834 International Organization states form PTAs to ensure the greatest possible gains from the multilateral re- gime itself. How the Multilateral Trade Regime Induces PTA Formation Much research concludes that states form PTAs to obtain the economic gains stem- ming from preferential access to members'markets(although it is worth reiterat- ing that whether states actually benefit from such arrangements remains the subject of substantial controversy).A growing body of literature,however,focuses on the incentives for states to establish PTAs as a means of increasing their bargaining power within the multilateral regime.s We focus on two ways that states entering preferential groupings enhance such power. First,establishing a preferential arrangement can strengthen a state's bargain- ing position vis-a-vis nonmembers by furnishing it with insurance against devel- opments within the multilateral regime that threaten its interests.Developments such as the failure to reach agreement in multilateral trade talks become less costly because the state has already secured open access to its PTA partners'markets. An Australian government official illustrated this point nicely.Speaking about two proposed FTAs,he remarked that "Australia's clout in the WTO talks de- pends on holding the line in our bilateral trade negotiations with Japan [and]the U.S..19 Safeguarding access to crucial overseas markets by forming a PTA is particu- larly useful if the enforcement mechanisms in the multilateral trade regime,de- signed to minimize discrimination and new protectionism,prove weak.20 Under these conditions,a preferential arrangement furnishes members with insurance against the prospect of their key trade partners unilaterally raising trade barriers in the future.Even if GATT/WTO enforcement mechanisms are strong,however, halting progress in achieving multilateral liberalization can stimulate fears of los- ing competitiveness in international markets,especially on the part of smaller states. For instance,at a time when the Uruguay Round had stalled and was threatening to end in failure,an Inter-American Development Bank official declared,"The Caribbean is in danger of becoming a backwater.Small countries will be wiped out unless they integrate."2 Referring to the unsuccessful efforts to jumpstart multi- lateral liberalization at the WTO's 1999 Seattle Ministerial meeting and China's looming accession to the WTO,Singapore's Foreign Minister expressed concerns 18.See,for example,Bhagwati 1993;Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996;Fernandez and Portes 1998; Krueger 1999;Krugman 1993;Ludema 1996;Mansfield 1998;Oye 1992;Perroni and Whalley 2000; and Whalley 1998. 19.Australian,29 April 2002,4. 20.Bagwell and Staiger 2001,321. 21.Journal of Commerce,3 September 1991,5A
states form PTAs to ensure the greatest possible gains from the multilateral regime itself+ How the Multilateral Trade Regime Induces PTA Formation Much research concludes that states form PTAs to obtain the economic gains stemming from preferential access to members’ markets ~although it is worth reiterating that whether states actually benefit from such arrangements remains the subject of substantial controversy!+ A growing body of literature, however, focuses on the incentives for states to establish PTAs as a means of increasing their bargaining power within the multilateral regime+ 18 We focus on two ways that states entering preferential groupings enhance such power+ First, establishing a preferential arrangement can strengthen a state’s bargaining position vis-à-vis nonmembers by furnishing it with insurance against developments within the multilateral regime that threaten its interests+ Developments such as the failure to reach agreement in multilateral trade talks become less costly because the state has already secured open access to its PTA partners’ markets+ An Australian government official illustrated this point nicely+ Speaking about two proposed FTAs, he remarked that “Australia’s clout in the WTO talks depends on holding the line in our bilateral trade negotiations with Japan @and# the U+S++++” 19 Safeguarding access to crucial overseas markets by forming a PTA is particularly useful if the enforcement mechanisms in the multilateral trade regime, designed to minimize discrimination and new protectionism, prove weak+ 20 Under these conditions, a preferential arrangement furnishes members with insurance against the prospect of their key trade partners unilaterally raising trade barriers in the future+ Even if GATT0WTO enforcement mechanisms are strong, however, halting progress in achieving multilateral liberalization can stimulate fears of losing competitiveness in international markets, especially on the part of smaller states+ For instance, at a time when the Uruguay Round had stalled and was threatening to end in failure, an Inter-American Development Bank official declared, “The Caribbean is in danger of becoming a backwater+ Small countries will be wiped out unless they integrate+” 21 Referring to the unsuccessful efforts to jumpstart multilateral liberalization at the WTO’s 1999 Seattle Ministerial meeting and China’s looming accession to the WTO, Singapore’s Foreign Minister expressed concerns 18+ See, for example, Bhagwati 1993; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996; Fernández and Portes 1998; Krueger 1999; Krugman 1993; Ludema 1996; Mansfield 1998; Oye 1992; Perroni and Whalley 2000; and Whalley 1998+ 19+ Australian, 29 April 2002, 4+ 20+ Bagwell and Staiger 2001, 321+ 21+ Journal of Commerce, 3 September 1991, 5A+ 834 International Organization
Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism 835 that Southeast Asia was"being left behind economically while North Asian coun- tries raced ahead."22 By insuring states against the loss of competitiveness in international markets and any future disruption in trade that developments within the multilateral re- gime could precipitate,PTAs promote the bargaining power of their members.The claim that preferential arrangements vest states with insurance against shocks to the international trading system has gained increasing currency in recent years.3 To date,however,no effort has been made to analyze how events within GATT WTO might lead member-states to seek the insurance that PTAs provide.This gap in the literature is surprising because it is widely acknowledged that even the United States has considered using PTAs to help offset the effects of any failures at the multilateral level.24 In 1993,for example,U.S.Trade Representative Mickey Kantor explicitly argued that trade liberalization within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)and the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)would be viable means to expand U.S.market access in the event that the Uruguay Round faltered.25 Second,PTAs may also boost bargaining power by giving states a greater voice in international trade forums and enhancing their market power.Many developing countries have considerable difficulty maintaining sufficient expertise on the mul- titude of covered issues and policies to participate effectively in multilateral trade negotiations.In fact,many of them have no delegation at the WTO whatsoever.26 To help resolve these problems,various PTAs pool members'resources to im- prove how they research,articulate,and represent their common interests in trade talks with nonmembers.For example,observers agree that a primary goal of the Caribbean Community and Common Market(CARICOM)was to "strengthen the region's external position through the coordination of member states'[trade]pol- icies."27 Indeed,CARICOM has sometimes negotiated as a group at the WTO.28 Likewise,Prime Minister Said Musa of Belize justified the proposed Central American-Caribbean FTA by saying,"we need to establish a common strategy so that we can obtain special treatment in international trade negotiations."29 Even larger countries have incentives to use PTAs to coordinate on the best ways to pursue their mutual interests vis-a-vis third parties.For instance,Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's 2002 proposal for an East Asian Economic Group, 22.Financial Times,25 July 2000,10. 23.See Fernandez and Portes 1998;Mansfield 1998;Perroni and Whalley 2000;Whalley 1998; and Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992. 24.Whalley 1998. 25.Irish Times,29 October 1993,14. 26.See Michalopoulos 1999;and Reinhardt 2002. 27.IADB 2000.31;see also Andriamananjara and Schiff 2001 28.WT02001. 29.James Canute,"Caribbean and Central America Press for Co-Operation,"Financia/Times.Avail- able at (www.ft.com).Accessed 12 February 2002
that Southeast Asia was “being left behind economically while North Asian countries raced ahead+” 22 By insuring states against the loss of competitiveness in international markets and any future disruption in trade that developments within the multilateral regime could precipitate, PTAs promote the bargaining power of their members+ The claim that preferential arrangements vest states with insurance against shocks to the international trading system has gained increasing currency in recent years+ 23 To date, however, no effort has been made to analyze how events within GATT0 WTO might lead member-states to seek the insurance that PTAs provide+ This gap in the literature is surprising because it is widely acknowledged that even the United States has considered using PTAs to help offset the effects of any failures at the multilateral level+ 24 In 1993, for example, U+S+ Trade Representative Mickey Kantor explicitly argued that trade liberalization within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ~APEC! and the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas ~FTAA! would be viable means to expand U+S+ market access in the event that the Uruguay Round faltered+ 25 Second, PTAs may also boost bargaining power by giving states a greater voice in international trade forums and enhancing their market power+ Many developing countries have considerable difficulty maintaining sufficient expertise on the multitude of covered issues and policies to participate effectively in multilateral trade negotiations+ In fact, many of them have no delegation at the WTO whatsoever+ 26 To help resolve these problems, various PTAs pool members’ resources to improve how they research, articulate, and represent their common interests in trade talks with nonmembers+ For example, observers agree that a primary goal of the Caribbean Community and Common Market ~CARICOM! was to “strengthen the region’s external position through the coordination of member states’ @trade# policies+” 27 Indeed, CARICOM has sometimes negotiated as a group at the WTO+ 28 Likewise, Prime Minister Said Musa of Belize justified the proposed Central American-Caribbean FTA by saying, “we need to establish a common strategy so that we can obtain special treatment in international trade negotiations+” 29 Even larger countries have incentives to use PTAs to coordinate on the best ways to pursue their mutual interests vis-à-vis third parties+ For instance, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s 2002 proposal for an East Asian Economic Group, 22+ Financial Times, 25 July 2000, 10+ 23+ See Fernández and Portes 1998; Mansfield 1998; Perroni and Whalley 2000; Whalley 1998; and Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992+ 24+ Whalley 1998+ 25+ Irish Times, 29 October 1993, 14+ 26+ See Michalopoulos 1999; and Reinhardt 2002+ 27+ IADB 2000, 31; see also Andriamananjara and Schiff 2001+ 28+ WTO 2001+ 29+ James Canute, “Caribbean and Central America Press for Co-Operation,” Financial Times+ Available at ^www+ft+com&+ Accessed 12 February 2002+ Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism 835
836 International Organization a revival of a Uruguay Round-era plan,was intended to help its potential mem- bers "be more effective in protecting their collective interests."30 Further,PTAs may increase leverage by accumulating the market power of in- dividual members,giving them a greater ability to influence their terms of trade and to negotiate favorable settlements with outsiders.31 On this score,Pascal Lamy-the EU's Commissioner for External Trade-conceded that "consolidat- ing Mercosur will give Brazil and its partners...more political weight in inter- national negotiations."3 Anticipating the formation of Mercosur,a Brazilian official similarly remarked,"Dealing directly with the U.S.on international trade issues is like getting into a cage with a tiger.Only if we have others in with us do we stand a better chance of getting some satisfactory results."33 The ability of a PTA to heighten the market power of members is especially pronounced for states in a customs union-such as the European Community (EC) and Mercosur-because these institutions erect a common external tariff(CET) and thus bargain over tariff levels with third parties as a unit.34 However,states need not form a customs union to enhance their negotiating position.It is widely argued that states have tried to influence the outcome of multilateral negotiations by threatening to form or actually establishing various types of PTAs.35 Further, regardless of whether a PTA imposes a CET,its members accrue bargaining power insofar as the arrangement improves their reversion point in negotiations with third parties and promotes collective action among them.In any case,Rodney Ludema has identified a fairly broad set of conditions under which the external bargaining power of customs unions and other PTAs is quite similar.36 Hence,we focus on PTAs as a group,rather than distinguishing among different types of them,in the following analysis. Central to our argument is that developments within GATT/WTO have influ- enced when member-states have sought the bargaining power offered by PTAs.As we explain below,the existence of a GATT/WTO multilateral negotiating round, fluctuations in its membership,and its mechanisms to settle commercial disputes between members are particularly important in this regard. Multilateral Trade Negotiations Since its creation,GATT/WTO has sponsored eight rounds of MTNs:Geneva (1947),Annecy(1949),Torquay(1950-51),Geneva(1955-56),Dillon(1961-62), 30.Business Times (Malaysia),23 May 2002,2. 31.See Fernandez and Portes 1998,201;Krugman 1993,73;Lawrence 1996,37;and Oye 1992. 32.European Commission,Trade DG,Information Unit,10 July 2001. 33.Financial Times,2 July 1985,5.See also Lawrence 1996,37. 34.However,FTAs routinely level asymmetries in external tariffs using rules of origin.WTO 1995a, 48-49. 35.See Fernandez and Portes 1998;Krueger 1999;and Whalley 1998. 36.Ludema 1996
a revival of a Uruguay Round-era plan, was intended to help its potential members “be more effective in protecting their collective interests+” 30 Further, PTAs may increase leverage by accumulating the market power of individual members, giving them a greater ability to influence their terms of trade and to negotiate favorable settlements with outsiders+ 31 On this score, Pascal Lamy—the EU’s Commissioner for External Trade—conceded that “consolidating Mercosur will give Brazil and its partners +++ more political weight in international negotiations+” 32 Anticipating the formation of Mercosur, a Brazilian official similarly remarked, “Dealing directly with the U+S+ on international trade issues is like getting into a cage with a tiger+ Only if we have others in with us do we stand a better chance of getting some satisfactory results+” 33 The ability of a PTA to heighten the market power of members is especially pronounced for states in a customs union—such as the European Community ~EC! and Mercosur—because these institutions erect a common external tariff ~CET! and thus bargain over tariff levels with third parties as a unit+ 34 However, states need not form a customs union to enhance their negotiating position+ It is widely argued that states have tried to influence the outcome of multilateral negotiations by threatening to form or actually establishing various types of PTAs+ 35 Further, regardless of whether a PTA imposes a CET, its members accrue bargaining power insofar as the arrangement improves their reversion point in negotiations with third parties and promotes collective action among them+ In any case, Rodney Ludema has identified a fairly broad set of conditions under which the external bargaining power of customs unions and other PTAs is quite similar+ 36 Hence, we focus on PTAs as a group, rather than distinguishing among different types of them, in the following analysis+ Central to our argument is that developments within GATT0WTO have influenced when member-states have sought the bargaining power offered by PTAs+ As we explain below, the existence of a GATT0WTO multilateral negotiating round, fluctuations in its membership, and its mechanisms to settle commercial disputes between members are particularly important in this regard+ Multilateral Trade Negotiations Since its creation, GATT0WTO has sponsored eight rounds of MTNs: Geneva ~1947!, Annecy ~1949!, Torquay ~1950–51!, Geneva ~1955–56!, Dillon ~1961–62!, 30+ Business Times (Malaysia), 23 May 2002, 2+ 31+ See Fernández and Portes 1998, 201; Krugman 1993, 73; Lawrence 1996, 37; and Oye 1992+ 32+ European Commission, Trade DG, Information Unit, 10 July 2001+ 33+ Financial Times, 2 July 1985, 5+ See also Lawrence 1996, 37+ 34+ However, FTAs routinely level asymmetries in external tariffs using rules of origin+ WTO 1995a, 48–49+ 35+ See Fernández and Portes 1998; Krueger 1999; and Whalley 1998+ 36+ Ludema 1996+ 836 International Organization
Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism 837 Kennedy (1963-67),Tokyo (1973-79),and Uruguay (1986-94),plus the Doha Development Agenda,launched in November 2001.Participants in MTNs that enter a PTA may be able to strengthen their bargaining position in these nego- tiations.37 Heightened market power enhances the ability of members to use pro- tectionist instruments to improve their terms of trade,thereby dampening their incentive to liberalize trade and bolstering their bargaining position in multilateral negotiations.38 Further,by vesting each member with preferential access to the markets of other participants,PTAs can help firms in member-states to achieve economies of scale.States entering a preferential grouping thus face a reduced need for multilateral liberalization to generate such economies,bolstering their leverage in multilateral negotiations.3 In this vein,it is noteworthy that the defin- itive accounting shows that countries such as Bolivia,India,Australia,South Africa,and Ecuador were granted significantly fewer Uruguay Round market access concessions than,respectively,Uruguay,Brazil,Austria,Turkey,and Honduras.40 At the time,the latter five countries were members of more preferen- tial arrangements than the former five,suggesting that participation in these arrangements did indeed increase their bargaining power in the Uruguay Round. If PTAs boost bargaining power in MTNs,as this illustrative evidence suggests, then MTNs should provide an impetus for states to enter PTAs. Moreover,by forming a PTA with key trade partners during a multilateral ne- gotiating round,parties to GATT/WTO can obtain insurance against the round stalling or failing to produce results in the specific areas they deem most impor- tant.41 A deadlocked MTN would place pressure on the multilateral regime and could threaten the stability of commercial relations between important trade part- ners.Such partners can minimize the severity of this threat by entering a PTA, because the grouping liberalizes commerce among members and limits their abil- ity to raise trade barriers in the future.In addition,entering a PTA helps a state attract foreign investment:overseas firms are often drawn to the expanded market access offered by preferential groupings,especially when the outcome of multilat- eral talks is uncertain or delayed. Although each of the eight MTNs sponsored by GATT/WTO yielded accords that liberalized global trade,nearly every MTN has been marked by intense dis- agreement while being fashioned.Ministers and observers often asserted that the round was in a state of crisis and teetering on the brink of failure until the final text was inked.The desire for insurance and bargaining power more generally is thus paramount throughout an MTN.We therefore hypothesize that PTAs are more likely to form during an MTN than when no such negotiation is underway. 37.See Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996;and Whalley 1998. 38.See Mansfield 1998,527;and Oye 1992. 39.See Bhagwati 1993;and Fernandez and Portes 1998,201-2. 40.Finger,Ingco,and Reincke 1996,201. 41.See Fernandez and Portes 1998.212:Krugman 1993,74:Mansfield 1998,535-36;Perroni and Whalley 2000;Whalley 1998;and WTO 1995a,52
Kennedy ~1963–67!, Tokyo ~1973–79!, and Uruguay ~1986–94!, plus the Doha Development Agenda, launched in November 2001+ Participants in MTNs that enter a PTA may be able to strengthen their bargaining position in these negotiations+ 37 Heightened market power enhances the ability of members to use protectionist instruments to improve their terms of trade, thereby dampening their incentive to liberalize trade and bolstering their bargaining position in multilateral negotiations+ 38 Further, by vesting each member with preferential access to the markets of other participants, PTAs can help firms in member-states to achieve economies of scale+ States entering a preferential grouping thus face a reduced need for multilateral liberalization to generate such economies, bolstering their leverage in multilateral negotiations+ 39 In this vein, it is noteworthy that the definitive accounting shows that countries such as Bolivia, India, Australia, South Africa, and Ecuador were granted significantly fewer Uruguay Round market access concessions than, respectively, Uruguay, Brazil, Austria, Turkey, and Honduras+ 40 At the time, the latter five countries were members of more preferential arrangements than the former five, suggesting that participation in these arrangements did indeed increase their bargaining power in the Uruguay Round+ If PTAs boost bargaining power in MTNs, as this illustrative evidence suggests, then MTNs should provide an impetus for states to enter PTAs+ Moreover, by forming a PTA with key trade partners during a multilateral negotiating round, parties to GATT0WTO can obtain insurance against the round stalling or failing to produce results in the specific areas they deem most important+ 41 A deadlocked MTN would place pressure on the multilateral regime and could threaten the stability of commercial relations between important trade partners+ Such partners can minimize the severity of this threat by entering a PTA, because the grouping liberalizes commerce among members and limits their ability to raise trade barriers in the future+ In addition, entering a PTA helps a state attract foreign investment: overseas firms are often drawn to the expanded market access offered by preferential groupings, especially when the outcome of multilateral talks is uncertain or delayed+ Although each of the eight MTNs sponsored by GATT0WTO yielded accords that liberalized global trade, nearly every MTN has been marked by intense disagreement while being fashioned+ Ministers and observers often asserted that the round was in a state of crisis and teetering on the brink of failure until the final text was inked+ The desire for insurance and bargaining power more generally is thus paramount throughout an MTN+ We therefore hypothesize that PTAs are more likely to form during an MTN than when no such negotiation is underway+ 37+ See Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996; and Whalley 1998+ 38+ See Mansfield 1998, 527; and Oye 1992+ 39+ See Bhagwati 1993; and Fernández and Portes 1998, 201–2+ 40+ Finger, Ingco, and Reincke 1996, 201+ 41+ See Fernández and Portes 1998, 212; Krugman 1993, 74; Mansfield 1998, 535–36; Perroni and Whalley 2000; Whalley 1998; and WTO 1995a, 52+ Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism 837
838 International Organization Anecdotal evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.The WTO,for example, officially attributed the wave of regionalism during the past decade to events in the Uruguay Round,such as the failed Brussels Ministerial meeting in December 1990.42 In the same vein,economic ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)launched an FTA in 1993,an initiative that was widely viewed as "a sign [of]...concern about the inability to achieve a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round.4 Equally,many observers point to the stalled multilat- eral negotiations as a critical catalyst for the U.S.-Canada FTA,arguing that the United States conceived of this arrangement as "a prod to recalcitrant nations to join in the GATT effort to make sure they weren't cut out of the action."44 More recently,the United States has proposed an extensive series of bilateral trade ac- cords,with the explicit purpose of leveraging more concessions from nonmem- bers during the Doha round of WTO talks.45 Growing GATT/WTO Membership Membership in GATT/WTO has grown more than sixfold since its inception,from twenty-two states in 1948 to 137 in 2000.46 It is widely recognized that as the multilateral system adds members,each member's leverage declines.47 Especially for smaller states,which have relatively little bargaining power to begin with,there are clear incentives to respond to a decrease in leverage by banding together to enhance their influence through the formation of a PTA.Consistent with this hy- pothesis,a number of formal models have shown that rising GATT/WTO mem- bership decreases the leverage of each participant and stimulates the establishment of preferential groupings.To date,however,this issue has not received much systematic empirical scrutiny. There are a number of related reasons to expect growth in the size of GATT WTO to precipitate PTA formation.As the number of parties to the multilateral regime has increased,so have the severity of collective action problems and the heterogeneity of preferences within the institution.4An expanded membership re- duces each participant's ability to monitor the trade practices of its counterparts. States also face rising incentives to cheat:because the actions of any single mem- 42.See Dryden1995,370;and WT01995a,54. 43.Far Eastern Economic Review,5 November 1992,50. 44.Dryden 1995,340;see also Preeg 1995,80. 45.For example,upon the completion of the U.S.-Singapore FTA negotiations,U.S.Trade Repre- sentative Robert Zoellick declared,"I firmly believe that a process of...competitive liberalization will enhance our ability to get Doha done."See Washington Post,20 November 2002,E3:and Finan- cial Times,I November 2002,14. 46.Chile signed the 1947 GATT agreement but did not accede formally until 1949.WTO 1995b, 1136. 47.See,for example,Koremenos,Lipson,and Snidal 2001,791-92;and McCalman 2002,154. 48.See Freund 2000,373-74:and McCalman 2002,154. 49.See Fernandez and Portes 1998,205;and Krugman 1993,74
Anecdotal evidence is consistent with this hypothesis+ The WTO, for example, officially attributed the wave of regionalism during the past decade to events in the Uruguay Round, such as the failed Brussels Ministerial meeting in December 1990+ 42 In the same vein, economic ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ~ASEAN! launched an FTA in 1993, an initiative that was widely viewed as “a sign @of# +++ concern about the inability to achieve a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round+” 43 Equally, many observers point to the stalled multilateral negotiations as a critical catalyst for the U+S+-Canada FTA, arguing that the United States conceived of this arrangement as “a prod to recalcitrant nations to join in the GATT effort to make sure they weren’t cut out of the action+” 44 More recently, the United States has proposed an extensive series of bilateral trade accords, with the explicit purpose of leveraging more concessions from nonmembers during the Doha round of WTO talks+ 45 Growing GATT/WTO Membership Membership in GATT0WTO has grown more than sixfold since its inception, from twenty-two states in 1948 to 137 in 2000+ 46 It is widely recognized that as the multilateral system adds members, each member’s leverage declines+ 47 Especially for smaller states, which have relatively little bargaining power to begin with, there are clear incentives to respond to a decrease in leverage by banding together to enhance their influence through the formation of a PTA+ Consistent with this hypothesis, a number of formal models have shown that rising GATT0WTO membership decreases the leverage of each participant and stimulates the establishment of preferential groupings+ 48 To date, however, this issue has not received much systematic empirical scrutiny+ There are a number of related reasons to expect growth in the size of GATT0 WTO to precipitate PTA formation+ As the number of parties to the multilateral regime has increased, so have the severity of collective action problems and the heterogeneity of preferences within the institution+ 49 An expanded membership reduces each participant’s ability to monitor the trade practices of its counterparts+ States also face rising incentives to cheat: because the actions of any single mem- 42+ See Dryden 1995, 370; and WTO 1995a, 54+ 43+ Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 November 1992, 50+ 44+ Dryden 1995, 340; see also Preeg 1995, 80+ 45+ For example, upon the completion of the U+S+-Singapore FTA negotiations, U+S+ Trade Representative Robert Zoellick declared, “I firmly believe that a process of +++ competitive liberalization will enhance our ability to get Doha done+” See Washington Post, 20 November 2002, E3; and Financial Times, 1 November 2002, 14+ 46+ Chile signed the 1947 GATT agreement but did not accede formally until 1949+ WTO 1995b, 1136+ 47+ See, for example, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 791–92; and McCalman 2002, 154+ 48+ See Freund 2000, 373–74; and McCalman 2002, 154+ 49+ See Fernández and Portes 1998, 205; and Krugman 1993, 74+ 838 International Organization