Foreword xIx that a particular morpheme can participate in,and the set of polysemous or homony- mous senses that a particular morphemic shape can represent.As noted,a dictionary can be regarded as a form of corpus work that addresses this latter example.Direct introspec- tion into such sets of alternatives typically does not come up with the entire range,our cognition apparently not being organized to bring the full set into attention. One main limitation of corpus research,though,is that it in general can not directly yield many abstract linguistic patterns.One reason is that the sentences speakers produce largely are multiply elliptical,omitting constituents that could,in principle,fill in the com- plete potential structure of some construction or lexical form.The various occurrences of such a construction or lexical form in a corpus will thus typically each lack certain com- ponents of their potentially full structure,components whose values might be understood but are implicit(see Talmy 2000a:Ch.4).For example,in one of its usages,a verb can have one or more optional arguments in its complement structure that are not overtly repre- sented,and will have a particular aspectual signature that can lack some accompanying temporal expression to reveal it.Moreover,a lexical form commonly has several usages,so that a verb,for example,will have several different complement structures and aspects,all of them appearing scattered through a corpus without identification as to the particular usage in play.Unguided attempts to characterize a verb's semantic-syntactic pattern can readily become confounded without sorting out the different levels and scopes in effect. Introspection has the advantage here,since our cognition seems to be organized so as to abstract out the distinct full patterns associated with lexical forms and constructions. Another limitation of a corpus is that it does not mark those occurrences of a lexical form or construction that are fully felicitous and well-formed,as against those that are less well selected or that deviate in any of the other respects indicated earlier-a recurrent feature of natural speech.This can lead to confounded characterizations of the properties of such forms and constructions.Again,our linguistic cognition is organized so as to have abstracted out the ideal grammatical and semantic properties of particular lexical forms and constructions,ones that can emerge through introspection in a deliberative process like writing,but that are commonly breached in the kind of fluent speech recorded in corpora. 5.Experimental method As a methodology in the study of language,cognitive psychology is distinguished in its application of the experimental method to linguistic cognition.This method largely con- sists of presenting a number of individuals with stimuli or instructions,prepared with the aim of addressing a single cognitive factor,and monitoring their responses.Under this aegis,techniques range widely,from the use of instrumentation for special presentations oflanguage-related stimuli or for recordings of physical responses to them;to instructions to generate a specified linguistic output,say,to produce all the words with a given meaning that one can think of in a brief period;to the re-presentation of certain linguistic stimuli after a lengthy period to test for memory.And the time scale of the cognitive processes
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 9:50 F: HCP18FR.tex / p.9 (550-605) Foreword that a particular morpheme can participate in, and the set of polysemous or homonymous senses that a particular morphemic shape can represent. As noted, a dictionary can be regarded as a form of corpus work that addresses this latter example. Direct introspection into such sets of alternatives typically does not come up with the entire range, our cognition apparently not being organized to bring the full set into attention. One main limitation of corpus research, though, is that it in general can not directly yield many abstract linguistic patterns. One reason is that the sentences speakers produce largely are multiply elliptical, omitting constituents that could, in principle, fill in the complete potential structure of some construction or lexical form. The various occurrences of such a construction or lexical form in a corpus will thus typically each lack certain components of their potentially full structure, components whose values might be understood but are implicit (see Talmy 2000a: Ch. 4). For example, in one of its usages, a verb can have one or more optional arguments in its complement structure that are not overtly represented, and will have a particular aspectual signature that can lack some accompanying temporal expression to reveal it. Moreover, a lexical form commonly has several usages, so that a verb, for example, will have several different complement structures and aspects, all of them appearing scattered through a corpus without identification as to the particular usage in play. Unguided attempts to characterize a verb’s semantic-syntactic pattern can readily become confounded without sorting out the different levels and scopes in effect. Introspection has the advantage here, since our cognition seems to be organized so as to abstract out the distinct full patterns associated with lexical forms and constructions. Another limitation of a corpus is that it does not mark those occurrences of a lexical form or construction that are fully felicitous and well-formed, as against those that are less well selected or that deviate in any of the other respects indicated earlier – a recurrent feature of natural speech. This can lead to confounded characterizations of the properties of such forms and constructions. Again, our linguistic cognition is organized so as to have abstracted out the ideal grammatical and semantic properties of particular lexical forms and constructions, ones that can emerge through introspection in a deliberative process like writing, but that are commonly breached in the kind of fluent speech recorded in corpora. . Experimental method As a methodology in the study of language, cognitive psychology is distinguished in its application of the experimental method to linguistic cognition. This method largely consists of presenting a number of individuals with stimuli or instructions, prepared with the aim of addressing a single cognitive factor, and monitoring their responses. Under this aegis, techniques range widely, from the use of instrumentation for special presentations of language-related stimuli or for recordings of physical responses to them; to instructions to generate a specified linguistic output, say, to produce all the words with a given meaning that one can think of in a brief period; to the re-presentation of certain linguistic stimuli after a lengthy period to test for memory. And the time scale of the cognitive processes
XX Leonard Talmy such techniques probe ranges from the millisecond level to months,although perhaps the bulk of experiments aims at the shorter end. One advantage of the experimental method is precisely this access to the millisec- ond scale of cognitive processes,which is not available to any other methodology.Toward the scale of whole seconds,the experimental method begins to share access with the methodology of audio-and videographic analysis. Additional advantages of the experimental method can be regarded as complements to advantages found in other methodologies,where the experimental method in turn has limitations.Thus,if an advantage of audiovisual recordings and corpora is that they permit the examination of naturalistic speech,the complementary advantage that exper- imental psychology shares with first-condition introspection is that the researcher can carefully control the stimuli that evoke linguistic behavior.That is,he can probe the system of linguistic cognition,even perturb it,as a means for detecting aspects of its organization often obscured or sporadic as it functions naturalistically. Further,if an advantage of introspection and of analytic thought is their direct ac- cess to subjectively presented objects of examination,with the researcher attending to the products of her own mind,the complementary advantage that experimental psychology shares with the use of live recordings and corpora is a focus on objectively presented ob- jects of examination,with the researcher attending to the products of the minds of other individuals.The earlier-mentioned concern of some that the act of introspection might affect the object of attention is not resolved by the experimental method,which can be equally at risk in affecting the target of observation.But the concern that introspection might not be reliable due to its very subjectivity is addressed by the experimental method. Finally,an advantage of audiovisual recording and introspection is that they both permit an in-depth examination of linguistic behavior within the cognition of a single individual,and are thus able to address cognition as an integrated system,one consist- ing of components in particular interactions.But then the complementary advantage that experimental psychology shares with the use of corpora is that they both base their con- clusions on the linguistic behavior exhibited across a set of individuals,and are thus able to abstract away from individual differences and discern even slight characteristics that linguistic cognition tends toward in humans. One main limitation of the experimental method in psychology might be found in this last contrast.The techniques designed to isolate what is taken as a single factor in linguis- tic cognition and to keep other factors among which it is embedded from confounding the probe can lead to decontextualization.The result can be an insufficient capacity to track the factor as it weaves through or interacts with its fellows within an integrated system,or to ascertain whether what has been isolated in fact constitutes a functionally discrete factor. As can be seen,each of the methodologies now being applied to cognitive linguistics has unique capacities that make it necessary for our overall understanding of conceptual structuring in language,as well as having limitations that make the other methodolo- gies additionally necessary for this understanding.It can be further observed that each methodology needs to look at the findings of its fellows for new ideas as to where to
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 9:50 F: HCP18FR.tex / p.10 (605-668) Leonard Talmy such techniques probe ranges from the millisecond level to months, although perhaps the bulk of experiments aims at the shorter end. One advantage of the experimental method is precisely this access to the millisecond scale of cognitive processes, which is not available to any other methodology. Toward the scale of whole seconds, the experimental method begins to share access with the methodology of audio- and videographic analysis. Additional advantages of the experimental method can be regarded as complements to advantages found in other methodologies, where the experimental method in turn has limitations. Thus, if an advantage of audiovisual recordings and corpora is that they permit the examination of naturalistic speech, the complementary advantage that experimental psychology shares with first-condition introspection is that the researcher can carefully control the stimuli that evoke linguistic behavior. That is, he can probe the system of linguistic cognition, even perturb it, as a means for detecting aspects of its organization often obscured or sporadic as it functions naturalistically. Further, if an advantage of introspection and of analytic thought is their direct access to subjectively presented objects of examination, with the researcher attending to the products of her own mind, the complementary advantage that experimental psychology shares with the use of live recordings and corpora is a focus on objectively presented objects of examination, with the researcher attending to the products of the minds of other individuals. The earlier-mentioned concern of some that the act of introspection might affect the object of attention is not resolved by the experimental method, which can be equally at risk in affecting the target of observation. But the concern that introspection might not be reliable due to its very subjectivity is addressed by the experimental method. Finally, an advantage of audiovisual recording and introspection is that they both permit an in-depth examination of linguistic behavior within the cognition of a single individual, and are thus able to address cognition as an integrated system, one consisting of components in particular interactions. But then the complementary advantage that experimental psychology shares with the use of corpora is that they both base their conclusions on the linguistic behavior exhibited across a set of individuals, and are thus able to abstract away from individual differences and discern even slight characteristics that linguistic cognition tends toward in humans. One main limitation of the experimental method in psychology might be found in this last contrast. The techniques designed to isolate what is taken as a single factor in linguistic cognition and to keep other factors among which it is embedded from confounding the probe can lead to decontextualization. The result can be an insufficient capacity to track the factor as it weaves through or interacts with its fellows within an integrated system, or to ascertain whether what has been isolated in fact constitutes a functionally discrete factor. As can be seen, each of the methodologies now being applied to cognitive linguistics has unique capacities that make it necessary for our overall understanding of conceptual structuring in language, as well as having limitations that make the other methodologies additionally necessary for this understanding. It can be further observed that each methodology needs to look at the findings of its fellows for new ideas as to where to
Foreword xxI proceed next within its own practices.The chapters in this volume are both early con- tributions in this collegial spirit,and harbingers of collaborations to come. References Talmy,L.(2000a).Toward a Cognitive Semantics,Volume I:Concept structuring systems.Cambridge:MIT Press. Talmy,L.(2000b).Toward a Cognitive Semantics,Volume II:Typology and process in concept structuring. Cambridge:MIT Press. Talmy,L.(2003).The representation of spatial structure in spoken and signed language.In Karen Emmorey (Ed.),Perspectives on Classifier Constructions in Sign Language (pp.169-195).Mahwah, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum. Talmy,L.(2004).Recombinance in the Evolution of Language.In Jonathon E.Cihlar,David Kaiser,Irene Kimbara,Amy Franklin (Eds.),Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society:The Panels.Chicago:Chicago Linguistic Society. Talmy,L.(2006).The fundamental system of spatial schemas in language.In Beate Hamp (Ed.),From perception to meaning:Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics(pp.199-234).Mouton de Gruyter. Talmy,L.(Forthcoming).The attentional system of language.Cambridge:MIT Press
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 9:50 F: HCP18FR.tex / p.11 (668-703) Foreword proceed next within its own practices. The chapters in this volume are both early contributions in this collegial spirit, and harbingers of collaborations to come. References Talmy, L. (2000a). Toward a Cognitive Semantics, Volume I: Concept structuring systems. Cambridge: MIT Press. Talmy, L. (2000b). Toward a Cognitive Semantics, Volume II: Typology and process in concept structuring. Cambridge: MIT Press. Talmy, L. (2003). The representation of spatial structure in spoken and signed language. In Karen Emmorey (Ed.), Perspectives on Classifier Constructions in Sign Language (pp. 169–195). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Talmy, L. (2004). Recombinance in the Evolution of Language. In Jonathon E. Cihlar, David Kaiser, Irene Kimbara, & Amy Franklin (Eds.), Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society: The Panels. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. Talmy, L. (2006). The fundamental system of spatial schemas in language. In Beate Hamp (Ed.), From perception to meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics ( pp. 199–234). Mouton de Gruyter. Talmy, L. (Forthcoming). The attentional system of language. Cambridge: MIT Press
Why cognitive linguists should care more about empirical methods Raymond W.Gibbs,Jr. 1.Introduction Linguistics and psychology have always had a curious relationship.Ever since the early days of generative linguistics when Chomsky started to argue that linguistics was a subfield of cognitive psychology,there has always been intense debate as to whether linguistic theo- ries are "psychologically real."In the early and mid 1960s,for example,psychologists were quite enthusiastic about transformational grammar being part of the underlying princi- ples organizing sentence processing.But a vast body of experimental research showed by the early 1970s that this was simply not the case (Fodor,Bever,Garrett 1974).Since that time,psychologists have struggled to apply various linguistic theories to explain lan- guage acquisition,production,and comprehension,with many psychologists expressing significant skepticism toward any theory of language use that is not based on objective scientific experiments.This has most recently been true in regard to how psychologists view the various theories and claims of cognitive linguistics.Many psychologists suggest that linguistic intuitions alone,even those of trained linguists,are insufficient sources of evidence for establishing "what people ordinarily do"when using and understanding lan- guage(Glucksberg 2001;Murphy 1996;Veraeke Kennedy 1996).The best,and in some people's view,the only,way to study ordinary language use is to objectively study the behavior of naive human participants in controlled experimental settings. My aim in this chapter is to present the case for why cognitive linguists should care more about empirical methods given the skepticism from people outside their field.First, I outline in a bit more detail some of the reasons for why the skilled intuitions of cogni- tive linguists may be useful,but not at all conclusive,in arguing for the specific influences of thought and embodied experience in everyday language use.Second,I suggest several principles that cognitive linguists should adopt in articulating psychologically plausible theories of mind and language.At the same time,I urge cognitive linguists to more fully explain the methods they use in analyzing linguistic phenomena and in making claims about human conceptual systems.I do not believe,contrary to some of my colleagues in psychology,that cognitive linguists must do experiments to have their ideas be con- sidered as psychological theories.Nonetheless,there are various empirical,experimental techniques that are part of the arsenal of"indirect methods"used in psycholinguistics that
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.1 (48-120) Why cognitive linguists should care more about empirical methods Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. . Introduction Linguistics and psychology have always had a curious relationship. Ever since the early days of generative linguistics when Chomsky started to argue that linguistics was a subfield of cognitive psychology, there has always been intense debate as to whether linguistic theories are “psychologically real.” In the early and mid 1960s, for example, psychologists were quite enthusiastic about transformational grammar being part of the underlying principles organizing sentence processing. But a vast body of experimental research showed by the early 1970s that this was simply not the case (Fodor, Bever, & Garrett 1974). Since that time, psychologists have struggled to apply various linguistic theories to explain language acquisition, production, and comprehension, with many psychologists expressing significant skepticism toward any theory of language use that is not based on objective scientific experiments. This has most recently been true in regard to how psychologists view the various theories and claims of cognitive linguistics. Many psychologists suggest that linguistic intuitions alone, even those of trained linguists, are insufficient sources of evidence for establishing “what people ordinarily do” when using and understanding language (Glucksberg 2001; Murphy 1996; Veraeke & Kennedy 1996). The best, and in some people’s view, the only, way to study ordinary language use is to objectively study the behavior of naïve human participants in controlled experimental settings. My aim in this chapter is to present the case for why cognitive linguists should care more about empirical methods given the skepticism from people outside their field. First, I outline in a bit more detail some of the reasons for why the skilled intuitions of cognitive linguists may be useful, but not at all conclusive, in arguing for the specific influences of thought and embodied experience in everyday language use. Second, I suggest several principles that cognitive linguists should adopt in articulating psychologically plausible theories of mind and language. At the same time, I urge cognitive linguists to more fully explain the methods they use in analyzing linguistic phenomena and in making claims about human conceptual systems. I do not believe, contrary to some of my colleagues in psychology, that cognitive linguists must do experiments to have their ideas be considered as psychological theories. Nonetheless, there are various empirical, experimental techniques that are part of the arsenal of “indirect methods” used in psycholinguistics that
Cognitive linguists and empirical methods 3 have proven to be quite useful in providing support for many of cognitive linguists'claims about mind and language.I briefly outline several of these in the third part of this chapter. My overall goal is to provide ways of drawing cognitive linguists and psychologists closer together,while simultaneously respecting these scholars'different theoretical goals and empirical methods. 2.The problem with introspection Despite their differences with generative linguists,cognitive linguists mostly employ tra- ditional linguistic methods of examining native speakers'intuitions about the gram- maticality and meaningfulness of linguistic expressions in order to uncover idealized speaker/hearer linguistic knowledge.In most cases,the linguistic expressions examined are made-up (i.e.,not derived from actual spoken and written discourse),and the intu- itions studied are those of the scholar actually conducting the work.Many linguists argue that their own intuitions about linguistic matters should count for something more than asking ordinary speakers who lack linguistic training.Within cognitive linguistics particu- larly,a scholar's trained intuitions seem essential in being able to uncover language-mind links,such as the mental spaces,the image schemas,the conceptual metaphors,and so on that have now become a major foundation for cognitive linguistic theories of human conceptual systems. I personally have a split view about the kinds of practices that cognitive linguists engage in when doing their work.On the one hand,I continue to be impressed with the different systematic analyses of linguistic patterns that point to different underlying conceptual structures that may provide partial motivation for the existence of words,ut- terances,and discourse structures within contemporary language.Psychologists should not ignore these findings simply because they are not the products of experiments.Many of my own experimental studies within cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics sug- gest that cognitive linguistic conclusions about the nature of human conceptual systems may indeed be correct and thus psychologically real(Gibbs 1994,2006;Gibbs,Lima, Francuzo 2004).In this manner,the trained intuitions of cognitive linguists have provided detailed insights into possible language-mind-body interactions that serve as the source of experimental hypotheses on the workings of the cognitive unconscious. Yet I share with my colleagues in Psychology,and other disciplines(see Sandra 1998; Sandra Rice 1995),some skepticism about trusting cognitive linguists'arguments and conclusions because these are so heavily based on individual introspections about matters of linguistic structure and behavior.Although introspections can be valuable sources for constructing hypotheses,we must always be cautious in accepting any individual analyst's linguistic judgments.Linguists assume that each scholar's intuitions should be represen- tative of all speakers of a language,because each person within a linguistic community presumably shares the same underlying linguistic competence(Psychology does this in psychophysics where only a few participants'perceptual judgments are presumably needed to establish the real workings of the visual system given the belief that everyone's vi- sual system is alike).But there is considerable variation in linguists'introspections.For
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.2 (120-180) Cognitive linguists and empirical methods have proven to be quite useful in providing support for many of cognitive linguists’ claims about mind and language. I briefly outline several of these in the third part of this chapter. My overall goal is to provide ways of drawing cognitive linguists and psychologists closer together, while simultaneously respecting these scholars’ different theoretical goals and empirical methods. . The problem with introspection Despite their differences with generative linguists, cognitive linguists mostly employ traditional linguistic methods of examining native speakers’ intuitions about the grammaticality and meaningfulness of linguistic expressions in order to uncover idealized speaker/hearer linguistic knowledge. In most cases, the linguistic expressions examined are made-up (i.e., not derived from actual spoken and written discourse), and the intuitions studied are those of the scholar actually conducting the work. Many linguists argue that their own intuitions about linguistic matters should count for something more than asking ordinary speakers who lack linguistic training. Within cognitive linguistics particularly, a scholar’s trained intuitions seem essential in being able to uncover language-mind links, such as the mental spaces, the image schemas, the conceptual metaphors, and so on that have now become a major foundation for cognitive linguistic theories of human conceptual systems. I personally have a split view about the kinds of practices that cognitive linguists engage in when doing their work. On the one hand, I continue to be impressed with the different systematic analyses of linguistic patterns that point to different underlying conceptual structures that may provide partial motivation for the existence of words, utterances, and discourse structures within contemporary language. Psychologists should not ignore these findings simply because they are not the products of experiments. Many of my own experimental studies within cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics suggest that cognitive linguistic conclusions about the nature of human conceptual systems may indeed be correct and thus psychologically real (Gibbs 1994, 2006; Gibbs, Lima, & Francuzo 2004). In this manner, the trained intuitions of cognitive linguists have provided detailed insights into possible language-mind-body interactions that serve as the source of experimental hypotheses on the workings of the cognitive unconscious. Yet I share with my colleagues in Psychology, and other disciplines (see Sandra 1998; Sandra & Rice 1995), some skepticism about trusting cognitive linguists’ arguments and conclusions because these are so heavily based on individual introspections about matters of linguistic structure and behavior. Although introspections can be valuable sources for constructing hypotheses, we must always be cautious in accepting any individual analyst’s linguistic judgments. Linguists assume that each scholar’s intuitions should be representative of all speakers of a language, because each person within a linguistic community presumably shares the same underlying linguistic competence (Psychology does this in psychophysics where only a few participants’ perceptual judgments are presumably needed to establish the real workings of the visual system given the belief that everyone’s visual system is alike). But there is considerable variation in linguists’ introspections. For