of property that would not be cured by private consolidation. But these views do not seem persuasive as presently articulated. In some particular cases, though, limitations on division of rights have a fairly clear justification. For example, consider zoning rules that prevent lot size from falling below a prescribed minimum. Small lots may be disliked by individuals in a neighborhood because they lead to congestion and reduce greenery for all to enjoy. If so, and if it would be difficult for the many individuals living in a neighborhood to contract with each other to keep lot sizes from being too small, regulation of lot size would be necessary to accomplish their common goal unknown person has a time share in his property. This view is discussed by Rudden 1987 and versions of it are developed and advanced by Merrill and Smith 2000 and by Hansmann and Kraakman 2002 If property is too fragmented, for instance, if too many time shares are sold, such that it would be more efficient for them to be consolidated and there to be one owner of real estate, the argument is that such consolidation might not come about through private purchase of the time shares. Hence, the law mi prevent such danger by proscribing fragmentation in the first place. This possibility is also discussed by Rudden 1987 and is endorsed by Heller 1999 Several arguments suggest that the goal of simplifying sales transactions does not justify legal limits on division of rights, at least not in an obvious way. First, if an owner of property divides rights Ich as by selling time shares, and this makes the property more expensive to sell (and for a buyer later to resell), then the price the owner will obtain for the property when he comes to sell it will fall as a consequence. Therefore, the owner has a natural reason to take the effect of division of rights on transactions costs into account however the argument is sometimes made that the owner does not have a reason to take into account the possibility that transactions in property other than his might be impeded the latter may happen because his division of rights will contribute to general worry among buyers about hidden interests in their property. This problem, if significant, seemingly could be met by either of two ypes of legal rules that do not bar individuals from dividing property rights if that is what they wish: (a)a rule under which a division of property rights is not enforced unless the division is made explicit in the sales documents(then there could be no concern about hidden interests ); or(b) a rule under which a division of property rights is not enforced unless the division has been entered into a registry, and possibly a fee has been paid for so doing( to induce those who obtain the rights to take into account the cost that others will bear in checking the registry) Regarding the inability of private parties to consolidate property if it is excessively fragmented, one wonders why consolidation by private parties would not usually occur(why for example a person would not ordinarily succeed in purchasing different individuals time shares if an apartment is more valuable when lived in year round by a single person). A satisfactory answer to this basic question has not been provided, even though it is possible that in some situations problems in bargaining might retard or prevent beneficial private consolidation Chapter 8-Page 4
of property that would not be cured by private consolidation.28 But these views do not seem persuasive as presently articulated.29 In some particular cases, though, limitations on division of rights have a fairly clear justification. For example, consider zoning rules that prevent lot size from falling below a prescribed minimum. Small lots may be disliked by individuals in a neighborhood because they lead to congestion and reduce greenery for all to enjoy. If so, and if it would be difficult for the many individuals living in a neighborhood to contract with each other to keep lot sizes from being too small, regulation of lot size would be necessary to accomplish their common goal. unknown person has a time share in his property. This view is discussed by Rudden 1987 and versions of it are developed and advanced by Merrill and Smith 2000 and by Hansmann and Kraakman 2002. 28 If property is too fragmented, for instance, if too many time shares are sold, such that it would be more efficient for them to be consolidated and there to be one owner of real estate, the argument is that such consolidation might not come about through private purchase of the time shares. Hence, the law might prevent such danger by proscribing fragmentation in the first place. This possibility is also discussed by Rudden 1987 and is endorsed by Heller 1999. 29 Several arguments suggest that the goal of simplifying sales transactions does not justify legal limits on division of rights, at least not in an obvious way. First, if an owner of property divides rights, such as by selling time shares, and this makes the property more expensive to sell (and for a buyer later to resell), then the price the owner will obtain for the property when he comes to sell it will fall as a consequence. Therefore, the owner has a natural reason to take the effect of division of rights on transactions costs into account. However, the argument is sometimes made that the owner does not have a reason to take into account the possibility that transactions in property other than his might be impeded -- the latter may happen because his division of rights will contribute to general worry among buyers about hidden interests in their property. This problem, if significant, seemingly could be met by either of two types of legal rules that do not bar individuals from dividing property rights if that is what they wish: (a) a rule under which a division of property rights is not enforced unless the division is made explicit in the sales documents (then there could be no concern about hidden interests); or (b) a rule under which a division of property rights is not enforced unless the division has been entered into a registry, and possibly a fee has been paid for so doing (to induce those who obtain the rights to take into account the cost that others will bear in checking the registry). Regarding the inability of private parties to consolidate property if it is excessively fragmented, one wonders why consolidation by private parties would not usually occur (why for example a person would not ordinarily succeed in purchasing different individuals’ time shares if an apartment is more valuable when lived in year round by a single person). A satisfactory answer to this basic question has not been provided, even though it is possible that in some situations problems in bargaining might retard or prevent beneficial private consolidation. Chapter 8 – Page 4
Chapter 9 ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF PROPERTY In this chapter, I consider the acquisition and transfer of property, an issue that is important because most property changes hands at least once(in a modern economy, it has to be sold by the producer to consumers). I begin with the acquisition of previously unowned property and with the related topic of the acquisition of lost or mislaid property I next examine the more common ways of acquiring property, through its transfer by sale, by gift, or by bequest. Then I discuss state-imposed constraints on the sale of property and last, involuntary transfer of property through so-called adverse possession l. Acquisition of Unowned Property of multiple parties, to find previously unowned things, such as fish in the sea or wild 1.1 Introduction. Here I inquire about the incentives of a single party, and the animals, or oil or mineral deposits. (Acquisition of things never previously owned is sometimes called original acquisition. ) The measure of social welfare will be the net a single individual and then the more complicated and realistic situation involving ke expected value of things, that is, the probability of finding them multiplied by their value, minus the costs of search effort. I will first consider the simple situation of acquisition by multiple parties Acquisition by a single individual. Let me first de scribe soc ly optimal behavior. Consider a situation in which a single individual has the opportunity to invest effort or resources to discover a thing. It will be socially desirable for the individual to make an investment when the investment would increase the expected return by more than its cost. Thus, if an undersea mineral deposit is worth 1, 000 and an exploration effort would increase the likelihood of finding it by 10 per cent, the expected value of the effort would be 100, so the effort ought to be taken if and only if its cost is less than 100 Finders-keepers rule leads to optimality. It is clear that an individual will invest socially optimally provided that he will obtain the full value of the thing if he discovers it. Consequently, the finders-keepers rule --under which the finder is deemed to be the owner of anything that he has found -will lead a finder to act desirably to locate things. In contrast, a rule that accords a finder only part of the value of what he discovers leads to inadequate incentives to find things 5 Most of what is said in this section will apply also to abandoned property, on which see section 2 below S An exception to the point of this paragraph concems unowned currency. Here the socially optimal effort to devote to finding it is zero, for there is no social value of currency: The state can print more currency at negligible cost. However, the value of currency to an individual is hardly zero; individuals will be willing to make substantial investments to obtain lost currency. Thus, perhaps, it would not be desirable to grant a person ownership of currency if, say, it was in the safe of a ship that was lost at sea and the person would mount an expensive effort to recover the currency napter 9-Page I
Chapter 9 ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF PROPERTY In this chapter, I consider the acquisition and transfer of property, an issue that is important because most property changes hands at least once (in a modern economy, it has to be sold by the producer to consumers). I begin with the acquisition of previously unowned property and with the related topic of the acquisition of lost or mislaid property. I next examine the more common ways of acquiring property, through its transfer by sale, by gift, or by bequest. Then I discuss state-imposed constraints on the sale of property, and last, involuntary transfer of property through so-called adverse possession. 1. Acquisition of Unowned Property 1.1 Introduction. Here I inquire about the incentives of a single party, and then of multiple parties, to find previously unowned things, such as fish in the sea or wild animals, or oil or mineral deposits.30 (Acquisition of things never previously owned is sometimes called original acquisition.) The measure of social welfare will be the net expected value of things, that is, the probability of finding them multiplied by their value, minus the costs of search effort. I will first consider the simple situation of acquisition by a single individual and then the more complicated and realistic situation involving multiple parties. 1.2 Acquisition by a single individual. Let me first describe socially optimal behavior. Consider a situation in which a single individual has the opportunity to invest effort or resources to discover a thing. It will be socially desirable for the individual to make an investment when the investment would increase the expected return by more than its cost. Thus, if an undersea mineral deposit is worth 1,000 and an exploration effort would increase the likelihood of finding it by 10 per cent , the expected value of the effort would be 100, so the effort ought to be taken if and only if its cost is less than 100. Finders-keepers rule leads to optimality. It is clear that an individual will invest socially optimally provided that he will obtain the full value of the thing if he discovers it. Consequently, the finders-keepers rule -- under which the finder is deemed to be the owner of anything that he has found -- will lead a finder to act desirably to locate things.31 In contrast, a rule that accords a finder only part of the value of what he discovers leads to inadequate incentives to find things. 30Most of what is said in this section will apply also to abandoned property, on which see section 2 below. 31An exception to the point of this paragraph concerns unowned currency. Here the socially optimal effort to devote to finding it is zero, for there is no social value of currency: The state can print more currency at negligible cost. However, the value of currency to an individual is hardly zero; individuals will be willing to make substantial investments to obtain lost currency. Thus, perhaps, it would not be desirable to grant a person ownership of currency if, say, it was in the safe of a ship that was lost at sea and the person would mount an expensive effort to recover the currency. ChChapapter 8 – Pag ter 9 – Pagee 51
1.3 Acquisition by multiple individuals. In this case, the description of socially optimal behavior involves a complication. When an individual searches for a thing, the increase in the probability that the individual in particular will find the thing typically exceeds the increase in the total probability of discovery - the probability that some individual will find the thing. The reason is that the person may search in places that others would have examined in any event, so that the increase in the particular persons likelihood of finding the thing will often come at the expense of others' likelihood of finding the thing. This factor needs to be taken into account in determining whether it socially desirable for an individual to devote effort to search, for it is only the increase in the total probability of success that is relevant in deciding whether a given individuals effort is socially justified Example 1. Suppose that if a alone searches for some thing, the odds of his discovering it will be 10 per cent; and if B joins A, the odds of B finding it will be 4 per cent and the odds of A finding it will fall to 7 per cent because b will be looking in some of the places A would have. Thus, if B searches along with A, the overall probability of discovery will rise by only l per cent--that is, by 4%0+ 7%-10%--not by 4 per cent Accordingly, the 1 per cent increase in the total probability of discovery is what is relevant for calculating whether it is socially desirable for B to search. If the value of the thing sought is 1, 000, the cost of search for A is 15 and the cost of search for B is 20 then A alone should search, for Bs cost exceeds the increase of 10(namely, 1%x1, 000) in the expected total return that he would bring about. // As a general matter, it is socially worthwhile for an individual to search, or to make a greater effort to search, only if the cost of so doing is warranted by the expected increase in the total probability of finding the thing, which equals the increase in his probability of finding the thing minus the reduction in others' probability of doing the same Finders-keepers rule results in excessive search. If whoever discovers a thing will own it, then incentives to search will generally depart from the optimal and there will be a tendency toward socially excessive search activity. The reason is that a person's incentive to engage in search derives from the likelihood that he, specifically, will find the thing, whereas, as just mentioned, his search will tend to lower the chance that others will find the thing. Thus, the individual's personal return from search under the finders keepers rule will exceed the social return, and as it is his personal return that will "I assume that A and b do not simultaneously discover the thing; thus the probability that one of the two discovers the thing is simply the sum of 4 per cent and 7 per cent 5 More precisely, if A alone searches, the net expected return is 10%x 1,000-15=85; and if A and B search, the net expected return is 11%x 1, 000-15-20=75; thus a alone ought to search To amplify, suppose that the per-person cost of search is c, that x is the number of people who search, and that p(x) is the probability each person has individually of finding a thing worth v. Note that the total probability that the thing will be found is xp(x)(suppose that people will never find the thing simultaneously ) Assume that p(x)<0 for the reasons discussed in text(notably, others will search where a given person might have)and that p'(x)>0. The social objective is for x to maximize the social surplus xp(xv-cx, meaning that the optimal x( treated as continuously variable) satisfies p(x)v+xp'(x)v =c. That is, individuals should engage in search until the expected gain p(x)v less the reduction in others' gain xp(x)v equals the cost c. Denote the optimal x by x* Chapter 9- Page 2
1.3 Acquisition by multiple individuals. In this case, the description of socially optimal behavior involves a complication. When an individual searches for a thing, the increase in the probability that the individual in particular will find the thing typically exceeds the increase in the total probability of discovery -- the probability that some individual will find the thing. The reason is that the person may search in places that others would have examined in any event, so that the increase in the particular person’s likelihood of finding the thing will often come at the expense of others’ likelihood of finding the thing. This factor needs to be taken into account in determining whether it is socially desirable for an individual to devote effort to search, for it is only the increase in the total probability of success that is relevant in deciding whether a given individual’s effort is socially justified. Example 1. Suppose that if A alone searches for some thing, the odds of his discovering it will be 10 per cent; and if B joins A, the odds of B finding it will be 4 per cent and the odds of A finding it will fall to 7 per cent because B will be looking in some of the places A would have. Thus, if B searches along with A, the overall probability of discovery will rise by only 1 per cent -- that is, by 4% + 7% !10% -- not by 4 per cent.32 Accordingly, the 1 per cent increase in the total probability of discovery is what is relevant for calculating whether it is socially desirable for B to search. If the value of the thing sought is 1,000, the cost of search for A is 15 and the cost of search for B is 20, then A alone should search, for B’s cost exceeds the increase of 10 (namely, 1% H 1,000) in the expected total return that he would bring about.33// As a general matter, it is socially worthwhile for an individual to search, or to make a greater effort to search, only if the cost of so doing is warranted by the expected increase in the total probability of finding the thing, which equals the increase in his probability of finding the thing minus the reduction in others’ probability of doing the same. 34 Finders-keepers rule results in excessive search. If whoever discovers a thing will own it, then incentives to search will generally depart from the optimal and there will be a tendency toward socially excessive search activity. The reason is that a person’s incentive to engage in search derives from the likelihood that he, specifically, will find the thing, whereas, as just mentioned, his search will tend to lower the chance that others will find the thing. Thus, the individual=s personal return from search under the finderskeepers rule will exceed the social return, and as it is his personal return that will 32I assume that A and B do not simultaneously discover the thing; thus the probability that one of the two discovers the thing is simply the sum of 4 per cent and 7 per cent. 33More precisely, if A alone searches, the net expected return is 10% H 1,000 ! 15 = 85; and if A and B search, the net expected return is 11% H 1,000 ! 15 ! 20 = 75; thus A alone ought to search. 34To amplify, suppose that the per-person cost of search is c, that x is the number of people who search, and that p(x) is the probability each person has individually of finding a thing worth v. Note that the total probability that the thing will be found is xp(x) (suppose that people will never find the thing simultaneously). Assume that p'(x) < 0 for the reasons discussed in text (notably, others will search where a given person might have) and that p''(x) > 0. The social objective is for x to maximize the social surplus, xp(x)v ! cx, meaning that the optimal x (treated as continuously variable) satisfies p(x)v + xp'(x)v = c. That is, individuals should engage in search until the expected gain p(x)v less the reduction in others’ gain xp'(x)v equals the cost c. Denote the optimal x by x*. Chapter 9 – Page 2
motivate him to engage in search, he will often search more than is socially desirable. In 40 as against his cost of 20; B will not take into account that A's expected return wp %. B the preceding example, the rule giving ownership to a finder will result in B joining A searching, even though this is not socially desirable: b will obtain an expected return drop by 30 when B searches as well bears several qualifications. First, it may be that different parties happen to search in different areas, so that their efforts are not competitive; if so, the private return and the social return will be the same, and search by each party will be optimal. Second, and related, parties may sometimes cooperate and agree to divide their areas of search into mutually exclusive regions; in this case too, search by each party will be optimal. Third, if one person's search activity would convey information to others about the possible location of a thing, then search effort could be less than socially desirable: An individual might refrain from investing in search because he anticipates being joined by others diluting his return, or he might limit his efforts in order to conceal them from others (work only at night in order to escape notice (b) Reality of the phenomenon of excessive search: Despite the foregoing qualifications, it seems clear that in a variety of instances too much effort is expended rying to find things. a well known case in point is fishing activity. It is a commonplace that the quantity of fish taken could be caught by a smaller fleet. relatedly, investment in equipment for fishing(powerful engines for beating other vessels to a site, sonar for detecting fish) has arguably been excessive; cheaper methods would be sufficient to produce present yields. Similarly, efforts to discover and extract oil have sometimes been unwarranted. For example, in the East Texas oil fields, over half of all the wells drilled as late as the 1930s were said to have been unnecessary .37 Possible remedies to the problem ofexcessive search. One response to the problem of excessive search activity under the finders-keepers rule is to reduce the retur to discovery by granting only partial ownership to finders or by imposing taxes on what is found 3 Another remedy is for the state to control directly the volume of search activity ( the number of fishermen, the length of the fishing season), their methods of search In the situation described in the previous note, it can be seen that too many individuals search. An individual will search as long as his expected return p(x)v is at least c, so that the condition determining x is p(x)v=c, call the x so determined x**. It is apparent that x*>x', since x"satisfies p(x)v =c-xp(x)v> C. For a survey of the extensive economic literature on the possible inefficiencies under the finders-keepers rule and its relation to law. see Lueck 1998 56A dramatic example of this is that so much effort and equipment has been devoted to beating competitors to catch herring in Alaska that I was told on a visit that the season may last less than one hour It would obviously be socially preferable for the herring to be caught more cheaply over a longer period of time. On the inefficiencies of investment and excessiveness of effort devoted to fishing, see, for example Libecap and Johnson 1982 3seey1938,1233 However, a tax will lead to inadequate levels of search effort if searchers have cooperated and divided the territory into mutually exclusive regions 9-Page 3
motivate him to engage in search, he will often search more than is socially desirable. In the preceding example, the rule giving ownership to a finder will result in B joining A in searching, even though this is not socially desirable: B will obtain an expected return of 40 as against his cost of 20; B will not take into account that A=s expected return will drop by 30 when B searches as well.35 Comments. (a) Qualifications: The point that search may be socially excessive bears several qualifications. First, it may be that different parties happen to search in different areas, so that their efforts are not competitive; if so, the private return and the social return will be the same, and search by each party will be optimal. Second, and related, parties may sometimes cooperate and agree to divide their areas of search into mutually exclusive regions; in this case too, search by each party will be optimal. Third, if one person’s search activity would convey information to others about the possible location of a thing, then search effort could be less than socially desirable: An individual might refrain from investing in search because he anticipates being joined by others, diluting his return, or he might limit his efforts in order to conceal them from others (work only at night in order to escape notice). (b) Reality of the phenomenon of excessive search: Despite the foregoing qualifications, it seems clear that in a variety of instances too much effort is expended in trying to find things. A well known case in point is fishing activity. It is a commonplace that the quantity of fish taken could be caught by a smaller fleet. Relatedly, investment in equipment for fishing (powerful engines for beating other vessels to a site, sonar for detecting fish) has arguably been excessive; cheaper methods would be sufficient to produce present yields.36 Similarly, efforts to discover and extract oil have sometimes been unwarranted. For example, in the East Texas oil fields, over half of all the wells drilled as late as the 1930s were said to have been unnecessary.37 Possible remedies to the problem of excessive search. One response to the problem of excessive search activity under the finders-keepers rule is to reduce the return to discovery by granting only partial ownership to finders or by imposing taxes on what is found.38 Another remedy is for the state to control directly the volume of search activity (the number of fishermen, the length of the fishing season), their methods of search 35In the situation described in the previous note, it can be seen that too many individuals search. An individual will search as long as his expected return p(x)v is at least c, so that the condition determining x is p(x)v = c; call the x so determined x**. It is apparent that x** > x*, since x* satisfies p(x)v = c ! xp'(x)v > c. For a survey of the extensive economic literature on the possible inefficiencies under the finders-keepers rule, and its relation to law, see Lueck 1998. 36A dramatic example of this is that so much effort and equipment has been devoted to beating competitors to catch herring in Alaska that I was told on a visit that the season may last less than one hour. It would obviously be socially preferable for the herring to be caught more cheaply over a longer period of time. On the inefficiencies of investment and excessiveness of effort devoted to fishing, see, for example, Libecap and Johnson 1982. 37See Ely 1938, 1233. 38However, a tax will lead to inadequate levels of search effort if searchers have cooperated and divided the territory into mutually exclusive regions. Chapter 9 – Page 3
(allowable net sizes, types of vessels), or the quantity of their recoveries. The chief problem with this, as with any regulatory approach, concerns the quality of the states information about proper regulation and the bluntness of its rules(regulating only the number of fishermen does not result in selection of those best able to fish An additional approach is for the state to sell or to grant some party an exclusive right to search. For example, the state could sell the right to search for oil in an offshore area This would tend to cure problems of search incentives because the purchaser of the right would then be motivated to choose the optimal number of searchers and to coordinate their actions, the purchaser's motive would be to maximize the total expected return minus the total costs of all hired searchers It should be noted, though, that when search activity and discovery is not observed by the state, the situation is, de facto, identical to that when finders obtain ownership of what hey discover, and no remedy is possible 1.4 The law. The character of the law regarding the rights of finders of things depends importantly on what the things are --notably, whether they are fish, game, oil,or undersea mineral deposits. To an important degree, finders are given title to what they discover, but they also are often restricted in various ways by the remedies just mentioned to the problem of excessive search effort. Those who catch fish at sea and those who kill game in hunting areas usually are deemed to be proper owners, but limits on the quantity of fish and of game that may be taken, the times when they may be taken and who may engage in search for them, are commonly imposed. 4 In the early days of oil exploration and recovery those who obtained oil given ownership of it, regardless of whose land the oil had lain under. Over time however, various regulations curtailing quantities taken and methods of recovery emerged, and now in many jurisdictions the race to extract oil is prevented by unitization schemes, under which all owners of land over an oil reservoir are required to join into a single unit for the purpose of developing their oil. Offshore oil exploration is governed afferently. The state typically sells the right to search and produce oil in a given offshore area The right to minerals on the ocean floor used to be enjoyed by whoever found them, but according to an international agreement, different areas of the ocean have been allocated across countries, and the countries will presumably sell or grant the right to search for minerals to private parties See generally Lueck 1998, 137-41, in addition to the references cited in notes 12-15 The motive for using these remedies is not just to control excessive search effort. The remedies may also be employed to prevent the closely related problem of excessive depletion of stocks(in the case of fish and wildlife)or to raise revenue for the state See Brown 1975. 13-23. Bean 1983 and Lund 1980 See, for example, Williams and Meyers 2001, chap.9. See, for example, Jones 1984 and Wiygul 1992. 'See un. convention on the law of the sea 1982 Chapter 9- Page 4
(allowable net sizes, types of vessels), or the quantity of their recoveries. The chief problem with this, as with any regulatory approach, concerns the quality of the state’s information about proper regulation and the bluntness of its rules (regulating only the number of fishermen does not result in selection of those best able to fish). An additional approach is for the state to sell or to grant some party an exclusive right to search. For example, the state could sell the right to search for oil in an offshore area. This would tend to cure problems of search incentives because the purchaser of the right would then be motivated to choose the optimal number of searchers and to coordinate their actions; the purchaser’s motive would be to maximize the total expected return minus the total costs of all hired searchers. It should be noted, though, that when search activity and discovery is not observed by the state, the situation is, de facto, identical to that when finders obtain ownership of what they discover, and no remedy is possible. 1.4 The law. The character of the law regarding the rights of finders of things depends importantly on what the things are -- notably, whether they are fish, game, oil, or undersea mineral deposits.39 To an important degree, finders are given title to what they discover, but they also are often restricted in various ways by the remedies just mentioned to the problem of excessive search effort.40 Those who catch fish at sea and those who kill game in hunting areas usually are deemed to be proper owners, but limits on the quantity of fish and of game that may be taken, the times when they may be taken, and who may engage in search for them, are commonly imposed.41 In the early days of oil exploration and recovery, those who obtained oil were given ownership of it, regardless of whose land the oil had lain under. Over time, however, various regulations curtailing quantities taken and methods of recovery emerged, and now in many jurisdictions the race to extract oil is prevented by unitization schemes, under which all owners of land over an oil reservoir are required to join into a single unit for the purpose of developing their oil.42 Offshore oil exploration is governed differently. The state typically sells the right to search and produce oil in a given offshore area.43 The right to minerals on the ocean floor used to be enjoyed by whoever found them, but according to an international agreement, different areas of the ocean have been allocated across countries,44 and the countries will presumably sell or grant the right to search for minerals to private parties. 39See generally Lueck 1998, 137-41, in addition to the references cited in notes 12-15. 40The motive for using these remedies is not just to control excessive search effort. The remedies may also be employed to prevent the closely related problem of excessive depletion of stocks (in the case of fish and wildlife) or to raise revenue for the state. 41See Brown 1975, 13-23, Bean 1983, and Lund 1980. 42See, for example, Williams and Meyers 2001, chap. 9. 43See, for example, Jones 1984 and Wiygul 1992. 44See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. Chapter 9 – Page 4