《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源：The Economic Consequences of Partnership Dissolution— A Comparative Analysis of Panel Studies from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden

538 ANDREB,BORGLOH,BROCKEL,GIESSELMANN,AND HUMMELSHEIM in high rates of part-time working women,which employees and single parents in allocating childcare seems to be the only way to combine family and work facilities (The Clearinghouse on International Develop- without risking a longer career break(Ringen,1997). ments in Child,Youth and Family Policies,2003:6). During the 1990s about 40 per cent of all active women Furthermore,data on labour force participation reveal were working part-time,which is the highest rate that there is good provision of jobs for divorced women. among the five countries.Additionally,women have to Whereas only 30 per cent of all married women are gain- be satisfied with less income than men.Women's earn- fully employed,60 per cent of all divorced women have a ings as share of men's earnings are lower than in job(Eurostat,2003).Contrary to the divorced women, Belgium,Germany,and Sweden.We conclude that male breadwinners are able to extend and stabilize their Great Britain has a rudimentary family policy,focusing sources of economic independence after partnership dis- on private arrangements according to individual mar- solution.Furthermore,the system of post-marriage ali- ket resources.Therefore,Great Britain represents the mony is rudimentary compared to the other countries. market model. Claims are not determined by the standard of living experienced during marriage (Timoteo,1995:287).All Italy in all,Italy can be assigned to the model of extended The Italian welfare state contains elements of different family solidarity,because of its rudimentary family pol- icy and its strong focus on family networks in case of prototypes,with the family as the main source of social economic problems. security (The Clearinghouse on International Develop- ments in Child,Youth and Family Policies,2003:3). Provision of childcare facilities for toddlers (below 3 Sweden years of age)is poor,but the state provides care facilities Sweden may be characterized as a country with an for somewhat older children (over three years of age) extensive family policy.Support for children and com- and generous parental leave arrangements that at least in pensation for the economic costs of child rearing have principle allow adult family members to participate in been the focus of Swedish policy for decades.The extent the labour market independent of their parental obliga- of financial support for families is generally very high. tions(Dienel,1993:249).In this respect,Italian family Among the five countries,Sweden spends the highest policy includes elements of the dual earner model.How- share of GDP on cash benefits to families.There are no ever,these policy measures are not always available at special benefits for separated or divorced individuals the local level or not accepted by many families.As a except an advanced maintenance scheme for children. consequence,a traditional gendered division of labour is Theoretically,the law provides spousal maintenance,but still very common (Saraceno,2000:62). in fact it is unusual to make such claims(Saldeen,1995: One reason for this contradictory result is that mod- 493).Furthermore,various life transitions,which are ern aspects of family policy are embedded in a tradi- somewhat critical in terms of income,are financially tional welfare system that is based on the idea of supported by the state:e.g.founding a home,giving extended family solidarity.The Italian constitution birth to a child,and educating children.There is a lot of obliges all citizens to provide alimony and care for fam- support for extended,paid,and job-protected parental ily members in need.s Thereby,the state determines leave.Fathers explicitly have the right to paternity leave 'family'as the basic unit of the welfare state.These insti- after birth of a child(this option has already been intro- tutionalized interdependencies motivate a (gendered) duced in 1974)and part of parental leave is reserved for division of labour within the family (Dienel,1993:93), each parent,so that both partners have incentives to take although provision is made for public childcare facilities part(Ministry of Health and Social Affairs,2002:2). and mothers need not stay at home.In addition,by The Swedish welfare system encourages the employ- granting tax deductions for dependent spouses and pro- ment of women as well as the reconciliation of work and viding access to free health care for families with house- family life for women and men.The Swedish system tra- hold incomes below a certain threshold,the state ditionally focuses on dual earner families.Women's provides monetary incentives for potential secondary employment is nearly as high as men's,even among earners not at work.Thus,it is harder for secondary married individuals with children below the age of six earners to establish an autonomous economic basis. (Sainsbury,1999:217).On the one hand this is due to a After partnership dissolution,women are more likely socially accepted consensus of gender equity,and on the to benefit from infrastructural efforts:the state privileges other hand this is due to a well-established system of

538 ANDREß, BORGLOH, BRÖCKEL, GIESSELMANN, AND HUMMELSHEIM in high rates of part-time working women, which seems to be the only way to combine family and work without risking a longer career break (Ringen, 1997). During the 1990s about 40 per cent of all active women were working part-time, which is the highest rate among the five countries. Additionally, women have to be satisfied with less income than men. Women’s earn￾ings as share of men’s earnings are lower than in Belgium, Germany, and Sweden. We conclude that Great Britain has a rudimentary family policy, focusing on private arrangements according to individual mar￾ket resources. Therefore, Great Britain represents the market model. Italy The Italian welfare state contains elements of different prototypes, with the family as the main source of social security (The Clearinghouse on International Develop￾ments in Child, Youth and Family Policies, 2003: 3). Provision of childcare facilities for toddlers (below 3 years of age) is poor, but the state provides care facilities for somewhat older children (over three years of age) and generous parental leave arrangements that at least in principle allow adult family members to participate in the labour market independent of their parental obliga￾tions (Dienel, 1993: 249). In this respect, Italian family policy includes elements of the dual earner model. How￾ever, these policy measures are not always available at the local level or not accepted by many families. As a consequence, a traditional gendered division of labour is still very common (Saraceno, 2000: 62). One reason for this contradictory result is that mod￾ern aspects of family policy are embedded in a tradi￾tional welfare system that is based on the idea of extended family solidarity. The Italian constitution obliges all citizens to provide alimony and care for fam￾ily members in need.5 Thereby, the state determines ‘family’ as the basic unit of the welfare state. These insti￾tutionalized interdependencies motivate a (gendered) division of labour within the family (Dienel, 1993: 93), although provision is made for public childcare facilities and mothers need not stay at home. In addition, by granting tax deductions for dependent spouses and pro￾viding access to free health care for families with house￾hold incomes below a certain threshold, the state provides monetary incentives for potential secondary earners not at work. Thus, it is harder for secondary earners to establish an autonomous economic basis. After partnership dissolution, women are more likely to benefit from infrastructural efforts: the state privileges employees and single parents in allocating childcare facilities (The Clearinghouse on International Develop￾ments in Child, Youth and Family Policies, 2003: 6). Furthermore, data on labour force participation reveal that there is good provision of jobs for divorced women. Whereas only 30 per cent of all married women are gain￾fully employed, 60 per cent of all divorced women have a job (Eurostat, 2003). Contrary to the divorced women, male breadwinners are able to extend and stabilize their sources of economic independence after partnership dis￾solution. Furthermore, the system of post-marriage ali￾mony is rudimentary compared to the other countries. Claims are not determined by the standard of living experienced during marriage (Timoteo, 1995: 287). All in all, Italy can be assigned to the model of extended family solidarity, because of its rudimentary family pol￾icy and its strong focus on family networks in case of economic problems. Sweden Sweden may be characterized as a country with an extensive family policy. Support for children and com￾pensation for the economic costs of child rearing have been the focus of Swedish policy for decades. The extent of financial support for families is generally very high. Among the five countries, Sweden spends the highest share of GDP on cash benefits to families. There are no special benefits for separated or divorced individuals except an advanced maintenance scheme for children. Theoretically, the law provides spousal maintenance, but in fact it is unusual to make such claims (Saldeen, 1995: 493). Furthermore, various life transitions, which are somewhat critical in terms of income, are financially supported by the state: e.g. founding a home, giving birth to a child, and educating children. There is a lot of support for extended, paid, and job-protected parental leave. Fathers explicitly have the right to paternity leave after birth of a child (this option has already been intro￾duced in 1974) and part of parental leave is reserved for each parent, so that both partners have incentives to take part (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2002: 2). The Swedish welfare system encourages the employ￾ment of women as well as the reconciliation of work and family life for women and men. The Swedish system tra￾ditionally focuses on dual earner families. Women’s employment is nearly as high as men’s, even among married individuals with children below the age of six (Sainsbury, 1999: 217). On the one hand this is due to a socially accepted consensus of gender equity, and on the other hand this is due to a well-established system of

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 539 childcare,which provides places for at least three quarters children after separation(also usually the wife)can be of all toddlers and nearly all infants.Nevertheless,about characterized as the economically more dependent part- one quarter of all economically active women work ner.Thus,we assume that part-time,which in Sweden means about 30 hours a week.Part-time work is a female domain in Sweden. Hib:Women-compared to men-more often expe- rience more severe income losses. Furthermore,the Swedish system of individual taxation generally encourages women to enter the labour market Basically,two mechanisms contribute to these ine- and wage differences between men and women are qualities(Holden and Smock,1991).(i)Income sharing small.All in all,Sweden may be said to fit the dual earner during partnership allows women to participate in model of our typology. men's market incomes,which are on average higher than women's market incomes.Maintenance payments Hypotheses after separation,if they exist at all,hardly compensate for the loss of this economic support.(ii)If children It is no surprise that separation often leads to increased exist,economic needs are higher for the resident parent financial strain for the involved partners.On the one after separation and this in most cases is the mother.She hand,they lose the advantage of household sharing and has to care for more economically dependent household using common resources.Sorensen (1994:178)has members and because of this she is often restricted in estimated these losses of economies of scale between 27 her earnings capacities.Besides that,the risk that the res- and 36 per cent.On the other hand,both partners have ident parent does not receive half of the child mainte- to deal with new costs including,e.g.,expenses for legal nance costs from the non-resident liable parent is high. procedures or for setting up a new home.Furthermore, Apparently,the gender gap in post-separation incomes would not exist if women's employment were as high as economic inactivity of one partner can no longer be men's,if women would achieve the same level of income absorbed by the 'family-income'of the main earner. Correspondingly,most empirical research on separation as men,if childcare were no restriction for gainful and divorce shows that partnership dissolution is com- employment(or would otherwise be remunerated),and if bined with income changes for both genders.In line the costs of childcare were equally shared by both parents. with this research,we expect that In such a perfect world,women and men would be eco- nomically autonomous.However,from our theoretical .Hia:Separation or divorce causes income changes for discussion we learned that gender-specific roles in part- both partners. nerships exist in most European countries and therefore However,research on separation and divorce has also women often have fewer resources than men.Besides shown an unequal distribution of these income changes. that,the national context is more or less supportive for Especially the economically more dependent partner has women's economic autonomy.Table 2 presents some to deal with income losses rather than income gains. stylized facts about the amount of cash transfers to fami- Women in general or the partner who cares for the lies,the availability of public childcare,and the extent of Table 2 Women's economic autonomy (country ranking) Economic autonomy Sweden(3) Belgium(2) Germany (2) Great Britain(2) Italy(1) Cash transfers Family cash benefits ++ 0 0 Child benefits ++ Social assistance 0 0 Public childcare 0-to 3-year olds ++ 3-to 6-year olds 0 0 Women's employment Employment rate ++ 0 + Low part-time employment + 0 0 ++ Economic autonomy:3,high;2,middle:1,low. Rank compared to five-country mean:-,very low;low;0,average;high;++very high

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 539 childcare, which provides places for at least three quarters of all toddlers and nearly all infants. Nevertheless, about one quarter of all economically active women work part-time, which in Sweden means about 30 hours a week. Part-time work is a female domain in Sweden. Furthermore, the Swedish system of individual taxation generally encourages women to enter the labour market and wage differences between men and women are small. All in all, Sweden may be said to fit the dual earner model of our typology. Hypotheses It is no surprise that separation often leads to increased financial strain for the involved partners. On the one hand, they lose the advantage of household sharing and using common resources. Sørensen (1994: 178) has estimated these losses of economies of scale between 27 and 36 per cent. On the other hand, both partners have to deal with new costs including, e.g., expenses for legal procedures or for setting up a new home. Furthermore, economic inactivity of one partner can no longer be absorbed by the ‘family-income’ of the main earner. Correspondingly, most empirical research on separation and divorce shows that partnership dissolution is com￾bined with income changes for both genders. In line with this research, we expect that • H1a: Separation or divorce causes income changes for both partners. However, research on separation and divorce has also shown an unequal distribution of these income changes. Especially the economically more dependent partner has to deal with income losses rather than income gains. Women in general or the partner who cares for the children after separation (also usually the wife) can be characterized as the economically more dependent part￾ner. Thus, we assume that • H1b: Women – compared to men –more often expe￾rience more severe income losses. Basically, two mechanisms contribute to these ine￾qualities (Holden and Smock, 1991). (i) Income sharing during partnership allows women to participate in men’s market incomes, which are on average higher than women’s market incomes. Maintenance payments after separation, if they exist at all, hardly compensate for the loss of this economic support. (ii) If children exist, economic needs are higher for the resident parent after separation and this in most cases is the mother. She has to care for more economically dependent household members and because of this she is often restricted in her earnings capacities. Besides that, the risk that the res￾ident parent does not receive half of the child mainte￾nance costs from the non-resident liable parent is high. Apparently, the gender gap in post-separation incomes would not exist if women’s employment were as high as men’s, if women would achieve the same level of income as men, if childcare were no restriction for gainful employment (or would otherwise be remunerated), and if the costs of childcare were equally shared by both parents. In such a perfect world, women and men would be eco￾nomically autonomous. However, from our theoretical discussion we learned that gender-specific roles in part￾nerships exist in most European countries and therefore women often have fewer resources than men. Besides that, the national context is more or less supportive for women’s economic autonomy. Table 2 presents some stylized facts about the amount of cash transfers to fami￾lies, the availability of public childcare, and the extent of Table 2 Women’s economic autonomy (country ranking) Economic autonomy: 3, high; 2, middle; 1, low. Rank compared to five-country mean: --, very low; –, low; 0, average; + high; ++, very high. Economic autonomy Sweden (3) Belgium (2) Germany (2) Great Britain (2) Italy (1) Cash transfers Family cash benefits ++ 0 – 0 -- Child benefits 0 ++ – – -- Social assistance 0 + – 0 -- Public childcare 0- to 3-year olds ++ + -- -- -- 3- to 6-year olds 0 + 0 -- + Women’s employment Employment rate ++ – 0 + -- Low part-time employment + 0 0 -- ++

540 ANDREB,BORGLOH,BROCKEL,GIESSELMANN,AND HUMMELSHEIM women's employment in Sweden,Belgium,Germany, Even if H2 turns out to be true,the question remains Great Britain,and Italy.Table 2 ranks the countries with whether this is a temporary or a permanent phenome- respect to each indicator and the level of overall economic non.In other words,does the economic position of autonomy of women within each country. women recover to former pre-separation levels or does it Sweden scores highest on this index of economic remain on a level below pre-separation standards?When autonomy because most indicators show above average a partnership breaks down,support from the extended values.Italy for the same reasons scores lowest,while it family and the welfare state may form a safety net secur- is hard to differentiate Belgium,Germany,and Great ing a minimum standard of living.However,in the long Britain,which range in between Sweden and Italy. run,only own gainful employment guarantees that sepa- Belgian women,e.g.,show below average employment rated individuals participate in the income prospects of rates,although the state offers an excellent infrastructure the general population.Another important factor may of childcare.If they gain economic independence,they be repartnering. do so because of generous cash transfers.Cash transfers In our empirical analysis,we distinguish between and childcare infrastructure in Germany are lower than short-and long-term income changes for women.Given in Belgium,but German women are more often gain- the already high labour market participation of Swedish fully employed and may,therefore,experience the same women and the generous cash transfers of the Belgian amount of economic autonomy as Belgian women.The welfare state for families and individuals in need same is true for British women,where employment rates (Table 2),we expect the short-term consequences of are even higher than in Belgium and Germany,although separation for women in both countries to be compara- employment to a much larger degree is part-time,possi- tively low.The opposite is true for Italy where the safety bly because of the meagre system of childcare.If,as this net at best is built up by the extended family and not by summary suggests,economic autonomy of women is the welfare state with its rudimentary benefits for fami- highest in Sweden,the gender gap in post-separation lies.Therefore,concerning negative short-term conse- incomes should be the smallest in Sweden.This should quences,we expect the following country ranking: also be true for Swedish mothers,not only because of the extensive childcare infrastructure in Sweden,but also .H3:Italy (highest),Germany,Great Britain,Belgium, because Swedish men more often than men from other Sweden (lowest). countries live with children after separation,as we will Concerning the long-term consequences,again see in our later empirical analysis. Swedish and Belgian women seem to be better off, .H2:In Sweden the gender gap in post-separation either because their participation rate is already high or income is low,while gender inequality with regard to because an extensive infrastructure of childcare is income is high in Germany,Great Britain,and Belgium, available that at least in principle allows mothers' and especially high in Italy. employment.On the other hand,high female partici- pation rates before separation in Sweden imply that Up to now,our hypotheses focus on the average increased employment after separation will induce women and the average man in each country.This is only minor income gains.Similarly,it is difficult to clearly a simplification,because the concomitant income make a prognosis for Belgium.On the one hand,the changes during the course of separation depend on childcare system clearly provides employment oppor- many individual circumstances:whether the person is tunities for mothers.On the other hand,generous fam- employed before and/or after separation,whether she/he ily benefits,as they are typical for the Belgian welfare has to care for children,how she/he copes with the new state,may as well be an incentive for mothers to stay at situation,which may be easier for younger and more home.In contrast to Sweden and Belgium,average educated individuals,and so on.All of these individual female participation rates in Germany and high part- factors should be controlled for as far as it is possible time employment in Great Britain do make increased within the comparative framework.Since we use inde- employment after separation a rewarding option,espe- pendent national household panels,we must limit the cially because cash transfers in both countries are com- following analysis to a few selected control variables, paratively low(Table 2).Therefore, namely education,age,employment status,and parental obligations,which we were able to measure equivalently .H:We have no a priori hypothesis about which between the different data sets (for more details see the country scores best concerning the long-term conse- following section). quences of separation

540 ANDREß, BORGLOH, BRÖCKEL, GIESSELMANN, AND HUMMELSHEIM women’s employment in Sweden, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy.6 Table 2 ranks the countries with respect to each indicator and the level of overall economic autonomy of women within each country. Sweden scores highest on this index of economic autonomy because most indicators show above average values. Italy for the same reasons scores lowest, while it is hard to differentiate Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain, which range in between Sweden and Italy. Belgian women, e.g., show below average employment rates, although the state offers an excellent infrastructure of childcare. If they gain economic independence, they do so because of generous cash transfers. Cash transfers and childcare infrastructure in Germany are lower than in Belgium, but German women are more often gain￾fully employed and may, therefore, experience the same amount of economic autonomy as Belgian women. The same is true for British women, where employment rates are even higher than in Belgium and Germany, although employment to a much larger degree is part-time, possi￾bly because of the meagre system of childcare. If, as this summary suggests, economic autonomy of women is highest in Sweden, the gender gap in post-separation incomes should be the smallest in Sweden. This should also be true for Swedish mothers, not only because of the extensive childcare infrastructure in Sweden, but also because Swedish men more often than men from other countries live with children after separation, as we will see in our later empirical analysis. • H2: In Sweden the gender gap in post-separation income is low, while gender inequality with regard to income is high in Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium, and especially high in Italy. Up to now, our hypotheses focus on the average women and the average man in each country. This is clearly a simplification, because the concomitant income changes during the course of separation depend on many individual circumstances: whether the person is employed before and/or after separation, whether she/he has to care for children, how she/he copes with the new situation, which may be easier for younger and more educated individuals, and so on. All of these individual factors should be controlled for as far as it is possible within the comparative framework. Since we use inde￾pendent national household panels, we must limit the following analysis to a few selected control variables, namely education, age, employment status, and parental obligations, which we were able to measure equivalently between the different data sets (for more details see the following section). Even if H2 turns out to be true, the question remains whether this is a temporary or a permanent phenome￾non. In other words, does the economic position of women recover to former pre-separation levels or does it remain on a level below pre-separation standards? When a partnership breaks down, support from the extended family and the welfare state may form a safety net secur￾ing a minimum standard of living. However, in the long run, only own gainful employment guarantees that sepa￾rated individuals participate in the income prospects of the general population. Another important factor may be repartnering. In our empirical analysis, we distinguish between short- and long-term income changes for women. Given the already high labour market participation of Swedish women and the generous cash transfers of the Belgian welfare state for families and individuals in need (Table 2), we expect the short-term consequences of separation for women in both countries to be compara￾tively low. The opposite is true for Italy where the safety net at best is built up by the extended family and not by the welfare state with its rudimentary benefits for fami￾lies. Therefore, concerning negative short-term conse￾quences, we expect the following country ranking: • H3: Italy (highest), Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Sweden (lowest). Concerning the long-term consequences, again Swedish and Belgian women seem to be better off, either because their participation rate is already high or because an extensive infrastructure of childcare is available that at least in principle allows mothers’ employment. On the other hand, high female partici￾pation rates before separation in Sweden imply that increased employment after separation will induce only minor income gains. Similarly, it is difficult to make a prognosis for Belgium. On the one hand, the childcare system clearly provides employment oppor￾tunities for mothers. On the other hand, generous fam￾ily benefits, as they are typical for the Belgian welfare state, may as well be an incentive for mothers to stay at home. In contrast to Sweden and Belgium, average female participation rates in Germany and high part￾time employment in Great Britain do make increased employment after separation a rewarding option, espe￾cially because cash transfers in both countries are com￾paratively low (Table 2). Therefore, • H4: We have no a priori hypothesis about which country scores best concerning the long-term conse￾quences of separation

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 541 Data and Methodology tion varies across waves,because not all questions are asked each survey year.'t'defines the year in which Sample these separations are observed.Since we want to com- For a detailed analysis of the economic consequences of pare the situation before and after separation,data of at partnership dissolution,it is essential to use longitudinal least one partner have to be available for years t-I data.We therefore created a thorough database of part- (before)and t (after separation).s If an individual fits nership dissolutions composed of different national these criteria,it becomes part of our study and all avail- household panels.The challenge was to make these dif- able panel information about this individual from the ferent data sets comparable across countries.In many years before and after separation is included in our data respects this worked out fine,in some respects-due to set (plus data from the year of separation).Further- limitations of the data-we had to be content with less more,we restrict the analysis to individuals between 18 perfect solutions.Table Al describes the main features of and 60 years of age to avoid a commingling of income the five national household panels used for creating our changes due to separation and income changes due to database.The Belgian,German,and British panel study retirement.Our data include 403 Belgian,1,437 German, offer a broad range of different income data,household 1,144 British,111 Italian,and 353 Swedish men and information,and socio-demographic characteristics of women,each contributing between 2 and 16 observa- each interviewed person.They were easily integrated into tions from their panel biography.Table 3 shows some our cross-national data set,while the Italian and Swedish of their characteristics. data were more problematic.The Banc of Italy Survey of As expected,we found only few cases of separation in Households'Income and Wealth,due to the initiator's Italy.Because of the few observations per individual in the interest,contains detailed information on income,but Italian panel,it is difficult to look at income changes over has rather poor data with respect to household composi- time.Therefore,Italy is not included in our multivariate tion or socio-demographic characteristics.Besides that, analyses.Another limitation of the Italian data concerns the panel section of this survey,which we use for our the type of partnership:it is only possible to identify mar- study,concerns only a small subsample of individuals, ital separations,but not break-ups of consensual unions. while the main survey consists of a series of repeated For Sweden we include both,but because of the limited cross-sections.Furthermore,individuals participating in information on marital status in the Swedish data we can- the panel section do not contribute more than three not tell these two apart.For the other countries where it is observations and then drop out of the panel.It seems as if possible to differentiate between consensual unions and not much emphasis is put on keeping the panel members marriages,the separations we look at are more often mar- motivated to take part continuously.The Swedish panel, ital break-ups than dissolutions of cohabitation. possibly because of unsteady funding,shows a lack of Furthermore,Table 3 shows that Italian and Swedish comparability over different panel waves,so that in some men and women are older on average than separating waves income data or data about the situation of the individuals in Germany,Belgium,or Great Britain at the household are missing. time of separation.For Italy,this is probably caused by Our group of interest are men and women experienc- the fact that separations included in the data set consist ing partnership dissolution.Separation is defined either of marital disruptions only,and people are usually older as separation of a consensual union or as separation of a when separating from marriage than when separating married couple.'For married couples we focus on sepa- from a consensual union.Besides that,British and Belgian ration and not on divorce because previous research individuals are more highly educated than German, (Andref and Gullner,2001)has shown that separation Swedish,and especially Italian individuals.10 is connected to more economic changes than legal Taking together part-time and full-time employment, divorce,which follows separation sometimes several Swedish (separated)women have the highest,Belgian years later,when the economic situation has already and Italian women the lowest employment rates in our stabilized.Separations were identified across the data set.It is striking that Great Britain is the only country, national panel data using similar criteria.If possible,we where almost one third of the men work part-time- combined information about marital status,different before and after a separation.Women also show the life events,and questions about household composi- highest part-time employment in Great Britain.Besides tion.In some surveys,only one of these types of infor- actual employment,it is interesting to see whether men's mation is available (e.g.,the Italian data include only and women's labour supply adapts to their new situation marital status),in others (e.g.,in Sweden)the informa- after separation.Comparing employment status before

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 541 Data and Methodology Sample For a detailed analysis of the economic consequences of partnership dissolution, it is essential to use longitudinal data. We therefore created a thorough database of part￾nership dissolutions composed of different national household panels. The challenge was to make these dif￾ferent data sets comparable across countries. In many respects this worked out fine, in some respects—due to limitations of the data—we had to be content with less perfect solutions. Table A1 describes the main features of the five national household panels used for creating our database. The Belgian, German, and British panel study offer a broad range of different income data, household information, and socio-demographic characteristics of each interviewed person. They were easily integrated into our cross-national data set, while the Italian and Swedish data were more problematic. The Banc of Italy Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth, due to the initiator’s interest, contains detailed information on income, but has rather poor data with respect to household composi￾tion or socio-demographic characteristics. Besides that, the panel section of this survey, which we use for our study, concerns only a small subsample of individuals, while the main survey consists of a series of repeated cross-sections. Furthermore, individuals participating in the panel section do not contribute more than three observations and then drop out of the panel. It seems as if not much emphasis is put on keeping the panel members motivated to take part continuously. The Swedish panel, possibly because of unsteady funding, shows a lack of comparability over different panel waves, so that in some waves income data or data about the situation of the household are missing. Our group of interest are men and women experienc￾ing partnership dissolution. Separation is defined either as separation of a consensual union or as separation of a married couple.7 For married couples we focus on sepa￾ration and not on divorce because previous research (Andreß and Güllner, 2001) has shown that separation is connected to more economic changes than legal divorce, which follows separation sometimes several years later, when the economic situation has already stabilized. Separations were identified across the national panel data using similar criteria. If possible, we combined information about marital status, different life events, and questions about household composi￾tion. In some surveys, only one of these types of infor￾mation is available (e.g., the Italian data include only marital status), in others (e.g., in Sweden) the informa￾tion varies across waves, because not all questions are asked each survey year. ‘t’ defines the year in which these separations are observed. Since we want to com￾pare the situation before and after separation, data of at least one partner have to be available for years t – 1 (before) and t (after separation).8 If an individual fits these criteria, it becomes part of our study and all avail￾able panel information about this individual from the years before and after separation is included in our data set (plus data from the year of separation). Further￾more, we restrict the analysis to individuals between 18 and 60 years of age to avoid a commingling of income changes due to separation and income changes due to retirement. Our data include 403 Belgian, 1,437 German, 1,144 British, 111 Italian, and 353 Swedish men and women, each contributing between 2 and 16 observa￾tions from their panel biography. Table 3 shows some of their characteristics. As expected, we found only few cases of separation in Italy. Because of the few observations per individual in the Italian panel, it is difficult to look at income changes over time. Therefore, Italy is not included in our multivariate analyses.9 Another limitation of the Italian data concerns the type of partnership: it is only possible to identify mar￾ital separations, but not break-ups of consensual unions. For Sweden we include both, but because of the limited information on marital status in the Swedish data we can￾not tell these two apart. For the other countries where it is possible to differentiate between consensual unions and marriages, the separations we look at are more often mar￾ital break-ups than dissolutions of cohabitation. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that Italian and Swedish men and women are older on average than separating individuals in Germany, Belgium, or Great Britain at the time of separation. For Italy, this is probably caused by the fact that separations included in the data set consist of marital disruptions only, and people are usually older when separating from marriage than when separating from a consensual union. Besides that, British and Belgian individuals are more highly educated than German, Swedish, and especially Italian individuals.10 Taking together part-time and full-time employment, Swedish (separated) women have the highest, Belgian and Italian women the lowest employment rates in our data set. It is striking that Great Britain is the only country, where almost one third of the men work part-time— before and after a separation. Women also show the highest part-time employment in Great Britain. Besides actual employment, it is interesting to see whether men’s and women’s labour supply adapts to their new situation after separation. Comparing employment status before

542 ANDREB,BORGLOH,BROCKEL,GIESSELMANN,AND HUMMELSHEIM Table 3 Separated men and women in the national household panels Belgium Germany Great Britain Italy Sweden Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Separations(N) 181 222 684 753 470 674 60 51 183 170 Marriages 94 126 405 444 263 383 60 51 Consensual unions 87 96 309 309 207 291 0 0 Age at separation(mean) 36 34 35 33 35 33 43 40 40 40 High education before separation(%) 37 30 17 13 43 28 8 6 17 26 Employment before separation(%) Not employed 14 36 13 28 15 31 49 13 26 Part-time employed 4 17 19 29 38 10 8 27 Full-time employed 82 48 84 52 56 31 92 41 80 47 Employment after separation(%) Not employed 14 38 15 28 20 31 10 35 9 18 Part-time employed 2 12 3 16 7 37 2 9 23 Full-time employed 84 51 83 56 53 33 90 53 82 59 After separation living with children 31 90 28 93 25 94 14 94 44 75 "In the Swedish data marital dissolution cannot be distinguished from separation of a consensual union. Data incude only separated fathers and mothers.Percentages add up to over%because parents can have joint custody,children from a new part- ner are included and because only one parent can be present in the data (cf.endnote 8). and after separation,we notice a trend towards more from labour,assets,public and private transfers(includ- employment in Italy and Sweden for women,while in ing child and spousal support)minus taxes and payable Belgium and Germany more women work full-time maintenance expenses.We have calculated monthly after separation.Since most men work full-time before disposable household income for each country as separation,further increases in employment are hardly analogously as possible(see Table A2 for details).Never- feasible.On the contrary,a reduction of employment for theless,our specific operationalization may differ from men is much more probable.However,this event is not panel to panel due to data restrictions.One restriction observed more often for men than for women. concerns the time period:if income was available only Childcare is largely the wife's responsibility.This is on a yearly basis,we divided the yearly amount by 12 to also the case when a partnership breaks down.Table 3 receive an average monthly income.Another restriction shows whether parents among our sample members live concerns tax payments:in some panels questions on together with children after separation (including own income taxes are asked,in others we only have a tax sim- and children from a new partner).As can be seen from ulation to estimate net income.1 Finally,the amount of these data,most mothers in all five countries live maintenance paid by liable persons and the amount together with children after separation.Sweden is the received by entitled persons do not agree in some cases. only country,where a significant proportion (44 per But given different question wordings and possible biased cent)of fathers cares for children after separation.The reports about support payments(Schaeffer et al.,1991), lowest proportion of fathers (14 per cent)living with no attempt was made to correct the data.All incomes children after separation is found in Italy. were measured in 1995 prices by using the official con- sumer price indices as provided by the International Income Indicators Monetary Fund(International Financial Statistics/Inter- national Monetary Fund,2002).Finally,incomes were Central focus of our analysis is the economic situation of converted from national currencies to Euros. the household before and after separation.The national Analysing the economic position of individuals within panel studies provide various income indicators for dif- the household context,i.e.using household instead of per- ferent time periods(year,month)both on the individual sonal incomes,is a difficult matter depending on various and on the household levels.For our analysis we use data methodological assumptions concerning income sharing, on monthly disposable household income.We define economies of scale,and different economic needs with disposable household income as the sum of income respect to age and other socio-demographic variables.We

542 ANDREß, BORGLOH, BRÖCKEL, GIESSELMANN, AND HUMMELSHEIM and after separation, we notice a trend towards more employment in Italy and Sweden for women, while in Belgium and Germany more women work full-time after separation. Since most men work full-time before separation, further increases in employment are hardly feasible. On the contrary, a reduction of employment for men is much more probable. However, this event is not observed more often for men than for women. Childcare is largely the wife’s responsibility. This is also the case when a partnership breaks down. Table 3 shows whether parents among our sample members live together with children after separation (including own and children from a new partner). As can be seen from these data, most mothers in all five countries live together with children after separation. Sweden is the only country, where a significant proportion (44 per cent) of fathers cares for children after separation. The lowest proportion of fathers (14 per cent) living with children after separation is found in Italy. Income Indicators Central focus of our analysis is the economic situation of the household before and after separation. The national panel studies provide various income indicators for dif￾ferent time periods (year, month) both on the individual and on the household levels. For our analysis we use data on monthly disposable household income. We define disposable household income as the sum of income from labour, assets, public and private transfers (includ￾ing child and spousal support) minus taxes and payable maintenance expenses. We have calculated monthly disposable household income for each country as analogously as possible (see Table A2 for details). Never￾theless, our specific operationalization may differ from panel to panel due to data restrictions. One restriction concerns the time period: if income was available only on a yearly basis, we divided the yearly amount by 12 to receive an average monthly income. Another restriction concerns tax payments: in some panels questions on income taxes are asked, in others we only have a tax sim￾ulation to estimate net income.11 Finally, the amount of maintenance paid by liable persons and the amount received by entitled persons do not agree in some cases. But given different question wordings and possible biased reports about support payments (Schaeffer et al., 1991), no attempt was made to correct the data. All incomes were measured in 1995 prices by using the official con￾sumer price indices as provided by the International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics/Inter￾national Monetary Fund, 2002). Finally, incomes were converted from national currencies to Euros. Analysing the economic position of individuals within the household context, i.e. using household instead of per￾sonal incomes, is a difficult matter depending on various methodological assumptions concerning income sharing, economies of scale, and different economic needs with respect to age and other socio-demographic variables. We Table 3 Separated men and women in the national household panels a In the Swedish data marital dissolution cannot be distinguished from separation of a consensual union. b Data include only separated fathers and mothers. Percentages add up to over 100%, because parents can have joint custody, because children from a new part￾ner are included and because only one parent can be present in the data (cf. endnote 8). Belgium Germany Great Britain Italy Sweden Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Separations (N) 181 222 684 753 470 674 60 51 183 170 Marriages 94 126 405 444 263 383 60 51 –a – Consensual unions 87 96 309 309 207 291 0 0 – – Age at separation (mean) 36 34 35 33 35 33 43 40 40 40 High education before separation (%) 37 30 17 13 43 28 8 6 17 26 Employment before separation (%) Not employed 14 36 13 28 15 31 7 49 13 26 Part-time employed 4 17 4 19 29 38 2 10 8 27 Full-time employed 82 48 84 52 56 31 92 41 80 47 Employment after separation (%) Not employed 14 38 15 28 20 31 10 35 9 18 Part-time employed 2 12 3 16 27 37 – 12 9 23 Full-time employed 84 51 83 56 53 33 90 53 82 59 After separation living with childrenb 31 90 28 93 25 94 14 94 44 75