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《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源：Trends and Variation in Assortative Mating：Causes and Consequences

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INTRODUCTION degree to which populations intermarry tells This article reviews recent studies of trends us about the openness of social boundaries. and variation in assortative mating,the nonran- Studies of assortative mating are also of interest dom matching of individuals into relationships. for personal reasons.People care deeply about People match assortatively in many ways,such who their romantic partners are.Matching as into jobs or friendships;this review focuses patterns are far from random,and the charac- on matching in romantic relationships.I follow teristics of partners affect relationship quality, convention and use the term assortative mating, satisfaction,and stability. borrowed from biological studies of mating in This article builds on previous reviews by Kalmijn (1998)and Blossfeld(2009).Kalmijn's animal populations,but my focus is on roman- tic relationships broadly construed rather than comprehensive review covered socioeconomic, on the characteristics of couples engaged in sex racial/ethnic,and religious matching studies and reproduction. written primarily in the 1980s and 1990s. Studies of assortative mating span many Blossfeld's review was more targeted,focusing disciplines.Sociologists interested in assorta- on trends and variation in educational assorta- tive mating typically focus on matching across tive mating.Like Kalmijn,I review socioeco- salient social boundaries,most often socio- nomic,racial/ethnic,and religious matching, economic status,race/ethnicity,and religion. but I update his review with studies published There is also a vibrant literature in psychology, since the late 1990s.Each of these topics could distinguished by a focus on matching on per- fill its own article.I include all three because sonality characteristics,although these studies even though the theories,concepts,and issues also often include demographic traits.Interest overlap,connections and insights from one in assortative mating in economics,which tends area are rarely applied to the others.Unlike to focus on spouses'economic resemblance,has Kalmijn's review,this article is primarily lim- grown considerably over the past 20 years.This ited to studies that inform our understanding of review focuses on the three types of assorta- trends and variation in assortative mating.This tive mating most common in the sociology and focus necessarily omits some active areas in the economics literature:(a)socioeconomic sta- literature,such as point-in-time studies of in- tus (including education,occupation,income, dividuals'preferences for mates and patterns of and class background);(b)race/ethnicity;and matching within a single context.Unlike both (c)religion. Kalmijn and Blossfeld,I devote considerable at- One of the major reasons why assortative tention to the consequences of assortative mat- mating has received so much attention in the ing.Research on this topic has grown substan- biological and social sciences is that it fun- tially,but findings from these studies have not damentally shapes the characteristics of yet been the subject of a comprehensive review. populations.It organizes people into families and determines the characteristics of parents. HOW ARE PATTERNS OF Because spouses (and to a lesser extent cohabit- ASSORTATIVE MATING ing couples)share resources,assortative mating GENERATED? affects individuals'access to resources and the The conceptual framework guiding most distribution of resources across families. studies of assortative mating is the notion of Moreover,to the extent that parents influence the marriage market.Individuals search for their children's characteristics,assortative partners in a market in which people have mating shapes the characteristics of future preferences for mates but face constrained op- populations.Boundaries between social groups portunities(Becker 1974,Goode 1970 [1963], are maintained through assortative mating and Mortensen 1988,Oppenheimer 1988).Search weakened through intermarriage.Thus,the is costly (in terms of both time and money),and 452 Sdrwartz

SO39CH22-Schwartz ARI 26 June 2013 15:20 INTRODUCTION This article reviews recent studies of trends and variation in assortative mating, the nonrandom matching of individuals into relationships. People match assortatively in many ways, such as into jobs or friendships; this review focuses on matching in romantic relationships. I follow convention and use the term assortative mating, borrowed from biological studies of mating in animal populations, but my focus is on romantic relationships broadly construed rather than on the characteristics of couples engaged in sex and reproduction. Studies of assortative mating span many disciplines. Sociologists interested in assortative mating typically focus on matching across salient social boundaries, most often socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, and religion. There is also a vibrant literature in psychology, distinguished by a focus on matching on personality characteristics, although these studies also often include demographic traits. Interest in assortative mating in economics, which tends to focus on spouses’ economic resemblance, has grown considerably over the past 20 years. This review focuses on the three types of assortative mating most common in the sociology and economics literature: (a) socioeconomic status (including education, occupation, income, and class background); (b) race/ethnicity; and (c) religion. One of the major reasons why assortative mating has received so much attention in the biological and social sciences is that it fundamentally shapes the characteristics of populations. It organizes people into families and determines the characteristics of parents. Because spouses (and to a lesser extent cohabiting couples) share resources, assortative mating affects individuals’ access to resources and the distribution of resources across families. Moreover, to the extent that parents influence their children’s characteristics, assortative mating shapes the characteristics of future populations. Boundaries between social groups are maintained through assortative mating and weakened through intermarriage. Thus, the degree to which populations intermarry tells us about the openness of social boundaries. Studies of assortative mating are also of interest for personal reasons. People care deeply about who their romantic partners are. Matching patterns are far from random, and the characteristics of partners affect relationship quality, satisfaction, and stability. This article builds on previous reviews by Kalmijn (1998) and Blossfeld (2009). Kalmijn’s comprehensive review covered socioeconomic, racial/ethnic, and religious matching studies written primarily in the 1980s and 1990s. Blossfeld’s review was more targeted, focusing on trends and variation in educational assortative mating. Like Kalmijn, I review socioeconomic, racial/ethnic, and religious matching, but I update his review with studies published since the late 1990s. Each of these topics could fill its own article. I include all three because even though the theories, concepts, and issues overlap, connections and insights from one area are rarely applied to the others. Unlike Kalmijn’s review, this article is primarily limited to studies that inform our understanding of trends and variation in assortative mating. This focus necessarily omits some active areas in the literature, such as point-in-time studies of individuals’ preferences for mates and patterns of matching within a single context. Unlike both Kalmijn and Blossfeld, I devote considerable attention to the consequences of assortative mating. Research on this topic has grown substantially, but findings from these studies have not yet been the subject of a comprehensive review. HOW ARE PATTERNS OF ASSORTATIVE MATING GENERATED? The conceptual framework guiding most studies of assortative mating is the notion of the marriage market. Individuals search for partners in a market in which people have preferences for mates but face constrained opportunities (Becker 1974, Goode 1970 [1963], Mortensen 1988, Oppenheimer 1988). Search is costly (in terms of both time and money), and 452 Schwartz Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:451-470. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

people compete with one another for preferred wants to partner“down,”and everyone ends up mates.The search for a romantic partner has with someone roughly similar to themselves.A often been compared with the search for a job. small literature attempts to adjudicate between Just as people have a reservation wage below these two hypotheses (Dimaggio Mohr which they will not take a job,they may also 1985,Kalmijn 1994),with recent studies in have a set of minimum qualifications they seek economics using novel data from internet in a partner below which they will not form dating websites,speed dating experiments,and a match.People may update their preferences marriages among movie stars (Bruze 2011, on the basis of their experience in the marriage Fisman et al.2006,Hitsch et al.2010).Overall, market,and the complex interaction between the evidence favors the matching hypothesis, people's potentially shifting preferences and but whether matching or competition prevails their constraints generates observed matching may vary by the trait in question,e.g.,compe- patterns.These ideas underlie many behavioral tition for income and matching on education, models of mate selection,although various race/ethnicity,and religion(Hitsch etal.2010). simplifying assumptions are made(e.g.,Burdett All these studies were conducted using data Coles 1997,Logan et al.2008,Wong 2003). from the United States,however,and whether They have primarily been applied to marriage matching or competition characterizes the but also apply to the search for other types of sorting process may vary by context. romantic partners (e.g,Choo Siow 2006, Becker predicted that negative assorta- Sahib Gu 2002). tive mating would occur for traits that are Becker's (1974,1981)economic model of substitutes.Traits are substitutes when there marriage is often evoked in studies of assor-are gains to specialization.Becker reasoned 宝 tative mating because of its clear predictions that,just as factory output can increase when about matching patterns.He predicted that like individuals specialize rather than complete all will marry like when traits are complements: parts of a process,the gains to marriage can be characteristics such as lifestyle,attractive-greater when members of a couple specialize, ness,and religion.Becker referred to this and individuals would thus sortinto marriageto phenomenon as positive assortative mating.maximize these gains.Although specialization The terms endogamy and exogamy are also could occur on numerous household tasks(e.g., often used,respectively,for in-or out-group I'm better attidying up,and my partner is better marriage (e.g.,by religion,race/ethnicity,or at washing dishes),Becker primarily focused on nativity),and homogamy and heterogamy specialization in the broad categories of market for marriages between people with similar or work versus household work.As others have Aold dissimilar traits (e.g.,by years of schooling,pointed out,Becker's ideas are reminiscent income,or attractiveness). of Parsons's (1949)classic discussion of the Other scholars have noted that homogamy conjugal family,in which the division of labor can be generated by two combinations of between husbands and wives serves to reduce preferences for mates:(a)Both sides of the competition between the sexes and promote market prefer partners with characteristics marital stability.The gains to specialization led similar to their own(the matching hypothesis),Becker to predict negative assortative mating or(b)both sides of the market prefer partners on wages such that high-wage men(or women) with more of a characteristic (the competition marry low-wage women (or men). hypothesis).The matching hypothesis leads to Exchange theory (Davis 1941,Merton homogamy because everyone is searching for 1941)also predicts negative assortative mating, someone similar to themselves.The competi-but for different reasons.In the absence of tion hypothesis leads to homogamy because,homogamy,it predicts that people will balance if both sides of the market prefer more of a unequal traits through exchange.For example, characteristic in their mates,then neither side highly educated men from disadvantaged class www.analreviews.orgTrends and Variation in Asortative Mating 453

SO39CH22-Schwartz ARI 26 June 2013 15:20 people compete with one another for preferred mates. The search for a romantic partner has often been compared with the search for a job. Just as people have a reservation wage below which they will not take a job, they may also have a set of minimum qualifications they seek in a partner below which they will not form a match. People may update their preferences on the basis of their experience in the marriage market, and the complex interaction between people’s potentially shifting preferences and their constraints generates observed matching patterns. These ideas underlie many behavioral models of mate selection, although various simplifying assumptions are made (e.g., Burdett & Coles 1997, Logan et al. 2008, Wong 2003). They have primarily been applied to marriage but also apply to the search for other types of romantic partners (e.g., Choo & Siow 2006, Sahib & Gu 2002). Becker’s (1974, 1981) economic model of marriage is often evoked in studies of assortative mating because of its clear predictions about matching patterns. He predicted that like will marry like when traits are complements: characteristics such as lifestyle, attractiveness, and religion. Becker referred to this phenomenon as positive assortative mating. The terms endogamy and exogamy are also often used, respectively, for in- or out-group marriage (e.g., by religion, race/ethnicity, or nativity), and homogamy and heterogamy for marriages between people with similar or dissimilar traits (e.g., by years of schooling, income, or attractiveness). Other scholars have noted that homogamy can be generated by two combinations of preferences for mates: (a) Both sides of the market prefer partners with characteristics similar to their own (the matching hypothesis), or (b) both sides of the market prefer partners with more of a characteristic (the competition hypothesis). The matching hypothesis leads to homogamy because everyone is searching for someone similar to themselves. The competition hypothesis leads to homogamy because, if both sides of the market prefer more of a characteristic in their mates, then neither side wants to partner “down,” and everyone ends up with someone roughly similar to themselves. A small literature attempts to adjudicate between these two hypotheses (Dimaggio & Mohr 1985, Kalmijn 1994), with recent studies in economics using novel data from internet dating websites, speed dating experiments, and marriages among movie stars (Bruze 2011, Fisman et al. 2006, Hitsch et al. 2010). Overall, the evidence favors the matching hypothesis, but whether matching or competition prevails may vary by the trait in question, e.g., competition for income and matching on education, race/ethnicity, and religion (Hitsch et al. 2010). All these studies were conducted using data from the United States, however, and whether matching or competition characterizes the sorting process may vary by context. Becker predicted that negative assortative mating would occur for traits that are substitutes. Traits are substitutes when there are gains to specialization. Becker reasoned that, just as factory output can increase when individuals specialize rather than complete all parts of a process, the gains to marriage can be greater when members of a couple specialize, and individuals would thus sort into marriage to maximize these gains. Although specialization could occur on numerous household tasks (e.g., I’m better at tidying up, and my partner is better at washing dishes), Becker primarily focused on specialization in the broad categories of market work versus household work. As others have pointed out, Becker’s ideas are reminiscent of Parsons’s (1949) classic discussion of the conjugal family, in which the division of labor between husbands and wives serves to reduce competition between the sexes and promote marital stability. The gains to specialization led Becker to predict negative assortative mating on wages such that high-wage men (or women) marry low-wage women (or men). Exchange theory (Davis 1941, Merton 1941) also predicts negative assortative mating, but for different reasons. In the absence of homogamy, it predicts that people will balance unequal traits through exchange. For example, highly educated men from disadvantaged class www.annualreviews.org • Trends and Variation in Assortative Mating 453 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:451-470. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

backgrounds can exchange their educational origin,race/ethnicity,religion)to achieved advantage to marry women from advantaged characteristics (e.g.,education,experience). class backgrounds with lower educational In the process,parents lose control over the attainments.The outcome of these matches is economic success of their children,and the negative assortative mating on both education influence of third parties (e.g.,families,com- and class,but it arises because people exchange munity members,the church,the state)over one advantage for another.Whether patterns mate selection wanes.Increasing geographic of exchange are evident in interracial marriages mobility also reduces the ability of parents in the United States has been the subject of and third parties to monitor and regulate lively debate (Gullickson Fu 2010;Kalmijn mate selection,but educational institutions 2010b:Rosenfeld2005,2010). and residential segregation remain important indirect methods of parental control (Blau Duncan 1967,Goode 1970 [1963]). TRENDS AND VARIATION: Assortative mating scholars have drawn on CAUSES these ideas-which can be loosely classified The ideas discussed above form the theoretical under the modernization theory umbrella-to basis for many studies of assortative mating,but predict an increase in sorting on achieved taken alone they are static.Theories of trends characteristics and a decrease in sorting on and variation in assortative mating require an ascribed characteristics (e.g.,Kalmijn 1991a,b; engine of change,be it variation in preferences, Rosenfeld 2006,2008;Rosenfeld Thomas in opportunities,or in some combination 2012).A variant of this hypothesis posits that of both.Although there is a small literature sorting on achieved characteristics follows an devoted to estimating the independent effects inverted U shape,first rising with the increased of preferences versus opportunities (e.g., importance of education but then falling as Abramitzky et al.2011,Choo Siow 2006, romantic love becomes the basis of mate Logan et al.2008),many of the ideas discussed selection (Smits et al.1998). below involve changes in both.In addition, Trends in assortative mating by religion feedback loops between preferences and and race/ethnicity are generally consistent with opportunities may render their independent predictions from modernization theory.With effects difficult to disentangle.Thus,while I use few exceptions,interracial and interreligious the concepts of preferences and opportunities marriages are vastly more common today than below,I do not dwell on these distinctions but in the past (e.g.,Kalmijn 1991a,Rosenfeld organize the discussion around the major sub- 2008).Trends in educational homogamy, stantive explanations for variation in assortative by contrast,are less consistent and more mating. contested.Several scholars have remarked that cross-national trends in educational homogamy appear to have no discernible pattern(Blossfeld Modernization and the Decline 2009,Kalmiin 1998,Smits Park 2009).In the of Third Party Control United States,most studies show a rise in edu- A constellation of interrelated ideas about mod- cational homogamy,but the results vary across ernization,economic development,urbaniza- the education distribution and are sensitive to tion,geographic mobility,secularization,and how spousal resemblance is measured (Hou the rise of individualism motivate a large Myles 2008,table 1;Rosenfeld 2008;Schwartz portion of theory about change and variation Mare 2005).Thus,at present,it is clear that in assortative mating.Although these ideas are cross-national trends in educational homogamy formulated in various ways,the basic argument do not neatly follow those predicted by mod- is that as societies develop,the basis of success ernization theory and that different or more shifts from ascribed characteristics (e.g.,social complex theories are needed,as advocated by 454 Sdrwartz

SO39CH22-Schwartz ARI 26 June 2013 15:20 backgrounds can exchange their educational advantage to marry women from advantaged class backgrounds with lower educational attainments. The outcome of these matches is negative assortative mating on both education and class, but it arises because people exchange one advantage for another. Whether patterns of exchange are evident in interracial marriages in the United States has been the subject of lively debate (Gullickson & Fu 2010; Kalmijn 2010b; Rosenfeld 2005, 2010). TRENDS AND VARIATION: CAUSES The ideas discussed above form the theoretical basis for many studies of assortative mating, but taken alone they are static. Theories of trends and variation in assortative mating require an engine of change, be it variation in preferences, in opportunities, or in some combination of both. Although there is a small literature devoted to estimating the independent effects of preferences versus opportunities (e.g., Abramitzky et al. 2011, Choo & Siow 2006, Logan et al. 2008), many of the ideas discussed below involve changes in both. In addition, feedback loops between preferences and opportunities may render their independent effects difficult to disentangle. Thus, while I use the concepts of preferences and opportunities below, I do not dwell on these distinctions but organize the discussion around the major substantive explanations for variation in assortative mating. Modernization and the Decline of Third Party Control A constellation of interrelated ideas about modernization, economic development, urbanization, geographic mobility, secularization, and the rise of individualism motivate a large portion of theory about change and variation in assortative mating. Although these ideas are formulated in various ways, the basic argument is that as societies develop, the basis of success shifts from ascribed characteristics (e.g., social origin, race/ethnicity, religion) to achieved characteristics (e.g., education, experience). In the process, parents lose control over the economic success of their children, and the influence of third parties (e.g., families, community members, the church, the state) over mate selection wanes. Increasing geographic mobility also reduces the ability of parents and third parties to monitor and regulate mate selection, but educational institutions and residential segregation remain important indirect methods of parental control (Blau & Duncan 1967, Goode 1970 [1963]). Assortative mating scholars have drawn on these ideas—which can be loosely classified under the modernization theory umbrella—to predict an increase in sorting on achieved characteristics and a decrease in sorting on ascribed characteristics (e.g., Kalmijn 1991a,b; Rosenfeld 2006, 2008; Rosenfeld & Thomas 2012). A variant of this hypothesis posits that sorting on achieved characteristics follows an inverted U shape, first rising with the increased importance of education but then falling as romantic love becomes the basis of mate selection (Smits et al. 1998). Trends in assortative mating by religion and race/ethnicity are generally consistent with predictions from modernization theory. With few exceptions, interracial and interreligious marriages are vastly more common today than in the past (e.g., Kalmijn 1991a, Rosenfeld 2008). Trends in educational homogamy, by contrast, are less consistent and more contested. Several scholars have remarked that cross-national trends in educational homogamy appear to have no discernible pattern (Blossfeld 2009, Kalmijn 1998, Smits & Park 2009). In the United States, most studies show a rise in educational homogamy, but the results vary across the education distribution and are sensitive to how spousal resemblance is measured (Hou & Myles 2008, table 1; Rosenfeld 2008; Schwartz & Mare 2005). Thus, at present, it is clear that cross-national trends in educational homogamy do not neatly follow those predicted by modernization theory and that different or more complex theories are needed, as advocated by 454 Schwartz Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:451-470. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

others (Smits Park 2009).A subset of the Economic Inequality ideas associated with modernization theory The economic inequality hypothesis represents has fared better in recent work on the decline an alternative to straight-line theories of mod- of third party control over mate selection and ernization and assimilation.It posits that the the rise of same-sex and interracial unions economic and social distance between groups is (Rosenfeld Kim 2005,Rosenfeld Thomas greater in times of high inequality,thereby re- 2012) ducing intermarriage.This hypothesis is quite general and can be applied to inequality across Assimilation many social groups,but it is most often applied Although some studies of trends in racial/ethnic to economic inequality by education(known as intermarriage draw on modernization theory, the returns to schooling)and to general lev- more common is the use of assimilation theory. els of income inequality across individuals or Like modernization theory,classical assimila- families (e.g,as measured by the Gini coeffi- Ajuo asn tion theory predicts an increase in racial/ethnic cient,Theil index,or coefficient of variation). intermarriage as the social boundaries between The mechanism linking inequality to assorta- euosiad groups blur through the process of assimilation tive mating is straightforward:When economic into a common culture(Gordon 1964,Park inequality across groups increases,people have Burgess 1921).Although long-run patterns of more to lose if they"marry down"(Fernandez racial/ethnic intermarriage fit squarely within et al.2005). predictions from both modernization and as- The inequality hypothesis is not new(Blau similation theory,an unprecedented decline in 1977,Rytina et al.1988,Smits et al.1998), Hispanic intermarriage between the mid-1990s but has received increased attention as a result 宝 and 2000s has sparked renewed interest among of several promising cross-national studies scholars of interracial/interethnic marriage in that have found higher odds of educational the link between preferences and opportunity homogamy in countries with greater income (e.g.,Lichter et al.2011;Qian Lichter 2007,inequality and returns to schooling(Dahan 2011).The leading explanation for Hispan-Gaviria 2001,Fernandez et al.2005,Torche ics'recent"retreat from intermarriage"is that 2010).Studies of trends within countries sup- -510c the large growth in the Hispanic immigrant port these findings:Educational homogamy population has increased opportunities for en-tends to move in tandem with the returns dogamy and may have also reinforced a shared to schooling (Han 2010,Heaton Mitchell cultural identity (Qian Lichter 2007,2011).2012).Related studies find that higher levels Aold The complement to these findings is that,while of male income inequality are associated with Hispanics in the United States have become delayed marriage among women (Gould increasingly endogamous,immigration out of Paserman 2003,Loughran 2002),potentially Mexico appears to have created a marriage mar-because whom one marries matters more in ket squeeze in which women living in areas of high inequality regimes than in low ones. Mexico with high levels of migration are more Whereas the inequality hypothesis is often likely to "marry down"in education than are framed as a shift in preferences stemming those living in areas with low migration(Choi from change in the cost of "marrying down,' Mare 2012).Broadly speaking,the variability of increases in income inequality are also asso- changes in intermarriage by race/ethnic group ciated with increased residential segregation supports more nuanced theories of assimilation (Reardon Bischoff 2011)and thus may reduce that are less unidirectional than classical assim-the opportunities for intermarriage.One way to ilation theory and follow multiple paths(e.g.,make progress toward identifying why inequal- Alba Nee 2003,Portes Zhou 1993,Qian ity and assortative mating are related would Lichter 2007). be to investigate the links between inequality, www.anmalreviews.org Trends and Variation in Asortative Mating 455

SO39CH22-Schwartz ARI 26 June 2013 15:20 others (Smits & Park 2009). A subset of the ideas associated with modernization theory has fared better in recent work on the decline of third party control over mate selection and the rise of same-sex and interracial unions (Rosenfeld & Kim 2005, Rosenfeld & Thomas 2012). Assimilation Although some studies of trends in racial/ethnic intermarriage draw on modernization theory, more common is the use of assimilation theory. Like modernization theory, classical assimilation theory predicts an increase in racial/ethnic intermarriage as the social boundaries between groups blur through the process of assimilation into a common culture (Gordon 1964, Park & Burgess 1921). Although long-run patterns of racial/ethnic intermarriage fit squarely within predictions from both modernization and assimilation theory, an unprecedented decline in Hispanic intermarriage between the mid-1990s and 2000s has sparked renewed interest among scholars of interracial/interethnic marriage in the link between preferences and opportunity (e.g., Lichter et al. 2011; Qian & Lichter 2007, 2011). The leading explanation for Hispanics’ recent “retreat from intermarriage” is that the large growth in the Hispanic immigrant population has increased opportunities for endogamy and may have also reinforced a shared cultural identity (Qian & Lichter 2007, 2011). The complement to these findings is that, while Hispanics in the United States have become increasingly endogamous, immigration out of Mexico appears to have created a marriage market squeeze in which women living in areas of Mexico with high levels of migration are more likely to “marry down” in education than are those living in areas with low migration (Choi & Mare 2012). Broadly speaking, the variability of changes in intermarriage by race/ethnic group supports more nuanced theories of assimilation that are less unidirectional than classical assimilation theory and follow multiple paths (e.g., Alba & Nee 2003, Portes & Zhou 1993, Qian & Lichter 2007). Economic Inequality The economic inequality hypothesis represents an alternative to straight-line theories of modernization and assimilation. It posits that the economic and social distance between groups is greater in times of high inequality, thereby reducing intermarriage. This hypothesis is quite general and can be applied to inequality across many social groups, but it is most often applied to economic inequality by education (known as the returns to schooling) and to general levels of income inequality across individuals or families (e.g., as measured by the Gini coeffi- cient, Theil index, or coefficient of variation). The mechanism linking inequality to assortative mating is straightforward: When economic inequality across groups increases, people have more to lose if they “marry down” (Fernandez ´ et al. 2005). The inequality hypothesis is not new (Blau 1977, Rytina et al. 1988, Smits et al. 1998), but has received increased attention as a result of several promising cross-national studies that have found higher odds of educational homogamy in countries with greater income inequality and returns to schooling (Dahan & Gaviria 2001, Fernandez et al. 2005, Torche ´ 2010). Studies of trends within countries support these findings: Educational homogamy tends to move in tandem with the returns to schooling (Han 2010, Heaton & Mitchell 2012). Related studies find that higher levels of male income inequality are associated with delayed marriage among women (Gould & Paserman 2003, Loughran 2002), potentially because whom one marries matters more in high inequality regimes than in low ones. Whereas the inequality hypothesis is often framed as a shift in preferences stemming from change in the cost of “marrying down,” increases in income inequality are also associated with increased residential segregation (Reardon & Bischoff 2011) and thus may reduce the opportunities for intermarriage. One way to make progress toward identifying why inequality and assortative mating are related would be to investigate the links between inequality, www.annualreviews.org • Trends and Variation in Assortative Mating 455 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2013.39:451-470. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

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