200 R.J.SMITH cajolery of Parkes and others,and perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training an attempt to 'seize our military authority and squander our financial resources.'21 His aim,therefore,was to gain full control of the situation as soon as possible.Fortunately,Li had valuable allies in the energetic Shanghai taotai,Ting Jih-ch'ang,and Gordon,now Li's close personal friend.22 After disbanding the Ever-Victorious Army,Gordon had planned to return to England,but pressure from both British officials and the Chinese induced him to stay and initiate the foreign-training project. Although not inclined to devote any longer time than is necessary for the starting of scheme,'Gordon believed that a training program of the sort proposed was a most important move.'23 Gordon hoped that China would be able to develop a foreign-trained national army 'under native leaders and subject to native laws,'but he felt that the change should be made 'gradually on a small scale at first,through the Futais,not through the Peking govt.who are a very helpless lot.'24 Following the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army in late May,1864,Li Hung-chang retained some six hundred artillerymen and about three hundred infantrymen from the force.Initially,Li planned to send the artillerymen to Nanking,but before he could do so the Taiping capital fell to Tseng Kuo-ch'tian.Li then arranged for the retained troops to be transferred to Feng-huang-shan(about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai)as part of a foreign-training program under colonels Yu Tsai-pang and Yuian Chiu-kao of the Anhwei Army.25 Most of the foreign drillmasters associated with the newly- formed camp had served in the Ever-Victorious Army or the British a I.W.S.M.T'ung-chih,25:27a-b;see also ibid.,32:35b-37;Li Hung-chang chih P'an Ting-hsin shu-cha (Li Hung-chang's letters to P'an Ting-hsin;Peking,1960; hereafter Li-P'an Letters),p.22;Chou Shih-ch'eng,Huai-chiin p'ing-Nien chi (Record of the Anhwei Army's suppression of the Nien;Shanghai,1877),I:6b 22 On Ting,consult Lu,Ting Jih-ch'ang;on Gordon's relationship with Li,see Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,393,confidential memorandum on the 'Imperialist Sphere'(n.d.),ibid.,'Account of Wushufu'(n.d.),and ibid.,Add.MSS.52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon,June 19,1864.See also Li's letters to Gordon in T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao (Historical materials on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom;Peking, 1950),esp.pp.369,374,and Li Wen-chung-kung ch'ian-chi (Letters),5:15b. 2 Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,389,Gordon to Henry Gordon,July 3,1864. 24 Ibid.,June 19,1864. as The troops eventually sent to Feng-huang-shan included remnants of the Ever- Victorious Army,men from the British training camp at Fa-hua,and some new recruits.See I.W.S.M.T'ung-chih,25:26a-27b;Tai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao,pp.371- 3,416-17,427-8;Lu,Ting Jih-ch'ang,pp.41-2;F.O.228/367,Gordon to Parkes, May 17,1864 (two communications and one memorandum);ibid.,Parkes to Bruce, May 21,1864;ibid.,Parkes to Bruce,June 6,1864;ibid.,Parkes to Russell,June 21, 1864;ibid.,Parkes to Bruce,June 27,1864
cajolery of Parkes and others, and perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training an attempt to 'seize our military authority and squander our financial resources.'21 His aim, therefore, was to gain full control of the situation as soon as possible. Fortunately, Li had valuable allies in the energetic Shanghai taotai, Ting Jih-ch'ang, and Gordon, now Li's close personal friend.22 After disbanding the Ever-Victorious Army, Gordon had planned to return to England, but pressure from both British officials and the Chinese induced him to stay and initiate the foreign-training project. Although 'not inclined to devote any longer time than is necessary for the starting of scheme,' Gordon believed that a training program of the sort proposed was a 'most important move.'23 Gordon hoped that China would be able to develop a foreign-trained national army 'under native leaders and subject to native laws,' but he felt that the change should be made 'gradually & on a small scale at first, & through the Futais, not through the Peking govt. who are a very helpless lot.,24 Following the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army in late May, 1864, Li Hung-chang retained some six hundred artillerymen and about three hundred infantrymen from the force. Initially, Li planned to send the artillerymen to Nanking, but before he could do so the Taiping capital fell to Tseng Kuo-ch'tian. Li then arranged for the retained troops to be transferred to Feng-huang-shan (about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai) as part of a foreign-training program under colonels Yii Tsai-pang and Yuan Chiu-kao of the Anhwei Army.25 Most of the foreign drillmasters associated with the newlyformed camp had served in the Ever-Victorious Army or the British 21 I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 27a-b; see also ibid., 32: 35b-37; Li Hung-chang chih P'an Ting-hsin shu-cha (Li Hung-chang's letters to P'an Ting-hsin; Peking, 1960; hereafter Li-P'an Letters), p. 22; Chou Shih-ch'eng, Huai-chin p'ing-Nien chi (Record of the Anhwei Army's suppression of the Nien; Shanghai, I877), i: 6b. 22 On Ting, consult Lii, Ting Jih-ch'ang; on Gordon's relationship with Li, see Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,393, confidential memorandum on the 'Imperialist Sphere' (n.d.), ibid., 'Account of Wushufu' (n.d.), and ibid., Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, June I9, I864. See also Li's letters to Gordon in T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao (Historical materials on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom; Peking, I950), esp. pp. 369, 374, and Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (Letters), 5: I5b. 23 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, July 3, 1864. 24 Ibid., June I9, I864. 25 The troops eventually sent to Feng-huang-shan included remnants of the EverVictorious Army, men from the British training camp at Fa-hua, and some new recruits. See . W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 26a-27b; T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, pp. 371- 3, 4i6-I7, 427-8; Lii, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 41-2; F.O. 228/367, Gordon to Parkes, May 17, I864 (two communications and one memorandum); ibid., Parkes to Bruce, May 21, I864; ibid., Parkes to Bruce, June 6, I864; ibid., Parkes to Russell, June 21, I864; ibid., Parkes to Bruce, June 27, I864. 200 R. J. SMITH
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA 20I training program at Fa-hua known as Kingsley's contingent.26 Although a recent (March I,1864)Order-in-Council explicitly prohibited British subjects from serving the Chinese in a military capacity,British policymakers in China did not anticipate London's disapproval of the Feng-huang-shan project,and events proved them correct.Despite some opposition in Parliament,Lord Russell eventually decided to 'deprecate the withdrawal of these instructors.'27 In any case,well before official instructions from London reached Shanghai,Gordon had already begun drilling troops at Feng-huang-shan.28 The training program began auspiciously.By mid-August,Gordon could already write of the great progress'he had made with the troops in manual,platoon and gun drill.'It is,'he wrote,'much easier than I supposed it would be.'2 About a week later,he complained that The instruction of the Chinese here is very tedious,and requires a great deal more patience than I have';but he added:'On the whole the men are picking up Artillery.The fact is that the whole system...is new to them the Mandarins.they [sic]do not see how it should be necessary for them to shout their words of command,when they are used to give [sic]the same by tap of drum or tom tom.'By the end of August, Gordon had his manual,platoon,company and part of his battalion drill programs 'in full swing,'and could state with some satisfaction that one or two of his men knew battery drill 'very fairly.'30 But after training troops for over a month,Gordon could no longer contain the urge to return home.His announced departure,in turn, provided impetus for negotiations between the British and Chinese over the future of Feng-huang-shan.Gordon himself expressed satisfaction with the program,feeling that it should continue 'to assimilate the men as much as possible to the Imperialists with respect to...dress,pay 26 Hong Kong Daily Press,July 26,1864;T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao,p.372. 27 F.O.228/380 Layard to Under-Secretary of State,War Department,July 25, 1865.See also Chinese and Japanese Repository,Vol.3 (June,1865),pp.300-2. a On July 26,1864,about the time Gordon began drilling troops at Feng-huang- shan,the Hong Kong Daily Press opined:The information about Gordon's rejoining the Chinese sounds strangely [sic].It is clearly a move to thwart the French.'At the time,the French operated a small training program at Kao-ch'ang-miao,near Shanghai.See Lu,Ting Jih-ch'ang,pp.22-3,44-5.Most probably,the comment by the Hong Kong Daily Press was prompted by Anglo-French competition in areas other than Shanghai,however-notably Canton.See Hong Kong Daily Press,July 27,1864. For Anglo-French rivalry in foreign-training at Foochow,consult F.O.228/366, Parkes to Bruce,June 8,1864 and F.O.228/408,Hewlett to Alcock,April 21,1866; for problems at Ningpo,see Hong Kong Daily Press,July 29,1864,and November 1, 14andI5,I864. Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,389,Gordon to Henry Gordon,August 17,1864. 30 Ibid.,August 26,1864;ibid.,August 30,1864
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA training program at Fa-hua known as Kingsley's contingent.26 Although a recent (March I, 1864) Order-in-Council explicitly prohibited British subjects from serving the Chinese in a military capacity, British policymakers in China did not anticipate London's disapproval of the Feng-huang-shan project, and events proved them correct. Despite some opposition in Parliament, Lord Russell eventually decided to 'deprecate the withdrawal of these instructors.'27 In any case, well before official instructions from London reached Shanghai, Gordon had already begun drilling troops at Feng-huang-shan.28 The training program began auspiciously. By mid-August, Gordon could already write of the 'great progress' he had made with the troops in manual, platoon and gun drill. 'It is,' he wrote, 'much easier than I supposed it would be.'29 About a week later, he complained that 'The instruction of the Chinese here is very tedious, and requires a great deal more patience than I have'; but he added: 'On the whole the men are picking up Artillery. The fact is that the whole system ... is new to them & the Mandarins. they [sic] do not see how it should be necessary for them to shout their words of command, when they are used to give [sic] the same by tap of drum or tom tom.' By the end of August, Gordon had his manual, platoon, company and part of his battalion drill programs 'in full swing,' and could state with some satisfaction that one or two of his men knew battery drill 'very fairly.'30 But after training troops for over a month, Gordon could no longer contain the urge to return home. His announced departure, in turn, provided impetus for negotiations between the British and Chinese over the future of Feng-huang-shan. Gordon himself expressed satisfaction with the program, feeling that it should continue 'to assimilate the men as much as possible to the Imperialists with respect to ... dress, pay & 26 Hong Kong Daily Press, July 26, I864; T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, p. 372. 27 F.O. 228/380 Layard to Under-Secretary of State, War Department, July 25, 1865. See also Chinese and Japanese Repository, Vol. 3 (June, i865), pp. 300-2. 28 On July 26, I864, about the time Gordon began drilling troops at Feng-huangshan, the Hong Kong Daily Press opined: 'The information about Gordon's rejoining the Chinese sounds strangely [sic]. It is clearly a move to thwart the French.' At the time, the French operated a small training program at Kao-ch'ang-miao, near Shanghai. See Lti, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 22-3, 44-5. Most probably, the comment by the Hong Kong Daily Press was prompted by Anglo-French competition in areas other than Shanghai, however-notably Canton. See Hong Kong Daily Press, July 27, 1864. For Anglo-French rivalry in foreign-training at Foochow, consult F.O. 228/366, Parkes to Bruce, June 8, 1864 and F.O. 228/408, Hewlett to Alcock, April 21, i866; for problems at Ningpo, see Hong Kong Daily Press, July 29, I864, and November I, I4 and 15, I864. 29 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, August I7, I864. 30 Ibid., August 26, I864; ibid., August 30, I864. 20I
202 R.J.SMITH discipline.'The foreigners connected with the camp,he believed,should only be 'Instructors and guarantees that the Force...[would be]duly kept up and paid.'31 This view coincided with that of the Chinese,who sought to restrict the British role solely to instruction.32 Gordon ack- nowledged that Li Hung-chang had given no cause for complaint re- garding the program at Feng-huang-shan,but he believed that an understanding should be reached with the Chinese authorities which would place the camp on a more permanent footing in the event of Li's transfer.33 Based on guidelines provided by Gordon,Parkes pro- posed in November certain conditions'for the camp,to be amended' by Li Hung-chang's representatives after consultation.The upshot was a thirteen-point agreement between the British and the Chinese which satisfied both parties.Although Li Hung-chang was forced to accept Lieutenant Jebb of the 67th Regiment as head drillmaster replacing Gordon,34 he succeeded in making Feng-huang-shan a Chinese institu- tion in fact as well as name.According to the terms of the agreement, a Chinese commander (t'ung-ling)would assume responsibility for all matters of promotion and dismissal,camp discipline,payment,rations and other major aspects of military administration.35 Jebb and his foreign drillmasters were responsible only for instruction and drill. With P'an Ting-hsin,a local Anhwei Army officer as t'ung-ling,and Ting Jih-ch'ang as taotai (later financial commissioner of Kiangsu and finally governor),Li could be reasonably confident that he had achieved his goal of assuring Chinese control over affairs at Feng-huang-shan.36 Meanwhile,at Peking,Chinese and British officials had also come to an agreement concerning Feng-huang-shan.According to Bruce,before the camp had actually been established,officials of the Tsungli Yamen, Wen-hsiang in particular,had expressed reservations about the plan to train Chinese troops in the use of Western arms and tactics.Bruce per- ceived that the Ch'ing government was anxious to keep Western- 31 F.O.228/368,Gordon to Brown,September (no day),1864. 2 See,for example,T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao,p.372. 3 Undoubtedly Gordon was influenced by a letter from Robert Hart,who in- formed him of Li Hung-chang's comment that if the men of the Anhwei Army 'were placed under any other chief than himself,or left in the province under another Footae [governor]he could not answer for them,and was of the opinion that they would be impossible to be controlled.'Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,387,Hart to Gordon,May 17, 1864.Italics in the original. 34 Jebb,who had trained British troops at Fa-hua in 1862,was the British com- mander-in-chief's choice.F.O.228/368,Brown to Parkes,October 3,1864.See also, Lane-Poole,Parkes,I,501-4. ss The agreement,and correspondence leading up to the agreement,are enclosed in F.O.228/368,Parkes to Wade,November 23,1864. 36 Li Wen-chung-kung ch'tian-chi (Memorials),7:5oa-b
discipline.' The foreigners connected with the camp, he believed, should only be 'Instructors and guarantees that the Force .. . [would be] duly kept up and paid.'31 This view coincided with that of the Chinese, who sought to restrict the British role solely to instruction.32 Gordon acknowledged that Li Hung-chang had given no cause for complaint regarding the program at Feng-huang-shan, but he believed that an understanding should be reached with the Chinese authorities which would place the camp on a more permanent footing in the event of Li's transfer.33 Based on guidelines provided by Gordon, Parkes proposed in November certain 'conditions' for the camp, to be 'amended' by Li Hung-chang's representatives after consultation. The upshot was a thirteen-point agreement between the British and the Chinese which satisfied both parties. Although Li Hung-chang was forced to accept Lieutenant Jebb of the 67th Regiment as head drillmaster replacing Gordon,34 he succeeded in making Feng-huang-shan a Chinese institution in fact as well as name. According to the terms of the agreement, a Chinese commander (t'ung-ling) would assume responsibility for all matters of promotion and dismissal, camp discipline, payment, rations and other major aspects of military administration.35 Jebb and his foreign drillmasters were responsible only for instruction and drill. With P'an Ting-hsin, a local Anhwei Army officer as t'ung-ling, and Ting Jih-ch'ang as taotai (later financial commissioner of Kiangsu and finally governor), Li could be reasonably confident that he had achieved his goal of assuring Chinese control over affairs at Feng-huang-shan.36 Meanwhile, at Peking, Chinese and British officials had also come to an agreement concerning Feng-huang-shan. According to Bruce, before the camp had actually been established, officials of the Tsungli Yamen, Wen-hsiang in particular, had expressed reservations about the plan to train Chinese troops in the use of Western arms and tactics. Bruce perceived that the Ch'ing government was anxious to keep Western- 31 F.O. 228/368, Gordon to Brown, September (no day), I864. 32 See, for example, T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, p. 372. 33 Undoubtedly Gordon was influenced by a letter from Robert Hart, who informed him of Li Hung-chang's comment that if the men of the Anhwei Army 'were placed under any other chief than himself, or left in the province under another Footae [governor] he could not answer for them, and was of the opinion that they would be impossible to be controlled.' Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,387, Hart to Gordon, May 17, I864. Italics in the original. 34Jebb, who had trained British troops at Fa-hua in I862, was the British commander-in-chief's choice. F.O. 228/368, Brown to Parkes, October 3, I864. See also, Lane-Poole, Parkes, I, 50I-4. 35 The agreement, and correspondence leading up to the agreement, are enclosed in F.O. 228/368, Parkes to Wade, November 23, I864. 36 Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (Memorials), 7: 5oa-b. 202 R. J. SMITH
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA 203 trained Chinese troops out of Li Hung-chang's complete control,and that Wen-hsiang,at least,was desirous to hold...[strategic]places with Manchoos [sic]and that he did not wish to see the Chinese population initiated in foreign discipline and the use of foreign arms.'37 Yet despite the apprehensions of Ch'ing officials at the capital,by late December,1864,Thomas Wade could report that he had received 'verbal assurances'that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a regular camp of instruction.38 Unlike Parkes and other local British officials at Shanghai,Wade did not insist that British officers head the training program,recognizing that the exclusive employment of British officers on a grand scale would awaken the jealousy of the other Treaty Powers.'He did,however,tell Parkes that he should impress upon Li Hung-chang(now governor-general of Liangkiang)the fright- ful danger incurred to the independence of China by the continued postponement of the question of military reform.'He also encouraged Parkes to point out to Li the dangers of foreign interference and the possibility of further interference 'both in the administration and finance of the country.'39 Such warnings did not fall upon deaf ears,although they were not always interpreted correctly.40 Although the Feng-huang-shan project enjoyed the avowed support of Chinese and British officials at all levels,matters did not remain in a satisfactory state at the camp.Apparently,Jebb's performance as head drillmaster did little to inspire confidence:Ting Jih-ch'ang complained of Jebb's recurrent absence from camp and other misdeeds,while Westerners found him laughably inflexible in his adherence to the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book.'41 There were few regrets, therefore,when Jebb received his transfer back to England in 1865.On the other hand,his departure had a unsettling effect,for it raised the issue of who would succeed him.Local British officials were convinced that the new commander-in-chief,General Guy,should name a succes- sor to Jebb;but Ting Jih-ch'ang in desperation bypassed regular chan- nels to secure the appointment of William Winstanley,a former British officer who had served in the Ever-Victorious Army and who had 37 F.O.17/410,Bruce to Russell,June 12,1864. 38 F.O.228/366,Wade to Parkes,December 31,1864.See also F.O.228/387, Wade to Parkes,March 24,1865 and Li-P'an Letters,p.21. 3F.O.228/366,Wade to Parkes,November 28,1864. 40 For an example of Wade's warnings in the Taiping period and the Chinese response,consult John S.Gregory,Great Britain and the Taipings (New York and Washington,1969),pp.93-4. 41 Hsun-Hu kung-tu (Official letters of the Shanghai taotai [Ting Jih-ch'ang]),7 (Ting-cheng 32):1ob-11;Fu-Wu kung-tu,50:8;Hake,Events,pp.526-7
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA trained Chinese troops out of Li Hung-chang's complete control, and that Wen-hsiang, at least, 'was desirous to hold ... [strategic] places with\ Manchoos [sic] and that he did not wish to see the Chinese population initiated in foreign discipline and the use of foreign arms.'37 Yet despite the apprehensions of Ch'ing officials at the capital, by late December, I864, Thomas Wade could report that he had received 'verbal assurances' that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a regular camp of instruction.38 Unlike Parkes and other local British officials at Shanghai, Wade did not insist that British officers head the training program, recognizing that 'the exclusive employment of British officers on a grand scale would awaken the jealousy of the other Treaty Powers.' He did, however, tell Parkes that he should impress upon Li Hung-chang (now governor-general of Liangkiang) 'the frightful danger incurred to the independence of China by the continued postponement of the question of military reform.' He also encouraged Parkes to point out to Li the dangers of foreign interference and the possibility of further interference 'both in the administration and finance of the country.'39 Such warnings did not fall upon deaf ears, although they were not always interpreted correctly.40 Although the Feng-huang-shan project enjoyed the avowed support of Chinese and British officials at all levels, matters did not remain in a satisfactory state at the camp. Apparently, Jebb's performance as head drillmaster did little to inspire confidence: Ting Jih-ch'ang complained of Jebb's recurrent absence from camp and other misdeeds, while Westerners found him laughably inflexible in his adherence to 'the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book.'41 There were few regrets, therefore, whenJebb received his transfer back to England in 1865. On the other hand, his departure had a unsettling effect, for it raised the issue of who would succeed him. Local British officials were convinced that the new commander-in-chief, General Guy, should name a successor to Jebb; but Ting Jih-ch'ang in desperation bypassed regular channels to secure the appointment of William Winstanley, a former British officer who had served in the Ever-Victorious Army and who had 37 F.O. 17/4I0, Bruce to Russell, June 12, 1864. 38 F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, December 31, I864. See also F.O. 228/387, Wade to Parkes, March 24, 1865 and Li-P'an Letters, p. 21. 39F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, November 28, I864. 40 For an example of Wade's warnings in the Taiping period and the Chinese response, consult John S. Gregory, Great Britain and the Taipings (New York and Washington, I969), pp. 93-4. 41 Hsiin-Hu kung-tu (Official letters of the Shanghai taotai [TingJih-ch'ang]), 7 (Ting-cheng 32): Iob-I i; Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 8; Hake, Events, pp. 526-7. 203
204 R.J.SMITH helped to initiate the Feng-huang-shan project.42 In justifying the move to his superiors,Ting emphasized that Gordon had recommended Winstanley in a letter from home,and he took pains to point out that Winstanley's lack of official connections with the British government would prove to be an advantage.43 British officials at Shanghai pro- tested Ting's coup vociferously,but to no avail.At Peking the British minister affirmed China's right to appoint a successor to Jebb,asking only that the Chinese inform him of their final selection.44 The issue of Jebb's successor brought into focus the tension between local British officials at Shanghai,who continually attempted to expand British influence in Chinese military affairs,and their superiors at Peking-Bruce,Wade and Rutherford Alcock-who sought to limit direct British interference.To be certain,each of the three ministers cherished the hope that China would modernize her military along Western lines.But they felt that military reform under Western leader- ship should be aimed at preventing rather than facilitating foreign interference in Chinese military affairs.45 In Bruce's words:'Our office is that of the schoolmaster who educates,not of the tyrant who im- poses.'46 Such attitudes contrast markedly with those of local British officials,W.H.Medhurst in particular.47 Organization and Administration at Feng-huang-shan By the time Winstanley assumed the position of head drillmaster at Feng-huang-shan in mid-1865,the basic features of the program had been set.Although daily roll call,parade and Western drill introduced elements of a foreign military lifestyle to the common soldier at Feng- huang-shan,the milieu was basically Chinese.Camp administration and discipline followed traditional lines,as did the uniform of men and officers.The organization of a 'stockade'(i.e.,battalion,ying)roughly approximated that of its counterpart in yung-ying armies,and there were no Western-style mess or barracks arrangements:"The native officers lived in quarters in the village close by,while the commandant 42 Winstanley obviously sought the position.See Demetrius Boulger,The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney (London and New York,1908),p.147. 43 Hstin-Hu kung-tu,7 (Ting-cheng 32):I1-12b. 4F.O.228/387,Wade to Parkes,August 1,1865;see also F.O.228/524,Wade to Medhurst,February I3,1873. s For Alcock's views,consult Wright,The Last Stand,p.216. 46 Gerson,'Letter,'p.I3. 47 On Medhurst's aggressiveness,see Martin Wolfson,'The English and the Ever- Victorious Army'(M.A.thesis,Columbia University,1962),pp.136-55
helped to initiate the Feng-huang-shan project.42 In justifying the move to his superiors, Ting emphasized that Gordon had recommended Winstanley in a letter from home, and he took pains to point out that Winstanley's lack of official connections with the British government would prove to be an advantage.43 British officials at Shanghai protested Ting's coup vociferously, but to no avail. At Peking the British minister affirmed China's right to appoint a successor to Jebb, asking only that the Chinese inform him of their final selection.44 The issue ofJebb's successor brought into focus the tension between local British officials at Shanghai, who continually attempted to expand British influence in Chinese military affairs, and their superiors at Peking-Bruce, Wade and Rutherford Alcock-who sought to limit direct British interference. To be certain, each of the three ministers cherished the hope that China would modernize her military along Western lines. But they felt that military reform under Western leadership should be aimed at preventing rather than facilitating foreign interference in Chinese military affairs.45 In Bruce's words: 'Our office is that of the schoolmaster who educates, not of the tyrant who imposes.'46 Such attitudes contrast markedly with those of local British officials, W. H. Medhurst in particular.47 Organization and Administration atFeng-huang-shan By the time Winstanley assumed the position of head drillmaster at Feng-huang-shan in mid-I865, the basic features of the program had been set. Although daily roll call, parade and Western drill introduced elements of a foreign military lifestyle to the common soldier at Fenghuang-shan, the milieu was basically Chinese. Camp administration and discipline followed traditional lines, as did the uniform of men and officers. The organization of a 'stockade' (i.e., battalion, ying) roughly approximated that of its counterpart in yung-ying armies, and there were no Western-style mess or barracks arrangements: 'The native officers lived in quarters in the village close by, while the commandant 42 Winstanley obviously sought the position. See Demetrius Boulger, The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney (London and New York, 1908), p. I47. 43 Hsin-Hu kung-tu, 7 (Ting-cheng 32): i I-I2b. 44 F.O. 228/387, Wade to Parkes, August i, 1865; see also F.O. 228/524, Wade to Medhurst, February I3, 1873. 45 For Alcock's views, consult Wright, The Last Stand, p. 2 6. 46 Gerson, 'Letter,' p. I3. 47 On Medhurst's aggressiveness, see Martin Wolfson, 'The English and the EverVictorious Army' (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, I962), pp. I36-55. 20o4 R. J. SMITH