of partnership dissolution is often capitalism,this typology is focused on different types of plagued by the small number of separations observed in family support.A Typology of Family Support also presents population-wide survey samples.For example,one of data about the five countries selected and asks whether the first comparative analyses for Germany(Burkhauser these countries are valid representatives of the typology. et al.,1990,1991)is based on 56 women and 45 men.As Hypotheses introduces our hypotheses,Data and Methodol- a consequence,country rankings of separation effects on ogy our data and methods.The results are presented in household income are not very stable and observed Results in two steps.First,a descriptive overview about differences between countries may as well be a result of income changes before and after separation is given for unreliable estimates.Furthermore,different studies use both men and women in all selected countries.This over- different methods of analysis,as Table I notes,which is view suggests a certain impact function on how separation another source of variation that makes substantive con- affects individual income trajectories.In a second step,this clusions difficult.Finally,many studies focus on women impact function is included in a multivariate panel model alone,although inequalities resulting from partnership and the hypotheses from Hypotheses are tested sequentially. dissolution are most clearly visible by comparing men's Discussion concludes with a discussion of the main results and women's income development.In sum,there is still in the light of the proposed typology of family support. a demand for comparative analyses based on greater number of cases than in previous studies for both genders and using the same methodology for each country. A Typology of Family Support Such a comparative analysis is most easily done with a cross-national survey like the European Community To what extent families and partnerships are supported Household Panel (ECHP)that uses equivalent instru- and promoted by state and society varies among differ- ments in each country.Unfortunately,the current ver- ent countries.Historically,two ways of ensuring the sion of the ECHP includes only a small number of welfare of families have emerged:some welfare states separations and divorces for each country as the analyses primarily provide monetary transfers and fiscal relief, by Uunk (2004)and Dewilde (2003)show.Instead,this while others focus on public infrastructure enabling article uses a similar approach to Burkhauser et al. family members to participate in the labour market. (2001),who succeeded in creating a cross-national With respect to partnership dissolution another task of equivalent file from several independent national house- the state is to enact laws,which protect children and hold panels.Starting from a typology of family support former partners from negative economic consequences. we select five countries(Belgium,Germany,Great Brit- The market,in turn,can secure individual welfare by ain,Italy,and Sweden),in which such panel studies exist providing opportunities to earn one's keep.Finally,family since several years.Even if each panel wave observes only and social networks can offer social and financial support, few separations and divorces,it is possible to collect a suf- especially in case of separation or divorce. ficient number of cases over time with such long-running In a former article,Andref(2003)suggested a typol- surveys.Another advantage of this approach is that each ogy of family support in industrialized countries, separated individual is represented in the data with a which shows how the particular national configuration long time-series ofobservations before and after separation. of state,market,and family influences the economic Using suitable statistical methods this enables us to consequences of separation and divorce.One dimen- study not only the short-term(before and after)changes sion of this typology is public policy orientation and found in most other studies,but also the long-term distinguishes between extensive and rudimentary

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 535 family, market, and state institutions that moderates the economic effects of partnership dissolution. Although such institutional explanations are both plausible and popular, they have not been tested very often with comparative studies applying the same methodology on equivalent longitudinal data in each country. Most previous studies were conducted on a national level and sometimes even use only cross-sectional data (Table 1). So far there exist only two longitudinal country comparisons including more than three countries (Dewilde, 2003; Uunk, 2004). Besides that, research on the consequences of partnership dissolution is often plagued by the small number of separations observed in population-wide survey samples. For example, one of the first comparative analyses for Germany (Burkhauser et al., 1990, 1991) is based on 56 women and 45 men. As a consequence, country rankings of separation effects on household income are not very stable and observed differences between countries may as well be a result of unreliable estimates. Furthermore, different studies use different methods of analysis, as Table 1 notes, which is another source of variation that makes substantive con￾clusions difficult. Finally, many studies focus on women alone, although inequalities resulting from partnership dissolution are most clearly visible by comparing men’s and women’s income development. In sum, there is still a demand for comparative analyses based on greater number of cases than in previous studies for both genders and using the same methodology for each country. Such a comparative analysis is most easily done with a cross-national survey like the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) that uses equivalent instru￾ments in each country. Unfortunately, the current ver￾sion of the ECHP includes only a small number of separations and divorces for each country as the analyses by Uunk (2004) and Dewilde (2003) show. Instead, this article uses a similar approach to Burkhauser et al. (2001), who succeeded in creating a cross-national equivalent file from several independent national house￾hold panels. Starting from a typology of family support we select five countries (Belgium, Germany, Great Brit￾ain, Italy, and Sweden), in which such panel studies exist since several years. Even if each panel wave observes only few separations and divorces, it is possible to collect a suf￾ficient number of cases over time with such long-running surveys. Another advantage of this approach is that each separated individual is represented in the data with a long time-series of observations before and after separation. Using suitable statistical methods this enables us to study not only the short-term (before and after) changes found in most other studies, but also the long-term consequences. It is an important question, from both a practical and a theoretical point of view, whether income losses can be compensated in the years following separation and what factors help to do so. Finally, unlike other studies we not only concentrate on the economic consequences for women, but have a look at both genders. The article is organized as follows. In A Typology of Fam￾ily Support we develop a typology that distinguishes four different configurations of family, market, and state institu￾tions. Compared to general typologies of welfare regimes like, e.g., Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three worlds of welfare capitalism, this typology is focused on different types of family support. A Typology of Family Support also presents data about the five countries selected and asks whether these countries are valid representatives of the typology. Hypotheses introduces our hypotheses, Data and Methodol￾ogy our data and methods. The results are presented in Results in two steps. First, a descriptive overview about income changes before and after separation is given for both men and women in all selected countries. This over￾view suggests a certain impact function on how separation affects individual income trajectories. In a second step, this impact function is included in a multivariate panel model and the hypotheses from Hypotheses are tested sequentially. Discussion concludes with a discussion of the main results in the light of the proposed typology of family support. A Typology of Family Support To what extent families and partnerships are supported and promoted by state and society varies among differ￾ent countries. Historically, two ways of ensuring the welfare of families have emerged: some welfare states primarily provide monetary transfers and fiscal relief, while others focus on public infrastructure enabling family members to participate in the labour market. With respect to partnership dissolution another task of the state is to enact laws, which protect children and former partners from negative economic consequences. The market, in turn, can secure individual welfare by providing opportunities to earn one’s keep. Finally, family and social networks can offer social and financial support, especially in case of separation or divorce. In a former article, Andreß (2003) suggested a typol￾ogy of family support in industrialized countries, which shows how the particular national configuration of state, market, and family influences the economic consequences of separation and divorce. One dimen￾sion of this typology is public policy orientation and distinguishes between extensive and rudimentary

536 ANDREB,BORGLOH,BROCKEL,GIESSELMANN,AND HUMMELSHEIM family policies.2As already mentioned,extensive fam- Andref assumes that these four types of family support ily policies can have two different orientations.If fam- create specific dependencies within the family,which in ily policies are only rudimentarily developed,either the case of separation or divorce may have negative economic market or the family has to step in.Including these consequences for the weaker partner.Using a term intro- subdivisions,four different models of family support duced by Orloff(1993),one can ask how much autonomy result: is granted to the weaker family members within each of 1.Welfare states with an extensive family policy can be the four models.3 Obviously,gainful employment and found in continental European and North-European own income are the basis of financial autonomy.On the countries.There are two different ways of govern- basis of Andref's typology it can be supposed that there is mental support:either through financial compensa- little gender-specific division of labour in the dual earner tion for children and other dependent household model.Both partners have more or less equal chances to members in the form of cash transfers or tax relief or combine work and family life.In the two models of rudi- by support for sufficient care facilities and gainful mentary family policy,a definite form of labour division employment for all adult family members.Accord- does not exist.It is rather left to the partners to coordinate ingly,Andref distinguishes between what he calls: employment and childcare.The model of traditional divi- sion of labour ranks in between,because on the one hand a.the model of traditional division of labour and a traditional division of labour is supported by granting b.the dual earner model. tax privileges for marriages with one principal earner and In the first model,a traditional gender-specific divi- by not offering sufficient full-time childcare facilities. sion of labour predominates.In most cases,men are Therefore full-time employment for a married mother is the main breadwinners,while women at most con- inefficient or utterly impossible.On the other hand this tribute a supplemental income,especially if they model affords a compatibility of childcare and work based have children.Given additional financial support on part-time employment of the mother. from the state for the dependent family members, Like every typology these four models of family sup- the male breadwinner's income will suffice for the port are 'Idealtypen'in a Weberian sense.They represent family's living.In contrast,employment of women hypothetical configurations of state,market,and family, is more supported in the dual earner model,and while the real world of nation states uses mixtures and childcare responsibilities are more evenly distrib- combinations of these models.Our comparative analysis uted between men and women.Family policy is ori- is based on data from Belgium,Germany,Great Britain, ented towards employment,thus sufficient care Italy,and Sweden.This selection was partly determined facilities for children and/or the elderly are offered. by the availability of adequate longitudinal data and Accordingly,double income households prevail. partly because preliminary analyses with aggregate data 2. Welfare states with a rudimentary family policy (AndreB,2003)indicated these countries as possible support families to a minor degree,if at all.This pol- representatives of the four models of family support.In icy orientation is dominant in the Anglophone and the following,we give a detailed account of each coun- Southern European countries.In countries with try's welfare mix and based on this information allocate rudimentary family policy,the few existing benefits each country to Andref's typology of family support. are established only to prevent poverty.Here the safeguard occurs either via the market or by the Belgium family,which AndreB calls a.the market model and Social policy in Belgium is family orientated,but its main focus is the traditional family with a male principal b.the model of extended family solidarity. earner.There are no special measures that help individu- The market model emphasizes individual freedom als coping with the economic consequences of separation of the members of a society and,therefore,prefers and divorce or with the situation of being a single parent private solutions based on the market to state inter- (Ruspini,2000:224).Extensive and generous family bene- vention in family matters.The model of extended fits contribute quite an extent to disposable household familial solidarity also prefers private solutions to income-independent of family constellation.Thus,child state intervention,but in this case the family net- allowances in Belgium constitute a large part of the work and its support capabilities play a greater role income package and social assistance benefits are the than the market. highest out of the five selected countries.The appreciation

536 ANDREß, BORGLOH, BRÖCKEL, GIESSELMANN, AND HUMMELSHEIM family policies.2 As already mentioned, extensive fam￾ily policies can have two different orientations. If fam￾ily policies are only rudimentarily developed, either the market or the family has to step in. Including these subdivisions, four different models of family support result: 1. Welfare states with an extensive family policy can be found in continental European and North-European countries. There are two different ways of govern￾mental support: either through financial compensa￾tion for children and other dependent household members in the form of cash transfers or tax relief or by support for sufficient care facilities and gainful employment for all adult family members. Accord￾ingly, Andreß distinguishes between what he calls: a. the model of traditional division of labour and b. the dual earner model. In the first model, a traditional gender-specific divi￾sion of labour predominates. In most cases, men are the main breadwinners, while women at most con￾tribute a supplemental income, especially if they have children. Given additional financial support from the state for the dependent family members, the male breadwinner’s income will suffice for the family’s living. In contrast, employment of women is more supported in the dual earner model, and childcare responsibilities are more evenly distrib￾uted between men and women. Family policy is ori￾ented towards employment, thus sufficient care facilities for children and/or the elderly are offered. Accordingly, double income households prevail. 2. Welfare states with a rudimentary family policy support families to a minor degree, if at all. This pol￾icy orientation is dominant in the Anglophone and Southern European countries. In countries with rudimentary family policy, the few existing benefits are established only to prevent poverty. Here the safeguard occurs either via the market or by the family, which Andreß calls a. the market model and b. the model of extended family solidarity. The market model emphasizes individual freedom of the members of a society and, therefore, prefers private solutions based on the market to state inter￾vention in family matters. The model of extended familial solidarity also prefers private solutions to state intervention, but in this case the family net￾work and its support capabilities play a greater role than the market. Andreß assumes that these four types of family support create specific dependencies within the family, which in case of separation or divorce may have negative economic consequences for the weaker partner. Using a term intro￾duced by Orloff (1993), one can ask how much autonomy is granted to the weaker family members within each of the four models.3 Obviously, gainful employment and own income are the basis of financial autonomy. On the basis of Andreß’s typology it can be supposed that there is little gender-specific division of labour in the dual earner model. Both partners have more or less equal chances to combine work and family life. In the two models of rudi￾mentary family policy, a definite form of labour division does not exist. It is rather left to the partners to coordinate employment and childcare. The model of traditional divi￾sion of labour ranks in between, because on the one hand a traditional division of labour is supported by granting tax privileges for marriages with one principal earner and by not offering sufficient full-time childcare facilities. Therefore full-time employment for a married mother is inefficient or utterly impossible. On the other hand this model affords a compatibility of childcare and work based on part-time employment of the mother. Like every typology these four models of family sup￾port are ‘Idealtypen’ in a Weberian sense. They represent hypothetical configurations of state, market, and family, while the real world of nation states uses mixtures and combinations of these models. Our comparative analysis is based on data from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden. This selection was partly determined by the availability of adequate longitudinal data and partly because preliminary analyses with aggregate data (Andreß, 2003) indicated these countries as possible representatives of the four models of family support. In the following, we give a detailed account of each coun￾try’s welfare mix and based on this information allocate each country to Andreß’s typology of family support.4 Belgium Social policy in Belgium is family orientated, but its main focus is the traditional family with a male principal earner. There are no special measures that help individu￾als coping with the economic consequences of separation and divorce or with the situation of being a single parent (Ruspini, 2000: 224). Extensive and generous family bene￾fits contribute quite an extent to disposable household income—independent of family constellation. Thus, child allowances in Belgium constitute a large part of the income package and social assistance benefits are the highest out of the five selected countries. The appreciation

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 537 of the family,in the way it is expressed by family benefits organized for somewhat older preschool children and on provided by the state,indicates that the family is a solid a part-time basis intended only to complement care work institution in Catholic Belgium(Fix,2000:308).The social within the family.Because of uncoordinated school and security system also has a strong family orientation in work hours and the lack of full-time day schools(Buchel terms of benefits and supplements.Besides financial trans- and Spief,2002),these problems continue when chil- fers,the state offers an excellent childcare system,which dren enter school.This places severe restrictions on the even includes care for toddlers.About one-third of all chil- employment opportunities for-in most cases-women dren aged up to three years and almost all children from (Ruspini,1999:95).Furthermore,the generous parental three to six years attend some kind of childcare facility. leave system (in terms of time and money)motivates In keeping with the preceding observations,it can be parents to retreat from the labour market for several said that Belgium has an extensive family policy:on the years and care for their children(Sainsbury,1999:194), one hand,with good support in terms of money for the at least until they can enter a preschool childcare facility. traditional male breadwinner model,which would Since it is predominantly women who make use of the suggest classifying Belgium as a representative of the parental leave system,female employment in Germany model of traditional division of labour;on the other is moderate and to a large extent part-time employment hand,there is a well-organized childcare infrastructure (Sainsbury,1999:131).As a result,Germany has the that enables women to work so that Belgium could be lowest percentage of dual earner and the highest per- assigned to the dual earner model (Andries,1996,1997). centage of single earner households,especially so for Nevertheless,from an empirical point of view,women families with children (Daly,2000:94).To conclude, are not as often employed as could be expected.From Germany is an adequate example for the model of tradi- 1980 to 2000 about 30-40 per cent of all women were tional division of labour. employed.This is the smallest female employment rate in comparison with the other countries (besides Italy). Great Britain Thus,Belgium somehow fits into both models. A'no interference'policy and a low level of public sector Germany involvement characterize the welfare system in Great Britain (Sims-Schouten,2002:270).Therefore,there is Germany belongs to those countries with an extensive no explicitly formulated policy on how to support fami- family policy.It acts on the assumption of traditional lies.Nevertheless,quite a few measures are taken in labour division and compensates for familial burdens. Great Britain to support families in different living condi- Although policy orientations changed somewhat in tions(Schmid,1996).Because government mainly inter- recent years,family policy is focused on the traditional venes in situations of crisis or dysfunction,support is two-parent family with an 'at-home'mother caring for means-tested rather than universal and the extent of sup- the children and,therefore,offers strong support for the port is rather limited.In most areas,Great Britain shows male breadwinner model (Daly,2000:81).Family policy only substandard support through monetary transfers has been rather generous in terms of benefits such as and tax credits (Neubauer,1993).In case of separation child allowances,social assistance benefits,and tax or divorce,there are no special benefits granted by the reliefs since the mid-1990s. state.Financial provision following divorce is a private The focus on a male breadwinner family can be seen matter,the amount of maintenance is rather low and in different life domains.Joint taxation for married part- often the liable parent does not pay the required sum at ners and the so-called Ehegattensplitting',in which all.Public childcare provision in Great Britain is poor, married couples are allowed to split their incomes especially for toddlers.In 2000,e.g.,only 2 per cent of all equally between both partners for tax purposes,impose children aged up to three years attended a childcare strong incentives to combine a large primary income, facility.Besides the low provision,the financial costs of usually the breadwinner's or man's income,with a com- childcare are often high. paratively small secondary income.Another example of In spite of insufficient opportunities to combine strong support for the male breadwinner model is the family and work,female labour market participation is limited German care system for children,disabled per- high.About 50 per cent of all British women are sons,and the elderly.Only a small proportion of chil- gainfully employed,which is the second highest dren aged up to three years attend a childcare facility employment rate in our comparative analysis.The (5 per cent at the maximum).Traditionally,day care is restrictions on mothers'employment,however,show

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 537 of the family, in the way it is expressed by family benefits provided by the state, indicates that the family is a solid institution in Catholic Belgium (Fix, 2000: 308). The social security system also has a strong family orientation in terms of benefits and supplements. Besides financial trans￾fers, the state offers an excellent childcare system, which even includes care for toddlers. About one-third of all chil￾dren aged up to three years and almost all children from three to six years attend some kind of childcare facility. In keeping with the preceding observations, it can be said that Belgium has an extensive family policy: on the one hand, with good support in terms of money for the traditional male breadwinner model, which would suggest classifying Belgium as a representative of the model of traditional division of labour; on the other hand, there is a well-organized childcare infrastructure that enables women to work so that Belgium could be assigned to the dual earner model (Andries, 1996, 1997). Nevertheless, from an empirical point of view, women are not as often employed as could be expected. From 1980 to 2000 about 30–40 per cent of all women were employed. This is the smallest female employment rate in comparison with the other countries (besides Italy). Thus, Belgium somehow fits into both models. Germany Germany belongs to those countries with an extensive family policy. It acts on the assumption of traditional labour division and compensates for familial burdens. Although policy orientations changed somewhat in recent years, family policy is focused on the traditional two-parent family with an ‘at-home’ mother caring for the children and, therefore, offers strong support for the male breadwinner model (Daly, 2000: 81). Family policy has been rather generous in terms of benefits such as child allowances, social assistance benefits, and tax reliefs since the mid-1990s. The focus on a male breadwinner family can be seen in different life domains. Joint taxation for married part￾ners and the so-called ‘Ehegattensplitting’, in which married couples are allowed to split their incomes equally between both partners for tax purposes, impose strong incentives to combine a large primary income, usually the breadwinner’s or man’s income, with a com￾paratively small secondary income. Another example of strong support for the male breadwinner model is the limited German care system for children, disabled per￾sons, and the elderly. Only a small proportion of chil￾dren aged up to three years attend a childcare facility (5 per cent at the maximum). Traditionally, day care is organized for somewhat older preschool children and on a part-time basis intended only to complement care work within the family. Because of uncoordinated school and work hours and the lack of full-time day schools (Büchel and Spieß, 2002), these problems continue when chil￾dren enter school. This places severe restrictions on the employment opportunities for—in most cases—women (Ruspini, 1999: 95). Furthermore, the generous parental leave system (in terms of time and money) motivates parents to retreat from the labour market for several years and care for their children (Sainsbury, 1999: 194), at least until they can enter a preschool childcare facility. Since it is predominantly women who make use of the parental leave system, female employment in Germany is moderate and to a large extent part-time employment (Sainsbury, 1999: 131). As a result, Germany has the lowest percentage of dual earner and the highest per￾centage of single earner households, especially so for families with children (Daly, 2000: 94). To conclude, Germany is an adequate example for the model of tradi￾tional division of labour. Great Britain A ‘no interference’ policy and a low level of public sector involvement characterize the welfare system in Great Britain (Sims-Schouten, 2002: 270). Therefore, there is no explicitly formulated policy on how to support fami￾lies. Nevertheless, quite a few measures are taken in Great Britain to support families in different living condi￾tions (Schmid, 1996). Because government mainly inter￾venes in situations of crisis or dysfunction, support is means-tested rather than universal and the extent of sup￾port is rather limited. In most areas, Great Britain shows only substandard support through monetary transfers and tax credits (Neubauer, 1993). In case of separation or divorce, there are no special benefits granted by the state. Financial provision following divorce is a private matter, the amount of maintenance is rather low and often the liable parent does not pay the required sum at all. Public childcare provision in Great Britain is poor, especially for toddlers. In 2000, e.g., only 2 per cent of all children aged up to three years attended a childcare facility. Besides the low provision, the financial costs of childcare are often high. In spite of insufficient opportunities to combine family and work, female labour market participation is high. About 50 per cent of all British women are gainfully employed, which is the second highest employment rate in our comparative analysis. The restrictions on mothers’ employment, however, show