not every threat jeopardises national survival,and not every threat to national survival can make the state commit consistently to industrialisation Threat and threat perception There is an existing literature on the relationship between military tension and economic development in general,and in Northeast Asia in particular.One body of work has focused on the connection between war,state making and the rise of capi- talism in Europe.5 These comparative historical studies argue that the rise of organic states and capitalism in Europe was due to centuries of military competition among European countries.Persistent military competition and interstate rivalry in Europe, so the argument goes,created centralised states and the strong economic founda- tions essential for military success. There are also studies of the relationship between military threat and industrialisa- tion in Northeast Asia.Several analyses point out that political survival under external threat is the main concern of the developmental states in Northeast Asia, and that industrialisation is a means rather than a goal Perhaps the only study that gives a detailed account of the security-growth link in Northeast Asia is Jung-en Woo's 1991 book,Race to the Swift.7 Woo argues that security concerns were the main force pushing the South Korean state to mobilise financial resources for rapid industrialisation.She divides the Cold War into different periods and examines,in particular,how security concerns were related to economic strategy in the 197os. Her 1998 article compares Taiwan to South Korea,arguing that national security was directly tied to the state-led nature of development in both cases.s A general question in the threat-development literature is why do some threats and wars strengthen the state and promote economic development while others do not? Gregory Kasza argues that the common weakness of studies in this field is that they attribute equal significance to all military threats and wars.In fact,different military threats and wars affect state formation and commitment to development in different ways.It is difficult for a country to consider long-term objectives like industrialisa- tion while actively engaged in war.Equally,industrialisation is not an automatic response for all countries under threat.Precisely how a country responds to a mili- tary threat depends on how it perceives the danger.The literature reviewed above tends to ignore this crucial issue.20 By introducing threat perception into the relationship between threats and developmental states and their economic policies, this study departs from previous analyses
Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 10 not every threat jeopardises national survival, and not every threat to national survival can make the state commit consistently to industrialisation. Threat and threat perception There is an existing literature on the relationship between military tension and economic development in general, and in Northeast Asia in particular. One body of work has focused on the connection between war, state making and the rise of capitalism in Europe.15 These comparative historical studies argue that the rise of organic states and capitalism in Europe was due to centuries of military competition among European countries. Persistent military competition and interstate rivalry in Europe, so the argument goes, created centralised states and the strong economic foundations essential for military success. There are also studies of the relationship between military threat and industrialisation in Northeast Asia. Several analyses point out that political survival under external threat is the main concern of the developmental states in Northeast Asia, and that industrialisation is a means rather than a goal.16 Perhaps the only study that gives a detailed account of the security–growth link in Northeast Asia is Jung-en Woo’s 1991 book, Race to the Swift.17 Woo argues that security concerns were the main force pushing the South Korean state to mobilise financial resources for rapid industrialisation. She divides the Cold War into different periods and examines, in particular, how security concerns were related to economic strategy in the 1970s. Her 1998 article compares Taiwan to South Korea, arguing that national security was directly tied to the state-led nature of development in both cases.18 A general question in the threat–development literature is why do some threats and wars strengthen the state and promote economic development while others do not? Gregory Kasza argues that the common weakness of studies in this field is that they attribute equal significance to all military threats and wars.19 In fact, different military threats and wars affect state formation and commitment to development in different ways. It is difficult for a country to consider long-term objectives like industrialisation while actively engaged in war. Equally, industrialisation is not an automatic response for all countries under threat. Precisely how a country responds to a military threat depends on how it perceives the danger. The literature reviewed above tends to ignore this crucial issue.20 By introducing threat perception into the relationship between threats and developmental states and their economic policies, this study departs from previous analyses
The international-relations literature is rich in its discussion of threat perception. 11 Based on the common understanding of threat perception in the international- relations field,2threat perception,as used in this study,is rooted in expected threat and expected external support to the threatened state.Both expected threat and expected external support are often estimated by gauging the intention and capa- bility of the threatening state and friendly state.Capability can be estimated by comparing the relative size of defence spending,the armed forces and the economy in the threatening state with those in the threatened state and friendly state.But any calculation of intentions is more uncertain.For example,leaders can make public statements that are ambiguous or contrary to their real intent.Misreading the intentions of the threatening state and/or friendly state often leads to threat mis- perception.In some cases,though,intentions are relatively easy to determine,based on past and recent experience of the relevant state."For instance,threatened countries,especially weak nations,find it relatively easy to estimate the intentions of the threatening countries if they 'have been subject to repeated attack and mili- tary pressure4 Outside support may provide real security,but it also induces real anxiety:the more one relies on external assistance,the greater the cost if that support is with- drawn.This again involves uncertainty about an ally's intentions.Enemy intentions also require more discussion.Given the strong capability of a potentially threatening state,estimates of intentions must include not only the existence of the threat,but also the intensity of the threat.Repeated aggressive action,threatening statements, past experience of conflict and uncertainty about outside support can produce a perception of a highly intensive threat.Obviously changes in the intentions and capability of the enemy and ally can alter this threat perception. Once a threat is perceived,the response options are varied.International-relations literature focuses on short-term and political/military responses,suggesting that a commitment to industrialisation is not an inevitable reaction.In fact,very few external threats inspire such a commitment(this probably explains why the inter- national-relations literature has almost no discussion of the issue).This study argues that commitment to industrialisation can follow only when the perceived threat is intensive and long term.Only an extremely intense threat will suffice to unite politicians and bureaucrats and to create a cohesive state,and only a long-term threat can motivate the cohesive state to engage in a long-term response.Industrial- isation,the foundation of national strength in general and military power in partic-
Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 11Analysis The international-relations literature is rich in its discussion of threat perception.21 Based on the common understanding of threat perception in the internationalrelations field,22 threat perception, as used in this study, is rooted in expected threat and expected external support to the threatened state. Both expected threat and expected external support are often estimated by gauging the intention and capability of the threatening state and friendly state. Capability can be estimated by comparing the relative size of defence spending, the armed forces and the economy in the threatening state with those in the threatened state and friendly state. But any calculation of intentions is more uncertain. For example, leaders can make public statements that are ambiguous or contrary to their real intent. Misreading the intentions of the threatening state and/or friendly state often leads to threat misperception. In some cases, though, intentions are relatively easy to determine, based on past and recent experience of the relevant state.23 For instance, threatened countries, especially weak nations, find it relatively easy to estimate the intentions of the threatening countries if they ‘have been subject to repeated attack and military pressure’.24 Outside support may provide real security, but it also induces real anxiety: the more one relies on external assistance, the greater the cost if that support is withdrawn. This again involves uncertainty about an ally’s intentions. Enemy intentions also require more discussion. Given the strong capability of a potentially threatening state, estimates of intentions must include not only the existence of the threat, but also the intensity of the threat. Repeated aggressive action, threatening statements, past experience of con flict and uncertainty about outside support can produce a perception of a highly intensive threat. Obviously changes in the intentions and capability of the enemy and ally can alter this threat perception. Once a threat is perceived, the response options are varied. International-relations literature focuses on short-term and political/military responses, suggesting that a commitment to industrialisation is not an inevitable reaction. In fact, very few external threats inspire such a commitment (this probably explains why the international-relations literature has almost no discussion of the issue). This study argues that commitment to industrialisation can follow only when the perceived threat is intensive and long term. Only an extremely intense threat will su ffice to unite politicians and bureaucrats and to create a cohesive state, and only a long-term threat can motivate the cohesive state to engage in a long-term response. Industrialisation, the foundation of national strength in general and military power in partic-
12 ular,is a primary option when a cohesive state seeks to combat a long-term threat.It remains to be seen whether such a threat can be perceived sufficiently early to pro- duce a long-term response.Klaus Knorr notes that'[a]ll we can do is to speculate on the shape of future events by studying the relevant(especially the recent)past5 Geopolitics and geopolitical structures The argument put forward in this study is closely linked to the geopolitics of North- east Asia.It suggests that the actions and policies of the major geopolitical actors affected the threat perceptions of the ruling elites in South Korea and Taiwan,and, therefore,shaped the rise and decline of these developmental states.This geopolitics- focused argument should be distinguished from geopolitical structural arguments. For example,according to the latter,expected threats and expected outside support for South Korea and Taiwan were a function of the Cold War confrontation in Northeast Asia.While there was a clear division and rivalry between the communist and capitalist camps in Northeast Asia,this geopolitical structure is not flexible enough to capture the complexity of geopolitics in the region.For instance,the strategic approach made by the us to China in the early 197os generally reduced Cold War tension in Northeast Asia,but it actually heightened Taiwan's perception of the threat from the mainland. A more persuasive argument concerns the geopolitical structure that existed before the Cold War,which had an impact on the formation of the developmental state in South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War.Bruce Cumings contends that Japan dominated the region's geopolitical structure from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War with its colonisation of Korea and Taiwan,and later its invasion of China.In particular,he argues that the Japanese colonisers trained local elites in Korea and Taiwan to assist their colonial administration,and that many of these elites were incorporated into the post-colonial governments after 1945.In this way,the Japanese model of the developmental state was transmitted to South Korea and Taiwan.In fact,Cummings'argument is dominant among the very limited number of studies that focus on the origins of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.27 However,this argument suffers from a few serious shortcomings.First,unlike Korea,Taiwan was ruled by a large number of politicians and bureaucrats who came from Mainland China and had not been trained by the Japanese.The Kuomintang (KMT)government basically moved to Taiwan from the mainland as a unit in 1949
Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 12 ular, is a primary option when a cohesive state seeks to combat a long-term threat. It remains to be seen whether such a threat can be perceived sufficiently early to produce a long-term response. Klaus Knorr notes that ‘[a]ll we can do is to speculate on the shape of future events by studying the relevant (especially the recent) past’.25 Geopolitics and geopolitical structures The argument put forward in this study is closely linked to the geopolitics of Northeast Asia. It suggests that the actions and policies of the major geopolitical actors affected the threat perceptions of the ruling élites in South Korea and Taiwan, and, therefore, shaped the rise and decline of these developmental states. This geopoliticsfocused argument should be distinguished from geopolitical structural arguments. For example, according to the latter, expected threats and expected outside support for South Korea and Taiwan were a function of the Cold War confrontation in Northeast Asia. While there was a clear division and rivalry between the communist and capitalist camps in Northeast Asia, this geopolitical structure is not flexible enough to capture the complexity of geopolitics in the region. For instance, the strategic approach made by the to China in the early 1970s generally reduced Cold War tension in Northeast Asia, but it actually heightened Taiwan’s perception of the threat from the mainland. A more persuasive argument concerns the geopolitical structure that existed before the Cold War, which had an impact on the formation of the developmental state in South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War. Bruce Cumings contends that Japan dominated the region’s geopolitical structure from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War with its colonisation of Korea and Taiwan, and later its invasion of China.26 In particular, he argues that the Japanese colonisers trained local élites in Korea and Taiwan to assist their colonial administration, and that many of these élites were incorporated into the post-colonial governments after 1945. In this way, the Japanese model of the developmental state was transmitted to South Korea and Taiwan. In fact, Cummings’ argument is dominant among the very limited number of studies that focus on the origins of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.27 However, this argument suffers from a few serious shortcomings. First, unlike Korea, Taiwan was ruled by a large number of politicians and bureaucrats who came from Mainland China and had not been trained by the Japanese. The Kuomintang () government basically moved to Taiwan from the mainland as a unit in 1949
Furthermore,the KMr government of the mainland era is often regarded as an ex- 13 tremely corrupt administration.In fact,one of the inventors of the rent-seeking theory,Gordon Tullock,was in China at that time,and witnessed the corruption and rent-seeking activities of the KMT regime.He later wrote: undoubtedly this experience had a lot to do with my eventual discovery of rent seeking. Second,even in relation to Korea,some scholars argue that there was significant historical discontinuity in the 195os,when the corrupt government of Syngman Rhee bore no resemblance to the earlier Japanese colonial state or to the future developmental state of Park Chung-Hee.29 Finally,if Japanese colonialism produced the developmental state in Korea(and even Taiwan),where did the Japanese dev- elopmental state come from?0 Of course,historical continuity cannot solely explain the transformation of corrupt governments into developmental states.This study highlights an alternative source of interest formation:perceived external military threat that is intense and long term However,this does not mean that historical legacies played no part in the process. While the perception of intensive and long-term threats created cohesive states and inspired development in South Korea and Taiwan(see below),historical legacies determined the particular way in which the developmental state engaged in econ- omic management.For example,the kMT government continued (after leaving the mainland)to promote public enterprises and to use them as major instruments in carrying out its industrial policy.In South Korea,however,Park's government,like the Japanese colonial administration,promoted big business conglomerates and guided them in the pursuit of rapid industrialisation.But those specific character- istics are clearly secondary to the shared characteristics between the developmental states of South Korea and Taiwan.A corrupt government can still promote public enterprises or business conglomerates,but it can hardly have a consistent commit- ment to industrialisation. This study will discuss the shared characteristics only,as they are essential to under- standing the rise and decline of the developmental state.On this note,the paper will now present specific evidence on the threat perceptions of South Korea and Taiwan and their relation to those shared characteristics,and,therefore,to the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia
Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 13Analysis Furthermore, the government of the mainland era is often regarded as an extremely corrupt administration. In fact, one of the inventors of the rent-seeking theory, Gordon Tullock, was in China at that time, and witnessed the corruption and rent-seeking activities of the regime. He later wrote: undoubtedly this experience had a lot to do with my eventual discovery of rent seeking.28 Second, even in relation to Korea, some scholars argue that there was signi ficant historical discontinuity in the 1950s, when the corrupt government of Syngman Rhee bore no resemblance to the earlier Japanese colonial state or to the future developmental state of Park Chung-Hee.29 Finally, if Japanese colonialism produced the developmental state in Korea (and even Taiwan ), where did the Japanese developmental state come from?30 Of course, historical continuity cannot solely explain the transformation of corrupt governments into developmental states. This study highlights an alternative source of interest formation: perceived external military threat that is intense and long term. However, this does not mean that historical legacies played no part in the process. While the perception of intensive and long-term threats created cohesive states and inspired development in South Korea and Taiwan (see below ), historical legacies determined the particular way in which the developmental state engaged in economic management. For example, the government continued (after leaving the mainland) to promote public enterprises and to use them as major instruments in carrying out its industrial policy. In South Korea, however, Park’s government, like the Japanese colonial administration, promoted big business conglomerates and guided them in the pursuit of rapid industrialisation. But those speci fic characteristics are clearly secondary to the shared characteristics between the developmental states of South Korea and Taiwan. A corrupt government can still promote public enterprises or business conglomerates, but it can hardly have a consistent commitment to industrialisation. This study will discuss the shared characteristics only, as they are essential to understanding the rise and decline of the developmental state. On this note, the paper will now present speci fic evidence on the threat perceptions of South Korea and Taiwan and their relation to those shared characteristics, and, therefore, to the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia