The Science of"Muddling Through" STOR Charles E.Lindblom Public Administration Review,Vol.19,No.2.(Spring,1959),pp.79-88 Stable URL: http//links istor.0 rg/sici2sici=0033-3352%28195921%2919%3A2%3C79%3ATS0%22T%3E2.0.C0%3B2-Z Public Administration Review is currently published by American Society for Public Administration. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use,available at http://www.istor org/about/terms html.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides,in part,that unless you have obtained prior permission,you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles,and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work.Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/aspa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world.The Archive is supported by libraries,scholarly societies,publishers, and foundations.It is an initiative of JSTOR,a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology.For more information regarding JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sun Sep923:22:012007
The Science of "Muddling Through" Charles E. Lindblom Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-3352%28195921%2919%3A2%3C79%3ATSO%22T%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 Public Administration Review is currently published by American Society for Public Administration. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/aspa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sun Sep 9 23:22:01 2007
The Science of "Muddling Through' By CHARLES E.LINDBLOM Associate Professor of Economics Yale University >Short courses,books,and articles exhort admin- istrators to make decisions more methodically,but there has been little analysis of the decision-making UPPOSE an administrator is given respon- process now used by public administrators.The usual process is investigated here-and generally de- sibility for formulating policy with re- fended against proposals for more "scientific"meth- spect to inflation.He might start by try- ods. ing to list all related values in order of Decisions of individual administrators,of course, importance,e.g.,full employment,reasonable must be integrated with decisions of others to form the mosaic of public policy.This integration business profit,protection of small savings, of individual decisions has become the major con- prevention of a stock market crash.Then all cern of organization theory,and the way individuals possible policy outcomes could be rated as make decisions necessarily affects the way those de- more or less efficient in attaining a maximum cisions are best meshed with others'.In addition, of these values.This would of course require decision-making method relates to allocation of de a prodigious inquiry into values held by cision-making responsibility-who should make what decision. members of society and an equally prodigious More "scientific"decision-making also is dis set of calculations on how much of each value cussed in this issue:"Tools for Decision-Making in is equal to how much of each other value.He Resources Planning.” could then proceed to outline all possible policy alternatives.In a third step,he would undertake systematic comparison of his multi- ployment.He would in fact disregard most tude of alternatives to determine which at- other social values as beyond his present in- tains the greatest amount of values. terest,and he would for the moment not even In comparing policies,he would take ad- attempt to rank the few values that he re- vantage of any theory available that general- garded as immediately relevant.Were he ized about classes of policies.In considering pressed,he would quickly admit that he was inflation,for example,he would compare all ignoring many related values and many pos- policies in the light of the theory of prices. sible important consequences of his policies. Since no alternatives are beyond his investi- As a second step,he would outline those gation,he would consider strict central con- relatively few policy alternatives that occurred trol and the abolition of all prices and mar- to him.He would then compare them.In kets on the one hand and elimination of all comparing his limited number of alternatives, public controls with reliance completely on inost of them familiar from past controversies, the free market on the other,both in the light he would not ordinarily find a body of theory of whatever theoretical generalizations he precise enough to carry him through a com- could find on such hypothetical economies. parison of their respective consequences.In- Finally,he would try to make the choice stead he would rely heavily on the record of that would in fact maximize his values. past experience with small policy steps to pre- An alternative line of attack would be to dict the consequences of similar steps ex- set as his principal objective,either explicitly tended into the future. or without conscious thought,the relatively Moreover,he would find that the policy al- simple goal of keeping prices level.This ob- ternatives combined objectives or values in jective might be compromised or complicated different ways.For example,one policy might by only a few other goals,such as full em- offer price level stability at the cost of some 79
The Science of "Muddling Through" By CHARLES E. LINDBLOM Associate Professor of Economics Yale University S UPPOSE an administrator is given responsibility for formulating policy with respect to inflation. He might start by trying to list all related values in order of importance, e.g., full employment, reasonable business profit, protection of small savings, prevention of a stock market crash. Then all possible policy outcomes could be rated as more or less efficient in attaining a maximum of these values. This would of course require a prodigious inquiry into values held by members of society and an equally prodigious set of calculations on how much of each value is equal to how much of each other value. He could then proceed to outline all possible policy alternatives. In a third step, he would undertake systematic comparison of his multitude of alternatives to determine which attains the greatest amount of values. In comparing policies, he would take advantage of any theory available that generalized about classes of policies. In considering inflation, for example, he would compare all policies in the light of the theory of prices. Since no alternatives are beyond his investigation, he would consider strict central control and the abolition of all prices and markets on the one hand and elimination of all public controls with reliance completely on the free market on the other, both in the light of whatever theoretical generalizations he could find on such hypothetical economies. Finally, he would try to make the choice that would in fact maximize his values. An alternative line of attack would be to set as his principal objective, either explicitly or without conscious thought, the relatively simple goal of keeping prices level. This objective might be compromised or complicated by only a few other goals, such as full em- > Short courses, books, and articles exhort administrators to make decisions more methodically, but there has been little analysis of the decision-making process now used by public administrators. The usual process is investigated here-and generally defended against proposals for more "scientific" methods. Decisions of individual administrators, of course, must be integrated with decisions of others to form the mosaic of public policy. This integration of individual decisions has become the major concern of organization theory, and the way individuals make decisions necessarily affects the way those decisions are best meshed with others'. In addition, decision-making method relates to allocation of decision-making responsibility-who should make what decision. More "scientific" decision-making also is discussed in this issue: "Tools for Decision-Making in Resources Planning." ployment. He would in fact disregard most other social values as beyond his present interest, and he would for the moment not even attempt to rank the few values that he regarded as immediately relevant. Were he pressed, he would quickly admit that he was ignoring many related values and many possible important consequences of his policies. As a second step, he would outline those relatively few policy alternatives that occurred to him. He would then compare them. In comparing his limited number of alternatives, most of them familiar from past controversies, he would not ordinarily find a body of theory precise enough to carry him through a comparison of their respective consequences. Instead he would rely heavily on the record of past experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences of similar steps exlended into the future. Moreover, he would find that the policy alternatives combined objectives or values in different ways. For example, one policy might offer price level stability at the cost of some
80 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW risk of unemployment;another might offer process-usually describe the first approach less price stability but also less risk of unem- and not the second.1 ployment.Hence,the next step in his ap- The common tendency to describe policy proach-the final selection-would combine formulation even for complex problems as into one the choice among values and the though it followed the first approach has been choice among instruments for reaching values. strengthened by the attention given to,and It would not,as in the first method of policy- successes enjoyed by,operations research,sta- making,approximate a more mechanical proc- tistical decision theory,and systems analysis. ess of choosing the means that best satisfied The hallmarks of these procedures,typical of goals that were previously clarified and the first approach,are clarity of objective,ex- ranked.Because practitioners of the second plicitness of evaluation,a high degree of com- approach expect to achieve their goals only prehensiveness of overview,and,wherever partially,they would expect to repeat end- possible,quantification of values for mathe- lessly the sequence just described,as condi- matical analysis.But these advanced proce- tions and aspirations changed and as accuracy dures remain largely the appropriate tech- of prediction improved. niques of relatively small-scale problem-solving where the total number of variables to be By Root or by Branch considered is small and value problems re- For complex problems,the first of these stricted.Charles Hitch,head of the Economics two approaches is of course impossible.Al- Division of RAND Corporation,one of the though such an approach can be described,it leading centers for application of these tech- cannot be practiced except for relatively sim- niques,has written: ple problems and even then only in a some- I would make the empirical generalization from what modified form.It assumes intellectual my experience at RAND and elsewhere that oper. capacities and sources of information that ations research is the art of sub-optimizing,i.e.,of men simply do not possess,and it is even more solving some lower-level problems,and that diffi- culties increase and our special competence di- absurd as an approach to policy when the minishes by an order of magnitude with every level time and money that can be allocated to a of decision making we attempt to ascend.The sort policy problem is limited,as is always the of simple explicit model which operations re. case.Of particular importance to public ad- searchers are so proficient in using can certainly ministrators is the fact that public agencies reflect most of the significant factors influencing are in effect usually instructed not to practice traffic control on the George Washington Bridge, the first method.That is to say,their pre- but the proportion of the relevant reality which scribed functions and constraints-the politi- we can represent by any such model or models in studying,say,a major foreign-policy decision,ap- cally or legally possible-restrict their atten- pears to be almost trivial. tion to relatively few values and relatively few alternative policies among the countless Accordingly,I propose in this paper to alternatives that might be imagined.It is the clarify and formalize the second method, second method that is practiced. James G.March and Herbert A.Simon similarly Curiously,however,the literatures of deci- characterize the literature.They also take some im- portant steps,as have Simon's recent articles,to de- sion-making,policy formulation,planning, scribe a less heroic model of policy-making.See Or- and public administration formalize the first ganizations (John Wiley and Sons,1958),p.137. approach rather than the second,leaving pub- "Operations Research and National Planning-A lic administrators who handle complex deci- Dissent,"5 Operations Research 718 (October,1957). Hitch's dissent is from particular points made in the sions in the position of practicing what few article to which his paper is a reply;his claim that preach.For emphasis I run some risk of over- operations research is for low-level problems is widely statement.True enough,the literature is well accepted. aware of limits on man's capacities and of the For examples of the kind of problems to which op- erations research is applied,see C.W.Churchman, inevitability that policies will be approached R.L.Ackoff and E.L.Arnoff,Introduction to Opera- in some such style as the second.But attempts tions Research (John Wiley and Sons,1957);and J.F. to formalize rational policy formulation-to McCloskey and J.M.Coppinger (eds.),Operations Re. search for Management,Vol.II,(The Johns Hopkins lay out explicitly the necessary steps in the Press,1956)
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW risk of unemployment; another might offer less price stability but also less risk of unemployment. Hence, the next step in his approach-the final selection-would combine into one the choice among values and the choice among instruments for reaching values. 11 would not, as in the first method of policymaking, approximate a more mechanical process of choosing the means that best satisfied goals that were previously clarified and ranked. Because practitioners of the second approach expect to achieve their goals only partially, they would expect to repeat endlessly the sequence just described, as conditions and aspirations changed and as accuracy of prediction improved. By Root or by Branch For complex problems, the first of these two approaches is of course impossible. Although such an approach can be described, it cannot be practiced except for relatively simple problems and even then only in a somewhat modified form. It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the case. Of particuIar importance to public administrators is the fact that public agencies are in effect usually instructed not to practice the first method. That is to say, their prescribed functions and constraints-the politically or legally possible-restrict their attention to relatively few values and relatively few alternative policies among the countless alternatives that might be imagined. It is the second method that is practiced. Curiously, however, the literatures of decision-making, policy formulation, planning, and public administration formalize the first approach rather than the second, leaving public administrators who handle complex decisions in the position of practicing what few preach. For emphasis I run some risk of overstatement. True enough, the literature is well aware of limits on man's capacities and of the inevitability that policies will be approached in some such style as the second. But attempts to formalize rational policy formulation-to lay out explicitly the necessary steps in the process-usually describe the first approach and not the second.1 The common tendency to describe policy formulation even for complex problems as though it followed the first approach has been strengthened by the attention given to, and successes enjoyed by, operations research, statistical decision theory, and systems analysis. The hallmarks of these procedures, typical of the first approach, are clarity of objective, explicitness of evaluation, a high degree of comprehensiveness of overview, and, wherever possible, quantification of values for mathematical analysis. But these advanced procedures remain largely the appropriate techniques of relatively small-scale problem-solving where the total number of variables to be considered is small and value problems restricted. Charles Hitch, head of the Economics Division of RAND Corporation, one of the leading centers for application of these techniques, has written: I would make the empirical generalization from my experience at RAND and elsewhere that operations research is the art of sub-optimizing, i.e., of solving some lower-level problems, and that difficulties increase and our special competence diminishes by an order of magnitude with every level of decision making we attempt to ascend. The sort of simple explicit model which operations researchers are so proficient in using can certainly reflect most of the significant factors influencing traffic control on the George Washington Bridge, but the proportion of the relevant reality which we can represent by any such model or models in studying, say, a major foreign-policy decision, appears to be almost trivial.' Accordingly, I propose in this paper to clarify and formalize the second method, James G. March and Herbert A. Simon similarly characterize the literature. They also take some important steps, as have Simon's recent articles, to describe a less heroic model of policy-making. See Organizations (John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 137. a "Operations Research and National Planning-A Dissent," 5 Operations Research 718 (October, 1957). Hitch's dissent is from particular points made in the article to which his paper is a reply; his claim that operations research is for low-level problems is widely accepted. For examples of the kind of problems to which operations research is applied, see C. W. Churchman, R. L. Ackoff and E. L. Arnoff, Introduction to Operations Research uohn Wiley and Sons, 1957); and J. F. McCloskey and J. M. Coppinger (eds.), Operations Research for Management, Vol. 11, (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956)
THE SCIENCE OF MUDDLING THROUGH 81 much neglected in the literature.This might ited comparisons is to see how the root be described as the method of successive lim- method often breaks down in its handling of ited comparisons.I will contrast it with the first values or objectives.The idea that values approach,which might be called the rational. should be clarified,and in advance of the ex- comprehensive method.3 More impressionis- amination of alternative policies,is appeal- tically and briefly-and therefore generally ing.But what happens when we attempt it used in this article-they could be character- for complex social problems?The first diffi- ized as the branch method and root method, culty is that on many critical values or objec- the former continually building out from the tives,citizens disagree,congressmen disagree, current situation,step-by-step and by small and public administrators disagree.Even degrees;the latter starting from fundamentals where a fairly specific objective is prescribed anew each time,building on the past only as for the administrator,there remains consid- experience is embodied in a theory,and al- erable room for disagreement on sub-objec- ways prepared to start completely from the tives.Consider,for example,the conflict with ground up. respect to locating public housing,described Let us put the characteristics of the two in Meyerson and Banfield's study of the Chi- methods side by side in simplest terms. Rational-Comprehensive (Root) Successive Limited Comparisons(Branch) a.Clarification of values or objectives distinct from 1b.Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of and usually prerequisite to empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct from one an- alternative policies. other but are closely intertwined. 2a.Policy-formulation is therefore approached through gb.Since means and ends are not distinct,means-end means-end analysis:First the ends are isolated, analysis is often inappropriate or limited. then the means to achieve them are sought. 3a.The test of a "good"policy is that it can be shown 3b.The test of a "good"policy is typically that vari- to be the most appropriate means to desired ends. ous analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective). 4a.Analysis is comprehensive;every important rele 4b.Analysis is drastically limited: vant factor is taken into account. i)Important possible outcomes are neglected. ii)Important alternative potential policies are neglected. iii)Important affected values are neglected. 5a.Theory is often heavily relied upon. 5b.A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory. Assuming that the root method is familiar and understandable,we proceed directly to cago Housing Authority4-disagreement which clarification of its alternative by contrast.In occurred despite the clear objective of provid- explaining the second,we shall be describing ing a certain number of public housing units how most administrators do in fact approach in the city.Similarly conflicting are objectives complex questions,for the root method,the in highway location,traffic control,minimum "best"way as a blueprint or model,is in fact wage administration,development of tourist not workable for complex policy questions, facilities in national parks,or insect control. and administrators are forced to use the Administrators cannot escape these con- method of successive limited comparisons flicts by ascertaining the majority's preference, for preferences have not been registered on Intertwining Evaluation and Empirical most issues;indeed,there often are no prefer- Analysis (1b) ences in the absence of public discussion suffi- The quickest way to understand how values cient to bring an issue to the attention of the are handled in the method of successive lim- electorate.Furthermore,there is a question I am assuming that administrators often make pol- icy and advise in the making of policy and am treating Martin Meyerson and Edward C.Banfield,Politics, decision-making and policy-making as synonymous for Planning and the Public Interest (The Free Press, purposes of this paper. 1955)-
THE SCIENCE OF "MUDDLING THROUGH" much neglected in the literature. This might be described as the method of successiue limited comparisons. I will contrast it with the first approach, which might be called the rationalcomprehensive method.3 More impressionistically and briefly-and therefore generally used in this article-they could be characterized as the branch method and root method, the former continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees; the latter starting from fundamentals anew each time, building on the past only as experience is embodied in a theory, and always prepared to start completely from the ground up. Let us put the characteristics of the two ited comparisons is to see how the root method often breaks down in its handling of values or objectives. The idea that values should be clarified, and in advance of the examination of alternative policies, is appealing. But what happens when we attempt it for complex social problems? The first difficulty is that on many critical values or objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree, and public administrators disagree. Even where a fairly specific objective is prescribed for the administrator, there remains considerable room for disagreement on sub-objectives. Consider, for example, the conflict with respect to locating public housing, described in Meyerson and Banfield's study of the Chimethods side by side in simplest terms. Rational-Comprehensive (Root) la. Clarification of values or objectives distinct from and usually prerequisite to empirical analysis of alternative policies. ea. Policy-formulation is therefore approached through means-end analysis: First the ends are isolated, then the means to achieve them are sought. $a. The test of a "good" policy is that it can be shown to be the most appropriate means to desired ends. 4a. Analysis is comprehensive; every important relevant factor is taken into account. 5a. Theory is often heavily relied upon. Assuming that the root method is familiarand understandable, we proceed directly to clarification of its alternative by contrast. In explaining the second, we shall be describing how most administrators do in fact approach complex questions, for the root method, the "best" way as a blueprint or model, is in fact not workable for complex policy questions, and administrators are forced to use the method of successive limited comparisons. Intertwining Evaluation and Empirical Analysis ( Ib) The quickest way to understand how values are handled in the method of successive lim- 'I am assuming that administrators often make policy and advise in the making of policy and am treating decision-making and policy-making as synonymous for purposes of this paper. - Successive Limited Comparisons (Branch) ib. Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct from one another but are closely intertwined. eb. Since means and ends are not distinct, means-end analysis is often inappropriate or limited. gb. The test of a "good" policy is typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective). qb. Analysis is drastically limited: i) Important possible outcomes are neglected. ii) Important alternative potential policies are neglected. iii) Important affected values are neglected. gb. A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory. cago Housing Authority4-disagreement which occurred despite the clear objective of providing a certain number of public housing units in the city. Similarly conflicting are objectives in highway location, traffic control, minimum wage administration, development of tourist facilities in national parks, or insect control. Administrators cannot escape these conflicts by ascertaining the majority's preference, for preferences have not been registered on most issues; indeed, there often are no preferences in the absence of public discussion sufficient to bring an issue to the attention of the electorate. Furthermore, there is a question Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (The Free Press, 1955)
82 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW of whether intensity of feeling should be con- state marginal objectives or values except in sidered as well as the number of persons pre- terms of particular policies.That one value ferring each alternative.By the impossibility is preferred to another in one decision situa- of doing otherwise,administrators often are tion does not mean that it will be preferred reduced to deciding policy without clarifying in another decision situation in which it can objectives first. be had only at great sacrifice of another value. Even when an administrator resolves to fol- Attempts to rank or order values in general low his own values as a criterion for decisions, and abstract terms so that they do not shift he often will not know how to rank them from decision to decision end up by ignoring when they conflict with one another,as they the relevant marginal preferences.The sig- usually do.Suppose,for example,that an ad- nificance of this third point thus goes very ministrator must relocate tenants living in far.Even if all administrators had at hand an tenements scheduled for destruction.One ob- agreed set of values,objectives,and con- jective is to empty the buildings fairly straints,and an agreed ranking of these val- promptly,another is to find suitable accom- ues,objectives,and constraints,their mar- modation for persons displaced,another is to ginal values in actual choice situations would avoid friction with residents in other areas in be impossible to formulate. which a large influx would be unwelcome,an- Unable consequently to formulate the rele- other is to deal with all concerned through vant values first and then choose among poli- persuasion if possible,and so on. cies to achieve them,administrators must How does one state even to himself the choose directly among alternative policies that relative importance of these partially con- offer different marginal combinations of val- flicting values?A simple ranking of them is ues.Somewhat paradoxically,the only practi- not enough;one needs ideally to know how cable way to disclose one's relevant marginal much of one value is worth sacrificing for values even to oneself is to describe the policy some of another value.The answer is that one chooses to achieve them.Except roughly typically the administrator chooses-and must and vaguely,I know of no way to describe- choose-directly among policies in which these or even to understand-what my relative eval- values are combined in different ways.He uations are for,say,freedom and security, cannot first clarify his values and then choose speed and accuracy in governmental decisions, among policies. or low taxes and better schools than to de- A more subtle third point underlies both scribe my preferences among specific policy the first two.Social objectives do not always choices that might be made between the al- have the same relative values.One objective ternatives in each of the pairs. may be highly prized in one circumstance, In summary,two aspects of the process by another in another circumstance.If,for ex- which values are actually handled can be dis- ample,an administrator values highly both tinguished.The first is clear:evaluation and the dispatch with which his agency can carry empirical analysis are intertwined;that is, through its projects and good public relations, one chooses among values and among policies it matters little which of the two possibly con- at one and the same time.Put a little more flicting values he favors in some abstract or elaborately,one simultaneously chooses a pol- general sense.Policy questions arise in forms icy to attain certain objectives and chooses which put to administrators such a question the objectives themselves.The second aspect as:Given the degree to which we are or are is related but distinct:the administrator fo- not already achieving the values of dispatch cuses his attention on marginal or incremen- and the values of good public relations,is it tal values.Whether he is aware of it or not, worth sacrificing a little speed for a happier he does not find general formulations of clientele,or is it better to risk offending the objectives very helpful and in fact makes spe- clientele so that we can get on with our work? cific marginal or incremental comparisons. The answer to such a question varies with Two policies,X and Y,confront him.Both circumstances. promise the same degree of attainment of ob- The value problem is,as the example jectives a,b,c,d,and e.But X promises him shows,always a problem of adjustments at a somewhat more of f than does Y,while Y margin.But there is no practicable way to promises him somewhat more of g than does
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW of whether intensity of feeling should be considered as well as the number of persons preferring each alternative. By the impossibility of doing otherwise, administrators often are reduced to deciding policy without clarifying objectives first. Even when an administrator resolves to follow his own values as a criterion for decisions, he often will not know how to rank them when they conflict with one another, as they usually do. Suppose, for example, that an administrator must relocate tenants living in tenements scheduled for destruction. One objective is to empty the buildings fairly promptly, another is to find suitable accommodation for persons displaced, another is to avoid friction with residents in other areas in which a large influx would be unwelcome, another is to deal with all concerned through persuasion if possible, and so on. How does one state even to himself the relative importance of these partially conflicting values? A simple ranking of them is not enough; one needs ideally to know how much of one value is worth sacrificing for some of another value. The answer is that typically the administrator chooses-and must choose--directly among policies in which these values are combined in different ways. He cannot first clarify his values and then choose among policies. A more subtle third point underlies both the first two. Social objectives do not always have the same relative values. One objective may be highly prized in one circumstance, another in another circumstance. If, for example, an administrator values highly both the dispatch with which his agency can carry through its projects and good public relations, it matters little which of the two possibly conflicting values he favors in some abstract or general sense. Policy questions arise in forms which put to administrators such a question as: Given the degree to which we are or are not already achieving the values of dispatch and the values of good public relations, is it worth sacrificing a little speed for a happier clientele, or is it better to risk offending the clientele so that we can get on with our work? The answer to such a question varies with circumstances. The value problem is, as the example shows, always a problem of adjustments at a margin. But there is no practicable way to state marginal objectives or values except in terms of particular policies. That one value is preferred to another in one decision situation does not mean that it will be preferred in another decision situation in which it can be had only at great sacrifice of another value. Attempts to rank or order values in general and abstract terms so that they do not shift from decision to decision end up by ignoring the relevant marginal preferences. The significance of this third point thus goes very far. Even if all administrators had at hand an agreed set of values, objectives, and constraints, and an agreed ranking of these values, objectives, and constraints, their marginal values in actual choice situations would be impossible to formulate. Unable consequently to formulate the relevant values first and then choose among policies to achieve them, administrators must choose directly among alternative policies that offer different marginal combinations of values. Somewhat paradoxically, the only practicable way to disclose one's relevant marginal values even to oneself is to describe the policy one chooses to achieve them. Except roughly and vaguely, I know of no way to describeor even to understand-what my relative evaluations are for, say, freedom and security, speed and accuracy in governmental decisions, or low taxes and better schools than to describe my preferences among specific policy choices that might be made between the alternatives in each of the pairs. In summary, two aspects of the process by which values are actually handled can be distinguished. The first is clear: evaluation and empirical analysis are intertwined; that is, one chooses among values and among policies at one and the same time. Put a little more elaborately, one simultaneously chooses a policy to attain certain objectives and chooses the objectives themselves. The second aspect is related but distinct: the administrator focuses his attention on marginal or incremental values. Whether he is aware of it or not, he does not find general formulations of objectives very helpful and in fact makes specific marginal or incremental comparisons. Two policies, X and Y, confront him. Both promise the same degree of attainment of objectives a, b, c, d, and e. But X promises him somewhat more of f than does Y, while Y promises him somewhat more of g than does