123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 44 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES operations.3 The Tigers remain in the middle stage;Sendero has steadily fallen back since Abimael Guzman's capture in the fall of 1992. Fifth and finally,terrorism is often done for international effect. Consider examples of assassination.Killing a foreign arms broker may be one government's way to deter future arms sales to dissidents or enemies; this has been described as the reason Israeli hitmen allegedly went to Brussels in March 1990 and killed Gerald Bull,the expert in long-range supergun'development,who was building two fearsome tubes for the Iraqis.The tubes could have fired shells into Israel,Iran,etc.,which might explain the assassination of Bull.The killing could also have served as a warning,a form of political and military deterrence against any who would make international military sales to enemy states.This act of pro-state terror may have been effective. Another act of assassination affected Israel in a very different way:in October 1981 a large group of fundamentalist Muslims of the Al Jihad organization gunned down President Anwar Sadat on a reviewing stand in 80160 Egypt.They may not have expected revolution to result,but certainly they were striking a blow against a 'dreadful appeaser of Israel'who had dared to break ranks with the Arab world and make the Camp David treaty.?This act in Egypt was intended primarily against Sadat as President and, presumably,secondarily to harm Israel,and thirdly to threaten the entire Arab world lest it allow any further appeasement.The impact from these gunshots not only reached Sadat but an entire current in contemporary international relations.A veteran of the plot,Talaat Fouad Kassem,founder of the Pakistani-based journal Al Murabitoun,proclaimed in a headline in uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo his first issue:"Terror is a means to confront God's enemies.'s Since Sadat's death,there have been many Muslim-spawned assassinations and terror attacks in Egypt,Israel,Jordan,and other countries. Each such killing does more than destroy life.It is a 'positive'testament to the power of the killer's religion over concern for his liberty and life.It raises the flag of action and calls to others to follow and commit their own acts.It adds to the social polarization that occurs with terrorism,compelling citizens to declare themselves one way or the other on the issue of secular governance or life under the Sharia,law guided by the Koran.The perpetrator might also expect his acts to draw political support from persons in government,or pull in financial support from abroad.He may wish to prove himself so as to rise in the organization.He may wish to pay a debt, for training or schooling or cash payment,to a state such as Iran or Sudan for advancing Islamic revolutions. Having thus introduced the destructive and constructive dimensions of the five most common strategies employed by contemporary terrorism,it is now appropriate to further discuss each,and how they work together
operations.5 The Tigers remain in the middle stage; Sendero has steadily fallen back since Abimael Guzman’s capture in the fall of 1992. Fifth and finally, terrorism is often done for international effect. Consider examples of assassination. Killing a foreign arms broker may be one government’s way to deter future arms sales to dissidents or enemies; this has been described as the reason Israeli hitmen allegedly went to Brussels in March 1990 and killed Gerald Bull, the expert in long-range ‘supergun’ development, who was building two fearsome tubes for the Iraqis. The tubes could have fired shells into Israel, Iran, etc., which might explain the assassination of Bull. The killing could also have served as a warning, a form of political and military deterrence against any who would make international military sales to enemy states.6 This act of pro-state terror may have been effective. Another act of assassination affected Israel in a very different way: in October 1981 a large group of fundamentalist Muslims of the Al Jihad organization gunned down President Anwar Sadat on a reviewing stand in Egypt. They may not have expected revolution to result, but certainly they were striking a blow against a ‘dreadful appeaser of Israel’ who had dared to break ranks with the Arab world and make the Camp David treaty.7 This act in Egypt was intended primarily against Sadat as President and, presumably, secondarily to harm Israel, and thirdly to threaten the entire Arab world lest it allow any further appeasement. The impact from these gunshots not only reached Sadat but an entire current in contemporary international relations. A veteran of the plot, Talaat Fouad Kassem, founder of the Pakistani-based journal Al Murabitoun, proclaimed in a headline in his first issue: ‘Terror is a means to confront God’s enemies.’8 Since Sadat’s death, there have been many Muslim-spawned assassinations and terror attacks in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and other countries. Each such killing does more than destroy life. It is a ‘positive’ testament to the power of the killer’s religion over concern for his liberty and life. It raises the flag of action and calls to others to follow and commit their own acts. It adds to the social polarization that occurs with terrorism, compelling citizens to declare themselves one way or the other on the issue of secular governance or life under the Sharia, law guided by the Koran. The perpetrator might also expect his acts to draw political support from persons in government, or pull in financial support from abroad. He may wish to prove himself so as to rise in the organization. He may wish to pay a debt, for training or schooling or cash payment, to a state such as Iran or Sudan for advancing Islamic revolutions. Having thus introduced the destructive and constructive dimensions of the five most common strategies employed by contemporary terrorism, it is now appropriate to further discuss each, and how they work together. 44 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 44 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 45 Spreading Chaos The world's terrorist groups are enjoying successes in the first and most general way of their business -the spreading of chaos.Numbers of incidents world-wide are not rising,but each act is having an impact,and the destructiveness of many acts is greater than before.The world became habituated to the hijacking of passenger airliners in the 1970s but felt it had seen the passing of such terrorist theater in the 1980s.So terrorists turned to much deadlier means,blowing up airliners in flight to yield unprecedented fatality rates.A Canadian airliner disappeared beneath the surface of the North Atlantic at night in 1985,taking 328 unwitting victims,probably murdered to attract attention to the cause of Sikhs fighting in India.A UTA airliner was destroyed over Chad in September 1989;a French judge has indicted four Libyan officials for the act,which killed 171,including seven Americans.Pan Am 103 blew up over Scotland in December 1988, s10 qwadas 80:60u uoo yueys]q papeojumod apparently to satisfy Libya,or both Libya and Iran(which had itself lost a passenger liner that flew too near a US warship in the Persian Gulf).A Colombian airliner was apparently downed by narcotraffickers in order to kill one passenger.Suicide bombers of the Algerian and Islamic Groupe Islamique Armee(GIA)nearly succeeded during 1995 with a plan to load an Air France liner with fuel and detonate explosives in the cockpit as it passed over Paris;they expected to kill hundreds inside and outside the plane.Most of these incidents killed many times more people than some states lost soldiers in the fighting in the 1991 Gulf War,even if each act was less disruptive than such a war.All these acts had occurred before the now- infamous date of 11 September 2001. The personal and political damage is indeed widespread.Ill effects radiate out like spokes from the hub,and include general fear of travel, disinclination to attend public events,distrust of one's own government because of its inability to protect citizens,and even racialist dread of foreign peoples who support or are alleged to support international terrorists Hijackings,complete with lists of political demands read over the media, yielded one sort of disorientation and despair.When explosions go entirely unclaimed,this yields another kind of fear.Some cases involve multiple claims,furthering confusion and making talk of retaliation rather empty. Finally,there have been bombings-of airliners,and the truck bombing of the Jewish community center in Argentina in 1994-never accompanied by a claim of credit.Instead of distress over the presence of a known but loose lethal enemy,the public thus faces the fear of knowing only that terrorists have struck,and may do so again,for reasons that are utterly unknown.As terror attacks grow more lethal,and employ new and hideous means such as gas and possibly biological weapons,the general fears they cause may increase. X
Spreading Chaos The world’s terrorist groups are enjoying successes in the first and most general way of their business – the spreading of chaos. Numbers of incidents world-wide are not rising, but each act is having an impact, and the destructiveness of many acts is greater than before. The world became habituated to the hijacking of passenger airliners in the 1970s but felt it had seen the passing of such terrorist theater in the 1980s. So terrorists turned to much deadlier means, blowing up airliners in flight to yield unprecedented fatality rates. A Canadian airliner disappeared beneath the surface of the North Atlantic at night in 1985, taking 328 unwitting victims, probably murdered to attract attention to the cause of Sikhs fighting in India. A UTA airliner was destroyed over Chad in September 1989; a French judge has indicted four Libyan officials for the act, which killed 171, including seven Americans. Pan Am 103 blew up over Scotland in December 1988, apparently to satisfy Libya, or both Libya and Iran (which had itself lost a passenger liner that flew too near a US warship in the Persian Gulf). A Colombian airliner was apparently downed by narcotraffickers in order to kill one passenger. Suicide bombers of the Algerian and Islamic Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) nearly succeeded during 1995 with a plan to load an Air France liner with fuel and detonate explosives in the cockpit as it passed over Paris; they expected to kill hundreds inside and outside the plane. Most of these incidents killed many times more people than some states lost soldiers in the fighting in the 1991 Gulf War, even if each act was less disruptive than such a war. All these acts had occurred before the nowinfamous date of 11 September 2001. The personal and political damage is indeed widespread. Ill effects radiate out like spokes from the hub, and include general fear of travel, disinclination to attend public events, distrust of one’s own government because of its inability to protect citizens, and even racialist dread of foreign peoples who support or are alleged to support international terrorists. Hijackings, complete with lists of political demands read over the media, yielded one sort of disorientation and despair. When explosions go entirely unclaimed, this yields another kind of fear. Some cases involve multiple claims, furthering confusion and making talk of retaliation rather empty. Finally, there have been bombings – of airliners, and the truck bombing of the Jewish community center in Argentina in 1994 – never accompanied by a claim of credit.9 Instead of distress over the presence of a known but loose lethal enemy, the public thus faces the fear of knowing only that terrorists have struck, and may do so again, for reasons that are utterly unknown. As terror attacks grow more lethal, and employ new and hideous means such as gas and possibly biological weapons, the general fears they cause may increase. FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 45 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 45 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 46 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES It is occasionally argued that terrorism does not ultimately succeed.A better argument would be that terrorism alone does not achieve power-and that argument offers but a limited truth."Terrorism is rarely employed by itself,without other accompanying strategies for gaining power.Calculating militants usually have other means as well.The Bolshevik,Castroite, Sandinista,and Palestinian revolutions are among the many that used terrorism to help create fundamental change and place new persons in power:Lenin,Castro,Ortega,and Arafat.In an interview marking the 25th anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre,terrorist principal Abu Daoud boasted of the success of his operation:Munich put the Palestinian cause inside every house',he correctly declared.Today there is a 'statelet' for the Palestinians. While terrorism functions as a strategy for gaining power it serves still better for something far easier -destroying the power of others.2 Terrorism's role in unsuccessful but devastating revolutions and in other political crises has been,and will be,immense.The life of central Paris was rent by bombing campaigns tied to the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction and its links to Syria and the East bloc services in 1986.3 The city reknitted itself,and even seemed fully restored,until another campaign,by Algerians,shattered Paris again during 1995 with one bloody public bombing after another.Scores of similar examples in the mid-1990s are at hand in other countries.Contemporary terrorism has a very high capacity for achieving its broadest and most typical first strategic objective,the wrecking of normalcy and political order. uojoe!f reysueyS]q papeoluMod Discrediting and Destroying Existing Government A second strategy of most terror groups is related but less wide:it is to discredit,diminish,or destroy a particular government,ruining its legitimacy and authority so as to replace it with a revolutionary government, whether left,right,religious,or other.This strategy is worked out with diverse kinds of effort.Two of the most commonplace are use of political propaganda,and use of political front groups. A skilled propagandist,Lenin believed that operating a newspaper was a multifaceted way of making inroads.'A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator,it is also a collective organizer',he noted in What Is To Be Done.Today his newspaper Iskra ('Spark')is forgotten;even its famous successor Pravda ('Truth')went broke in 1996 But Lenin's point was sound.As one infiltrator in the 1960s US terrorist group Weathermen discovered,selling their paper Prairie Fire on the streets was a way for a cadre to prove commitment,make contacts with prospective recruits,and also make a little money for the Weathermen.It is for such
It is occasionally argued that terrorism does not ultimately succeed.10 A better argument would be that terrorism alone does not achieve power – and that argument offers but a limited truth.11 Terrorism is rarely employed by itself, without other accompanying strategies for gaining power. Calculating militants usually have other means as well. The Bolshevik, Castroite, Sandinista, and Palestinian revolutions are among the many that used terrorism to help create fundamental change and place new persons in power: Lenin, Castro, Ortega, and Arafat. In an interview marking the 25th anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, terrorist principal Abu Daoud boasted of the success of his operation: ‘Munich put the Palestinian cause inside every house’, he correctly declared. Today there is a ‘statelet’ for the Palestinians. While terrorism functions as a strategy for gaining power it serves still better for something far easier – destroying the power of others.12 Terrorism’s role in unsuccessful but devastating revolutions and in other political crises has been, and will be, immense. The life of central Paris was rent by bombing campaigns tied to the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction and its links to Syria and the East bloc services in 1986.13 The city reknitted itself, and even seemed fully restored, until another campaign, by Algerians, shattered Paris again during 1995 with one bloody public bombing after another. Scores of similar examples in the mid-1990s are at hand in other countries. Contemporary terrorism has a very high capacity for achieving its broadest and most typical first strategic objective, the wrecking of normalcy and political order. Discrediting and Destroying Existing Government A second strategy of most terror groups is related but less wide: it is to discredit, diminish, or destroy a particular government, ruining its legitimacy and authority so as to replace it with a revolutionary government, whether left, right, religious, or other. This strategy is worked out with diverse kinds of effort. Two of the most commonplace are use of political propaganda, and use of political front groups. A skilled propagandist, Lenin believed that operating a newspaper was a multifaceted way of making inroads. ‘A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer’, he noted in What Is To Be Done. Today his newspaper Iskra (‘Spark’) is forgotten; even its famous successor Pravda (‘Truth’) went broke in 1996. But Lenin’s point was sound. As one infiltrator in the 1960s US terrorist group Weathermen discovered, selling their paper Prairie Fire on the streets was a way for a cadre to prove commitment, make contacts with prospective recruits, and also make a little money for the Weathermen. It is for such 46 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 46 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 47 reasons,as well as for the content of the newspaper,that dozens of terrorist groups today publish.The IRA's An Phoblacht ('Republican News')is available from 58 Parnell Square in Dublin;it sells throughout Europe,can be purchased in New York,and is available on the Internet.Its stories,in turn,are picked up by editors of sympathetic news organs like The Irish People,the New York City-based weekly,or more mainstream newspapers. The American 'Unabomber,'in paragraph 96 of his famous 1995 manifesto,explained the powerful combination of violence and the printed word with explicitness: ..freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an individual...If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present writings to a publisher,they probably would not have been accepted.If they had been accepted and published,they probably would not have attracted many readers,because it's more s10 Jaqwadas 80:60uoo eyaueys]q papeoluod fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media than to read a sober essay.Even if these writings had had many readers,most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them.In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression,we've had to kill people Where security is tight,or where the climate of opinion or laws circumscribe overt activism,terror groups may be restricted to quiet distribution of leaflets and press releases.This has been an activity of Hizballah activists in the United States.14 There should be no underestimating the powers of such small missives.Some personalities are readily swung on the cord of a single idea.'5 Here for example is an admission of malleability and shallowness from a Swede in the teaching profession who became a hardcore anti-Semite: First I belonged to a leftist group.I have always been committed to some cause.Then one day someone gave me a leaflet.That leaflet changed my life,even if it was only three pages long.When I had read it I understood that it all was a lie,the Holocaust had never happened, it was a dizzy feeling...At first I was ashamed,I did not dare to tell anyone that I had these thoughts,these doubts...I had become an anti- Semite...At my work as a teacher in a public school I had to pretend that nothing had happened,but now...when I have met others who feel like I do,I dare to come out more and more as an open anti- Semite.16 In Palestine,printed propaganda handouts helped further the 1987-93 intifada from its beginning.That movement is today sometimes represented
reasons, as well as for the content of the newspaper, that dozens of terrorist groups today publish. The IRA’s An Phoblacht (‘Republican News’) is available from 58 Parnell Square in Dublin; it sells throughout Europe, can be purchased in New York, and is available on the Internet. Its stories, in turn, are picked up by editors of sympathetic news organs like The Irish People, the New York City-based weekly, or more mainstream newspapers. The American ‘Unabomber,’ in paragraph 96 of his famous 1995 manifesto, explained the powerful combination of violence and the printed word with explicitness: … freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an individual … If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been accepted. If they had been accepted and published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because it’s more fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media than to read a sober essay. Even if these writings had had many readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression, we’ve had to kill people. Where security is tight, or where the climate of opinion or laws circumscribe overt activism, terror groups may be restricted to quiet distribution of leaflets and press releases. This has been an activity of Hizballah activists in the United States.14 There should be no underestimating the powers of such small missives. Some personalities are readily swung on the cord of a single idea.15 Here for example is an admission of malleability and shallowness from a Swede in the teaching profession who became a hardcore anti-Semite: First I belonged to a leftist group. I have always been committed to some cause. Then one day someone gave me a leaflet. That leaflet changed my life, even if it was only three pages long. When I had read it I understood that it all was a lie, the Holocaust had never happened, it was a dizzy feeling… At first I was ashamed, I did not dare to tell anyone that I had these thoughts, these doubts… I had become an antiSemite… At my work as a teacher in a public school I had to pretend that nothing had happened, but now…when I have met others who feel like I do, I dare to come out more and more as an open antiSemite.16 In Palestine, printed propaganda handouts helped further the 1987–93 intifada from its beginning. That movement is today sometimes represented FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 47 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 47 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 48 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES as 'the success of the barefoot soldier'and even as a symbol of the transformation of contemporary politics."The leaflet flourishes there still. In a March 1994 incident,Fatah Hawks loyal to Yasser Arafat were distributing propaganda by car in a Gaza refugee camp when they became embroiled in a firefight with undercover Israeli troops that left six Hawks dead.Others distributing leaflets in the region include Kach and Kahane Lives,the right-wing Jewish organizations founded-respectively -by an American rabbi and by his son,so recently assassinated.Kach press releases that threatened Arabs with expulsion and promoted violence had also appeared in the months prior to the 1994 Hebron rampage by Kach activist Baruch Goldstein,who murdered no fewer than 39 worshippers in a few moments with a Galil automatic rifle.At one time,the elder Kahane had run for parliament,in addition to his other political activities;later,stained by terrorism,both Kahane groups were banned in Israel,and remain so. Radio and television are efficient ways of transmitting news and propaganda,given their almost instantaneous impact and their ability to sott.soetulriann shape public perceptions.the news.One mark of terror group sophistication and financial strength is the move into such media.While Hizballah publishes a daily and a weekly newspaper,it also has a television station, and radio 'Voice of the Oppressed'which beams out of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.An Israeli air raid took it down for three months during 1995.20 But few states are as willing as Israel to take such countermeasures against propaganda outlets.In past years,the communist Czech government allowed Red Brigadists who had slipped behind the Iron Curtain to make propaganda broadcasts back into Italy;Rome mounted no violent response, uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo and rarely even complained in public.In the 1990s,the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)broadcast from secure facilities in Syria.The little notice such Syrian support received in the West was an inadequate measure of its significance;an official sponsor like Damascus lends immense credibility to any organization like the PKK. A second form of political action,more complex than propaganda but highly effective when successful,is the use of front groups.This has been one of many strategies of a group in Chile,the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front(MRPF).Founded as an arm of Chile's Communist Party,and named for a former Chilean fighter for independence from Spain,the Front lingered into the latter 1990s as the only important active terror group in Chile,which is democratic and economically successful.The MRPF was buffeted by that party's internal divisions,as well as vigorous Chilean counterterrorist work.It came to marshal no more than a hundred members, down from a thousand or more in 1990.The Front's policy,stated frankly by defector 'Commandante Miguel'in mid-1992,was to fight against the government of Chile 'until power is completely achieved
as ‘the success of the barefoot soldier’ and even as a symbol of the transformation of contemporary politics.17 The leaflet flourishes there still. In a March 1994 incident, Fatah Hawks loyal to Yasser Arafat were distributing propaganda by car in a Gaza refugee camp when they became embroiled in a firefight with undercover Israeli troops that left six Hawks dead.18 Others distributing leaflets in the region include Kach and Kahane Lives, the right-wing Jewish organizations founded – respectively – by an American rabbi and by his son, so recently assassinated. Kach press releases that threatened Arabs with expulsion and promoted violence had also appeared in the months prior to the 1994 Hebron rampage by Kach activist Baruch Goldstein, who murdered no fewer than 39 worshippers in a few moments with a Galil automatic rifle.19 At one time, the elder Kahane had run for parliament, in addition to his other political activities; later, stained by terrorism, both Kahane groups were banned in Israel, and remain so. Radio and television are efficient ways of transmitting news and propaganda, given their almost instantaneous impact and their ability to shape public perceptions. the news. One mark of terror group sophistication and financial strength is the move into such media. While Hizballah publishes a daily and a weekly newspaper, it also has a television station, and radio ‘Voice of the Oppressed’ which beams out of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. An Israeli air raid took it down for three months during 1995.20 But few states are as willing as Israel to take such countermeasures against propaganda outlets. In past years, the communist Czech government allowed Red Brigadists who had slipped behind the Iron Curtain to make propaganda broadcasts back into Italy; Rome mounted no violent response, and rarely even complained in public. In the 1990s, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) broadcast from secure facilities in Syria. The little notice such Syrian support received in the West was an inadequate measure of its significance; an official sponsor like Damascus lends immense credibility to any organization like the PKK. A second form of political action, more complex than propaganda but highly effective when successful, is the use of front groups. This has been one of many strategies of a group in Chile, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (MRPF). Founded as an arm of Chile’s Communist Party, and named for a former Chilean fighter for independence from Spain, the Front lingered into the latter 1990s as the only important active terror group in Chile, which is democratic and economically successful. The MRPF was buffeted by that party’s internal divisions, as well as vigorous Chilean counterterrorist work. It came to marshal no more than a hundred members, down from a thousand or more in 1990. The Front’s policy, stated frankly by defector ‘Commandante Miguel’ in mid-1992, was to fight against the government of Chile ‘until power is completely achieved’.21 48 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 48 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015