14 Raymond W.Gibbs,Jr. gas for the mind."A final study showed that conceptual metaphors consistent with a ver- bal metaphor were not better recall cues for participants trying to remember the verbal metaphors than were unrelated cues.Overall,the findings from these studies were taken to imply that people's interpretations of verbal metaphors are not necessarily related to their putative,underlying conceptual metaphors. McGlone's data are interesting in many respects,although they are not especially sur- prising.First,it is not clear that having people verbally paraphrase a metaphor is the best method for tapping into different types of,possibly metaphorical,knowledge that might be used when people interpret,or make sense of,verbal metaphors.After all,var- ious others empirical methods have shown some influence of conceptual metaphors on comprehension of,at least,idiomatic and proverbial phrases.One shouldn't imply that the failure to find effects using one task invalidates the positive evidence in favor of hy- pothesis 3 using different tasks unless some principled reasons are given for preferring one task over another.Paraphrase tasks are notoriously insensitive as measures of people's, especially children,ability to understand metaphors. 6.Bodily movement and metaphor comprehension I now turn to two instances of methods for exploring the plausibility of hypothesis 4, namely that conceptual metaphors influence people's immediate comprehension of con- ventional,metaphorical phrases.Imagine that one hears the idiomatic expression "John blew his stack"in a conversation in which it is clear that the speaker's intended mean- ing is roughly“John got very angry.”The figurative meaning of“blew his stack”is partly motivated by the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. The question is whether people compute or access some conceptual representation for ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER when they immediately process the fig- urative meaning of "John blew his stack."Participants in one series of studies read stories one line at a time on a computer screen.Each story ended with an idiom("John blew his stack"),a literal paraphrase of the idiom ("John got very angry"),or an unrelated literal statement("John saw the dented door")(Gibbs,Bogdonovich,Sykes Barr 1997).The computer measured how long it took people to read each line and then push a button signifying that they had understood what they just read.After reading the last line,partic- ipants were presented with a letter string and asked to decide as quickly as possible if this was a meaningful word in English.These letter-strings reflected either something about the conceptual metaphors underlying these idioms(e.g.,"heat"for ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER having just read "John blew his stack")or letter-strings that were unrelated to these conceptual metaphors(e.g.,"lead"). There were two important findings.First,people were faster to make lexical decision responses to the related metaphor targets(i.e.,"heat)having just read idioms than they were to either literal paraphrases ofidioms(e.g.,"John got very angry")or control phrases (e.g.,phrases still appropriate to the context such as "John saw many dents").Second, people were faster in recognizing related metaphorical targets than unrelated ones hav- ing read idioms,but not literal paraphrases or unrelated phrases.This pattern of results
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.13 (788-844) Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. gas for the mind.” A final study showed that conceptual metaphors consistent with a verbal metaphor were not better recall cues for participants trying to remember the verbal metaphors than were unrelated cues. Overall, the findings from these studies were taken to imply that people’s interpretations of verbal metaphors are not necessarily related to their putative, underlying conceptual metaphors. McGlone’s data are interesting in many respects, although they are not especially surprising. First, it is not clear that having people verbally paraphrase a metaphor is the best method for tapping into different types of, possibly metaphorical, knowledge that might be used when people interpret, or make sense of, verbal metaphors. After all, various others empirical methods have shown some influence of conceptual metaphors on comprehension of, at least, idiomatic and proverbial phrases. One shouldn’t imply that the failure to find effects using one task invalidates the positive evidence in favor of hypothesis 3 using different tasks unless some principled reasons are given for preferring one task over another. Paraphrase tasks are notoriously insensitive as measures of people’s, especially children, ability to understand metaphors. . Bodily movement and metaphor comprehension I now turn to two instances of methods for exploring the plausibility of hypothesis 4, namely that conceptual metaphors influence people’s immediate comprehension of conventional, metaphorical phrases. Imagine that one hears the idiomatic expression “John blew his stack” in a conversation in which it is clear that the speaker’s intended meaning is roughly “John got very angry.” The figurative meaning of “blew his stack” is partly motivated by the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. The question is whether people compute or access some conceptual representation for ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER when they immediately process the figurative meaning of “John blew his stack.” Participants in one series of studies read stories one line at a time on a computer screen. Each story ended with an idiom (“John blew his stack”), a literal paraphrase of the idiom (“John got very angry”), or an unrelated literal statement (“John saw the dented door”) (Gibbs, Bogdonovich, Sykes & Barr 1997). The computer measured how long it took people to read each line and then push a button signifying that they had understood what they just read. After reading the last line, participants were presented with a letter string and asked to decide as quickly as possible if this was a meaningful word in English. These letter-strings reflected either something about the conceptual metaphors underlying these idioms (e.g., “heat” for ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER having just read “John blew his stack”) or letter-strings that were unrelated to these conceptual metaphors (e.g., “lead”). There were two important findings. First, people were faster to make lexical decision responses to the related metaphor targets (i.e., “heat) having just read idioms than they were to either literal paraphrases of idioms (e.g., “John got very angry”) or control phrases (e.g., phrases still appropriate to the context such as “John saw many dents”). Second, people were faster in recognizing related metaphorical targets than unrelated ones having read idioms, but not literal paraphrases or unrelated phrases. This pattern of results
Cognitive linguists and empirical methods suggests that people are immediately computing or accessing at least something related to the the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER when they read idioms. In another experiment,participants were faster to make lexical decision responses to metaphor targets(e.g.,"heat")having read an idiom motivated by a similar conceptual metaphor (e.g.,"John blew his stack")than an idiom with roughly the same figurative meaning but motivated by a different conceptual metaphor(e.g.,"John bit her head off" which is motivated by the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR).Peo- ple were also faster to respond to related targets having read idioms motivated by similar conceptual metaphors than when they read idioms motivated by different conceptual metaphors.In general,these online priming studies reveal that people appear to com- pute or access the relevant conceptual metaphor for an idiom during some aspect of their immediate processing of these phrases.It is not clear from these results whether the acti- vated conceptual metaphor is used to interpret an idiom's meaning,or whether conceptual metaphors are simply tagged onto different idioms without serving as the causal basis for interpreting these conventional phrases.Nonetheless,this kind of data,and the methods involved in collecting it,is exactly what is required to test hypothesis 4. A different,more recent,line of research investigated the possible influence of bod- ily action on people's speeded processing of simple metaphoric phrases,as "stamp out a feeling,”“push an issue,”“sniff out the truth”and“cough up a secret,”each of which denote physical actions upon abstract items.Wilson and Gibbs(2006)hypothesized that if abstract concepts are indeed understood as items that can be acted upon by the body, then performing a related action should facilitate sensibility judgments for a figurative phrase that mentions this action.For example,if participants first move their arms and hands as if to grasp something,and then read"grasp the concept,"they should verify that this phrase is meaningful faster than when they first performed an unrelated body ac- tion.Our hypothesis was that engaging in body movements associated with these phrases should enhance the simulations that people create to form a metaphorical understand- ing of abstract notions,,such as“concept,.”even if“concepts”are not things that people can physically grasp.People's conceptual understandings of what a"concept"is,for exam- ple,need not be completely embodied and metaphorical.However,our suggestion is that some simulated construals of "concept"are rooted in embodied metaphor that may be highlighted by engaging in body actions relevant to what people mentally do with ideas. Participants in this study first learned to perform various specific bodily actions(e.g., throw,stamp,push.swallow,cough,grasp)given different nonlinguistic cues.Following this,participants were individually seated in front of a computer screen.The experiment consisted of a series of trials where an icon flashed on the screen,prompting the partici- pant to perform the appropriate bodily action.After doing this,a string of words appeared on the screen and participants had to judge as quickly as possible whether that word string was“sensible.” Analysis of the speeded sensibility judgments showed that participants responded more quickly to the metaphorical phrases that matched the preceding action (e.g.,the motor action grasp was followed by"grasp the concept"),than to the phrases that did not match the earlier movement(e.g,the motor action kick was followed by "grasp the con-
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.14 (844-914) Cognitive linguists and empirical methods suggests that people are immediately computing or accessing at least something related to the the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER when they read idioms. In another experiment, participants were faster to make lexical decision responses to metaphor targets (e.g., “heat”) having read an idiom motivated by a similar conceptual metaphor (e.g., “John blew his stack”) than an idiom with roughly the same figurative meaning but motivated by a different conceptual metaphor (e.g., “John bit her head off” which is motivated by the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR). People were also faster to respond to related targets having read idioms motivated by similar conceptual metaphors than when they read idioms motivated by different conceptual metaphors. In general, these online priming studies reveal that people appear to compute or access the relevant conceptual metaphor for an idiom during some aspect of their immediate processing of these phrases. It is not clear from these results whether the activated conceptual metaphor is used to interpret an idiom’s meaning, or whether conceptual metaphors are simply tagged onto different idioms without serving as the causal basis for interpreting these conventional phrases. Nonetheless, this kind of data, and the methods involved in collecting it, is exactly what is required to test hypothesis 4. A different, more recent, line of research investigated the possible influence of bodily action on people’s speeded processing of simple metaphoric phrases, as “stamp out a feeling,” “push an issue,” “sniff out the truth” and “cough up a secret,” each of which denote physical actions upon abstract items. Wilson and Gibbs (2006) hypothesized that if abstract concepts are indeed understood as items that can be acted upon by the body, then performing a related action should facilitate sensibility judgments for a figurative phrase that mentions this action. For example, if participants first move their arms and hands as if to grasp something, and then read “grasp the concept,” they should verify that this phrase is meaningful faster than when they first performed an unrelated body action. Our hypothesis was that engaging in body movements associated with these phrases should enhance the simulations that people create to form a metaphorical understanding of abstract notions, such as “concept,” even if “concepts” are not things that people can physically grasp. People’s conceptual understandings of what a “concept” is, for example, need not be completely embodied and metaphorical. However, our suggestion is that some simulated construals of “concept” are rooted in embodied metaphor that may be highlighted by engaging in body actions relevant to what people mentally do with ideas. Participants in this study first learned to perform various specific bodily actions (e.g., throw, stamp, push. swallow, cough, grasp) given different nonlinguistic cues. Following this, participants were individually seated in front of a computer screen. The experiment consisted of a series of trials where an icon flashed on the screen, prompting the participant to perform the appropriate bodily action. After doing this, a string of words appeared on the screen and participants had to judge as quickly as possible whether that word string was “sensible.” Analysis of the speeded sensibility judgments showed that participants responded more quickly to the metaphorical phrases that matched the preceding action (e.g., the motor action grasp was followed by “grasp the concept”), than to the phrases that did not match the earlier movement (e. g, the motor action kick was followed by “grasp the con-
16 Raymond W.Gibbs,Jr. cept").People were also faster in responding to the metaphor phrases having performed a relevant body moment than when they did not move at all.In short,performing an ac- tion facilitates understanding of a figurative phrase containing that action word,just as it does for literal phrases.A second study showed that same pattern of bodily priming effects when participants were asked to imagine performing the actions before they made their speeded responses to word strings.This result reveals that real movement is not required to facilitate metaphor comprehension,only that people mentally simulate such action. Most generally,people do not understand the nonliteral meanings of these figurative phrases as a matter of convention.Instead,people actually understand "toss out a plan," for instance,in terms of physically tossing something (ie.,plan is viewed as a physical object).In this way,processing metaphoric meaning is not just a cognitive act,but involves some imaginative understanding of the body's role in structuring abstract concepts.People may create embodied simulations of speakers'messages that involve moment-by-moment "what must it be like"processes that make use of ongoing tactile-kinesthetic experiences. These simulation processes operate even when people encounter language that is abstract, or refers to actions that are physically impossible to perform. 7.Conclusion:Cognitive linguists need not do experiments Cognitive linguistics is firmly embedded within the cognitive sciences,and as such is both a disciplinary and interdisciplinary endeavor.The interdisciplinary side of cognitive lin- guistics is evident in the increasing body of research in which linguists have collaborated with scholars from other disciplines,or have started to engage in research utilizing exper- imental and computational methods.I now talk with many younger cognitive linguistics students who are quite interested in doing informal experiments to test their ideas as part of their dissertation projects,in some cases using some of the methods described above, such as mental imagery and context-matching tasks.This is obviously a good thing for the field of cognitive linguistics overall,and for our understanding of human thought and language more generally. However,my personal belief is that cognitive linguists need not become experimental psychologists or computer scientists for their work and ideas to be seen as legitimate with significant theoretical implications.There is a trend in cognitive science in which scholars in any one discipline always turn toward the right to seek evidence from a neighboring field to find additional,usually more empirical,support for their ideas and theories.For instance,philosophers often turn to linguistics,linguistics has historically turned to devel- opmental and cognitive psychology,linguistics and psychology have often turned toward computer science,and most recently,cognitive scientists of all colors have turned toward neuroscience.Once more,these developments are natural and in many cases lead to im- portant new work and empirical findings.But cognitive linguists are skilled at being able to conduct these sorts of systematic analyses,even if their methods for doing this are not always explicit,and have provided a huge body of work that simply could not be done by people in any other field.Why ask cognitive linguists to turn away from what they do best to secure their work on a different empirical foundation?My research has benefited greatly
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.15 (914-975) Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. cept”). People were also faster in responding to the metaphor phrases having performed a relevant body moment than when they did not move at all. In short, performing an action facilitates understanding of a figurative phrase containing that action word, just as it does for literal phrases. A second study showed that same pattern of bodily priming effects when participants were asked to imagine performing the actions before they made their speeded responses to word strings. This result reveals that real movement is not required to facilitate metaphor comprehension, only that people mentally simulate such action. Most generally, people do not understand the nonliteral meanings of these figurative phrases as a matter of convention. Instead, people actually understand “toss out a plan,” for instance, in terms of physically tossing something (i.e., plan is viewed as a physical object). In this way, processing metaphoric meaning is not just a cognitive act, but involves some imaginative understanding of the body’s role in structuring abstract concepts. People may create embodied simulations of speakers’ messages that involve moment-by-moment “what must it be like” processes that make use of ongoing tactile-kinesthetic experiences. These simulation processes operate even when people encounter language that is abstract, or refers to actions that are physically impossible to perform. . Conclusion: Cognitive linguists need not do experiments Cognitive linguistics is firmly embedded within the cognitive sciences, and as such is both a disciplinary and interdisciplinary endeavor. The interdisciplinary side of cognitive linguistics is evident in the increasing body of research in which linguists have collaborated with scholars from other disciplines, or have started to engage in research utilizing experimental and computational methods. I now talk with many younger cognitive linguistics students who are quite interested in doing informal experiments to test their ideas as part of their dissertation projects, in some cases using some of the methods described above, such as mental imagery and context-matching tasks. This is obviously a good thing for the field of cognitive linguistics overall, and for our understanding of human thought and language more generally. However, my personal belief is that cognitive linguists need not become experimental psychologists or computer scientists for their work and ideas to be seen as legitimate with significant theoretical implications. There is a trend in cognitive science in which scholars in any one discipline always turn toward the right to seek evidence from a neighboring field to find additional, usually more empirical, support for their ideas and theories. For instance, philosophers often turn to linguistics, linguistics has historically turned to developmental and cognitive psychology, linguistics and psychology have often turned toward computer science, and most recently, cognitive scientists of all colors have turned toward neuroscience. Once more, these developments are natural and in many cases lead to important new work and empirical findings. But cognitive linguists are skilled at being able to conduct these sorts of systematic analyses, even if their methods for doing this are not always explicit, and have provided a huge body of work that simply could not be done by people in any other field. Why ask cognitive linguists to turn away from what they do best to secure their work on a different empirical foundation? My research has benefited greatly
Cognitive linguists and empirical methods 17 from cognitive linguistics studies,and we need more of this work and would hate to see cognitive linguists all try to become experimental psychologists,computer scientists,or neuroscientists.Doing experiments is hard work,and one does not casually pick up the skills needed to engage in this kind of research.What is needed,again,is for cognitive lin- guists to be more sensitive to some of the important properties of framing experimental hypotheses(e.g.,constructing falsifiable hypotheses,considering alternative hypotheses), and trying to articulate their ideas,and empirical findings in ways that may be tested by scholars in other disciplines.This does not mean,however,that cognitive linguists must themselves run out and be something that they are not. Finally,I have focused in this chapter on why cognitive linguists should care more about empirical methods,and suggested some of the ways that they could alter their work to better situate their findings within cognitive science.Yet psychologists,at the same time,would greatly benefit from learning more about cognitive linguistics,and learning to conduct some of the systematic analysis of linguistic expressions that is critical to un- derstanding the conceptual/embodied motivation for linguistic meaning.Doing cognitive linguistics is,of course,hard work also.But the best way to appreciate the insights from cognitive linguistics,and apply these ideas to experimental tests,is to do cognitive linguis- tics.Some of us need help in doing such work,and my hope is that cognitive linguists will put more effort into sharing their knowledge and working methods with scholars from other disciplines. References Barsalou,L.(1993).Flexibility,structure,and linguistic vagary in concepts:Manifestations of a com- positional system of perceptual symbols.In A.Collins S.Gathercole (Eds.),Theories of memory (pp.29-101).Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum. Bresnan,J.Kaplan,R.(1982).Grammars as mental representations of language.In J.Bresnan(Ed.),The mental representation of grammatical relations(pp.xvii-liii).Cambridge,MA:MIT Press. Coulson,S.(2001).Semantic leaps.New York:Cambridge University Press. Fauconnier,G.Turner,M.(2002).The way we think:Conceptual blending and the mind's hidden com- plexities.New York:Basic Books. Fodor,J.,Bever,T.,&Garrett,M.(1974).Psycholinguistics.New York:Wiley. Gibbs,R.(1992).What do idioms really mean?Journal of Memory and Language,31,485-506. Gibbs,R.(1994).The poetics of mind:Figurative thought,language,and understanding.New York: Cambridge University Press. Gibbs,R.(2000).Making good psychology out of blending theory.Cognitive Linguistics,11,347-358. Gibbs,R.(2006).Embodiment and cognitive science.New York:Cambridge University Press. Gibbs,R.O'Brien,J.(1990).Idioms and mental imagery:The metaphorical motivation for idiomatic meaning.Cognition,36,35-64. Gibbs,R.&Steen,G.(Eds.).(1999).Metaphor in cognitive linguistics.Amsterdam:Benjamins. Gibbs,R.,Bogdonovich,J.,Sykes,J.,Barr,D.(1997).Metaphor in idiom comprehension.Journal of Memory and Language,37,141-154. Gibbs,R.,Lima,P.,Francuzo,E.(2004).Metaphor is grounded in embodied experience.Journal of Pragmatics,36,1189-1210
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.16 (975-1056) Cognitive linguists and empirical methods from cognitive linguistics studies, and we need more of this work and would hate to see cognitive linguists all try to become experimental psychologists, computer scientists, or neuroscientists. Doing experiments is hard work, and one does not casually pick up the skills needed to engage in this kind of research. What is needed, again, is for cognitive linguists to be more sensitive to some of the important properties of framing experimental hypotheses (e.g., constructing falsifiable hypotheses, considering alternative hypotheses), and trying to articulate their ideas, and empirical findings in ways that may be tested by scholars in other disciplines. This does not mean, however, that cognitive linguists must themselves run out and be something that they are not. Finally, I have focused in this chapter on why cognitive linguists should care more about empirical methods, and suggested some of the ways that they could alter their work to better situate their findings within cognitive science. Yet psychologists, at the same time, would greatly benefit from learning more about cognitive linguistics, and learning to conduct some of the systematic analysis of linguistic expressions that is critical to understanding the conceptual/embodied motivation for linguistic meaning. Doing cognitive linguistics is, of course, hard work also. But the best way to appreciate the insights from cognitive linguistics, and apply these ideas to experimental tests, is to do cognitive linguistics. Some of us need help in doing such work, and my hope is that cognitive linguists will put more effort into sharing their knowledge and working methods with scholars from other disciplines. References Barsalou, L. (1993). Flexibility, structure, and linguistic vagary in concepts: Manifestations of a compositional system of perceptual symbols. In A. Collins & S. Gathercole (Eds.), Theories of memory (pp. 29–101). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bresnan, J. & Kaplan, R. (1982). Grammars as mental representations of language. In J. Bresnan (Ed.), The mental representation of grammatical relations (pp. xvii–liii). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Coulson, S. (2001). Semantic leaps. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fauconnier, G. & Turner, M. (2002). The way we think: Conceptual blending and the mind’s hidden complexities. New York: Basic Books. Fodor, J., Bever, T., & Garrett, M. (1974). Psycholinguistics. New York: Wiley. Gibbs, R. (1992). What do idioms really mean? Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 485–506. Gibbs, R. (1994). The poetics of mind: Figurative thought, language, and understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gibbs, R. (2000). Making good psychology out of blending theory. Cognitive Linguistics, 11, 347–358. Gibbs, R. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gibbs, R. & O’Brien, J. (1990). Idioms and mental imagery: The metaphorical motivation for idiomatic meaning. Cognition, 36, 35–64. Gibbs, R. & Steen, G. (Eds.). (1999). Metaphor in cognitive linguistics. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Gibbs, R., Bogdonovich, J., Sykes, J., & Barr, D. (1997). Metaphor in idiom comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 37, 141–154. Gibbs, R., Lima, P., & Francuzo, E. (2004). Metaphor is grounded in embodied experience. Journal of Pragmatics, 36, 1189–1210
18 Raymond W.Gibbs,Jr. Gibbs,R.,Strom,L,Spivey-Knowlton,M.(1997).Conceptual metaphor in mental imagery for proverbs.Journal of Mental Imagery,21,83-110. Glucksberg,S.(2001).Understanding figurative language.New York:Oxford University Press. Katz,A.,Cacciari,C.,Gibbs,R.,&Turner,M.(1998).Figurative language and thought.New York:Oxford University Press. Kovecses,Z.(2002).Metaphor:A practical introduction.New York:Oxford University Press. Lakoff,G.(1993).The contemporary theory of metaphor.In A.Ortony(Ed.),Metaphor and thought-,Vol. 2(pp.201-233).New York:Cambridge University Press. Lakoff,G.Johnson,M.(1980).Metaphors we live by.Chicago:University of Chicago Press. Lakoff,G.&Johnson,M.(1999).Philosophy in the flesh.Chicago:University of Chicago Press. Libet,B.(2004).Mind time.Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press. McGlone,M.(1996).Conceptual metaphor and figurative language understanding:Food for thought? Journal of Memory and Language,35,544-565. Murphy,G.(1996).On metaphoric representations.Cognition,60,173-204. Nayak,N.Gibbs,R.(1990).Conceptual knowledge in the interpretation of idioms.Journal of Experimental Psychology:General,119,315-330. Nunberg,G.,Sag,L.,Wasow,T.(1994).Idioms.Language,70,491-538. Sandra,D.(1998).What linguists can and can't tell about the human mind:A reply to Croft.Cognitive Linguistics,9,361-378. Sandra,D.Rice,S.(1995).Network analyses of prepositional meaning:Mirroring the mind-the linguist's or the language user's?Cognitive Linguistics,6,89-130. Thomas,A.,Bulevich,J.,Loftus,E.(2003).Exploring role of repetition and sensory elaboration in the imagination inflation effect.Memory Cognition,31,630-640. Vervaeke,J.Kennedy,J.(1996).Metaphors in thought and language:Falsification and multiple meanings.Metaphor and Symbol,11,273-284. Wegner,D.(2002).The illusion of conscious will.Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press. Wilson,N.Gibbs,R.(2006).Real and imagined body movement primes metaphor comprehension. Manuscript submitted for publication. Wilson,T.(2002).Strangers to ourselves:Discovering the adaptive unconscious.Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press
JB[v.20020404] Prn:12/04/2007; 10:05 F: HCP1801.tex / p.17 (1056-1139) Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. Gibbs, R., Strom, L., & Spivey-Knowlton, M. (1997). Conceptual metaphor in mental imagery for proverbs. Journal of Mental Imagery, 21, 83–110. Glucksberg, S. (2001). Understanding figurative language. New York: Oxford University Press. Katz, A., Cacciari, C., Gibbs, R., & Turner, M. (1998). Figurative language and thought. New York: Oxford University Press. Kövecses, Z. (2002). Metaphor: A practical introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Lakoff, G. (1993). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought-, Vol. 2 (pp. 201–233). New York: Cambridge University Press. Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Libet, B. (2004). Mind time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McGlone, M. (1996). Conceptual metaphor and figurative language understanding: Food for thought? Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 544–565. Murphy, G. (1996). On metaphoric representations. Cognition, 60, 173–204. Nayak, N. & Gibbs, R. (1990). Conceptual knowledge in the interpretation of idioms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 119, 315–330. Nunberg, G., Sag, I., & Wasow, T. (1994). Idioms. Language, 70, 491–538. Sandra, D. (1998). What linguists can and can’t tell about the human mind: A reply to Croft. Cognitive Linguistics, 9, 361–378. Sandra, D. & Rice, S. (1995). Network analyses of prepositional meaning: Mirroring the mind- the linguist’s or the language user’s? Cognitive Linguistics, 6, 89–130. Thomas, A., Bulevich, J., & Loftus, E. (2003). Exploring role of repetition and sensory elaboration in the imagination inflation effect. Memory & Cognition, 31, 630–640. Vervaeke, J. & Kennedy, J. (1996). Metaphors in thought and language: Falsification and multiple meanings. Metaphor and Symbol, 11, 273–284. Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilson, N. & Gibbs, R. (2006). Real and imagined body movement primes metaphor comprehension. Manuscript submitted for publication. Wilson, T. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press