Soft Law may become hard law Examples In the european Union, the Social Dialogue' between employers association and trade unions can produce labour standards(soft law) which can become hard law in the form of directives Accounting standards in Europe(cf. below)
16 Soft Law may become hard law Examples: - In the European Union, the ‘Social Dialogue’ between employers’ association and trade unions can produce labour standards (soft law) which can become hard law in the form of Directives - Accounting standardsin Europe (cf. below)
No clear dichotomy between self- regulation”and“ public regulation Public and private actors interact in complex and collaborative ways to address problems of public policy 17
17 No clear dichotomy between “self-regulation” and “public regulation” Public and private actors interact in complex and collaborative ways to address problems of public policy
3. Risks and Advantages of Co-Regulation 3. 1. Risks 3.2. Advantages
18 3. Risks and Advantages of Co-Regulation 3.1. Risks 3.2. Advantages
3.1. Risks of Private Regulation and co-regulation Serious questions concerning the legitimacy of private regulators Risks of lax standards or absence of enforcement Risks of conflict of interests and of regulatory capture
19 3.1. Risks of Private Regulation and Co-regulation • Serious questions concerning the legitimacy of private regulators • Risks of lax standards or absence of enforcement • Risks of conflict of interests and of regulatory capture
Risk of regulatory Capture Concept built by Georges Stigler, Nobel Prize in economics(1982) Regulatory capture happens when private interests organizations are able to substantially influence the decision of public regulatory authorities through ntellectual domination lobbying activities direct participation to joint committees between public and private organization Corruption etc G. Stigler, an economist belonging to the ultra-liberal school of Chicago, was concluding that it was better not to develop regulation than to create regulation captured by private interests 20
20 Risk of Regulatory Capture • Concept built by Georges Stigler, Nobel Prize in economics (1982) • Regulatory capture happens when private interests organizations are able to substantially influence the decision of public regulatory authorities through: • intellectual domination, • lobbying activities, • direct participation to joint committees between public and private organization • Corruption • etc. • G. Stigler, an economist belonging to the ultra-liberal school of Chicago, was concluding that it was better not to develop regulation than to create regulation captured by private interests