4 Raymond W.Gibbs,Jr. instance,different linguistic theories of idiomaticity often rest with scholars varying in- tuitions about the acceptability,and/or grammaticality,of different word strings(under different syntactic permutations).Not surprisingly,linguists'introspections on such mat- ters often are most consistent with their own particular view of idiomaticity,and more generally,the interface between the grammar and the lexicon (see Bresnan,Kaplan 1982;Gibbs 1994;Nunberg,Sag,Wasow 1994).An outside observer may ask "Whose intuitions,and ultimately which theory,should I trust?" The second concern with linguists'introspections has to do with the possibly biased nature of any one person's observations about the cognitive unconscious.Smart people like to believe that they can articulate the inner workings of their own minds.My un- dergraduate students in Psychology often report,after I have presented them some recent empirical findings about the nature of mind "Ray,my brain doesn't work like that!"as if they somehow have privileged access to their unconscious cognitive processes that we psychologists on the outside can never see.But psychological studies,across a wide range of subfields within the discipline,have long demonstrated that people actually have very poor insights into the underlying cognitive processes at work when they perceive,learn, solve-problems,use language,and,most interestingly,have different emotional reactions to their own predicaments and to other people(Wilson 2002).The fact that we think we can introspect about the inner workings of our minds does not mean that such intuitions, even if trained,are either consistent or accurate.Research from both social psychology and cognitive psychology shows that people often give explanations for their decisions which vary significantly from what is shown by more objective means (Wilson 2002), and that people can significantly vary from one day to the next in reporting their be- liefs or knowledge,even for simple things like the names of all the birds or furniture they know(Barsalou 1993).People may sometimes have reasonable access to certain kinds of knowledge,such as some autobiographical events,but even here there are studies showing significant degrees of self-illusion about the accuracy of what one putatively knows with people often reporting as"it really happened"events that they only imagined(Thomas, Bulevich,Loftus 2003). Our conscious ideas about the workings of the unconscious mind may be flawed for a number of reasons,even for those individuals who are trained in providing detailed anal- yses of their intuitions,such as many linguists and philosophers.In general,the adaptive unconscious mind differs from the conscious mind along a number of different dimen- sions that have been understood through many years of scientific study (adapted from Wilson 2002): Adaptive/cognitive unconscious Consciousness Multiple systems Single system Online pattern detector After the fact check and balance Concerned with the here and now Taking the long view Automatic,fast,unintentional Slow,effortful,intentional Uncontrollable Controllled Rigid Flexible Precocious Slower to develop
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.3 (180-250) Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. instance, different linguistic theories of idiomaticity often rest with scholars varying intuitions about the acceptability, and/or grammaticality, of different word strings (under different syntactic permutations). Not surprisingly, linguists’ introspections on such matters often are most consistent with their own particular view of idiomaticity, and more generally, the interface between the grammar and the lexicon (see Bresnan, & Kaplan 1982; Gibbs 1994; Nunberg, Sag, & Wasow 1994). An outside observer may ask “Whose intuitions, and ultimately which theory, should I trust?” The second concern with linguists’ introspections has to do with the possibly biased nature of any one person’s observations about the cognitive unconscious. Smart people like to believe that they can articulate the inner workings of their own minds. My undergraduate students in Psychology often report, after I have presented them some recent empirical findings about the nature of mind “Ray, my brain doesn’t work like that!” as if they somehow have privileged access to their unconscious cognitive processes that we psychologists on the outside can never see. But psychological studies, across a wide range of subfields within the discipline, have long demonstrated that people actually have very poor insights into the underlying cognitive processes at work when they perceive, learn, solve-problems, use language, and, most interestingly, have different emotional reactions to their own predicaments and to other people (Wilson 2002). The fact that we think we can introspect about the inner workings of our minds does not mean that such intuitions, even if trained, are either consistent or accurate. Research from both social psychology and cognitive psychology shows that people often give explanations for their decisions which vary significantly from what is shown by more objective means (Wilson 2002), and that people can significantly vary from one day to the next in reporting their beliefs or knowledge, even for simple things like the names of all the birds or furniture they know (Barsalou 1993). People may sometimes have reasonable access to certain kinds of knowledge, such as some autobiographical events, but even here there are studies showing significant degrees of self-illusion about the accuracy of what one putatively knows with people often reporting as “it really happened” events that they only imagined (Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus 2003). Our conscious ideas about the workings of the unconscious mind may be flawed for a number of reasons, even for those individuals who are trained in providing detailed analyses of their intuitions, such as many linguists and philosophers. In general, the adaptive unconscious mind differs from the conscious mind along a number of different dimensions that have been understood through many years of scientific study (adapted from Wilson 2002): Adaptive/cognitive unconscious Consciousness Multiple systems Single system Online pattern detector After the fact check and balance Concerned with the here and now Taking the long view Automatic, fast, unintentional Slow, effortful, intentional Uncontrollable Controllled Rigid Flexible Precocious Slower to develop
Cognitive linguists and empirical methods 5 This list of differences between the adaptive/cognitive unconscious reinforces the idea that is may be impossible to understand the operations of the unconscious mind through conscious introspection alone(i.e.,a first-person approach).Even psychotherapy,which studies show can be quite effective,works more because it allows a person to construct a better conscious narrative about one's thoughts,feelings,and experiences than it does in providing deeper,and accurate,insights into unconscious mental functioning.One may argue that the unconscious and conscious minds are still part of the same overall system (i.e.,the person)and therefore must work in some harmonious way together as part of some grand overall design.But even this idea may not necessarily be true,as many cogni- tive scientists now question whether consciousness has any direct bearing on unconscious mental processes (Libet 2004;Wegner 2002). It is not surprising,then,that many cognitive scientists are skeptical of theoretical claims based simply on one's intuitions or introspections,no matter how well trained these may be.Cognitive psychologists,and others,criticize cognitive linguistic work be- cause it is so heavily based on individual analysts'intuitions(i.e.,cognitive linguists-a third-person approach),and thus does not constitute the kind of objective,replicable data preferred by many scholars in the cognitive and natural sciences(e.g.,data collected on large numbers of naive participants under controlled laboratory conditions).This desire for objective evidence,based on experiments that can be replicated,and that test falsifiable hypotheses(more on this below)is especially needed if one wishes to make generalizations about the way that people ordinarily,and automatically,engage in cognitive and linguistic processing.Cognitive psychologists argue that indirect methods(i.e.,not based on first- person assessments of unconscious cognition)must be employed to examine what people do,and how they do it,without asking them to say what they are doing,precisely because we now know how unreliable such reports can be. 3.Do cognitive linguists use empirical methods? Beyond the concern about the reliability of linguists'introspections,and whether it is pos- sible to understand the cognitive unconscious mind through introspection,there is also the deeper problem of specifying exactly what it is that cognitive linguists do when they do their work.Consider a case close to my own research interests-identifying conceptual metaphors from the systematic analyses of linguistic expressions.For instance,read the following set of expressions. “Look how far we have come.” "We are not making any progress with this research." "I am just spinning my wheels trying to get a Ph.D." “I am at a turning point in my life.” Since Lakoff and Johnson(1980),cognitive linguists have argued that these conventional expressions are not isolated,but are related in slightly different ways to a single underlying conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY.This conceptual metaphor is presumed to be part of people's ordinary conceptual system that functions automatically in how people
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.4 (250-299) Cognitive linguists and empirical methods This list of differences between the adaptive/cognitive unconscious reinforces the idea that is may be impossible to understand the operations of the unconscious mind through conscious introspection alone (i.e., a first-person approach). Even psychotherapy, which studies show can be quite effective, works more because it allows a person to construct a better conscious narrative about one’s thoughts, feelings, and experiences than it does in providing deeper, and accurate, insights into unconscious mental functioning. One may argue that the unconscious and conscious minds are still part of the same overall system (i.e., the person) and therefore must work in some harmonious way together as part of some grand overall design. But even this idea may not necessarily be true, as many cognitive scientists now question whether consciousness has any direct bearing on unconscious mental processes (Libet 2004; Wegner 2002). It is not surprising, then, that many cognitive scientists are skeptical of theoretical claims based simply on one’s intuitions or introspections, no matter how well trained these may be. Cognitive psychologists, and others, criticize cognitive linguistic work because it is so heavily based on individual analysts’ intuitions (i.e., cognitive linguists- a third-person approach), and thus does not constitute the kind of objective, replicable data preferred by many scholars in the cognitive and natural sciences (e.g., data collected on large numbers of naïve participants under controlled laboratory conditions). This desire for objective evidence, based on experiments that can be replicated, and that test falsifiable hypotheses (more on this below) is especially needed if one wishes to make generalizations about the way that people ordinarily, and automatically, engage in cognitive and linguistic processing. Cognitive psychologists argue that indirect methods (i.e., not based on firstperson assessments of unconscious cognition) must be employed to examine what people do, and how they do it, without asking them to say what they are doing, precisely because we now know how unreliable such reports can be. . Do cognitive linguists use empirical methods? Beyond the concern about the reliability of linguists’ introspections, and whether it is possible to understand the cognitive unconscious mind through introspection, there is also the deeper problem of specifying exactly what it is that cognitive linguists do when they do their work. Consider a case close to my own research interests- identifying conceptual metaphors from the systematic analyses of linguistic expressions. For instance, read the following set of expressions. “Look how far we have come.” “We are not making any progress with this research.” “I am just spinning my wheels trying to get a Ph.D.” “I am at a turning point in my life.” Since Lakoff and Johnson (1980), cognitive linguists have argued that these conventional expressions are not isolated, but are related in slightly different ways to a single underlying conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This conceptual metaphor is presumed to be part of people’s ordinary conceptual system that functions automatically in how people
6 Raymond W.Gibbs,Jr. conceive of themselves,and others,experiences.Linguistic research,across a wide-range of languages,including signed languages,now shows that conceptual metaphors are critical in motivating the creation and continued existence of systematic conventional expressions, polysemous words,many novel metaphors,and play a role in gesture(Gibbs 1994,2006; Gibbs Steen 1999;Lakoff Johnson 1999). Yet how accurate are these claims?Do ordinary speakers really have conceptual metaphors and use them automatically in everyday thought and language?How does one even establish that a given word or expression in context expresses metaphorical meaning? Part of the resistance to cognitive linguists'claims is that these scholars do not sufficiently explain the methods employed in doing their linguistic analyses,and most importantly in drawing inferences from systematic patterns of language (a problem by itself)to claims about the underlying nature of human conceptual systems.We may be impressed by pos- sible relationships between so-called conventional expressions when these are presented out of context.But how does any scholar really determine what words and phrases express metaphorical meanings or reflect metaphorical concepts? To get a better sense of these difficulties,consider the following short paragraphs from an editorial published in the San Francisco Chronicle,April 29,2003(A22),titled "Toward a new Iraq.” The job of constructing a new,democratic Irag from the social wreckage left by Saddam Hussein will take many months and a steely determination by U.S.sponsors of the process to stay focused on the rights of all Iraqis-and to maintain order in the country until those rights are sufficiently protected by a new government. In the meantime,improved security in the streets and the restoration of war-damaged services should help create a climate in which people can think about their political options beyond the task of just staying alive. President Bush sought to boost the democracy-building effort in a speech Monday to Iraqi Americans in Michigan.He walks a fine line in assuring that the United States has 'no intention of imposing our form of government or our culture,but insisting that all Iraqis will enjoy a voice and legal protections. What words and phrases in these excerpts are metaphorical?Some readers immediately point out that the word "Toward"in the editorial title is metaphorical in that the writer is not speaking of physically moving to a new place called Iraq,but is conceiving of metaphorically moving toward a new nation-state that emerges from the Iraq war.But what about the phrase "constructing a new Iraq"?Is this being used metaphorically,or might it simply refer to the physical rebuilding of Irag after the devastation of the war and Hussein's long-time neglect of the country?Might this phrase have both a literal and metaphorical meaning?The term "social wreckage"seems metaphorical,or at least it does to some speakers.The adjective in the phrase "steely determination"seems quite metaphorical,precisely because"determination"is an abstract concept that has no physi- cal dimensions.Finally,what about the preposition "on"in "stay focused on the rights of all Iraqis"?Is there something physical here that actually represents some contact between two entities,asin“The cat is on the mat"？
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.5 (299-384) Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. conceive of themselves, and others’, experiences. Linguistic research, across a wide-range of languages, including signed languages, now shows that conceptual metaphors are critical in motivating the creation and continued existence of systematic conventional expressions, polysemous words, many novel metaphors, and play a role in gesture (Gibbs 1994, 2006; Gibbs & Steen 1999; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Yet how accurate are these claims? Do ordinary speakers really have conceptual metaphors and use them automatically in everyday thought and language? How does one even establish that a given word or expression in context expresses metaphorical meaning? Part of the resistance to cognitive linguists’ claims is that these scholars do not sufficiently explain the methods employed in doing their linguistic analyses, and most importantly in drawing inferences from systematic patterns of language (a problem by itself) to claims about the underlying nature of human conceptual systems. We may be impressed by possible relationships between so-called conventional expressions when these are presented out of context. But how does any scholar really determine what words and phrases express metaphorical meanings or reflect metaphorical concepts? To get a better sense of these difficulties, consider the following short paragraphs from an editorial published in the San Francisco Chronicle, April 29, 2003 (A22), titled “Toward a new Iraq.” The job of constructing a new, democratic Iraq from the social wreckage left by Saddam Hussein will take many months and a steely determination by U.S. sponsors of the process to stay focused on the rights of all Iraqis- and to maintain order in the country until those rights are sufficiently protected by a new government. In the meantime, improved security in the streets and the restoration of war-damaged services should help create a climate in which people can think about their political options beyond the task of just staying alive. President Bush sought to boost the democracy-building effort in a speech Monday to Iraqi Americans in Michigan. He walks a fine line in assuring that the United States has ‘no intention of imposing our form of government or our culture,’ but insisting that all Iraqis will enjoy a voice and legal protections. What words and phrases in these excerpts are metaphorical? Some readers immediately point out that the word “Toward” in the editorial title is metaphorical in that the writer is not speaking of physically moving to a new place called Iraq, but is conceiving of metaphorically moving toward a new nation-state that emerges from the Iraq war. But what about the phrase “constructing a new Iraq”? Is this being used metaphorically, or might it simply refer to the physical rebuilding of Iraq after the devastation of the war and Hussein’s long-time neglect of the country? Might this phrase have both a literal and metaphorical meaning? The term “social wreckage” seems metaphorical, or at least it does to some speakers. The adjective in the phrase “steely determination” seems quite metaphorical, precisely because “determination” is an abstract concept that has no physical dimensions. Finally, what about the preposition “on” in “stay focused on the rights of all Iraqis”? Is there something physical here that actually represents some contact between two entities, as in “The cat is on the mat”?
Cognitive linguists and empirical methods 7 When asked,cognitive linguists will typically have strong responses to these impor- tant questions,and frequently explain,on a case-by-case basis,the reason for why,for example,a set of conventional expressions may be motivated by some underlying con- ceptual metaphor (or primary metaphor).Cognitive linguistics go on to argue that these methods are reliable,are taught regularly in linguistic classes,and have successfully illu- minated many facets of language and mind that were undiscoverable by other linguistic methods.However,the remarkable fact is that there are very few published writings on methods in cognitive linguists (see Kovecses 2002 for an exception).For example,there is virtually no set of reliable,replicable methods that can be employed to identify words as metaphorical,or for relating systematic patterns of entire expressions to underlying conceptual metaphors.I am not claiming that cognitive linguists do not have empirical methods.But they really should place far more effort toward explicating their methods, and strive to show that the methods they employ are reliable,and replicable.On a personal note,the need for such explications is perhaps the single main complaint I encounter from metaphor scholars in many disciplines,ranging from applied linguistics to experimental psychology.Cognitive linguistics,as a discipline,would have much greater status within the cognitive sciences if they paid more attention to explicating the methods they use,and demonstrate that these provide for consistent,replicable research results. 4. Challenges for cognitive linguistics In addition to trying to better explicate their methods for analyzing linguistic data,and better justifying their claims for different language-mind,and language-mind-body con- nections,cognitive linguists need to better frame their work so that it may be more amenable to experimental test.A common complaint from scholars outside of cognitive linguistics is that it is difficult to falsify aspects of theories within the discipline.Some cog- nitive linguists respond to these complaints by saying "That's not my problem or concern," while others go so far as to reject falsification as an important part of their theoretical work.Nonetheless,cognitive linguists still strongly maintain that their research provides detailed accounts of linguistic and cognitive behavior,and as such should have scientific credibility.Even if cognitive linguists do not conduct experiments,their work would sig- nificantly benefit from adherence to several general principles in framing their theories and research implications(Gibbs 2000). First,different hypotheses must be falsifiable!Thus,each hypothesis must be stated in such a way that it can be experimentally/empirically examined and shown to be pos- sibly false(and if not shown to be false,then one can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is evidence in support of the hypothesis).The problem of falsifying theories/ideas from cognitive linguistics is a big problem,and leads me to remain some- what skeptical about certain claims(e.g.,from conceptual blending theory).Ideas are very appealing,but it is unclear how one would go out and test this as compared to reasonable alternative hypotheses. This point leads to the second recommendation-consider alternative explanations. For instance,might there be alternative reasons for the apparent systematicity among con-
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.6 (384-440) Cognitive linguists and empirical methods When asked, cognitive linguists will typically have strong responses to these important questions, and frequently explain, on a case-by-case basis, the reason for why, for example, a set of conventional expressions may be motivated by some underlying conceptual metaphor (or primary metaphor). Cognitive linguistics go on to argue that these methods are reliable, are taught regularly in linguistic classes, and have successfully illuminated many facets of language and mind that were undiscoverable by other linguistic methods. However, the remarkable fact is that there are very few published writings on methods in cognitive linguists (see Kövecses 2002 for an exception). For example, there is virtually no set of reliable, replicable methods that can be employed to identify words as metaphorical, or for relating systematic patterns of entire expressions to underlying conceptual metaphors. I am not claiming that cognitive linguists do not have empirical methods. But they really should place far more effort toward explicating their methods, and strive to show that the methods they employ are reliable, and replicable. On a personal note, the need for such explications is perhaps the single main complaint I encounter from metaphor scholars in many disciplines, ranging from applied linguistics to experimental psychology. Cognitive linguistics, as a discipline, would have much greater status within the cognitive sciences if they paid more attention to explicating the methods they use, and demonstrate that these provide for consistent, replicable research results. . Challenges for cognitive linguistics In addition to trying to better explicate their methods for analyzing linguistic data, and better justifying their claims for different language-mind, and language-mind-body connections, cognitive linguists need to better frame their work so that it may be more amenable to experimental test. A common complaint from scholars outside of cognitive linguistics is that it is difficult to falsify aspects of theories within the discipline. Some cognitive linguists respond to these complaints by saying “That’s not my problem or concern,” while others go so far as to reject falsification as an important part of their theoretical work. Nonetheless, cognitive linguists still strongly maintain that their research provides detailed accounts of linguistic and cognitive behavior, and as such should have scientific credibility. Even if cognitive linguists do not conduct experiments, their work would significantly benefit from adherence to several general principles in framing their theories and research implications (Gibbs 2000). First, different hypotheses must be falsifiable! Thus, each hypothesis must be stated in such a way that it can be experimentally/empirically examined and shown to be possibly false (and if not shown to be false, then one can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is evidence in support of the hypothesis). The problem of falsifying theories/ideas from cognitive linguistics is a big problem, and leads me to remain somewhat skeptical about certain claims (e.g., from conceptual blending theory). Ideas are very appealing, but it is unclear how one would go out and test this as compared to reasonable alternative hypotheses. This point leads to the second recommendation- consider alternative explanations. For instance, might there be alternative reasons for the apparent systematicity among con-
8 Raymond W.Gibbs,Jr. ventional expressions?Might systematicity just be a historical product,but have no role at all in how contemporary speakers think and use language?Might the systematicity among various words and expressions be a matter of polysemy,instead of conceptual metaphor,as some psychologists have claimed,incorrectly in my view(Glucksberg 2001;Murphy 1996). An example of the failure to consider alternative hypotheses in cognitive linguistics is seen in some,but not all,work on conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier Turner 2002). Conceptual blending theory predicts that various sorts of blending processes should occur when people understand certain kinds of complex linguistic expressions(Coulson 2001). One can go out and do an experiment which shows that,indeed,people take longer to process certain utterances compared to others,or that some parts of utterances,where blending should occur,specifically take extra time to comprehend or engage more com- plex brain activity.But many other theories of linguistic processing would predict the very same finding!Thus,it is not clear that conceptual blending theory,despite its differ- ent conceptual and terminological perspective,is sufficiently unique to be considered the most viable psychological theory.Making the case for the "psychological reality"of any cognitive linguistic theory demands that such arguments be situated within the context of ongoing debates,and alternative theories within cognitive science. Finally,cognitive linguists must realize that language understanding is not a single kind of mental process.Thus,the kind of mental activity used when a person listens to real speech,or reads a text in real-time,is quite different from the processes involved when a person reflects on what one is hearing or reading.This too is a major concern and per- haps the main reason why many cognitive scientists,especially in psychology,are deeply skeptical of ideas from cognitive linguistics.For example,cognitive linguists have written that conceptual metaphors are "used constantly and automatically,with neither effort or awareness"(Lakoff 1993).But is this true?Does the linguistic evidence alone provide the right kind of evidence to judge this idea?Many say no(see Glucksberg 2001;Gibbs 1994). What is needed,then,is a more detailed set of specific hypotheses that can be indi- vidually examined using,perhaps,different experimental techniques.Among the possible hypotheses are(see Gibbs 1994;Katz,Cacciari,Gibbs,Turner 1999): 1.Conceptual metaphors motivate why certain words and expressions have acquired their various figurative/metaphorical meanings over time (i.e.,diachronically),but play no role in how contemporary speakers use and understand conventional and novel metaphorical expressions. 2.Conceptual metaphors motivate why certain words and expressions have their spe- cific figurative meanings within linguistic communities and contemporary speakers can under the right circumstances,determine these motivations.Thus,knowledge of conceptual metaphors reflects something about idealized speakers-hearers.BUT conceptual metaphors are not "psychologically real"in the sense of being parts of ordinary,contemporary speakers'conceptual systems. 3.Conceptual metaphors motivate why certain words and expressions have their spe- cific figurative meanings and these metaphors underlie why contemporary speakers tacitly recognize why these words and phrases have the particular meanings they do. Thus,conceptual metaphors are part of ordinary speakers'conceptual systems.But
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.7 (440-486) Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. ventional expressions? Might systematicity just be a historical product, but have no role at all in how contemporary speakers think and use language? Might the systematicity among various words and expressions be a matter of polysemy, instead of conceptual metaphor, as some psychologists have claimed, incorrectly in my view (Glucksberg 2001; Murphy 1996). An example of the failure to consider alternative hypotheses in cognitive linguistics is seen in some, but not all, work on conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner 2002). Conceptual blending theory predicts that various sorts of blending processes should occur when people understand certain kinds of complex linguistic expressions (Coulson 2001). One can go out and do an experiment which shows that, indeed, people take longer to process certain utterances compared to others, or that some parts of utterances, where blending should occur, specifically take extra time to comprehend or engage more complex brain activity. But many other theories of linguistic processing would predict the very same finding! Thus, it is not clear that conceptual blending theory, despite its different conceptual and terminological perspective, is sufficiently unique to be considered the most viable psychological theory. Making the case for the “psychological reality” of any cognitive linguistic theory demands that such arguments be situated within the context of ongoing debates, and alternative theories within cognitive science. Finally, cognitive linguists must realize that language understanding is not a single kind of mental process. Thus, the kind of mental activity used when a person listens to real speech, or reads a text in real-time, is quite different from the processes involved when a person reflects on what one is hearing or reading. This too is a major concern and perhaps the main reason why many cognitive scientists, especially in psychology, are deeply skeptical of ideas from cognitive linguistics. For example, cognitive linguists have written that conceptual metaphors are “used constantly and automatically, with neither effort or awareness” (Lakoff 1993). But is this true? Does the linguistic evidence alone provide the right kind of evidence to judge this idea? Many say no (see Glucksberg 2001; Gibbs 1994). What is needed, then, is a more detailed set of specific hypotheses that can be individually examined using, perhaps, different experimental techniques. Among the possible hypotheses are (see Gibbs 1994; Katz, Cacciari, Gibbs, & Turner 1999): 1. Conceptual metaphors motivate why certain words and expressions have acquired their various figurative/metaphorical meanings over time (i.e., diachronically), but play no role in how contemporary speakers use and understand conventional and novel metaphorical expressions. 2. Conceptual metaphors motivate why certain words and expressions have their specific figurative meanings within linguistic communities and contemporary speakers can under the right circumstances, determine these motivations. Thus, knowledge of conceptual metaphors reflects something about idealized speakers-hearers. BUT conceptual metaphors are not “psychologically real” in the sense of being parts of ordinary, contemporary speakers’ conceptual systems. 3. Conceptual metaphors motivate why certain words and expressions have their specific figurative meanings and these metaphors underlie why contemporary speakers tacitly recognize why these words and phrases have the particular meanings they do. Thus, conceptual metaphors are part of ordinary speakers’ conceptual systems. But